Spitsyn Sergei 6th company. "Step into Immortality"

Became the "center" of attention of all news channels. Murder, investigation, funeral march. Of course, he is sorry, like any person ... But the dead are either good or nothing. Therefore, there is nothing to add to the word "sorry".

But the fact that on February 29, 2000, a company of paratroopers took the battle with many times superior forces of militants, the country found out only on March 5, 2000. For three days, 90 guys held back, according to various sources, from 2.5 to 3 thousand militants who were breaking through the Argun Gorge from the territory of Chechnya.

And how many people remembered on March 1, 2015 that 15 years ago, on February 29 - March 1, almost the entire 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th airborne regiment of the 76th Guards Pskov Airborne Division died in an unequal battle?

About 21 thousand people came to the funeral march in memory of Nemtsov, about 200 people came to the peaceful action in memory of the Pskov paratroopers in the capital. Yes, perhaps in 15 years no one will remember about Nemtsov, but this is not the main thing ...

It is important whether the people remember those who, without sparing their lives, protect the peace and peace of our cities, even at the cost of their lives.

On February 29, troops of the federal group liberated the last settlement in Chechnya from militants. General Troshev (at that time the deputy commander of the OGV in the North Caucasus) brought the Russian flag to the city of Shatoy in order to symbolically hoist it over the city. At the same time, Troshev, in his interview, stated that large organized gangs no longer exist, and the remnants of the militants "scatter in small groups in order to save their own skin." On the same day, Minister of Defense I.D. Sergeev reported to and. about. President Vladimir Putin on the successful completion of the 3rd stage of the counter-terrorist operation. And just a few hours later, the battle began at a height of 776.0.

On March 3, 2000, Russian generals Viktor Kazantsev, Gennady Troshev, Vladimir Shamanov, as well as the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces Anatoly Kvashnin became honorary citizens of Makhachkala. The decree was signed by the head of the Makhachkala administration, Said Amirov.
Honorary citizenship was awarded to the generals for their contribution to the defeat of the bandit formations that attacked Dagestan in August-September last year. As it became known, in addition to special addresses, Kazantsev, Shamanov, Troshev and Kvashnin will be given personalized - Kubachi sabers.

And at the same time, there is not a word about the dead paratroopers in the media. To avoid dissonance?

From the memoirs of Andrey Velichenko (as part of a group of paratroopers of the 104th regiment, he marched and crossed the Abuzalgol River, but due to heavy enemy fire they could not break through to help the soldiers of the 6th company):

The picture was very creepy. Almost the entire personnel of the 6th parachute company was located on a plot of land, somewhere 200 by 200.

Showing incredible courage, 90 paratroopers fought off attacks by more than 2.5 thousand militants. According to various sources, from 370 to 700 militants were killed. 84 paratroopers were killed, six were lucky - they survived.

In 2006, director Vitaly Lukin made the feature film Breakthrough, based on the last battle of the heroic 6th company of the 104th Guards Regiment. The script was written by Ivan Loshchilin and Vyacheslav Davydov. Starring Igor Lifanov, Marina Mogilevskaya, Anatoly Kotenev and other domestic actors. True, the film turned out to be controversial both from the director's point of view and from the side of historical accuracy.

On March 12, 2000, presidential decree No. 484 appeared on awarding the title of Hero of Russia to 22 paratroopers who died, the rest of the victims were awarded the Order of Courage.

Three years later, the case of the death of 84 paratroopers was closed by Deputy Prosecutor General Sergei Fridinsky. The materials of the investigation have not yet been made public. For ten years, the picture of the tragedy has been collected bit by bit by relatives and colleagues of the victims.

In July 2003, an open appeal was published by a regional public organization of the families of fallen servicemen to President Vladimir Putin. In it, relatives asked a number of questions to acting. Commander of the United Forces, General Gennady Troshev, Chief of the General Staff, General A.V. Kvashnin, and to the command of the Airborne Forces.

1. Why was the exit of the company delayed by the command for a day?
2. Why couldn't the company's property be dropped by helicopter?
3. Why did the company move into an ambush prepared in advance for it?
4. Why didn't long-range artillery support the company?
5. Why was the company commander not warned about the presence of the main enemy forces on the route? How did the information about the movement of the company become known to the militants?
6. Why did the regiment commander demand to hold on and promise help, although the company could be withdrawn at any moment, and the company sent to help went along the most inconvenient route?
7. Why did the military leave the battlefield to the militants for three days, allowing them to bury their dead and gather the wounded?
8. Why did the information of the Pskov journalists, published five days later, take the generals by surprise?

Partially, these questions were answered by Gennady Troshev in his book “My War. Chechen diary of a trench general. In particular, Troshev points out that the paratroopers were nevertheless provided with fire support. Regimental 120-mm guns 2S9 "worked" at a height of 776 almost continuously from noon on February 29 until the morning of March 1 (when Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin called fire on himself), firing about 1200 shells during this time. Moreover, according to the author, most of the losses of militants in this battle were caused precisely by shelling. Troshev also mentions the impossibility of transferring the personnel of the company by air, since during the reconnaissance of the area carried out in advance, not a single suitable site could be found.

What a pity that someone has to become a hero in order to "compensate" for the incompetence or venality of others!

After the fall of the city of Grozny, which was stormed from late December 1999 to February 6, 2000, a large group of Chechen fighters and Arab mercenaries representing the armed forces of the free Republic of Ichkeria settled in the Shatoi region of Chechnya. Federal forces blocked the militants in the area, inflicting airstrikes and artillery strikes, while simultaneously squeezing the encirclement. During the week from February 22 to 29, fierce battles took place for Shata - the last fortified area of ​​​​the forces of the Republic of Ichkeria. Using the mountainous - wooded area, a significant part of the militants under the leadership of field commanders Khattab and Ruslan Gelaev, breaking into a number of small groups, left the blocking area.

At noon on February 29, 2000, the fighting in Shatoi itself ended. The President was informed by the army command about the completion of the third phase of the operation to eliminate illegal armed groups. However, intelligence received in the last days of February showed that several large detachments of militants under the command of Khattab would break out of the Argun Gorge in the direction of the Republic of Dagestan. The exact place of the breakthrough was unknown, therefore, barriers were urgently set up on the possible directions of the militants' exit from the Argun "bag", including by the forces and means of the 6th company of the 104th parachute regiment of the 76th (Pskov) airborne division.

On February 28, 2000, the 6th PDR received an order from the commander of the 104th infantry regiment, Colonel Melentyev, to advance and occupy the Ista-Kord height. Having occupied height 776, the company commander, Major Molodov, sent a reconnaissance patrol of 12 people in the direction of the Ista-Kord height (located 4.5 km from height 776).

At 12.30 on February 29, the scouts come into combat contact with the vanguard of the militants and, having accepted the battle, retreat to the main forces of the 6th company. At 4:00 pm on February 29, the 6th company begins the battle for Hill 776.

Separately, it must be said about the moment of promotion of the 6th company to the height. The soldiers of the company began their combat exit after a long march, i.e. without rest. The paratroopers carried all the equipment, body armor, weapons, full ammunition. Landing from helicopters was impossible, since air reconnaissance did not find "windows" in a continuous beech forest. The forces of the paratroopers were running out. Before the battle, the 6th company did not even have time to properly dig in. The company stronghold has just begun to be equipped.

"The paratroopers set off still dark. They had to make a fifteen-kilometer forced march in a few hours to a given square, where they were to set up a new base camp. They walked with full combat gear. They were armed only with small arms and grenade launchers. A prefix for a radio station, providing covert radio exchange, they left at the base. They were carrying water, food, tents and potbelly stoves. According to the calculations of Vladimir Vorobyov, the unit stretched for 5-6 kilometers, passing no more than a kilometer per hour. Note that the paratroopers went to a height immediately after a difficult throw along the Dombay-Arzy route, i.e. without proper rest.

At this time, the militants approached Hill 776 in two columns, where they were met by Vorobyov's reconnaissance. After the field commanders approached Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin (commander of the 2nd infantry brigade 104 infantry division, insured Molodov) by radio with an offer to let their detachments through for money, but were refused, shelling from mortars and grenade launchers of the positions of the 6th company began. Then the militants launched an assault on the heights. At this time, the commander of the 6th PDR, Major Molodov, dies from a sniper's bullet. The command of the company takes p / n - to Evtyukhin.

At the beginning of the battle and some time later, the command of the 6th company assumed that a small number of militants were attacking them, since they did not have accurate information about the enemy. They did not request help in a timely manner, the militants managed to organize a solid defense, which is why the groups that went to the aid of the 6th company could not get to their comrades. But artillery fired about 1200 shells into the battle area for the entire duration of the battle. We also note that the battle was fought by two platoons of the 6th company, since the third platoon of the company, stretching for 3 kilometers along the slope, was literally shot by militants. By the end of the day on February 29, the company lost 31 people out of 90 dead.

... "From three to five in the morning on March 1, there was a "respite". There were no attacks, but mortars and snipers did not stop shelling. Battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin reported to the regiment commander, Colonel Sergei Melentyev, the situation. He ordered to hold on, wait for help. After a few hours of battle it became obvious that the 6th company simply did not have enough ammunition to hold back the continuous attacks of the militants. The battalion commander, by radio, asked for help from his deputy major Alexander Dostovalov, who was one and a half kilometers from the dying company. There were fifteen fighters with him. "

Moreover, Dostovalov left contrary to the order of the command. His group helped hold the altitude for another two hours. "The soldiers of the 1st company of the 1st battalion sought to help their comrades. However, during the crossing of the Abazulgol River, they were ambushed and were forced to gain a foothold on the shore. Only on the morning of March 3 did the 1st company manage to break through to the positions of the 6th company ."

“On the night of March 1, at a height of 776, hand-to-hand combat took place, which took on a focal character. The snow at the height was mixed with blood. The paratroopers fought off the last attack with several machine guns. And then he turned to Captain Viktor Romanov, who, bleeding, with the stumps of his legs tied with tourniquets, was lying next to the company command post.

Come on, call the fire on yourself!

Already losing consciousness, Romanov handed over the coordinates to the battery. At 6:10 a.m., communication with Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin was cut off. The battalion commander fired back to the last bullet and was hit by a sniper's bullet in the head.

The militants carried out the last assault on the height, having already been pretty pumped up with drugs, according to the testimony of the survivors, they went to their full height in "waves", with an interval of half an hour. Despite the heroic resistance of the 6th company, the militants took the height. When on March 3 the 1st company of the 104th infantry regiment reached the height of 776, all the dead paratroopers were found to have lumbago of the skull, characteristic of the so-called. "control shot". Some of the bodies of the paratroopers were simply chopped up by the militants, who were venting their rage.

It is still not completely clear how it happened that a company of paratroopers died without receiving help in time. There are several versions in this direction: the company was betrayed; help was not called in a timely manner; command errors, which led to a tragic denouement.

About the losses of militants.

A number of Intert's electronic resources posted the number of militants who broke through - 70 people. It was they who, having lost 20 people killed, destroyed the 6th company. I think that such a statement does not need comments, as it is obviously false, as a result of which it will not be considered.

The most optimal estimate is 350 - 600 people only killed, not counting the wounded. This is the assessment of the Russian side. Why is it optimal? Because 1200 shells in height plus the shot ammunition of the 6th company. Add the testimony of the militants. Captives.

I do not presume to judge the details of that battle, since there are many obscure and not entirely clear in the stories and investigations. For example, why did the hero of Russia Suponinsky after the battle have a completely clean machine gun and not a single cartridge was shot from the ammunition load?

Why did Russian counterintelligence work with these guys (who survived)?

Why did those officers who made their way to the heights after the battle did not believe Suponinsky, and then openly offered him to remove the star of the hero of Russia, as undeserved? And why like this...

This is the official, generally accepted version of the documentary character, outlining the death of the 6th company of the 76th Airborne Division. What are the reasons for this event?

This tragedy was investigated by everyone who could. Documents and radio communications on this case are still classified, and the case itself is allegedly suspended and archived. On this basis, a variety of versions are built about the causes of the tragedy of the 6th company.

Their main motive is the betrayal of Moscow politicians and/or the Russian military command. However, I would like to draw attention to a number of factors that, without any betrayal, doomed the 6th company in advance to the final that took place in harsh reality.

Weighty arguments, having conducted a detailed study of the battle at Hill 776, were provided by the command of the US Armed Forces. Having analyzed the past battle of the 6th company, they made only three conclusions, but significant ones:

The company did not put up a vanguard and flank patrols;

Reconnaissance measures of a tactical nature have not been carried out in full;

Lack of interaction with our units surrounding the company.

Americans can object, for example:

It is impossible to set up flank patrols on a mountain path;

A platoon shot on the march (which carried stoves, tents, etc.) theoretically went

For the rear patrol, and Vorobyov's scouts for the vanguard;

That Mark Yevtyukhin had to take stoves and tents, because he did not want to receive a reprimand from the command (previously received by the 5th company, if I'm not mistaken);

There was no time for preliminary reconnaissance of the area;

The regimental tactical group consisted of only 760 people for almost 30 km of the Argun Gorge, so the 6th company was immediately thrown from one march to another. Those. there were no people, etc.

But such justifications form the reasons for the defeat of units in any operation.

Here we see that not only the high command miscalculated, but mistakes were also made by the commanders of the tactical level, i.e. those who will directly come into fire contact with the enemy.

Therefore, it is necessary to stop the ritual howl about "abandoned and betrayed", since this only hinders understanding what happened at the height of 776.

The fact that people periodically appear who have documents of radio intercepts and copies of archival documents confirming the version of betrayal does not mean anything.

In this case, go to Desantura. Ru and provide these materials. They are very much awaited by paratroopers, intelligence officers, military analysts and, in general, fighters, one way or another involved in those events. Otherwise, it turns out like in a bad fairy tale: the farther from that battle, the more living witnesses to this event.

I will try to illustrate my point of view with a simple example - the battle of the Maikop brigade and the 81st motorized rifle regiment in the so-called. "New Year's assault" on Grozny 1994 - 1995. What was it? Self-confidence of the Russian command or a "gift" to local separatists to test the strength of their own formations? What, they also didn’t know that Dudayev once commanded an ADD division? What created four combat-ready divisions in their own Chechnya? They knew. But the guys were thrown to capture the city, ignoring all the data of undercover and military intelligence. They counted on surprise, on the fact that the separatists would not dare to strike at Russian troops using heavy armored vehicles, etc. Draw your own conclusions.

But the most terrible thing in the prelude to the tragedy of the 6th company is that already on October 3, 1993, US special forces fell into a brutal meat grinder in Mogadishu (Somalia). A question to fill in for those who are in the subject: were the American guys also betrayed? Could our commanders analyze this event and apply it to Chechnya? Of course. Did something interfere?

And everything would be fine, but the United States and Russia (represented by the USSR) successfully carried out such operations in Europe during the Second World War. When assault groups were created in cities with the participation of armor, artillery, chemists, sappers, infantry, snipers, and urban battles did not turn into beating columns on the streets and destroying equipment without infantry cover. When the intersections of streets and buildings were occupied by infantry, creating roadblocks, mining possible approaches, creating "corridors" for the approach of reserves and the supply of ammunition. The wounded, the dead and damaged equipment were taken back. This tactic will be used by 276 SMEs in Grozny in the same 1995.

It turns out that the lesson did not go for the future?

Similar (about the fact that they were betrayed) could well be said by our grandfathers, who went through the "cauldrons" of 1941 - 1942, (of those who survived) when the armies died, not just companies. But, of course, no one abandoned or betrayed them.

Let's consider the most frequently asked questions.

1. The most running - why was the 6th company one on one with more than 2 thousand militants?

In reality, not 2 thousand militants participated in the battle, but about 700 - 900 people (there are suggestions that the entire number of several groups of militants was about 120 - 200 people, changing after the ammunition was used up) out of 2000 - 2500 bayonets. The number of 2,000 is created from the sum of the battle groups themselves plus the extensive rear, consisting of a large number of ungulates and their escorts. Count for yourself: a large amount of ammunition for RPGs and mortars, MANPADS and small arms, the mortars themselves and medicines, food for people and animals, personal belongings and tents, entrenching tools, etc. Can you imagine how much horse-drawn transport is needed for this? And this whole horde goes along mountain paths, stretching for several kilometers. And not just one path at a time.

In addition, the militants' mortar crews also did not directly accept the battle with the use of small arms.

Of course, the militants fought in groups that changed. And not all at once.

2. Why didn't Russian units come to the aid of the 6th company?

To answer clearly, it is necessary to state the features of the war in the mountains. It is possible to go anywhere in the mountainous territories only along a limited number of roads and paths known to the warring parties. But there are some trails that only the locals know. But the paths do not always go in such a way as to reach the neighboring peak quickly, even if it was a couple of kilometers before it. This partly explains the fact that several groups: in particular, the 1st company of the 1st battalion of the 104th infantry regiment could not quickly come to the aid of the 6th company. Heavy and light armored vehicles could not get into the height area due to the lack of roads.

Heavy artillery, located at a distance of a shot from its guns, was not involved due to the large dispersion of shells at long combat distances and, as a result, the destruction of its own troops by its own fire.

The regimental self-propelled artillery worked mainly: "SADN (two-battery composition: SABatr 104 pdp, SABatr 234 pdp, control platoon): 10 - 120-mm self-propelled artillery guns 2S9" Nona ""

Air support was also not provided to those who fought at Hill 776. They were not provided because the battle distances were minimal. The fight itself took place at night.

All of the above is typical only for height 776. If we look at what happened next to height 776, we will find interesting details.

Below are excerpts from documentary materials about the course of that battle.

Please read this text, do not be lazy.

"At 12.30 29.02, the reconnaissance patrol of the 6th reconnaissance patrol, 2 km south of Ulus-Kert, discovered a group of militants numbering up to 20 people. A battle ensued. By decision of the commander of the battalion, the 6th reconnaissance patrol began to withdraw to the area of ​​​​the dominant height from elevation 776.0 (5965), where control 2 was located Pdb and 3 pdv 4 pdp After the withdrawal of 6 pdv, together with 3 pdv 4 pdp, rg rr 104 pdp took up defense at heights 776.0 and 787.0.

The militants pulled up reinforcements and began to fire at the battalion units from several directions, the fire was fired from small arms and mortars. At 23.25, a massive attack of militants began in "waves", using riverbeds and open flanks.

Battle 2 pdb was supported by the artillery division of 104 pdp and army aviation helicopters. Attempts by the command of the operational group of the Airborne Forces, PTGr 104 of the Guards PDP to release the encircled grouping did not bring success due to the heavy fire of the bandit formations and the difficult conditions of the "mesopotamia".

From the side of the militants there were proposals to surrender. At this time, the artillery of the regiment and the main forces of the airborne forces group continued to fire on the militants.

At 03.00 01.03, taking advantage of the lull, 3 pdv 4 pdr under the leadership of deputy. commander of the 2nd infantry brigade major Dostavalov A.V. elev. 787.0 (5866) broke through to 6 PDR through the barrier of militants.

At 05.00 01.03, the militants, not paying attention to their losses, launched an attack from all directions and came close to the positions of 6 PDR. The battalion commander called the artillery fire on himself. At 6.10 01.03, communication with the commander of the 2nd infantry brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Evtyukhin M.N. broke off.

In the dynamics of the battle, with the beginning of the appearance of losses, the commander of the OG Airborne Forces was tasked with the commander of 104 airborne troops to maneuver 1 airborne infantry to the combat area to release 6 airborne infantry and prepare routes for the evacuation of the wounded and the dead.

1 PDR made an attempt to cross the Abazulgol River in a section 1 km south of the water's edge 520.0 (6066), but was ambushed and forced to gain a foothold on the shore under enemy mortar and machine-gun fire.

With the support of artillery, several more attempts were made to cross the river, but the intensity of enemy fire did not decrease. Only on the morning of March 2, the company was able to break into the battle area, despite the fact that during the entire firefight both the artillery of the regiment, and the artillery of the OG Airborne Forces, and the senior commander fired back, attacked army aviation helicopters.

On March 2, under enemy fire, a cover group from 1 pdb 104 pdp of 80 people and a group of evacuation of the wounded and the dead (4 pdr 104 pdp of 50 people) broke into the battle area under enemy fire.

The nature of the enemy's actions has not changed. The gangs continued to make attempts to break through in small and large groups through the battle formations of subunits and units of the Vedensky direction, while suffering significant losses.

According to radio interception, undercover intelligence (obtained at the end of the battle), eyewitness accounts, local residents, as well as militants who surrendered, the bandits lost up to 400 people during the battle, including the field commander Idris was killed, two gangs of field commanders Idris were defeated and Abu Walid.

Unfortunately, as a result of 4 days of heavy fighting, the paratroopers also suffered heavy losses. March 3 this year the bodies of 84 dead servicemen were evacuated from the combat area.

As can be seen from this material, to whom it was possible - both artillery support and air support were provided. Perhaps - in terms of the fact that it is clearly visible where they were their own, and where strangers were. The 6th company did not have an aircraft controller.

Therefore, all the talk about the fact that the 6th company was abandoned and it was not provided with assistance is a lie. Including those who rushed to the dying company under enemy fire on the battlefield.

3. Why was the company not dropped from helicopters?

At that time, the Russian army did not have landing halyards, shown, for example, in the movie Black Hawk Down. To this I will add that it is necessary to clean at least some site. For this, preliminary reconnaissance is necessary, but there is no time left.

4. Mistakes of tactical commanders. Were they allowed?

Yes, they were allowed. There are several of them:

“And secondly, this time the main thing: no preliminary reconnaissance was carried out. Thus, the company went into the unknown. Nevertheless, an order is an order, and together with the unit, the commander of the first battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin, is sent to the height. Sergei Molodov was recently transferred to part, he does not yet know all the soldiers, relations with subordinates are just being established.Therefore, the battalion commander decides to go along with him in order to help in case of a difficult situation.

At the same time, Yevtyukhin is convinced that by the evening of the 28th he will return to the location of the battalion, and even orders his foreman to cook dinner. However, the march was not easy. The fighters loaded with weapons and ammunition carried tents, heavy potbelly stoves in short, everything necessary for a large camp. According to Vladimir Nikolaevich, this was their third mistake.

The march had to be carried out lightly and not to take too much with you, my interlocutor explains. If they went to a height, entrenched themselves so that no one could smoke them out of there, only then it would be possible to send for tents.

Here we can talk about the fourth serious miscalculation. Leaving the location of the first battalion, the company was greatly stretched. The march in the mountains, along a narrow path, turned out to be much more difficult than the battalion commander thought. Nevertheless, Mark Evtyukhin informs Melentiev that they have already LEFT 776.0 in order to continue moving to Ista-Kord. In fact, they will go to it almost all night, and the first to be there will be scouts led by senior lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov.

This is an excerpt from the investigation, if my memory serves me, the father of Vorobyov, who died in that battle (reconnaissance platoon commander)

A small afterword.

I did not post maps of the battles that took place in the vicinity of height 776 and Ista-Kord until the moment when the 6th company appeared there.

Before the battle with the 6th company, the militant detachments, trapped in Ulus-Kert, twice tried to escape from the Argun Gorge towards Selmentauzen, but both attempts were unsuccessful. The strongholds, created in advance, repelled the attacks of the Wahhabis with the support of artillery, which also pre-shot the area in front of the strongholds.

The militants had one opportunity left - to transport large masses of troops and livestock through Ista - Kord (they were under a lot of time).

That's where the 6th company was urgently sent (without rest). But it's too late...

They say that Evtyukhin shouted into the radio not “I’m calling fire on myself” but “Bitches, YOU BETRAYED US!” Artillery only hid the traces of betrayal. And, allegedly, therefore, radio interception is classified. Then answer one simple question: why did you have to throw a company for slaughter? To publicize the case of militants paying for the passage?

But this is obviously stupid. It's easier to let them out of the "bag" quietly. The generals will receive a scolding, they will be labeled by the people like "they don't know how to fight" and everyone will remain with their problems. Of course, there may be a variant that Moscow decided to get rid of such compromising "partners" as field Chechen commanders. But this, again, is just fortune-telling on the coffee grounds.

The version that the army command did not know about the machinations of politicians in the Kremlin and continued to carry out the operation to block the Argun Gorge looks more convincing.

General Shamanov was tormented by conscience, because. he assumed that the 6th company could be helped more effectively than it turned out in reality. On his words, a hypothesis is built about the betrayal of the 6th company. Built by individual Russian intelligence officers.

Strange...and no comment.

Put yourself in the place of General Shamanov. Happened? Now tell the parents of the dead paratroopers a convincing reason why you, Comrade General, did not save their sons? Creepy, right? This is where the remorse comes from. And besides the parents of the dead, Shamanov was waiting for a scolding from the higher command, a resonance of public opinion, etc.

At the same time, there was a fair amount of chaos and inconsistency in the headquarters of the groups of Russian troops that held the militants in Ulus-Kert. As you can see, without betrayal, we have enough problems with what happened at height 776.

Once upon a time I In short, it was necessary to block a certain height (gorge) in the second Chechen one. A company of paratroopers was sent there, who stumbled upon the militants and after many hours of fighting, they all died.

And then recently I came across a slightly different version of the development of events: the 6th company: the story of a tragedy (copied text under the cut)

The truth is, however strange it is in the middle, or rather everywhere - the crap command was at all levels. Well, the soldiers distinguished themselves.

The official version describes the start of the battle at 12.30, when the scouts collided at the foot of Mount Istykort with a small detachment of the enemy.

The beginning of the battle happened a little earlier than it should be considered - around 10.30. Then the forward detachments of spirits came out to the blocks of the 3rd company of Captain Vasiliev (marks 666.0 and 574.9.). Vasiliev had everything ready for the "meeting" - full-profile trenches, minefields, a lined-up fire system and artillery binding in the area.
The spirits went out to Vasiliev on the radio and called him by name (!) Offered money for unhindered passage. However, they were refused. Following this, the assault began. Proofreader Art. Lieutenant Zolotov called in artillery fire. During a short clash, the militants retreated after suffering losses.
Then, again going out to Vasiliev, they offered to disperse for good, otherwise the units allegedly "waited for death." Vasiliev again refused. Even 2 snipers of the 3rd company, originally from Dagestan, took part in the "conversation", who told the militants that "Russians do not surrender!"
The militants never went on the attack again. In front of the positions of the blocks, the soldiers of the 3rd company found the bodies of 4 dead militants.

Around the same time, at 12.30, at the foot of Mount Istykort, a reconnaissance patrol under the command of Vorobyov, at the edge of the forest, discovers several militants. According to some reports, the militants were sitting at a halt by the fire.

I wonder what will happen in 2 years.

Shortly before the re-election of Vladimir Putin in Russia, the 12th anniversary of the military tragedy in the Argun Gorge, where Chechen fighters killed the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the Pskov airborne division, passed little noticed. The senseless death of soldiers was renamed into a feat and the topic was closed on this.

Until now, in our country there is no serious study on this tragedy, which would be publicly open. Therefore, information, often contradictory, has to be collected from open sources, the media, statements by officials, as well as blogs of enthusiasts who have tried to bring together the entire array of confirmed and unconfirmed information about the battle at height 776 at the Ulus-Kert-Selmentauzen line in the Argun Gorge on February 29 - March 1, 2000.

Then, at the end of February, the federal troops were completing the operation to capture the city of Shatoy, and all attention was focused on this theater of operations. By the end of February, the defeat of the militants near Shatoi became obvious, their detachments began to leave the outskirts of the city. Part of the militants, led by Ruslan Gelaev, left in a northwestern direction and reached the village of Komsomolskoye, where in March they fought fierce battles with federal Russian troops, and several detachments, presumably under the command of Khattab, left in the direction of Vedeno to the east and southeast. Their path just ran through the line Ulus-Kert - Selmentauzen.

In order to prevent the militants from leaving for the Vedeno region, the Russian military command is transferring a grouping there from the forces of the 76th Pskov airborne and 7th airborne divisions. The command post of the first was stationed in the village of Makhety. The soldiers of the Pskov division were supposed to hold the Selmentauzen - Makhkety - Tevzana (Kirov-Yurt) line, blocking the area east of the Abazulgol River, to prevent the militants from breaking through to the east (the direction of Khatuni-Agishty-Vedeno). Logically, militants from Ulus-Kert could break through here.

From the south and south-west, units of the 1st airborne battalion of the Pskov division, whose command post was placed on Mount Dembairzy (west of Makheta), were supposed to support units of the 7th airborne division of the Novorossiysk division. They blocked the interfluve of the Sharoargun and Abazulgol and blocked the militants from passing through the Sharoargun gorge and the Dargenduk ridge. On this ridge, company strongholds were to be equipped, and part of the soldiers were to take positions east of Ulus-Kert on the heights by February 27. However, the helicopter assault landing on Dargenduk on February 24 turned out to be unsuccessful - due to frost and snowstorms, several dozen soldiers received frostbite, and two fighters even froze to death. As a result, by February 28, the units of the 7th division failed to complete the task.

Here we must make a digression. Immediately after the tragedy of the 6th company, allegations appeared in the Russian media that up to 2.5 thousand militants took part in the battle for height 776, and up to 500-600 died. It is not clear what these data are based on, according to the information of the separatists themselves, there were supposedly only 70 of them, which suggests an underestimation of the number. According to enthusiastic researchers, the maximum number of militants was about 400-600 people, but not all of them took part in the battle.

Meanwhile, the command of the Pskov division and the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment did not have operational information and could not even imagine how many militants would resist them. Special reconnaissance units were generally transferred to the zone of operations of the 7th division. The group of Russian troops in Chechnya had, to put it mildly, few means of aerial or space reconnaissance, and the information received from them hung in the headquarters for a long time. Therefore, the 1st battalion of the Pskov division, which began on February 24 to create company posts on the heights between Selmentauzen and Ulus-Kert, acted almost blindly. We also recall that at that time a command circular was in force, prohibiting reconnaissance operations by companies and battalions outside the range of artillery. The ill-fated height 776 was located at a distance of more than 8.5 kilometers from the artillery positions of the 76th division - just at the limit of the range of the Nona installations.

On February 26, two platoons of the 3rd company of the 1st battalion created a stronghold on the left bank of the Abazulgol. The soldiers dug trenches, and also set up minefields and established contact with divisional artillery.

Then the strangeness begins. On February 26, the command ordered the 76th division to block Ulus-Kert from the east, and initially for these purposes, including the occupation of heights 776 and Ista-Kort, the companies of the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment were intended, as the most prepared. In particular, the 1st company of the 1st battalion, reinforced by platoons of the 2nd company, fire support platoons and scouts, was to occupy Hill 776 (and a few more nearby). On the morning of February 27, the plan changes: these units are transferred north of Selmentauzen, and the task of occupying height 776 falls on the 2nd battalion of the 104th regiment, commanded by Major Mark Evtyukhin.

Evtyukhin decided to use the most trained unit of the battalion for this task - the 4th company with added reinforcement (sapper squad, machine gun crew, reconnaissance platoon) and a platoon of the 6th company. The soldiers of these units served at checkpoints in the Vedeno district and had to get to the battalion command post in their armored vehicles and vehicles, from where they would go on foot to occupy the indicated positions. On February 27, it suddenly turned out that out of 10 cars of the 4th company, only three started up! As a result, the battalion commander had to change the plan on the move and make a decision to advance to the height of 776 and the surrounding positions of the 6th company, which was given one platoon from the 4th company.

It is noteworthy that the 6th company was also located at a distance from the gorge of the Abazulgol River - its soldiers served at checkpoints near the village of Elistanzhi near Vedeno. On February 28, in the morning, the company arrived at the regimental command post near Makheta, and then the entire group under the command of Mark Evtyukhin and Major Dostavalov, who, by the way, developed the route of movement, set out on foot on a mission. The first important point was the command observation post of the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment on Mount Dembairzy. Here, oddities also did not leave the detachment - one of the two aircraft controllers did not have time to join it.

Stretching for more than a kilometer, the column of paratroopers went along muddy mountain roads. The layout for each fighter reached up to 40-50 kilograms - in addition to weapons and ammunition, they had to carry food, tents and potbelly stoves. The speed of movement of the unit was less than 1 kilometer per hour. Therefore, the soldiers of the 6th company finally reached the command post of the 1st battalion of the 104th regiment only by 19:30 on February 28.

According to Yevtyukhin's plan, his unit, first, under the cover of company posts of the 1st battalion on the right bank of the Abazulgol River, crosses it and occupies Hill 776, and with one platoon is fixed on the neighboring Hill 787.

On the morning of February 29, the 6th company resumed its march along the mountain paths. Loaded soldiers of platoons after crossing the river stretched for more than a kilometer. At the same time, the scouts walking in the head of the column reached height 776 already at 10 o'clock in the morning, waited for the arrival of the 3rd platoon of the 4th company following them and left for height 787, where this platoon was supposed to go. Behind them, exhausted soldiers of the 1st, 2nd platoons of the 6th company, a control platoon and machine gunners gradually crawled up to the height. The 3rd platoon of the 6th company, we note specifically, never reached the height - when the battle with the militants began (about 16 hours for height 776), it was destroyed on the slope of the height. According to another version, the battle began already in the evening, when the fighters at the height managed to eat and some even fell asleep, and the soldiers of the 3rd platoon were just climbing it.

In the meantime, the scouts advanced even further to the height of Ista-Kord, where they stumbled upon the militants and fought back to height 776. And then the company, which did not really gain a foothold on the height, was forced to immediately join the battle. The company did not receive support from attack helicopters (due to the death of the only aircraft controller), the artillery shelling was not accurate. As a result, by the morning of March 1, the entire company was destroyed, and the attempts of the soldiers of the 1st company of the 1st battalion to break through to her aid were unsuccessful. According to one of the alternative versions, the remnants of the soldiers of the 6th company died due to the artillery strike of their own artillery.

Whatever it was, there are several versions about this battle and its outcome. The result, however, is the same - the company was destroyed, 84 people died, only six servicemen survived. Only on March 3 did Russian troops manage to break through to the ill-fated height. But Russian propagandists managed to immediately make a feat according to Soviet patterns out of the tragedy: already on March 4, information appeared in the press about 2.5 and even 3 thousand militants, stabbed and storming the heights in close ranks, and also that the Chechens lost up to 350-500 human.

If you believe the Russian media, the Chechens managed to either bury all their numerous fallen or take them away with them, while managing to simultaneously fight with the paratroopers from the 1st battalion, breaking through to height 776. According to other sources, as many as 400 corpses of militants. True, no photo or video with so many destroyed Chechen separatists has ever been seen.

In general, such a version - about the feat of the 6th company, which detained a gigantic detachment of militants and died heroically, completely suited the then Russian authorities. The heroes were honored, a memorial was built, and the question of the quality of command in the Russian army was hidden behind the shadow of a soldier's feat. Moreover, in 2000, there was an election campaign to appoint Vladimir Putin as the second resident of Russia, and at the end of February, the generals reported after the capture of Shatoi about the end of the war in Chechnya.

Battle scheme

However, there are still some questions and we will present some.

1. Why was no aerial reconnaissance of the vicinity of the Ista-Kort and 776 heights carried out before the advancement of the 6th company? A detachment of 2.5-3 thousand militants is very difficult not to notice even in the mountains (assuming, of course, that there were just so many of them).

2. Why the paratroopers were not supported by aviation and attack helicopters (some sources claim that there was thick fog, another that it was sunny, and still others that the air strike was canceled due to the death of the air controller, and fourth that they were afraid to hit their own, however at the same time, according to Gennady Troshev, allegedly 1200 artillery shells were poured onto the height).

There are a lot of such questions (up to the point where there are numerous shell craters and hundreds of militant corpses), but it is already impossible to answer them - all the officers of the 6th company died. In all likelihood, the main reason for the death of the company was the bad and weak management of the command, the lack of intelligence, its general unpreparedness for battle.

Photos and maps, as well as a number of information, will be gleaned from the blog of enthusiasts exploring the history of the last battle of the 6th company.

A year ago, I wrote about this unprecedented battle (Your Son and Brother, Izvestia, No. 138). Our command released 2,500 Chechen fighters from Shatoi - they parted, opened the way to the Argun Gorge. But the paratroopers of the 6th company of the 104th regiment did not know about this, the regiment commander who knew nothing gave them the task to occupy four heights. They walked quietly until they ran into militants at a height of 776.

The company fought, holding the height, for 20 hours. Two battalions of "White Angels" - Khattab and Basayev, more than 600 people, pulled up to the militants.

2500 vs 90.

Who pulled up to ours?

Nearby there were two companies (one - scouts), about 130 people, but the Chechens put up external guards, ours did not accept the battle, they left. Helicopters flew in, for some reason without an aircraft controller, circled, fired a volley blindly and flew away (now they found another reason: it began to get dark). Front-line aviation was not involved (later they referred to bad weather - a lie). Regimental artillery worked poorly, the shells barely reached.

The company was driven without preliminary air and ground reconnaissance.

There were many criminal oddities. The people of Pskov, military and civilian, specialists and ordinary people, are sure that the militants have bought a retreat corridor from our military leaders. (They also named the amount - half a million dollars.) But at the regimental level they did not know this.

Of the 90 paratroopers of the company, 84 were killed.

The switchman was punished: the commander of the regiment, Melentiev, was transferred to Ulyanovsk as the chief of staff of the brigade. The commander of the eastern group, General Makarov, remained on the sidelines (Melentyev asked him six times to give the company the opportunity to retreat, not to destroy the guys) and another general, Lentsov, who led the task force of the Airborne Forces.

After the publication, I thought that the offended military leaders would sue Izvestia. Didn't submit. And there was no answer to the editorial office, the General Staff and other departments kept silent.

The silence of the generals is like a conspiracy against everyone. They are silent, thereby creating the conditions for future disasters.

"Rota was framed"

I wrote about the possible perfidy of military officials and the heroism of the 6th company. Now I will talk about miscalculations at the company level. What for? At least to avoid new victims. Unless, of course, the military leaders hide again and draw public conclusions.

In January 2000, the 6th company as part of the 104th regiment left to replace the paratroopers of Colonel Isokhonyan. The mood was carefree and upbeat, inspired by the example of their predecessors: near Argun, the Gelaev gang was ruffled, more than 30 people were laid down, and only two combat losses.

Lieutenant Colonel A.

The company was a team, formed before leaving. Due to the lack of junior officers, people from all over the division were crammed in, and they recruited from the 34th regiment, and from their 104th, but from other companies. Company commander Eremin was in Chechnya at the time. The paratroopers were trained by Roman Sokolov. But in the end, a third was appointed company commander - Molodov, he was a stranger - from special forces, no combat experience - he commanded a company of young soldiers. He was the first to die in this battle from a sniper bullet. The commander - and the first one set himself up. Battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin, who led the company to the heights, was in Chechnya for only a month - on a business trip. No combat experience - neither he nor the commander of the regiment Melentiev. They did it at the training ground, of course. But how... I guess they weren't ready to fight.

The events in Chechnya are already a consequence. Error upon error. Evtyukhin reported one thing, but the reality was something else. They climbed to the height very slowly, stretched for three kilometers. As a result, two platoons rose, and the third did not have time, the militants shot on the rise. Fatal mistake - did not dig in. The battalion commander sent reconnaissance to the neighboring height of Ista-Kord, gave the command to the business executives to cook dinner, but did not give the order to dig in.

If you dug in, fought back?

Yes. In the mountains it is necessary to secure every small line - to open trenches, to organize a system of fire. There was enough ammunition. Then only artillery or aviation could take them. The enemy had neither one nor the other.

On a nearby hill, Evtyukhin's deputy, Major Alexander Dostavalov, dug in together with the 4th company. The militants poked their heads in, but, meeting a rebuff, left. There were 15 people in the company.

When the battalion commander Yevtyukhin realized that things were really bad, he contacted Dostavalov: "Help." Dostavalov and Evtyukhin were friends, in Pskov they lived side by side, in the same hostel. And the 6th company was dear to him, he had previously commanded it for several years. But he had an order from the command: do not leave your height.

Still, is it true, - I asked the lieutenant colonel, - that the road was sold, and the 6th company was set up - for credibility, to cover up the traces?

The company was framed. There was betrayal. 2500 people cannot be overlooked. At this time, there is still no greenery.

And you don't have to notice. They knew about the militants, it is possible that they were being led. It seems to be true that, moving at night, they gave a sign with flashlights and ours did not shoot without having an order. So it was or otherwise - it does not matter.

Dostavalovs

Vasily Vasilyevich Dostavalov, father:

My son was born in 1963 in Ufa, I served there. I immediately called him Alexander. To be Alexander Vasilyevich, like Suvorov. I was transferred to Kuibyshev, to Odessa, to Sevastopol - there I was already a deputy regiment commander. Sasha came running to me in the unit, all his childhood surrounded by infantry, sappers, artillerymen. At school, he was friends with weak guys and girls - to protect. We called him Suvorik. "Die yourself, but save a comrade."

To call I went to the military enlistment office. “I myself am an infantryman, I want my son to serve in the elite troops.” - "In which?" - "In the landing." Now I'm visiting him - in Ryazan. The battalion commander praised: “If only everyone served like that!” And I kissed my son. In 1987 he graduated from the famous Ryazan School. Came shining, in lieutenant's shoulder straps. I will never forget this day. My wife and I cried with happiness.

Then - Bendery, Transnistria, battles. I'm already retired. There are no letters. Turns out he was shot in the shoulder. For three months he lay in the hospital: “Dad, don’t come yet, I’m completely thin, then you will come.”

And then - Chechnya. I did not take him to the first war, he left suddenly, he did not tell me not to worry. But where is it ... I’ll tell the truth, I even started drinking. There was no money. I sold the dacha, I’m taking half of the money to him in Chechnya: “Sasha, buy yourself a car.” - "Why? I'll buy a car myself." He returned - the Order of Courage. And I have a second stroke.

He lived in Tver with his wife and mother-in-law. January 3 calls: "Dad, sleep well, everything is in order." And on February 4, I call my mother-in-law, I congratulate her on her birthday, she tells me: “But Sasha is in Chechnya.” Again he did not want to worry me, and again I did not see him off.

On February 10, he took the first battle, accompanied the column, discovered an ambush. Destroyed 15 militants, the column passed without loss.

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- Help.

One word was enough for Major Dostavalov, contrary to the order from above, to rush with a platoon to a height of 776.

Did Dostavalov know that he was going to certain death? The most experienced paratrooper - the third war, realized that the battalion commander was dying and no one helped him. At night he went through the rear of the militants, ran into ambushes twice, left, on the third attempt he led the platoon to the heights. Without a single loss.

Moments of happiness. The doomed people at the height decided that help was coming, they were not forgotten, they were not abandoned.

Dostavalovtsy burned down in this fire all. The major himself was one of the last to die.

Vasily Vasilievich Dostavalov:

Sasha's wife called me from Tver: "Sasha is dead! .." I fell.

Alexander Nikolaevich Shevtsov:

My Volodya was also in this platoon. He wrote me a letter as a declaration of love to his commander. Zamkombat never called his son and other privates by their last names. Only by name or first name. And he only shook hands. discipline, order. These guys would go through fire and water for Dostavalov. They went.

When my son decided to go to Chechnya under a contract, I said: “You are 21 years old, adult, decide for yourself.” Then it seemed that the war was over. Comes: "We're going in the evening." I put ointments, cologne, iron, shoe polish in a sports bag. I say - you look at the TV, there is dirt, tanks are skidding. You will be walking in rubber boots. And they and a friend bought sweets, gingerbread - half a bag. Sweet tooth. Children, adult children. “You are a machine gunner, where will you attach a machine gun?” - "I'll hang it around my neck." I drove him to the gate of the unit, he jumped off and, without saying goodbye, ran to the unit. Like a pioneer camp. I called, he returned, we said goodbye.

Here, in the division, a wall newspaper came out, in it a story about how the checkpoint was ambushed, and Volodya rescued them with a machine gun.

When they brought the notice: "He died a hero's death ...", for two days my hair stood on end, I was shaking, goosebumps. I didn’t want to believe it until the credits went on television.

Alexander Nikolaevich goes to his son's grave every day, takes sweets.

Monument

Two years ago, Vladimir Putin proposed creating a monument to the 6th company.

The erection of the monument was accompanied by scandals (Izvestia reported on this on August 3, 2002). The military won. Despite the objections of the regional administration, the Pskov mayor's office, relatives of the victims, a monument was erected near the checkpoint of the 104th parachute regiment in Cherekha: it will educate fighters. They considered it a departmental issue. They erected a 20-meter structure in the form of an open parachute. High under the dome - 84 autographs of the fallen paratroopers, copied from their personal documents. “Who are we going to wear flowers to, a parachute, or what?” asked relatives of the victims.

They were waiting for Putin at the opening, after all, his order.

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Vasily Vasilyevich Dostavalov now lives abroad. AT

Simferopol. They were not invited to the holiday of the Airborne Forces, to the opening of the monument, but this did not bother him much. There, in Pskov, the grave of his son, this is the main thing, once or twice a year he visits him. And then there were financial problems.

Suddenly, Crimean paratroopers came to my house, they also graduated from the Ryazan military school. They must have read your Izvestia. “Are you Dostavalov Vasily Vasilyevich?” Sat down. We drank a little. I'm talking about the opening of the monument. "Will you go?" - "No, guys, I can't - empty-handed." They say, "That's not your problem." And they bring me round-trip tickets. They asked him to tell Putin: "Russian paratroopers in Crimea are ready to defend Russia."

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All year, the six fighters who survived did not go out of their heads. The last one, who was left without a single cartridge, when the militants went at him like a dark wall, raised his hands: “I surrender.” He was hit on the head with a rifle butt, he lost consciousness. Woke up cold. I found a machine gun under the body of the dead man, walked around the height, did not meet the wounded. He himself told everything, honestly, as it was. Hidden, kept silent - no one would ever know anything.

At home, he tried to commit suicide, his mother pulled him out of the noose. The military prosecutor's office conducted an investigation, crime, gross violations were not found. The guy, like others, was awarded the Order of Courage. And absolutely right. But the pain did not subside: “Why didn’t I die along with everyone else? It's my fault that I didn't die." The guy did not come to the opening of the monument, he ended up in a mental hospital. And one more did not come: also in a mental hospital.

And two more have not arrived. Khristolyubov and Komarov. I saw them on the TV show "How It Was". Sitting: hands on knees, eyes on the floor. The host tried to squeeze out of them how the battle went on at the top, whether it was scary or not, what they were thinking about. They stared blankly down like zombies. They answered quietly: “Yes. Not". They didn't remember anything. As it turned out later, they could not remember.

They slowly climbed to the top at the tail of the third platoon, which did not reach the hill. Khristolyubov and Komarov carried a stove and a machine gun. When the shooting started, the grenade launcher Izyumov jumped up, grabbed a machine gun and rushed up. And these two disappeared, appeared when everything was quiet.

Senior officer Oleg P.:

Khristolyubov and Komarov went downstairs, hid in a crevice, heard a groan: “Guys, help!” It was the name of Senior Lieutenant Vorobyov, the deputy commander of the reconnaissance company. Both were scared, washed off. After the battle, below, at the foot of the hill, they mumbled: “There, on the slope, the officer remained, still alive.” When our people got up, Vorobyov was already dead. Khristolyubov and Komarov were also awarded the Order of Courage. The chief of staff of the regiment, Teplinskiy, was against it, and we, all the officers, were against it, but, apparently, in Moscow they decided differently: the whole company is heroes. Most surprisingly, Khristolyubov and Komarov quickly got used to this role.

And two more of those who survived.

After the death of Dostavalov, the last officer, Senior Lieutenant Kozhemyakin, survived. He ordered to crawl to the cliff and jump, he himself picked up a machine gun to cover. Fulfilling the order, Suponinsky and Porshnev jumped, the height of the cliff - from a five-story building.

Private Suponinsky, the only survivor, was awarded the Golden Star of the Hero. The Airborne Forces helped him with an apartment in Tatarstan. But with work - it didn’t work: wherever it comes - it’s not needed. (So ​​they told the press service of the Airborne Forces.) The hero is entitled to benefits, vouchers, vacations. I hid the Star - they took it without problems.

I found his phone, called, said that I wanted to come, talk, help. “No need,” he refused. - And I did not hide the Golden Star. I'm going to Pskov for the opening of the monument, I'll be passing through Moscow for two days. I left my cell phone number, some more - for communication. I called him fifteen times. The phones were silent. He resolutely avoided me.

I decided to go to Pskov for the opening of the monument.

Opening

On the platform I was met by a lieutenant colonel and then did not leave. An honest man, he warned: “It is not recommended for you to meet with the parents of the dead. The officers have been instructed, they themselves will refuse to speak.”

In anticipation of Putin, all the soldiers and officers worked for a month cleaning the military unit, the territory of the 104th regiment is now like an English park.

But Putin did not arrive. And Kasyanov did not come. The representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the North-Western District and the vice-speaker of the Federation Council arrived. Head of the administration of the Pskov region, Mayor of Pskov. Of the current and former military leaders - Shpak, Podkolzin and Shamanov. Complied with the regulations established in the event of the arrival of the president. They spoke solemnly and formally. There were also those who did not really understand where they got to, the vice-speaker of the Federation Council honored the memory of those who died "in a fleeting" (!) Battle.

No one spoke from parents and widows. Colonel Vorobyov, who had lost his son, went up to the microphone, but he was considered a man from the command: "He is no longer ours." Indeed, there was also a report.

None of the speakers named any of the victims by name.

Vasily Vasilievich Dostavalov tried to break through to the surrounded podium, but his way was blocked. He came up to me, upset, caught his breath, the heat was over 30 degrees, took off his jacket. “My son made his way to the hill, but I can’t get to the podium? ..” No, he didn’t make it. Mighty colonels stood with their chests, more precisely, with their stomachs.

I was very afraid that the old man would not have a third stroke.

There he is, there Suponinsky! - my guardian, lieutenant colonel, pointed to the line of speakers. Telepathy: Suponinsky turned sharply in our direction.

After his short speech, I approached and held out the promised last year's Izvestia - there were good words about him.

I won't talk to you about anything! - narrowed his eyes unkindly, as if preparing for hand-to-hand combat.

Yes, I want to tell you about you. More.

All! No stories, - cut off the evil and walked away.

There were instructions, of course. But it's not about her at all. The only Hero of Russia from the surviving paratroopers seemed to be afraid of talking.

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- Why do they treat me like that? - It was painful to look at Dostavalov. - For what?!

They were afraid that you would talk about your son...

Evtyukhin, Molodov and Vorobyov were forever enrolled in the lists of the military unit. And the name of Alexander Dostavalov was crossed out. For rushing to rescue his comrades. The deputy division commander explained to his father this way: “Your son left his hill, violated the order.” That is, he had to sit and watch his comrades die.

They were afraid: the living word of the father would break the pretentious scenario.

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Of course, it would be necessary to give the floor to the representative of the public committee "In Memory of the 6th Company." The Committee does not forget any of the relatives of the dead Pskovites.

Gennady Maksimovich Semenkov, member of the committee:

The deputies of the regional Assembly and I traveled through 14 districts of the region, visited all 22 burial places, saw our parents and widows. We found out who needed repairs, who needed a telephone, who needed psychological rehabilitation ... Some local administrations hid the parents of paratroopers from us: the disadvantaged ones drink.

The work of the committee began in full cooperation with the divisional command. But then the members of the committee began to find out the details of the battle - who died how? How could all this happen? Divisional Commander Major General Stanislav Yuryevich Semenyuta began to get annoyed: "This is not your business, these are military issues."

Before the opening of the monument, we spent three sleepless nights, dangled to St. Petersburg in order to have time to print posters with photographs of paratroopers by August 2. All 84 people on one poster. We prepared this for relatives.

But even before the rally, Semenkov found the deputy division commander for educational work: "The presence of a public committee here is undesirable, this is the order of the division commander." Semenkov and Rear Admiral Alexei Grigoryevich Krasnikov with rolls of posters stood aside from the monument, from the rally. The deputy commander of the 104th regiment approached them: "You were not invited here." Semenkov showed a newspaper with an announcement: “Here: all the townspeople are invited. At the request of relatives, we must distribute posters of heroes.” "I'm instructed to keep an eye on your group - where and what." The celebrations were already in full swing when soldiers with a mine detector approached Semenkov and Krasnikov: “It was ordered to check for the presence of mines and land mines.” They gutted the rolls with portraits of the heroes, in full view of everyone they began to check the flowers around with a mine detector: what if these people of a deeply respectable age, whom, by the way, the organizers of the celebrations knew very well, threw away explosives? ..

It was a shameful sight - to the complete loss of officer honor.

After the rally, everyone moved to the territory of the regiment, where, at the stadium, the paratroopers were supposed to demonstrate martial arts. There, Semenkov and Krasnikov were supposed to hand posters to their relatives. Dostavalov also joined them. We walked slowly through the park. Dostavalov became ill. "I won't go any further," he said, and leaned against a tree.

There were 50 meters left before the stadium when an officer caught up with them: “You are not allowed to be here! I'll walk you to the exit." Semenkov and Rear Admiral refused the convoy, turned around and left.

After the demonstration performances of the paratroopers, there was a gala dinner.

Near the monument, the grandmother of the deceased paratrooper Denis Zenkevich was crying bitterly. Mother died after the death of Denis - a heart attack. Granny cried because the photograph of her grandson on the poster turned out to be the worst - a large dark spot covers almost the entire face, and because she does not see Denis's painting under the dome - it hurts high.

No one - neither officer nor soldier - took her by the arm.

Heroes and order bearers

Of the 84 dead - 18 Heroes, the rest - the Order of Courage. Who and how divided them posthumously into Heroes and order bearers? All officers are Heroes.

Of those who came with Dostavalov to the rescue, there are three Heroes - Alexander Dostavalov himself, this is understandable, the platoon commander Lieutenant Oleg Ermakov and Sergeant Dmitry Grigoriev. The remaining 13 people are privates, not a single Hero, although they went to their deaths voluntarily!

Nevertheless, I managed to talk to both the officers and the parents. It was the next day, August 3rd.

Officer (I will not name not only the name, but also the rank):

All officers were warned not to give interviews to anyone ...

The privates were awarded the Gold Star based on the track record: who showed himself in the process of service - diligence, discipline.

But heroism is often shown by intractable, extraordinary people.

I say how it was. Now about why Suponinsky ran away from you. That he was one of the last defenders on the hill and Kozhemyakin released him and Porshnev is a lie. That they jumped off a cliff as high as a five-story building is a lie. Show me this break. I climbed this hill up and down. On March 1, following fresh tracks, I climbed, on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th, when all the dead were carried away from a height. The battlefield speaks volumes. Kozhemyakin, the commander of the reconnaissance platoon, is a good hand-to-hand man and, apparently, resisted well. His face was completely smashed with rifle butts, and several stabbed militants were lying nearby. They probably wanted to take him alive as the last officer.

On the morning of March 1, when everything was quiet, I met Suponinsky and Porshnev at the foot of the hill. Suponinsky was talking feverishly as they walked away, but Porshnev was silent, his eyes downcast. He has not yet had time to come up with his legend. And how is it - they retreated together, and one became a Hero? Suponinsky's lower leg was severely cut by a fragment, with such a wound he would not have descended from a height.

They weren't up to par. They hid, waited and left.

Soon Khristolyubov and Komarov appeared at the foot. Yes, they abandoned the seriously wounded Vorobyov, that's right. Both barrels are clean and full of ammo. They didn't fire a shot.

Timoshenko, the battalion commander's liaison officer, was the last to leave.

One officer directly told Suponinsky: “Take off the star” ... All six of them should not have been awarded.

I met with the mothers of the dead at the editorial office of the Novosti Pskov newspaper. Pakhomova Lyudmila Petrovna, her son Roman, aged 18, died. Kobzeva Raisa Vasilievna, her son Sasha was 18.

Lyudmila Pakhomova:

Only our sons, under the command of Dostavalov and company commander Ermakov, rushed to rescue the 6th company. Nobody else. On August 2, 2000, following fresh tracks, I showed a photograph of my son to Suponinsky: “Sasha, have you seen my Roma?” He says: “No, I was wounded at the beginning of the battle and they carried me out.”

At the start of the fight!

My boss gave my husband a car, and we went to Rostov to pick up our son. We live in the Lipetsk region, the city of Gryazi. There were many coffins, all soldered. I said: I don’t need zinc, you can freeze your son, it’s not far for me to take him. They refused for a long time, and then they say: “You have to pay for freezing.” Paratrooper from the Tula division Sasha Tonkikh, he came to accompany Roma, said: "Don't worry, I'll pay everything myself."

Did you have to make sure it was him?

What is it. And if he had remained in a zinc coffin, he would not have been sewn up and washed. They sewed up his eye and thigh, and I washed my hands at home. Sasha Thin bought houses and wreaths, and did everything. And he gave me money for escort - 5000. We are not by rail, but by car. And he said to his people: “Give money for gasoline to your mother.” Oh what a good guy.

Raisa Kobzeva:

And my coffin is open. And accompanied by Sasha Smolin, also a paratrooper, but from the Naro-Fominsk division. He also went to pay for the freezing, it turns out: “Aunt Raya, you don’t need anything, the guy said:“ I don’t take from my own ... ”The son’s face is disfigured, his arms are missing - one to the wrist, the other to the elbow, no legs - fragmented. One body, and then the stomach is torn. It appears to be a projectile.

Lyudmila Pakhomova:

We, the parents, on August 2, in the morning, before the celebrations, were gathered in the assembly hall of the House of Officers, so that we could say who needed what kind of help. They announced: "With the parents of the Heroes - a separate conversation, the rest - sit aside." Apparently, for them - other means, benefits.

We, the Dostavalovs, and others from the 6th company went out into the corridor ...

And our children are still heroes, though not Heroes.

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It was a reward action, in which there should have been no place for any confused or coward, and among the survivors there should also be a Hero.

Let. Not for me, a civilian, to judge. In the end, the paratrooper Suponinsky was where I had never been, and saw what I would not see. Another thing is more important - that there should not be a single offended.

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We will never know the whole truth. But the officers of the regiment promised to tell much of what they knew when they retired. Isn't it too late? Eyewitnesses and participants are dying. A month before the opening of the monument, the former regiment commander Melentyev died of a heart attack - the only one who was punished.

I went to the cemetery with Dostavalov and Shevtsov. Before that, Vasily Vasilyevich, at my request, read his failed speech: “Dear Pskovites, dear parents ... This monument is for each of our sons separately ... This monument is a continuation of the life of our sons ... They died, but came out victorious. .. In life, everything passes and leaves. We will also leave, only what we could, managed to do for people will remain on earth. You and I gave birth, raised children and gave them to Russia ... "

It would be a good performance, and most importantly - in the first person.

About the son - not a word.

At the cemetery, Alexander Nikolaevich Shevtsov kept calm. As always, he brought sweets to the grave.

And Dostavalov knelt down and cried.

They are buried nearby - sweet tooth and Suvorik.