Second shock army 42 offensive map. About the second shock army

On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created by the headquarters of the Supreme High Command, which united the troops of the 4th, 52nd and two reserve armies - the 26th and 59th. On December 25, 1941, the 26th Army was renamed the 2nd Shock Army ...

At the word “Vlasovites”, the surviving veterans of the Great Patriotic War frown in disgust, or even give vent to anger, cursing what the world is worth. Still: this word in the minds of those who defended their country in the most difficult war of the century is strongly associated with betrayal, with the limit of moral decline. “Vlasovites” are those who went over to the side of the enemy and, for the sake of the German ration, shed the blood of their compatriots under the leadership of a gold-chasing renegade ...

Meanwhile, in 1942, completely different people were called Vlasovites. Those who have no shame. And never was. For "the dead have no shame", having died in the hardest honest battle for the Fatherland ...

From the second half of August until mid-September 1941, German troops tried to storm Leningrad, but did not achieve decisive success, they switched to blockade and siege of the city. On October 16, 1941, four German divisions (8, 12 TD, 18, 20 MD) crossed the river. Volkhov and rushed through the city of Tikhvin to the river. Svir to connect with the Finnish army and close the second blockade ring east of Lake Ladoga. For Leningrad and the troops of the Leningrad Front, this would mean certain death.

The enemy, after linking up with the Finns, was going to attack Vologda and Yaroslavl, intending to form a new front north of Moscow and, at the same time, encircle our troops of the North-Western Front with a strike along the Oktyabrskaya railway. Under these conditions, the Soviet Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, despite the critical situation near Moscow, found an opportunity to reinforce the reserves of the 4th, 52nd and 54th armies, which were defending in the Tikhvin direction. On November 19, they launched a counteroffensive and by December 24 they had driven the Germans back beyond the Volkhov.

During these battles, the Soviet Headquarters developed an operation to completely defeat the Germans near Leningrad. To accomplish the task, on December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was formed. It included the 4th and 52nd armies and two new armies from the Headquarters reserve - the 2nd shock (former 26th) and 59th. The front under the command of General of the Army K.A. Meretskov was to destroy the Mginsky enemy grouping with the forces of the 2nd shock, 59th and 4th armies, together with the 54th army of the Leningrad Front (which was outside the blockade ring), and thereby break through the blockade of Leningrad, and with a blow in a southerly direction by the forces of the 52nd armies to liberate Novgorod and cut off the enemy's retreat in front of the North-Western Front, which also went on the offensive. The weather conditions were favorable for the operation - in the wooded and marshy area, the harsh winter fettered swamps and rivers.

General Meretskov was arrested on June 24, interrogated during the investigation, and only on August 30, 1941 was released from prison. The notorious L.Z. was appointed to him as a representative of the Headquarters. Mekhlis - Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

Even before the start of the operation, separate units and units of the 52nd Army crossed the Volkhov River on December 24-25 in order to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on a new line, and even captured small bridgeheads on the western bank. On the night of December 31, the Volkhov was also crossed by units of the newly arrived 376th Infantry Division of the 59th Army, but no one managed to hold the bridgeheads.

The reason was that just the day before, on December 23-24, the enemy completed the withdrawal of his troops from Tikhvin and Malaya Vishera beyond the Volkhov to pre-prepared positions, pulled up reserves of manpower and equipment. The Volkhov grouping of the 18th German Army already consisted of 8 infantry (11, 21, 61, 126, 215, 250 (i), 254, 291 infantry divisions), 2 motorized (18, 20 md), 1 tank (12 td) divisions .

With the advent of the 2nd Shock and 59th Armies and units of the Novgorod Army Group, our Volkhov Front received an advantage over the enemy in manpower by 1.5 times, in guns and mortars by 1.6 times, in aircraft by 1.3 times.

On January 1, 1942, the Volkhov Front united 21 rifle divisions (4th Guards, 44, 46, 65, 92, 111, 191, 225, 259, 267, 288, 305, 310, 327, 366, 372, 374, 376 , 377, 378, 382 sd), 8 rifle brigades (22, 23, 24, 25, 53, 57, 58, 59 osbr), 1 grenadier brigade (because of the lack of small arms it was armed with grenades), 18 separate ski battalions , 4 cavalry divisions (25, 27, 80, 87 cd), 1 tank division (60 d), 1 separate tank brigade (7 guards brigade), 6 separate artillery regiments (18, 442, 448, 561, 839, 881 ap ), 2 high-power howitzer regiments (137, 430 gap BM), a separate anti-tank defense regiment (884 anti-tank artillery squadrons), 6 guards mortar battalions of rocket artillery, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, 18 bomber, assault, fighter air regiments and 1 reconnaissance squadron.

However, by the beginning of the operation, the Volkhov Front had a quarter of ammunition ammunition, the 4th and 52nd armies were exhausted by battles, 3.5-4 thousand people remained in their divisions. instead of regular 10-12 thousand. Only the 2nd shock and 59th armies had a complete set of personnel. But on the other hand, they almost completely lacked sights for guns, communication equipment - a telephone cable and radio stations, and motor transport units, which made it very difficult to control combat operations and supply troops. The new armies also lacked warm clothes. In addition, on the entire Volkhov front there were not enough automatic weapons, tanks, shells, and transport. About half of the aviation of the front (211 aircraft) were light-engine U-2, R-5, R-zet ...

Meretskov asked the Headquarters to send more tanks, vehicles, artillery tractors, but the Headquarters believed that heavy equipment could not be effectively used in forests and swamps. As subsequent events showed, the Stavka's opinion was erroneous.

The 2nd shock army was such only in name. At the end of 1941, it consisted of one rifle division (327), eight rifle brigades (22, 23, 24, 25, 53, 57, 58, 59) and five separate ski battalions (39, 40, 42, 43, 44 ). During the operation, she received new units, including 17 separate ski battalions in January - February, several divisions were transferred to her operational subordination. The troops of the front were not ready for a big offensive, and Meretskov asked the Stavka to postpone the operation. The headquarters, taking into account the difficult situation of Leningrad, agreed to postpone the start only until January 7, 1942.

On January 7, without waiting for the concentration of all units, the front went on the offensive. But only two battalions of the 1002nd Rifle Regiment of the 305th Rifle Division of the 52nd Army and soldiers of the 376th and 378th Rifle Divisions of the 59th Army succeeded in crossing the Volkhov River. The 4th Army could not complete the task. On January 8, our armies stopped their attacks due to the obvious fire superiority of the enemy and the unpreparedness of the offensive. The occupied bridgeheads had to be abandoned. The advance of the front failed. The Germans mistook him for reconnaissance in battle. The headquarters dismissed Lieutenant General G.G., who commanded the 2nd shock army, from his post for poor leadership. Sokolov, former deputy commissar of the NKVD, and replaced him with Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov, who had previously commanded the 52nd Army. The 52nd Army was received by Lieutenant General V.F. Yakovlev from the 4th Army.

On January 13, the offensive resumed, but success was noted only in the 15-kilometer combat zone of the 52nd and 2nd shock armies. Advancing from the captured bridgehead at the Krasny Urudnik state farm, the 2nd shock army traveled 6 km in 10 days of fighting, broke into the enemy’s first line of defense, and on January 24 reached the second line, located along the Novgorod-Chudovo highway and railroad. To the south, the 52nd Army made its way to the highway and the railway. The 59th Army also managed to capture a smaller bridgehead to the north on the western bank of the Volkhov River, however, it failed to develop an offensive there. In mid-January, she and her troops were redirected by the front command to the bridgehead of the 2nd shock army, and divisions of the 4th army took its place on the western bank of the river.

On the night of January 25, the 2nd shock army, with the support of the 59th, broke through the second line of German defense near the village of Myasnoy Bor. The 23rd, 59th rifle brigades and the 13th cavalry corps (25th, 87th cavalry divisions), and then the 366th rifle division and other units and formations of the 2nd shock army, were introduced into the gap 3-4 km wide in the enemy’s defenses. The army rapidly - through forests and swamps - began to move to the north-west and in 5 days of fighting it went up to 40 km. Ahead was the cavalry corps, behind it, expanding the flanks of the breakthrough, rifle brigades and divisions. For successful actions, the 366th Rifle Division on March 17, 1942 was transformed into the 19th Guards.

On January 13, to meet the Volkhovites, the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front launched an offensive on Pogostye and Tosno. However, having occupied a small foothold at the Pogostye station southwest of the Moscow-Leningrad railway, she soon stopped, having used up ammunition. At that time, the 52nd and 59th armies were fighting bloody battles to expand the bridgehead and hold the breakthrough corridor in Myasnoy Bor. In these battles near the villages of Maloye and Bolshoye Zamoshye, the 305th division fought with the 250th Spanish "blue division" sent by the dictator Franco to the Soviet front. The 305th managed to recapture only one village of Maloye Zamoshye from the Spaniards. To the south of the village of Myasnoy Bor, the 52nd Army went along the highway to the village of Koptsy, to the north, the 59th Army approached a large enemy stronghold - with. Spasskaya Polist.

At the beginning of the operation, the Volkhov Front suffered heavy losses in people and equipment. 40-degree frosts exhausted people, it was forbidden to make fires under the terms of camouflage, tired soldiers fell into the snow and froze to death. And although in January-February the front received reinforcements - 17 ski battalions and marching units - it became impossible to develop the offensive according to the original plan: firstly, the troops ran into the rear defensive line of the enemy, which ran along the line of the unfinished Chudovo-Weimarn railway, secondly secondly, the resistance of the Germans at this turn especially intensified in the northern direction, towards Lyuban and Leningrad.

On the southern flank of the Volkhov Front, the 52nd Army was unable to completely break through the Spanish and German positions and advance on Novgorod, and on the northern flank, the 59th Army was unable to capture Spasskaya Polista and break through to Chudov. Both of these armies with difficulty held the corridor of the breakthrough of the 2nd shock in Myasnoy Bor. In addition, due to the lengthening of communications and the narrowness of the breakthrough corridor, the 2nd shock army from the end of January began to feel an acute shortage of ammunition and food. Its supply was then carried out along the only forest road that passed through the corridor. Subsequently, it became known as the South Road.

250 German aircraft operated against our troops and their only main line of communication, and on February 2, Hitler ordered long-range aircraft to be thrown here as well. On the morning of February 12, the 111th division of the 59th army, transferred to the 2nd shock army, but not yet had time to pass through Myasnoy Bor, and the 22nd rifle brigade, after an unexpected night leaving positions by the German infantry brigade of Koechling, took the villages of Mostki and Lyubino in the morning A field on the highway Leningrad - Novgorod. Continuing the offensive, the 111th division pushed the enemy back to Spasskaya Polist and cut the forest road Spasskaya Polist - Olkhovka. As a result, the neck of the breakthrough expanded to 13 km and enemy machine-gun fire ceased to threaten the corridor. By that time, the bridgehead along the Volkhov had also expanded somewhat, its width had reached 35 km. For these battles, the 111th Rifle Division on March 17, 1942 was transformed into the 24th Guards.

In view of the insufficient offensive capabilities of the 2nd shock army, the command of the front, starting from the second decade of February, began to transfer divisions and brigades from the 4th, 52nd and 59th armies to it. The introduction of new units into the breakthrough, the development of the offensive and, in connection with this, the lengthening of communications required an increase and speed up the delivery of goods to the 2nd shock army. But one road could not cope with this, and then in February-March, a second one was laid along a neighboring clearing, 500 m north of the first road. The new road began to be called the North. The Germans called it "Eric's clearing".

On February 17, instead of Colonel-General N.N. Voronov, a new representative of the Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov, former commander-in-chief of the entire North-West direction. The Stavka changed the plan of the operation, and Voroshilov brought the Stavka's demand: instead of striking directly to the northwest, intensify operations in the Luban direction in order to encircle and destroy the Lubansko-Chudovskaya enemy grouping. Voroshilov went to the troops of the 2nd shock army to get acquainted with its condition and clarify the plan of the operation.

To capture Lyuban, the front command concentrated in the forests 15 km south-west of the city near the Krasnaya Gorka farm (a hill among almost impenetrable forests where the forester's house stood) the 80th cavalry division, transferred from the 4th Army, as well as the 1100th a rifle regiment of the 327th rifle division, the 18th artillery regiment of the RGK, the 7th guards tank brigade (on the move near a company of tanks), a rocket mortar division and several ski battalions. They were supposed to break through the front and approach Lyuban, after which the second echelon was introduced into the gap: the 46th rifle division and the 22nd separate rifle brigade.

The 80th Cavalry Division began fighting near Krasnaya Gorka on February 16, as soon as it approached the front line here. Headquarters representative Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov observed the events at the temporary command post of the army in the town of Ozerye, 7 km southwest of Krasnaya Gorka. On February 18, the 1st Squadron of the 205th Cavalry Regiment drove the Germans off the embankment of the unfinished railway and, pursuing them, captured Krasnaya Gorka. The cavalrymen were supported by the 18th howitzer regiment of the RGC. Following the cavalrymen, the 1100th rifle regiment of the 327th rifle division entered the breakthrough, its remaining regiments were still on the march near Ogorely. The main forces of the 13th cavalry corps were in the following position: the 87th cavalry division was fighting in the farthest part of the breakthrough near the village of Konechki, together with the 25th cavalry division of the corps, which was stationed near the villages of Savkino and Khaimino.

By the morning of February 23, the 46th Rifle Division and the 22nd Separate Rifle Brigade approached Krasnaya Gorka. The concentration of forces for an attack on Luban continued. To help the advancing troops, on February 13, Commander N.K. Klykov decided to send the 546th and 552nd rifle regiments of the 191st rifle division to the south to capture the Pomeranie station on the Moscow-Leningrad railway, 5 km southeast of Lyuban. This decision was approved by the commander K.A. Meretskov, about which he reported to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. The regiments had to advance waist-deep in the snow with light forests, without artillery, convoys and medical battalions. Each soldier was given 5 biscuits and 5 lumps of sugar, 10 cartridges for a rifle, one disk for an automatic or light machine gun, and 2 grenades.

On the night of February 17, the regiments crossed the dirt road between the villages of Dubove and Koroviy Ruchey in the northeast direction towards Lyuban. By the evening of February 17, the enemy knocked down the barrier left by the division on the road, and closed the path for the passage of regiments and the supply of ammunition. The units that were supposed to develop success did not come to this place in time.

On the same day, the enemy began to bombard the advancing regiments with artillery fire. The fire corrected the German aircraft. The units suffered losses of 35 killed and 50 wounded. Division commander Colonel A.I. Starunin ordered to immediately attack the enemy on the road north of the village of Apraksin Bor, but he managed to bring up reinforcements, incl. tanks. The night attack of the 546th regiment failed, the units withdrew into the forest to the southwest, having suffered losses. As a result of hostilities, all radio stations with radio operators were killed. The divisional commander decided to carry out the task in another area.

Having no ammunition and since February 15 food for personnel, at a meeting of commanders it was decided to carry out a written order of the commander of the task force, Major General P.F. Privalov about the capture of the villages of Malaya Bronnitsa and Oak. Both regiments made two unsuccessful attacks on them on the night of February 18-19, after which they withdrew east into the forest.

At a meeting convened by the divisional commander, in the presence of regimental commanders and commissars, a collegial decision was made in order to save emaciated people without an order from the command to go back in small groups of 40-50 people. behind the front line, to their rear, in three columns (division headquarters with a sapper battalion, commandant's and reconnaissance companies and two regiments). All the wounded (about 80 people) were left in the forest under guard. Their fate is most likely unenviable. The regimental columns, with losses, broke through to their own approximately at the crossing point of the dirt road Dubovoe - Koroviy Ruchey, and the headquarters column, leaving to the south-west, left the rear to the front line of the German 254th Infantry Division and was fired upon.

The headquarters group withdrew into the forest, where they settled in the discovered forest dugouts of local residents. The group was surrounded by the Germans. Colonel A.I. Starunin ordered the commander of the commandant's company I.S. Osipov with five fighters and Lieutenant Kostin, assistant chief of the operations department of the division headquarters, to get to his own and ask for help to exit the headquarters. Warriors I.S. Osipova and Kostin crossed the front line and reported to the command of the task force about the critical state of the remnants of the division, but Major General P.F. Privalov did not take any measures - there was no one to save, there were no troops at the disposal of the operational group. As a result of the fighting, divisional commander Colonel A.I. Starunin, chief of staff of the division, lieutenant colonel P.D. Krupichev and about 500 soldiers were captured, the commissar of the division, the senior battalion commissar S.A. Alekseev shot himself at the dugouts. The Germans from the 254th Infantry Division gathered the prisoners in the village of Apraksin Bor, fed them, and on February 28, 1942, they sent them on foot to the assembly camp in Lyuban. P.D. Krupichev was released from captivity in April 1945. The further fate of Colonel A.I. The starunina remained unknown. Considering the fact that before the war he served in 1933-1939. in responsible positions in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, it can be assumed that his fate as a prisoner of war was not trivial.

On the night of February 23, Volkhov partisans raided Lyuban. The Germans decided that the city was surrounded and called in reinforcements from Chudov and Tosno. The partisans safely retreated, but the arriving enemy forces strengthened the city's defenses.

Meanwhile, the advancing group of troops conducted reconnaissance of approaches to the Lyuban station from the borders of the Sichev River. Reconnaissance was especially necessary because of the extremely limited ammunition: in the 1100th regiment there were only 5 shells for each gun, there were also not enough cartridges, aimless shooting was strictly prohibited.

Reconnaissance established that the enemy had no deep defenses from the northwest, and on the morning of February 25, the 200th cavalry regiment of the 80th division resumed the offensive, but was stopped by bunker fire and strong enemy air impact, and almost all the horses died, and the cavalrymen turned into to regular infantry. Then the 25th cavalry division, the 22nd brigade, which were at the base of the breakthrough, two regiments of the 327th division, the 46th rifle division and the 7th guards tank brigade, were subjected to powerful air strikes.

On February 26, the Germans with one infantry regiment of the 291st Infantry Division from the right flank of the breakthrough and the second infantry regiment from the left flank launched an attack on Krasnaya Gorka along the railroad track and connected, interrupting communication with the units of the 2nd Shock Army that had gone into the breakthrough. The advance detachment was surrounded and stopped west of the villages of Kirkovo and Lyuban. On the morning of February 28, they had to walk 4 km to Lyuban. Separate groups of scouts managed to penetrate to the southwestern outskirts of the city. The encircled group ran out of ammunition and food, the Germans methodically bombed, fired upon and attacked our soldiers, but the encircled staunchly held out for 10 days, while there was still hope for help. And only on the night of March 8-9, the 80th Cavalry Division and the 1100th Regiment, having also made a collegial decision, due to the lack of communications, without an order from the command, destroyed heavy weapons, including machine guns, and with personal weapons with losses broke through back to their little west of the exit point to the breach. At the same time, part of the personnel of the cavalry division and the rifle regiment was captured.

While the fighting for Lyuban was going on, on February 28, the Stavka clarified the original plan of the operation. Now the 2nd shock and 54th armies were to advance towards each other and unite in Lyuban, surround and destroy the Lubansko-Chudovskaya enemy grouping and then strike at Tosno and Siverskaya to defeat the Mginskaya grouping and break the blockade of Leningrad. The 54th Army was ordered to launch an offensive on March 1, but it could not launch combat operations without preparation, and the Stavka's decision turned out to be belated.

On March 9, K.E. again flew from Moscow to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front in Malaya Vishera. Voroshilov, and with him a member of the State Defense Committee G.M. Malenkov, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov and A.L. Novikov and a group of senior officers. Vlasov arrived at the post of deputy front commander. At the beginning of the war, he commanded the 4th mechanized corps, then the 37th army near Kyiv and the 20th army near Moscow, had a reputation as a well-trained commander in operational and tactical terms, he was highly characterized by G.K. Zhukov, and I.V. Stalin considered a promising general. The appointment of Vlasov was, according to the Headquarters, to strengthen the command of the front. On March 12, he arrived along broken roads at the forefront of the efforts of the 2nd Shock Army - in the forests to Krasnaya Gorka and led the battles for it.

Deputy Commissar of Defense for Aviation A.A. Novikov arrived to organize massive air strikes against the enemy's defensive lines, airfields and communications before a new front offensive. For this, 8 air regiments from the Stavka reserve, long-range aviation and the air force of the Leningrad Front were involved. The assembled aircraft made 7,673 sorties in March, dropped 948 tons of bombs, and destroyed 99 enemy aircraft. Due to air strikes, the Germans had to postpone the planned counteroffensive, but the enemy transferred aviation reserves to Volkhov and, on the whole, retained air supremacy.

By the Directive of the Headquarters of February 28, shock groups were created in the armies of the Volkhov Front: in the 2nd shock army - from 5 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades and a cavalry division; in the 4th Army - from 2 rifle divisions, in the 59th Army - from 3 rifle divisions. On March 10, in the 2nd Shock Army, such a group included the 92nd Rifle Division with the 24th Brigade, the 46th Rifle Division with the 53rd Brigade, the 327th Rifle Division with the 7th Guards Tank Brigade, the 259th and the 382nd Rifle Divisions, the 59th Rifle Brigade and the 80th Cavalry Division. In addition to them, the army had 26 ski battalions of varying degrees of staffing, four artillery regiments, two tank battalions, five sapper battalions of army subordination.

On the morning of March 11, these troops launched an offensive along the front in an arc from Chervinskaya Luka to Eglino with the aim of encircling and capturing Lyuban. The 259th, 46th, 92nd and 327th Rifle Divisions, the 24th and 53rd Rifle and the 7th Guards Tank Brigades aimed directly at Lyuban. However, the lack of reconnaissance data on the positions of the enemy, the lack of ammunition and the complete dominance of the enemy in the air did not allow our troops to complete their task. Part of the personnel of the 259th division was cut off by the enemy across the Sichev River and was taken prisoner.

Simultaneously with the 2nd shock army, towards it, the 54th Army of the Lenfront went on the offensive near Pogost, which advanced 10 km. As a result, the Luban grouping of the Wehrmacht was in a semi-circle. But on March 15, the enemy launched a counteroffensive against the 54th Army and by mid-April threw it back to the Tigoda River.

Front commander K.A. Meretskov and commander N.K. Klykov, in view of the weak offensive capabilities of the 2nd shock army, offered the Headquarters three options for resolving the issue: the first was to strengthen the front with the combined arms army promised back in January and complete the operation before the onset of spring thaw; the second - in connection with the arrival of spring, withdraw the army from the swamps and look for a solution in another direction; the third is to wait out the mudslide, accumulate strength and then resume the offensive.

The headquarters leaned towards the first option, but it did not have free troops. The question of the 2nd shock army remained unresolved.

While the second attack on Lyuban was going on, the front headquarters developed an operation to destroy the enemy penetration between the 2nd shock and 59th armies, encircle and capture Spasskaya Polist by the forces of the 59th army's shock group. For this, the 377th Rifle Division was transferred from the 4th Army to the 59th, and the 267th Division from the 52nd Army, to the former positions of which, south of the village of Myasnoy Bor, the 65th Division was transferred from the 4th Army.

The 59th Army made its first unsuccessful attempt to carry out an operation to capture Spasskaya Polista at the end of January 1942. In order to act from the side of the 2nd shock army to join forces advancing from the side of the highway, the command of the 59th army sent its 4th guards division through Myasnoy Bor on February 7, and at the end of February it still continued to fight in the area north of Olkhovka, blocking the Olkhovka farms. Now the main forces of the 267th Rifle Division joined the 4th Guards on the eastern shore of the Gazhya Sopka swamp. On March 1, the 846th Rifle and 845th Artillery Regiments of the 267th Division launched an attack from the 2nd Shock Army on the village of Priyutino, and the 844th Rifle Regiment - on the village of Tregubovo north of Spasskaya Polisti.

The offensive of the division did not bring success. She was moved to the north, and to replace her, two rifle regiments (1254th and 1258th) and an artillery regiment of the 378th rifle division were led through the corridor near Myasny Bor. On March 11, they entered the battle and began to make their way from the west to the highway, from the side of which, towards them, the third rifle regiment of the division, the 1256th, broke through.

The battles for Priyutino, Tregubovo, Mikhalevo, Glushitsa continued throughout March. The enemy repeatedly counterattacked, and at the end of March he surrounded the 378th division, and on April 24, 1942, its remnants broke out of the ring with heavy losses. The area occupied at that time by the 2nd shock army resembled in its outlines a flask with a radius of 25 km with a narrow neck in Myasny Bor. With one blow to the neck, it was possible to cut off the army from other formations of the front, drive it into swamps and destroy it. Therefore, the enemy constantly rushed to Myasnoy Bor. Only the strength of the onslaught changed - depending on the situation in other sectors of the Volkhov Front.

In early March, as soon as it became clear that the offensive of the 2nd shock army was running out of steam, and the Volkhovites did not have enough strength to take Spasskaya Polista, the Germans sharply increased pressure on the corridor, first from the south - on the positions of the 52nd army, and from March 16, having received reinforcements, the enemy launched a general offensive on the corridor both from the south and from the north - against the 59th Army. The enemy was continuously supported by large aviation forces. Our soldiers held firm, but the enemy sent more and more troops into battle, including the SS division "Policeman", the legions of the Dutch and Belgian fascists "Netherlands" and "Flanders".

On March 19, the Germans, having broken through the defenses of the 372nd and 374th rifle divisions of the 59th Army and the 65th and 305th rifle divisions of the 52nd Army, broke into the corridor and blocked it 4 km west of the village of Myasnoy Bor, between the Polist River and Teremets-Kurlyandsky village.

The front command mobilized all possible forces to drive the Germans out of the corridor. From the 2nd Shock Army, the 7th Guards Tank, 24th and 58th Rifle Brigades, participants in the army junior lieutenant courses, were sent to the place of the German breakthrough. Our attacks followed one after another, but the enemy's artillery and especially aviation superiority remained overwhelming. On March 23, the 376th Rifle Division, transferred from the 4th Army and just replenished with unfired personnel (3000 people), joined the attacks. On the very first day of the offensive, she underwent an air strike and suffered very heavy losses, inexperienced people succumbed to panic and fled. Commander of the 1250th Infantry Regiment, Major G.A. Hatemkin shot himself on March 27.

The fights were the hardest. From the side of the 2nd shock army, the events were directly led by Vlasov, the commander of the front. On March 26, the 24th and 58th Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades, and from March 27 also the 8th Guards Regiment of the 4th Guards Rifle Division, struck to the east. On March 27, a narrow corridor was outlined. On the morning of March 28, the 58th Rifle and 7th Guards Tank Brigades with units of the 382nd Rifle Division from the west and the 376th Division from the east pierced a corridor 800 meters wide along the Northern Road with a counter attack.

On the evening of March 28, the narrow road began to operate, although it was under constant enemy machine-gun, artillery and aviation influence. On March 30, they managed to break through a small corridor along the Southern Road, and by April 3, communications in Myasnoy Bor were completely freed.

During the period of the March encirclement in the 2nd shock army, heavy defensive battles were fought by the 23rd separate rifle brigade. It was located on the left flank of the army in the southwestern corner of the occupied territory, and the enemy tried to break through its positions into the center of the 2nd Shock and cut the army into two parts, but the soldiers of the brigade repelled all enemy attacks.

The March encirclement revealed the extreme danger of even a short-term disruption of communications in Myasnoy Bor. Food and ammunition encircled had to be delivered by aircraft. The food ration in the cavalry corps was immediately reduced to 1 cracker per day. Surrounded dug out from under the snow and ate dead horses, for the protection of live horses it was necessary to allocate reinforced outfits so that they would not be beaten and eaten by soldiers. The surviving horses of the Cavalry Corps began to be evacuated to the rear through Myasnoy Bor.

On March 29, heavy snow melting began, the roads turned into a muddy mess. The Germans continued to break through on communications, and the struggle for the corridor turned into hand-to-hand combat. To supply the troops, a field airfield was urgently equipped near the army headquarters near the village of Dubovik. Seeing the plight of our troops, the Germans began to drop propaganda leaflets with prisoner passes from their planes.

In April, the fighters of Myasny Bor became even more difficult. Due to the spring thaw, even wagons could not walk on the roads, and special groups of soldiers and local residents carried ammunition and food for 30-40 km. On April 10, ice drift began on the Volkhov, and (until floating bridges were built) the supply of our troops worsened even more.

At the end of March, the headquarters of the 2nd shock army and the Volkhov Front learned from the captured chief lieutenant that the enemy was preparing a new major operation to encircle and destroy the 2nd shock army, but instead of paying due attention to this information, the command of the army and the front continued to complete the development of a new, third, operation to capture Lyuban.

A new offensive of the 2nd Shock Army began on April 3, 30 km southwest of Lyuban in the direction of the villages of Apraksin Bor and Cow Ruchey. Like the two previous ones, this offensive was not successful due to the small number of troops and lack of ammunition, and on April 8 it was stopped, although the 54th Army of the Lenfront resumed oncoming battles from the end of March and diverted large enemy forces.

On April 13, the seriously ill Commander N.K. Klykov. Illness is not an excuse. In the personal file of Klykov, the fact that he was ill from 1935 to 1938, being released from command military posts, appears. In the spring of 1942 the same illness worsened. She pursued Klykov until the end of her life (dismissed due to illness in December 1945, died in 1969).

On April 16, after negotiations with the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army, the front commander K.A. Meretskov proposed to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to approve the candidacy of Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov as commander of the 2nd Shock. The Headquarters agreed to this and on April 17 an Order along the front signed by Meretskov followed about this.

Preparations began for another attack on Lyuban, this time by the forces of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps, which began to be formed on the basis of the 4th Guards Rifle Division withdrawn to the front reserve (without one rifle regiment). In terms of manpower and armament, the corps was to become the main force of the front.

At the same time, in late March - early April, the K.A. Meretskov repeatedly asked the Headquarters to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the swamps to the bridgehead to Volkhov, but instead, on April 21, the Headquarters decided to liquidate the Volkhov Front. This was done at the suggestion of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General M.S. Khozin and Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee and City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.A. Zhdanov. Khozin argued that if the troops of the Volkhov Front were combined with the troops of the Leningrad Front under his command, then he would be able to combine actions to break the blockade of Leningrad.
On April 23, the Volkhov Front was transformed into an operational group of troops of the Volkhov direction of the Leningrad Front. Meretskov was sent to the Western Front to command the 33rd Army, which suffered heavy losses, incl. Commander Lieutenant General M.G. Efremov. But it soon became clear that M.S. Khozin cannot pay due attention to the Volkhov group, and especially to the 2nd shock army. The decision to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous, and for the 2nd shock army it became fatal.

The situation in late April in the 2nd shock army continued to deteriorate. The trenches were flooded with water, corpses were floating around, the soldiers and commanders were starving, there was no salt, there was no bread. There was no bleach left to disinfect water, no medicines. There were no leather shoes, and people walked around in shawls and worn, wet felt boots. On April 26, the Germans again began to break through to our communications. Myasnoy Bor and neighboring forests bombarded enemy aircraft with leaflets - passes for captivity. On April 30, the 2nd shock received an order to take up a tough defense. This date became the official date for the end of the Luban operation, as it was eventually called after the war. To supply the army, its soldiers, working until May 23 for 3 weeks waist-deep in water, built a narrow-gauge railway from Myasny Bor to Finyov Lug 500 meters north of the Northern Road. Gauge rails taken from the logging sites near Lyubin Pol and Mostkov went to its construction.

On April 29, the 59th Army tried to break through to the 2nd shock new corridor from the village of Mostki in the Lesopunkt area. A blow to the west was delivered by the 2nd Rifle Division, which had just been formed in the city of Arkhangelsk, numbering 10,564 people. together with units of the 376th division, the 24th and 58th rifle brigades, however, on May 10, the enemy bypassed the flanks of both divisions and closed the ring in the area west of the Leningrad-Novgorod highway. Only on the night of May 13, the defeated units of the 2nd and 376th divisions were able to break through from the encirclement. The 2nd Infantry Division suffered 80% casualties in personnel, of which about 1000 people. prisoners and 3500 people. killed, also losing almost all artillery, mortars and machine guns.

In the meantime, in late April - early May, local battles did not stop along the entire perimeter of the location of the 2nd shock army (200 km), the enemy exerted especially strong pressure on the positions of the 23rd and 59th rifle brigades - on the left flank and at the tip of the breakthrough at Eglino.

These days, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front came to the conclusion that it was urgent to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army to the bridgehead to Volkhov. While the Stavka was considering this proposal, M.S. On May 13, 1942, Khozin ordered the command of the 2nd Shock Army to prepare for withdrawal through intermediate lines according to the plan drawn up by the commander A.A. Vlasov. Reporting to the Headquarters the army's exit plan, Khozin also proposed to separate a group of troops of the Volkhov direction from the Lenfront into an independent operational formation, i.e. actually restore the Volkhov Front. Thus, Khozin acknowledged the groundlessness of his former opinion.

In anticipation of the decision of the Headquarters, Khozin brought to the bridgehead by May 16 a significant part of the cavalry, parts of the 4th and 24th Guards Divisions, the 378th Division, the 7th Guards and 29th Tank Brigades. From May 17 to May 20, a wooden flooring (“zherdёvka”) was built on the Northern Road for the convenience of supplying and evacuating troops, especially equipment. On May 21, the Headquarters finally allowed the withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd shock army to the bridgehead to Volkhov through three intermediate lines. The first line passed along the line of villages Ostrov - Dubovik - Glubochka. The second - near the village of Volosovo, Rogavka station, settlements Vditsko - Novaya - Krapivno. Third: Pyatilipy - Deaf Kerest - Finev Lug - Krivino.

The troops that penetrated the enemy's defenses in the north-west direction most deeply retreated to the first line: the 382nd division, the 59th and 25th brigades. Simultaneously with them, but immediately to the second line, their neighbors located to the east retreated: the 46th, 92nd and 327th divisions, the 22nd and 23rd brigades. The second frontier was the main one. Here it was necessary to take up a tough defense and hold on. The defense was assigned to the 92nd and 327th divisions and the 23rd brigade.

The first rearguard group, as well as the 46th division and the 22nd brigade, were to pass through the main line and follow along with other units to the area of ​​​​the villages of Krechno, Olkhovka and Maloye Zamoshye. There, the 2nd Shock was concentrated for a throw through a new corridor, which was again planned to break through in the Lesopunkt area.

The first to leave were hospitals, rear services, equipment was evacuated. After leaving the semi-encirclement of the main forces of the army, the covering troops retreated to the third line, from where they passed the neck in the order of priority, and the last from the 2nd Shock Army was the 327th division, and it was followed by the 305th holding the defense there from Maly Zamoshye division of the 52nd Army, than the withdrawal of troops was completed.

The plan was logical and thought out, but fate made its own adjustments to it. They managed to equip the frontiers on time: on May 22, the Germans began an operation in many areas to narrow the Volkhov cauldron. The advance detachment of the 291st German division on May 23 penetrated deep along the railway into the location of our troops in the area of ​​the village of Dubovik. The news of this led to the spontaneous and hasty removal of the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army from its command post in the area of ​​the village of Ogoreli without the permission of the leadership of the Leningrad Front. The German detachment was partially destroyed, partially dispersed on May 24 by soldiers of the 382nd Infantry Division, the withdrawal of the remaining units continued systematically under the cover of special detachments, which created the appearance of the presence of troops in their previous positions. The 2nd Shock Army did not allow its battle formations to be violated in other places. Two divisions and two brigades occupied the second line of defense, the rest of the troops moved to the area of ​​concentration to Novaya Kerest, where they accumulated in crowded battle formations on an area of ​​\u200b\u200bless than 16 square kilometers.

On May 26, the enemy intensified the pursuit of retreating units and began to compress the ring around the 2nd Shock Army. By May 28, the covering troops retreated to the main defensive line, where bunkers and minefields were prepared in advance. The fight on this frontier lasted about two weeks. Upon learning of the withdrawal of the 2nd shock army, the Germans not only intensified their flank attacks, but on May 30 they rushed to the neck at Myasny Bor and on May 31 broke through the army's communications. The corridor was closed again.

For the first 5 days, no one bothered the Germans in the captured corridor. They managed to fortify themselves by building a layered defense with a front to the east on the western outskirts of the village of Teremets-Kurlyandsky against the 59th and 52nd armies and a front to the west along the eastern bank of the river. Polist against the 2nd Shock Army. The command of the front and the 59th Army had to abandon the planned new attack on Lesopunkt and send the assembled troops to liberate the former corridor. The 165th Infantry Division, which had just been formed from the Urals in the city of Kurgan, was pulled up to the former corridor in full strength, the defeated units of the 2nd Infantry Division, the 374th Infantry Division, consisting of two regiments (the third regiment was in the ring), 58- I am a rifle brigade. The 1236th Rifle Regiment of the 372nd Division, which was cut into two parts by the Germans on May 31, was replenished, remaining outside the ring. At the corridor outside the ring, the 54th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 19th Guards Division and the 1004th Rifle Regiment of the 305th Rifle Division were also in readiness to act. The southern flank of the planned offensive near the corridor was provided by the 65th Rifle Division of the 52nd Army.

At 2 am on June 5, the 2nd shock and 59th armies began a meeting battle without artillery preparation in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe Northern Road and the narrow gauge railway. There was no night, instead of them there was a bright twilight, which allowed enemy aircraft to carry out raids on our units at night. Regiments of the unfired Ural 165th Infantry Division, Colonel P.I. Solenov, crowding together during the offensive, came under a concentrated attack by German aircraft from the air and artillery from the ground. Because of the huge losses, panic began. Attempts to stop the fighters did not lead to anything. After putting the units in order and introducing new forces, the attacks continued. However, the enemy managed to beat them off within 3 days. On June 8, the troops went on the defensive. The 165th division lost over 60% of the personnel of the regiments in 3 days.

As a result of these battles, the Headquarters finally realized the fallacy of the abolition of the Volkhov Front. On June 8, the front was restored, K.A. again became in command of it. Meretskov. On the same day, he, together with the new chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky arrived in Malaya Vishera and further to the village of Myasnoy Bor. Stalin ordered them to withdraw the 2nd shock army from the ring, at least without heavy weapons and equipment. On June 10, at 2 am, the 2nd shock and 59th armies launched a new counter offensive. All our combat-ready formations were drawn to Myasnoy Bor, up to the consolidated regiments of cavalrymen of the 25th Cavalry Division of the 13th Corps on foot. The replenished 24th Rifle Brigade was also transferred to the corridor. The fighting went on without stopping for 9 days with varying success, but with a clear preponderance of the enemy, especially in artillery and aviation.

Meanwhile, the encircled troops occupied the last line along the river. Kerest. Their situation was desperate - almost without cartridges, without shells, without food, without large reinforcements, they could hardly hold back the onslaught of 4 enemy divisions. There were 100-150 people left in the regiments, the soldiers received a matchbox of rusk crumbs a day, and even if our planes managed to break through in the white nights that had come, people still held on. In these battles, the 327th Rifle Division of Colonel I.M. Antyufeev, who was later taken prisoner.

On June 18, a U-2 plane landed at the location of the army, bringing crackers, canned food and ... newspapers. Army Commander A.A. Vlasov was asked to fly on this plane. He refused. Instead, the wounded commander of the artillery of the army, Major General G.E., was put on the plane. Degtyarev. The plane was the last one that managed to land in the ring.

On June 19, in the zone of operations of the 2nd shock and 59th armies in Myasny Bor, there was some success - in the evening, the forces of the 24th rifle and 29th tank brigades managed to break through a corridor along the Northern Road and a narrow gauge railway about 1 km wide. From that moment began a disorderly exit of the personnel of the encircled units that fought on the western bank of the river. Polist. In total, about 17,000 people came out. Together with the soldiers, the civilian population also tried to leave, of which there were about 6.5 thousand people in the location of the 2nd Shock Army.

A feature of the events was that the flanks of the newly created corridor were not fixed. The exhausted soldiers of the 2nd Shock, who had not seen normal food for about 20 days, were not able to stop at their positions and return to the corridor. And after leaving, they could not eat much for medical reasons, although a considerable amount of food stocks were concentrated at the Myasnoy Bor station for distribution to the leaving soldiers. Of these, right at the station, representatives of the headquarters of the 59th Army and the front formed teams that were brought together in a detachment of about 1,500 people. and are subordinate to Colonel N.P. Korkin, who was in the reserve of the command staff of the 59th Army. The detachment with difficulty returned to the corridor and fought on a par with other units, the battle formations of which, frankly, were scattered. Parts suffered huge losses, which there was no one to make up for.

On the evening of June 22, the enemy again succeeded along the eastern bank of the river. Polist to intercept the corridor with the forces of the SS division “Policeman” and the 540th penal battalion. They fought the desperation of suicide bombers. The distance between the encircled 2nd Shock Army and the Mainland, although only about 2 km in a straight line, again became insurmountable.

The location of the 2nd shock army, the German artillery was already shooting through the entire depth. The Germans managed to escape the cryptographer of the 8th department of the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army Malyuk. He pointed the German bombers directly at the location of the army headquarters, indicating the exact location on the map. The enemy carried out a massive aerial bombardment of the indicated place. At the same time, the communication center of the army headquarters was partially broken, among the staff workers there were many losses in the dead and wounded.

K.A. Meretskov warned A.A. Vlasov, that the front gathered the last forces for a breakthrough and all encircled troops should prepare for a decisive blow.

In agreement with the headquarters of the front, the assault on the German line near the river. Polist and exit from the encirclement were scheduled for 23.30 on June 24th. The troops were divided into three columns, with one of them leaving the Military Council of the Army, headed by the commander. All equipment (artillery and mortars - about 600 barrels of all calibers, about 650 vehicles, communications equipment) was blown up or damaged, people went out light with personal portable weapons. Everyone understood that this would be the very “last and decisive battle”, as in the anthem of the Communist Party “Internationale”. In the forest dotted with funnels between the Glushitsa and Kerest rivers, there were about 10,000 wounded. Some of them were lying on narrow-gauge railway platforms, some were in stretchers or simply on the ground among fallen trees. They were not taken into the breach. The head of the sanitary department of the army, military doctor of the 1st rank K.K., remained with the wounded. Boborykin and almost the entire management staff. All of them fell into the hands of the enemy on June 26-28. Chief Sanitary Officer Boborykin was released from captivity in 1945.

To the border of the Germans at the river. Throughout the day and evening of June 24, thousands of people secretly pulled up to Polist. Everyone was waiting for the signal to launch an attack to the east. The enemy continued to methodically bombard the location of the army. However, the greatest damage to the battle formations of the encircled Soviet units concentrated for the attack was caused by massive fire ... of their own rocket artillery. At 22.40, 22.45 and 22.50 the 28th and 30th Guards Mortar Regiments of the 59th and 52nd armies fired 4 regimental volleys with Katyusha rockets from outside the ring right along the former corridor and, instead of destroying the enemy’s battle formations, hit crowded units 2 th Shock Army. The Germans also got it in order. Seeing this, the surviving personnel of our units, without a signal, without waiting for the agreed time, went on a breakthrough. Parts are in motion. Perhaps this explains the fact that the Military Council of the Army and the persons accompanying it (about 120-150 people) did not find anyone at the location of the headquarters of the 46th Infantry Division, with which they were supposed to leave according to the plan.

The enemy began a massive barrage of artillery fire across the area of ​​the corridor. The artillery of the 59th and 52nd armies at the appointed hour also opened fire on enemy positions, trying to border the corridor from the north and south, but luck did not always accompany either the artillerymen or the outgoing encirclement. Surviving eyewitnesses reported that the frequency of explosions in the corridor was approximately equal both from our side and from the enemy. And destructive in the same way. After the war, he became the first deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, the future colonel general, and in June 1942 - the head of intelligence of the 2nd Shock Army, Colonel A.M. Rogov testified in 3 copies of his report, different in content, that it was possible to get out of the ring only if applied to the waves of barrage fire, which hit from both sides. A wave of shells exploded - get up and run as fast as you can to the next funnel so that you have time to fall before the arrival of a new wave of shells. And only in this way, by rifts, relying on the speed of the legs and luck, it was possible to go through all the hell that the swampy, dead forest had turned into.

In total, on June 24-25, 1942, 9611 people managed to pass through the corridor from the ring. The Military Council of the army did not come out to the mainland. The front commander sent 5 T-34 tanks with machine gunners led by his adjutant Captain Beard to search for him. The captain completed the task halfway - having lost 4 tanks, he found the place where the army commander and members of the Military Council of the army were last seen, but did not find anyone there.

At 09:30 on June 25, the enemy finally blocked the corridor. The remnants of the covering troops and soldiers who did not have time to pass the corridor, he squeezed in a deadly vice between the rivers Polist, Glushitsa and Kerest and near the Zamoshskoye swamp. On June 26 and 27, the command of the Volkhov Front made the last attempt to break the ring - the enemy was attacked from the east in a swampy forest north of the narrow-gauge railway of the 8th Guards. and 11 Guards. rifle regiments of the replenished 4th Guards Rifle Division, as well as a combined detachment of the 378th division. The attempt was unsuccessful. The advancing units suffered heavy losses, but they could not break through to the encircled.

On June 26, the enemy united with units of the 61st, 254th, 291st and 58th Infantry Divisions inside the ring, thus breaking it into several parts. On June 28, during a fierce hand-to-hand fight, the enemy managed to eliminate the last centers of resistance of our troops.

By the evening of June 28, the fighting in the area occupied by the 2nd Shock Army had subsided. The troops of both sides went on the defensive. The Germans continued to clear the "cauldron", shooting the seriously wounded and allowing those who could walk to move. The Germans first led the soldiers of our defeated army out of the forest to the river. Kerest. Several trucks with food were thrown there, after which they distributed a little to each prisoner who got what. It is known that the Germans allocated more high-calorie food to the captured command staff. Some commanders shared it with the soldiers. After that, all the prisoners were gathered in columns and led in the direction of Chudovo along the Kerest River. Some of those who were healthier were left in the near military rear of the German troops to carry out auxiliary and construction work 3-4 km from the front line. There were almost no guards at the locations of the prisoners, but there were few escapes. Some of the soldiers who were in these camps, having escaped, managed to cross the front line and go to their own in the bands of the 59th and 4th armies.

On June 28, Hitler's Headquarters published a victorious message about the end of the Battle of Volkhov, which the Nazis dated from January 13, 1942. It says about the capture of 32,759 prisoners for the entire period of events all the way from Ladoga to Novgorod, the loss in the same zone by our troops of 649 guns, 171 tanks, 2904 machine guns, mortars and machine guns. Those. the losses were shown by the Germans in the zone of their 18th army, but in the zones of the 54th, 4th, 59th, 2nd Shock and 52nd armies of our side. There is no doubt that the largest part of the losses fell on the troops of the 2nd Shock and 59th armies. For example, on the basis of archival documents, it can be reliably said that in June 1942 the total losses, incl. killed, wounded and missing, only in parts of the 59th and 52nd armies, who were not in the ring and fought to break through the corridor to the surrounded 2nd Shock Army, amounted to 98,000 people. Up to 7-8 thousand encircled died in June in the ring on the square from the Kerest River to the Polist River. This statistics is confirmed by the finds of search engines in those places for 1986-2016. Up to 20 thousand of our fighters were captured in the same place on June 24-30, 1942.

In the available publications, an erroneous opinion has been established about the number of people who left the ring. For example, you can find such messages: “In total, 16,000 people left the encirclement. Another 6,000 people were killed during the breakthrough. 8,000 people are missing."

In fact, by the beginning of June 1942, about 61,500 people were in the ring. military personnel and about 6,500 civilians. In reality, in just the period of June 19-30, 1942 and later, about 30,000 people left the encirclement. soldiers of the 2nd Shock and 52nd armies. The output of groups and singles continued until autumn. Someone managed to get out on the site of the 54th Army, and others in the strip of the North-Western Front south of Lake Ilmen.

The total losses of the Volkhov Front for the period from the beginning of January to June 30, 1942 amounted to almost 396 thousand people killed, wounded, missing, frostbitten, sick and captured, incl. 143 thousand people - irrevocably (killed, missing and taken prisoner).

For a long time, the fate of the 2nd Shock Army was mistakenly associated by many with the fate of its last commander, General A.A. Vlasov. In fact, having arrived in the already surrounded army, Vlasov, until the very last days of the encirclement, performed his duties as best he could. He became a traitor, who forever covered his name with shame, a little later ... When the attempt to break through failed, Vlasov's group, in which 45 people remained, returned to the command post of the 382nd division. Vlasov was still in a state of shock and the command was temporarily taken over by the chief of staff of the army, Colonel P.S. Vinogradov. It was decided to withdraw behind enemy lines and cross the front line elsewhere.

The detachment moved north, crossed the river. Kerest, near the village. Vditsko had a fight with the Germans. We decided to move west, behind the Batetskaya - Leningrad railway, to the village of Poddubie. Vlasov said that he had recovered from nervous stress and was already in command of the detachment again. We stopped to rest 2 km from Poddubye. Here the detachment, at the suggestion of P.S. Vinogradova was divided into groups, many of which reached their own in different ways. The group of Commander Vlasov (himself, Chief of Staff Vinogradov, Red Army soldier-vest Kotov, staff driver Pogibko and nurse-cook Masha Voronova) on the evening of July 11, in a skirmish with the Germans, entered into a skirmish. Kotov was slightly wounded, Vinogradov in the overcoat of Lieutenant General Vlasov died. He was later at first mistaken for Vlasov. Kotov and Pogibko went to the village of Yam-Tesovo, where they were captured by the police, and Vlasov and Voronova went to the village of Tukhovezhi, inhabited by Old Believers. Vlasov called himself a refugee teacher, on his Red Army tunic there were no insignia or orders. They were received by the headman of the village, who fed the travelers. While they were resting, he also brought armed local residents from self-defense to detain both. Vlasov and Voronova were locked in a bathhouse (or barn). The Germans were informed about the detention of the "bandits". On the morning of July 12, the head of the intelligence department of the 1st 38th Army Corps, Hauptmann von Schwerdtner, with an interpreter Sonderführer Pelhau, an assistant Hamann and a driver Lipski, left to identify the corpse of Vlasov (actually Vinogradov). The corpse was identified as supposedly the corpse of Vlasov. On the way back, the group stopped at Tukhovezhi to check and interrogate the detainees. The headman opened the door and ordered the man to come out with his hands up. “Don’t shoot, I’m General Vlasov,” he said in broken German after leaving the bathhouse and handed Schwerdtner a red leather certificate signed by Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko. The man turned out to be like two drops of water similar to the lieutenant general and commander Vlasov killed in his overcoat in the photo of Schwerdtner.

The general was taken to the headquarters of Army Group North in the village of Siverskaya. At the very first interrogation, Vlasov told the Germans everything he knew about the position of the Red Army near Leningrad. Thus began the path of his betrayal. His further fate is known - service to the Germans, the formation of units from defectors and morally unstable prisoners, the war against his own and the logical ending - the general, after a closed court session, was hanged at dawn on August 2, 1946 in the courtyard of the internal prison of the USSR Ministry of State Security - as a traitor to the motherland and a military man criminal...

Soviet military propaganda deliberately shifted all the blame for the failure of the operation to Vlasov - thereby keeping silent about the numerous miscalculations of the Headquarters (i.e., I.V. Stalin himself) and the General Staff in planning and leading the entire winter-spring campaign of 1942. To these miscalculations this includes the inability to organize the interaction of the Volkhov Front with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, and the planning of the operation without proper provision of troops with ammunition, and much more, in particular, the decision of the Stavka to introduce an entire army into a narrow gap, barely punched in the enemy defenses.

The miscalculations of the high command, plus the huge technical superiority of the enemy, did not allow the soldiers of the Volkhov Front to complete the Luban operation and break through the blockade of Leningrad on the first attempt. Nevertheless, the heroic struggle of the 54th, 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th, as well as the 4th armies saved the exhausted Leningrad, which could not withstand a new assault, pulled over more than 15 enemy divisions (including 6 divisions and one brigade were transferred from Western Europe), ultimately allowed our troops near Leningrad to win a difficult victory and defend the city after a while.

The blockade of Leningrad killed not only the inhabitants of the besieged city. Attempts to lift the siege were made constantly and often ended in catastrophes of various sizes. One of the most famous such stories was the offensive of the 2nd shock army and its death in the spring and summer of 1942. For various reasons, this operation became widely known and overgrown with various speculations regarding the circumstances of the tragedy. In addition, the last commander of the army, Lieutenant General Vlasov, in captivity, went to cooperate with the Nazis and became one of the most famous traitors of the Second World War.

By January 1942, the Wehrmacht was on the verge of a grandiose disaster. Suddenly emerging from the fog of war, the Soviet reserve armies inflicted a heavy defeat on Army Group Center near Moscow, and the counteroffensive quickly spread along the entire front. The German Eastern Front only with great difficulty avoided complete collapse. For their part, the Soviet troops got their first taste of victory and carried out enthusiastic offensives along the entire front, from Tikhvin to the Crimea. This wave of winter offensives also included an attempt to lift the siege of Leningrad.

The Germans did not give up hope of locking up and eventually destroying Leningrad completely. To achieve this goal, it was supposed to go to the eastern outskirts of the city and interrupt the Road of Life. Such a threat was quite real, and only active actions could fend it off.

Breaking through the "bottleneck" itself south of Lake Ladoga was the most obvious option. However, even a successful exit to Shlisselburg did not solve the main problem in the end. The gap would inevitably be very narrow, allowing the Germans to shoot through the corridor, or even seal it back. A wider offensive was needed, which could push the front a considerable distance from Leningrad. It was this idea that formed the basis of the future Luban operation.

The strike force of the offensive was to be the Volkhov Front of General of the Army Kirill Meretskov. The plan provided for a classic encirclement: they were going to envelop the Germans with armies advancing towards each other in the direction of Tosno. Support for this offensive from the south was provided by the 2nd Shock Army. It belonged to the reserve associations, it was formed only in the autumn of 1941. The disappearance of entire armies and even fronts in the cauldrons of 1941 led to the emergency creation of divisions, and then armies, which had a short time for coordination and training. There was also a shortage of command personnel, and the new army was led by Lieutenant General of the NKVD Grigory Sokolov. Until now, his service experience has been associated mainly with the internal and border troops.

On paper, the army was a pretty serious force. It included 44 thousand people, two tank battalions (71 vehicles), 462 guns. However, even when setting the task, a serious mistake was made: the army was assigned a very ambitious task - to break through into the depths of the German defense, and then turn at a right angle to the south and get right up to Luga. The headquarters overestimated the capabilities of the 2nd Army.

The offensive ground to a halt almost immediately, with only marginal gains being made by the attackers. The lack of artillery, ammunition, imperfect tactics and poor leadership led to the fact that the attacks bogged down in just a couple of days. The 2nd shock suffered heavy losses at the very beginning of the battle. Some brigades attacked without artillery support, not even mortars.

On January 10, Stalin reprimanded Meretskov and offered to take a break from the attacks for better preparation. Sokolov was removed from the post of army commander due to blatant incompetence. He was replaced by the more experienced Nikolai Klykov, an experienced officer who commanded a platoon back in World War I, who had fought in the northern sector of the front since the summer of 1941 and had positive experience in leading the army near Tikhvin. Having time to prepare, combined with the organizational conclusions, had an immediate effect. The army crossed the Volkhov and made its way through the first line of defense of the Wehrmacht. Against the backdrop of the completely failed attacks of the neighbors, this already looked like a success, and Meretskov reoriented the reserves into the 2nd strike zone.

The army struggled its way through the swampy forests. Transfers from other sectors managed to achieve a serious numerical superiority over the Germans, and the army, paying with blood for every step, nevertheless broke the front. Meretskov significantly reduced the swing of his pincers, and now the offensive was actually carried out by two armies: the 2nd shock army from the southeast to the northwest and the 54th from the northeast to the southwest. They were supposed to meet at the Lyuban station, creating a small cauldron for the Germans.

The wedge driven into the German positions was quite deep, it already reached 30 kilometers - but narrow. The base of the breakthrough did not exceed 12 km. It cannot be said that Klykov or Meretskov did not see that the army was already in a dangerous position. However, while the offensive continued, and a breakthrough to Lyuban would have already put the Germans in a catastrophic situation. Go to the rear of the Germans, intercept the road - and then ...

However, Army Group North was not led by amateurs. Von Küchler, the commander of the army, was withdrawing reserves to fend off the Russian offensive from literally everywhere. Küchler paid special attention to maintaining strongholds at the base of the breakthrough. In the winter of 1941, the creation of these strongholds, "corner posts", became a standard operational technique for the Germans.

At the base of the breakthrough, a section was selected that was pumped up with reserves and defended in any conditions. The defeat of these defense centers was a great difficulty for the Red Army during the first military winter, due to both objective reasons (weak industry and, as a result, a lack of ammunition) and subjective (untried tactics). On the front of the 2nd shock army, the village of Spasskaya Polist became such a tough nut to crack. Already from the name ("polist" - "bog") one can easily understand the nature of the area. An attempt to capture the German strongholds on the flank by specially assigned operational groups and thus secure themselves failed.

Meanwhile, Meretskov decided to finish off the enemy by bringing cavalry into battle - the 13th Cavalry Corps. The cavalry began to bypass Luban, and the arrows attacked the station, which was only 10 kilometers away.

However, this task has remained almost solved. The 2nd shock drove a wedge into the front already 75 km deep. Large forces were required to protect the perimeter that had suddenly become huge. Thus, an insufficient number of troops remained at the spearhead of the attack. The advancing 54th Army did not penetrate deep, and Luban was still a close elbow that could not be bitten. In mid-February, Meretskov's detachments slightly widen the gap at the base, and Klykov again sends fresh forces to Lyuban. The cavalry had already cut the railroad north of the station.

Meanwhile, on the opposite side of the front, too, they were well aware that the situation had become threatening. German reserves arrived at the front of the 2nd shock army. By the end of winter, the offensive finally fizzled out. The Germans cut off the wedging to the railway with a local counterattack. Although the Russians quickly made their way out of the small pot, the road was unblocked. It became impossible to continue the offensive. The 2nd shock army almost won its battle - and froze.

An almost won, but never taken place, victory put the Red Army units in a very dangerous position. A large group was in the rear of the Germans, suspended on two large clearings in a corridor only 14 km wide. Spring was coming, and this meant even greater difficulties in terms of supply, removal of the wounded. In addition, all the reserves were already thrown into the furnace, and in case of trouble it would be difficult to fend off the German counterattacks.

The Red Army found itself in a situation where everything was at stake, but the bet did not work. The zigzags of the defense perimeter of the 2nd shock were already 200 kilometers, the front was stretched like a string. Meanwhile, there was little time left to take fire measures to save her. On March 2, Hitler demanded a counteroffensive from von Küchler to encircle and defeat the 2nd shock.

On March 15, the Germans made their move. Of course, the corridor at the base of the breakthrough became the point of application of forces. The five-day battles culminated in the formation of German shock groups. The 2nd shock was surrounded in almost primeval forests and swamps.

However, the Russians kept their positions near the roads and did not allow the Germans to really take over them. On March 27, a counterattack was planned from inside and outside the boiler. Outside, Meretskov gathered three rifle divisions - not much, but they had a short distance to go.

It was then that the name of the village of Myasnoy Bor was imprinted in the history of the country. Near it, it was possible to make a corridor only about three kilometers wide. Nevertheless, even such a narrow gap allowed the 2nd shock to hold out for some more time.

It was during the March battles on the Volkhov front that one of the main participants in the drama, Lieutenant General Andrei Vlasov, appeared. Considering that it was he who commanded the army in its last weeks, and later won Judas fame, it is necessary to dwell on his personality in more detail.

Vlasov participated in the Civil War and, apparently, showed himself well: in battles against the White Guard and the anarchists of Makhno, he made a rather quick career. Between the Civil and World War II, he managed to serve in China, and by the beginning of the war he headed the 4th mechanized corps. Like others, he retreated in 1941 and in September, at the head of the remnants of his 37th Army, made his way from the Kyiv pocket.

A further episode of his career gave rise to strange speculations: already in our time, Vlasov was declared by his modern supporters to be the savior of Moscow. This thesis of reality, of course, does not correspond to any approximation. Near Moscow, Vlasov commanded the 20th Army. This army is one of the reserve formations that were supposed to extinguish the energy of the German strike in the event of the introduction of large reserves and, possibly, fight on the streets of Moscow. In the defense of the capital, the 20th Army participated only at the end of the battle.

On the good side, Vlasov showed himself already in December, during the counteroffensive of the Red Army. Here the 20th was advancing quite successfully, and although it did not achieve such a deep breakthrough as some others, it also did not turn out to be an outsider at all. As a result of the offensive, Vlasov became deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

It was in this capacity that he came to the 2nd shock army. That is, if we discard the stories about "Stalin's favorite commander", we have before us a biography not of some great hero, but of a proven officer who is in good standing with the command. Vlasov, of course, was included in the clip of commanders who advanced as a result of the struggle for Moscow (Govorov, Lelyushenko, Belov ...). So the Headquarters had every reason to rely on his experience and qualifications.

Meanwhile, Meretskova seems to have embraced the excitement of the player. As soon as the 2nd strike was hardly cut through a narrow and fragile corridor, he issues an order to Klykov:

"The immediate task of the army is to capture the Oktyabrskaya railway and the Leningradskoye highway in the sector southeast of Lyuban. In the future, providing for itself from the Chudov direction, advance and seize Lyuban in cooperation with the troops of the Leningrad Front."

The decision is frankly adventurous. Is it possible to understand Meretskov? Can. The 2nd shock army has already paid with great blood for a breakthrough, its fate hung in the balance, and Luban is so close. The temptation to go to the kings with one blow was too great. At the same time, Klykov, whose army, in fact, was at risk, was already ringing the bells and pointing out the danger of the position of his troops.

The new attack of the army was not successful: after a slight advance, it was again stopped.

The army, in the words of the historian David Glantz, had not yet been strangled, but was already suffocating. The muddy road made the clearings barely passable, fuel, provisions, even ammunition were delivered intermittently. No wonder, in fact, that a fairly strong blow was parried so easily. The army now had a very short breath, it could not withstand the intense battle for a long time, corny due to the exhaustion of shells and cartridges.

April was a moment of serious shake-up of the command of the Red Army in the northern sector of the front. The Volkhov direction was headed by Lieutenant General Mikhail Khozin. Like a number of other commanders of the Red Army, he received officer epaulettes in the old army, graduating from the ensign school in 1916. Theoretically, he was one of the very well-trained commanders of the Red Army. In practice, the results of the direct command of troops performed by this commander can hardly be called unambiguously positive. A good rear guard, supplier and teacher, during the war Khozin repeatedly received not the most flattering marks as a commander in the field.

The commander of the 2nd shock also changed: instead of the seriously ill Klykov, the army was under the command of Vlasov. He had to accept the army in the most deplorable state: lack of ammunition, food, medicines, a huge shortage of any auxiliary equipment, problems even with shoes and uniforms, a long absence of replenishment of exhausted units. The trenches are flooded with water, there is nowhere to dry off, there is nowhere to warm up either.

Artilleryman Boris Pavlov recalled:

"The area on Volkhovskoye is swampy and wooded, there were places where a human foot had not set foot for centuries, tons of mushrooms and berries, then I read: the Germans called these places the Volkhov jungle, people and equipment really drowned in the swamps. We melted the stoves with artillery gunpowder, as long as pasta, there was water in the dugouts all year round, you can’t dig holes from bombs, you can’t bury ammunition either, guns, especially heavy ones, were installed only on log cabins, after a few shots the gun sagged. exploded - a headache for pyrotechnicians on both sides. There were practically no roads, only roads built with incredible labor. "

It cannot be said that Khozin generally ignored the problem of the rear of the 2nd shock. His first steps look quite reasonable: he was going to withdraw two divisions from the positions of the 2nd shock to solve the problem of Spasskaya Polis. Subsequently, the whole tragedy of the 2nd shock was blamed on Khozin, but it was he who was the author of the report of May 11, which contained the following words:

"Either we create a grouping strong enough to defeat the enemy in the area southwest of Spasskaya Polisti, and thereby maintain the advantageous operational position of the 2nd shock army for the subsequent Luban operation, or we are forced to cede the captured territory to the enemy and, saving troops, withdraw 2nd shock army and part of the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies to the front of Olkhovka, Novaya Kerest, Bolshoye Zamoshye ... "

Unlike the gambling Meretskov, Khozin preferred to be careful and gradually pull the army out of the trap in which it was. Another question is how exactly to conduct this operation.

Meanwhile, personnel changes reached the top leadership of the army. On May 11, 1942, Alexander Vasilevsky took over as Chief of the General Staff. One of his first decisions in his new capacity was the withdrawal of the 2nd shock army. Vasilevsky was anything but a gambler, and the situation near Lyuban immediately worried him.

Realizing that the army is already almost surrounded, he orders not only to withdraw troops from the ledge, but to actually break through. The Directive of the Stavka proposes to withdraw the army from the sack by forcibly breaking through the redoubts at Spasskaya Polist. The new plan had one serious weakness: for the next blow to Polisti, the troops on the corridor itself were greatly weakened, which remained the only way for the army to escape.

By the end of April, the 2nd shock was already not just in a bad situation. It is difficult not to come to the conclusion that any decision of the Headquarters, whether adventurous or cautious, still worsened its position. While the soldiers slowly pulled out of the trap along thin threads, the Wehrmacht was preparing the final blow.

On May 22, a bag near Lyuban was attacked by nine enemy divisions from different sides. This time the Germans had a numerical advantage over the troops of the army, and, given the exhaustion of the Soviet troops, this blow should already have been fatal. Note that the divisions of the Vlasov army have long been out of line with their own name. In fact, these formations of 2-5 thousand people were rather reinforced brigades.

The biggest mistake, which eventually led to the death of the army, perhaps, consisted precisely in the fact that the capabilities of the troops in the corridor were not given due attention, and the troops withdrawn from the bag did not cover the retreat of their comrades who were still inside.

The stubborn defense of two weak divisions along the corridor made it possible to hold it for several days. Then the strength ran out. On May 31 the lid slammed shut. The soldiers of the 2nd shock army these few days were finally divided into the living and the dead. More than 40 thousand people remained in the boiler.

The rate reacted to what was happening belatedly, but actively. The first strikes from outside were not successful, but a new offensive was planned for June 10 to rescue the encircled. Khozin was removed from his post, Meretskov was returned to his place, but this did little to help the cause. Nevertheless, it was this commander who still had to bring this painfully ending operation to the end.

Whenever possible, supplies were dropped into the boiler by aircraft. These were crumbs: the USSR did not have a sufficiently powerful transport aircraft for an air bridge for 40 thousand encircled. Outside, they were preparing a group to break through the ring. At this time, the soldiers in the cauldron experienced monstrous suffering. Often the fighters did not eat for several days. Grass, bark, frogs, insects were eaten, draft horses were eaten a long time ago. The ammunition for the heavy artillery ran out, and those who made their way made their way only with direct-fire forty-five fire.

Outside, a new strike was being prepared. It was necessary to hurry: the Germans slowly but surely gnawed through the front of the 2nd shock, squeezing the bag. On June 19, one of the battle groups (11 T-34s and landing troops) managed the almost impossible - with a desperate attack, they broke through the encirclement ring and created a small corridor. In a space only 300 meters wide, everything that could move rushed to freedom. The corridor was continuously shelled, many people found death in the swamps along the edges of the paths, but thousands of people and, in particular, 2000 wounded managed to get out. "A wall of fire, howling and roaring, suffocating the stench of burning human flesh," wrote an eyewitness of this hell, one of the soldiers who managed to go east. "We all thought it was better to die in the fire than to be taken prisoner."

On the night of June 22, the last organized group broke out of the encirclement - 6 thousand people. The detachment of the 29th tank brigade of Colonel Mikhail Klimenko, who broke through the path to salvation (those same “thirty-fours”), no doubt deserved their eternal glory: many truly turned out to be indebted to a few for everything.

Communication with the 2nd shock army was interrupted. June 24 began the last frenzied attack from within. All able to move dismantled their weapons and supported the attack. Tankers, gunners, riders, drivers - everyone tried to use the last chance. The technique was undermined, if there was anything left. A dense smoke spread over the positions of the 2nd shock: they burned the last warehouses with what they could not carry away. The attack was supported by the artillery of the troops remaining outside the pocket.

No one really commanded the last attack. Among the attackers was the head of the reconnaissance department of the Rogov army, but he led only those fighters to whom he could personally shout. Groups of soldiers and officers acted at their own discretion. The hail of shells from the east slowed down the activity of the German cannons and machine guns a little, so some detachments of determined soldiers managed to break free, demolishing the barriers with the fire of hand weapons. However, for most of the soldiers and officers, the roads littered with bodies near the village of Myasnoy Bor were the last thing they saw in their lives.

On June 25, during the day, all exits from the ring were finally sealed. The army broke up into separate pockets of resistance.

The deputy commander of the army went out to the partisans, and later he was taken to the mainland. On July 12, Vlasov was captured, captured by the policemen of the village, in which he tried to find food. The collaborators handed it over to the German patrol. The remnants of the army either surrendered or stubbornly continued to search for ways to get out.

In total, about 11 thousand people managed to escape, taking into account all the groups that subsequently escaped. The losses of the 2nd shock army and the 59th army (at the base of the boiler) from May to the end of the battle amounted to about 55 thousand people killed and captured. Of these, at least 30-40 thousand died or were captured in the 20th of June.

The further fate of Vlasov is well known. His collaborationist army never became a combat-ready formation, and the cases when it entered into battle with the Red Army can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Subsequently, Vlasov was caught, sentenced to death and hanged.

In the future, attempts were made both to blame him for the defeat of the army, and to declare the tragedy the 2nd shock reason for his betrayal. Both of these theses are unfounded. In the position of army commander, Vlasov acted quite rationally, no worse than almost any army commander in his place. He was captured when communication with all combat units had long been lost.

On the other hand, with all the horrors of the environment, he could not see anything new there compared to the tragedy of the Kyiv boiler, in which he fought in the 41st. The story of Vlasov's betrayal is, in the final analysis, "just" the story of a psychologically broken person, and, perhaps, he did not prevaricate at the trial, when, when asked about the reasons for going over to the side of the Germans, he succinctly answered: "I lost heart."

The six-month battle of the 2nd Shock Army could have been one of the biggest victories of the Red Army, but turned into a terrible defeat. Victory has many fathers, defeat is always an orphan, and yet it is worth considering how such a catastrophe came about.

In the spring of 1942, many formations of the Red Army fell into the same type of trap. The advances made during the winter resulted in the appearance of many protrusions of the front line, often with a narrow base. The practice of forming "corner pillars" later resulted in a whole series of defeats, when such strongholds became starting positions for Wehrmacht counterattacks. In the case of the 2nd strike point, Spasskaya Polist became such a point.

However, concrete decisions led to a specific disaster at Myasny Bor. The Wehrmacht in 1942 was generally superior to the Red Army in terms of ability to fight, but this superiority in itself does not explain anything. Let by making more efforts, losing more people, the Red Army was already able to shake the enemy's defenses. And the breakthrough in depth, which brought the 2nd shock army almost to Lyuban itself, showed this perfectly.

However, an offensive with Spasskaya Polista in the rear that had not been taken was already a risky step, and further attempts to attack, without securing their own rear, smacked of a gamble. At the same time, the command of the army and the entire front constantly rushed between the two directions, in the end not solving any of the urgent tasks: neither Polist nor Lyuban were taken.

Probably, a large private operation that would lead to the release of Polisti would have solved the problem, but the difficulty is that she never had enough strength that it would not be a pity to give to solve a specific issue. It is we who now have accurate information that there were not enough opportunities to capture Luban. And the command of the army, the front, and the Headquarters itself at any given moment seemed to be able to solve the problem with the next last effort to interrupt the communications of the Wehrmacht and solve the problem radically.

One should not think that this is only a problem of the Red Army: exactly the same attempts to throw all their forces into the cause and bring down the enemy’s defenses with the last spurt led the Wehrmacht in the same 1942 to the little-known boiler near Gisel and the world-famous boiler near Stalingrad.

However, in May-June, this humanly understandable desire led to the death of the 2nd shock army. In the end, when the new commanders, Vlasov, Khozin and Vasilevsky, tried to stop the gambling race with death and smoothly withdraw the army from the bag, she had already climbed too deep into the trap.

What did the captured Soviet commander tell the Germans

This document was preserved in an envelope glued to the album “Battle of Volkhov”, which was published in a limited edition in December 1942 by the 621st propaganda company of the 18th German army. It ended up at the disposal of a German collector who asked me to help in the search for a Russian museum or a colleague interested in getting the find to Russia.

Fragments of the protocol published below have already been published in No. 4 of the Military Historical Journal for 1991 (translated from a copy stored in the Lubyanka archive), but I have read its full text for the first time. Here he is.

“Secret.

Report on the interrogation of the commander of the 2nd Soviet-Russian shock army, Lieutenant General Vlasov.

Part I

Brief information about the biography and military career.

Vlasov was born on September 1, 1901 in the Gorky region (so in the text. - B.S.). Father: a peasant, the owner of 35-40 morgens of land (morgen - 0.25 hectares, therefore, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe plot is about 9-10 hectares, that is, Vlasov's father was a middle peasant, and not a fist, as Soviet propaganda claimed. - B.S. ), an old peasant family. Received a secondary education. In 1919 he studied for 1 year at the University of Nizhny Novgorod. In 1920 he joined the Red Army.

“Vlasov did not hide anything from the Germans and told the enemy everything he knew or heard. However, nothing indicated the possibility of his transfer to the service of the enemy”

V. was not originally accepted into the Communist Party as a former seminarian.

1920 - attends the school of junior commanders. Then he commands a platoon on the Wrangel front. Continues military service until the end of the war in 1920. Then until 1925 - platoon commander and acting company commander. 1925 - attends the secondary commanders' school. 1928 - School of senior commanders (in his autobiography, dated April 16, 1940, the brigade commander A. A. Vlasov reported: "In the period 1928-1929 he graduated from the tactical and rifle training courses for the improvement of the command staff of the Red Army" Shot "in Moscow." - B .FROM.). 1928 - battalion commander, 1930 - joins the Communist Party in order to be promoted in the Red Army. 1930 - teaches tactics at the officers' school in Leningrad. Starting from 1933, he was an assistant to the head of department 1a (operational department) at the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District (in the autobiography of A. A. Vlasov, written on April 16, 1940, it says: “From February 1933 he was transferred to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District, where he held positions: assistant chief of the 1st sector of the 2nd department - 2 years, assistant chief of the combat training department - 1 year, after which he was the head of the training department for military translator courses of the intelligence department of the LVO for 1.5 years. the department at that time really was called the operational department. - B.S.). 1930 - regiment commander. 1938 - for a short time, chief of staff of the Kyiv military district, after participating in the Soviet-Russian military delegation in China. During this period, he was promoted to the rank of colonel. At the end of a business trip to China in 1939 - commander of the 99th division in Przemysl. 13 months the commander of this division. 1941 - commander of a motorized corps in Lemberg (Lvov. - B.S.). In the battles between Lemberg and Kyiv, the motorized mechanized corps was destroyed. After that, he was appointed commander of the Kyiv fortified area. At the same time, he was transferred to the newly formed 37th Army. He left the encirclement in the Kyiv region with a small group of people. After that, he was temporarily appointed at the disposal of General (actually Marshal. - B.S.) Timoshenko in order to restore the material support units of the Southwestern Front. A month later he was already transferred to Moscow to take command of the newly formed 20th Army. Then - participation in defensive battles around Moscow. Until March 7 - Commander of the 20th Army. March 10 - transfer to the headquarters of the Volkhov Front. Here he began his career as a tactical adviser to the 2nd shock army. After the removal of the commander of the 2nd shock army, General Klykov, took command of this army on April 15th.

Data on the Volkhov Front and the 2nd Shock Army.

The composition of the Volkhov Front in mid-March: 52nd, 59th, 2nd shock and 4th armies.

Commander of the Volkhov Front: General of the Army Meretskov.

Commander of the 52nd Army: Lieutenant General Yakovlev.

Commander of the 59th Army: Major General Korovnikov.

Commander of the 4th Army: unknown.

Characteristics of Army General Meretskov.

Egoist. A calm, objective conversation between the commander of the army and the commander of the front took place with great difficulty. Personal antagonism between Meretskov and Vlasov. Meretskov tried to move Vlasov. Very unsatisfactory orientation and unsatisfactory orders from the front headquarters of the 2nd shock army.

Brief description of Yakovlev.

Achieved good success in the military field, but not satisfied with its use. Personnel officers often bypassed him with promotion. Known to be drunk...

The structure of the 2nd shock army.

Famous brigades and divisions. It is noteworthy that those units of the 52nd and 59th armies that were stationed in the Volkhov pocket were not subordinate to the 2nd shock army.

By mid-March, the units of the 2nd shock army looked very exhausted. They suffered heavy losses during the heavy winter fighting. There were sufficient weapons, but there was not enough ammunition. In mid-March, supplies were already bad and the situation worsened from day to day.

Information about the enemy as of mid-March was of poor quality.

Reasons: lack of intelligence sources, only a few prisoners were captured.

The headquarters of the 2nd shock army believed in mid-March that the armies were opposed by about 6–8 German divisions. It was known that in mid-March these divisions received significant reinforcements.

In mid-March, the 2nd shock army was faced with the following tasks: the capture of Lyuban and the connection with the 54th army.

In connection with the subordination of the 2nd shock army to the Volkhov Front, and the 54th Army to the Leningrad Front, it was not possible to agree on orders for a joint attack on Lyuban.

Information about the real situation of the 54th Army reached the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army very rarely and for the most part did not correspond to reality and exaggerated the successes of the army. With the help of such methods, Meretskov wanted to induce the 2nd shock army to move faster towards Lyuban.

After the connection of the 2nd shock and 54th armies, the next task was to defeat the German troops concentrated in the Chudovo-Lyuban region. The ultimate task of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts in the winter of 1942, according to Vlasov, is the liberation of Leningrad by military means.

In mid-March, the plan to link up the 2nd Shock Army with the 54th Army was as follows: concentrating the forces of the 2nd Shock Army to attack Lyuban through Krasnaya Gorka, strengthening the flank in the Dubovik-Eglino area with the help of the 13th Cavalry Corps, conducting auxiliary attacks on Krivino and Novaya Derevnya.

According to the commander of the 2nd shock army, this plan failed for the following reasons: insufficient striking power, too exhausted personnel, insufficient supplies.

They adhered to the plan of advancing to Lyuban until the end of April.

In early May, Lieutenant General Vlasov was summoned to Malaya Vishera to meet with the front headquarters, which was temporarily headed by Lieutenant General Khozin from the Leningrad Front (M. S. Khozina, who commanded the Leningrad Front, from April 23 to June 8 included in the troops of the temporarily abolished Volkhov Front also made themselves a scapegoat for the death of the 2nd shock army.On June 8, he was removed from his post with the murderous wording: "For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of troops of the 2nd shock army, for command and control methods, for separating from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut the communications of the 2nd shock army and the latter was put in an exceptionally difficult position. ”But, strictly speaking, the enemy cut the communications of the 2nd shock army even before Khozin began to command troops of the Volkhov Front. - B.S.). At this meeting, Vlasov received an order to evacuate the Volkhov boiler. The 52nd and 54th Armies were to cover the retreat of the 2nd Shock Army. On May 9, the commander of the 2nd shock army met with the division commanders, brigade commanders and commissars at the army headquarters, to whom he first announced his intention to retreat.

Note. The testimony of defectors about the 87th Cavalry Division was first received on May 10 at the headquarters of the 18th Army, subsequent news came between May 10 and 15.

Between 15 and 20 May, the retreat orders were given to the troops. Between 20 and 25 May the retreat began.

For the evacuation of the Volkhov boiler, there was the following plan.

First, the withdrawal of rear services, heavy equipment and artillery under the protection of infantry with mortars. Then follows the retreat of the remaining infantry for three consecutive lines:

1st line: Dubovik - Chervinskaya Luka;

2nd line: Finev Lug - Olkhovka;

3rd sector: border of the Kerest river.

The retreat of the 2nd shock army was to be covered from the flanks by the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies. Parts of the 52nd and 59th armies, located inside the Volkhov pocket, were supposed to leave it in an easterly direction last.

The reasons for the failure of the retreat: the extremely poor condition of the roads (spill), very poor supply, especially ammunition and provisions, the lack of a unified leadership of the 2nd shock, 52nd and 59th armies from the Volkhov front.

The fact that on May 30 the broken encirclement ring was again closed by the German troops, the 2nd shock army became aware only two days later. In connection with this closure of the encirclement, Lieutenant General Vlasov demanded from the Volkhov Front: the 52nd and 59th armies should bring down the German barriers at any cost. In addition, he moved all the forces of the 2nd shock army at his disposal to the area east of Krechno in order to open the German barrier from the west. Lieutenant General Vlasov does not understand why the front headquarters did not follow a general order for all three armies to break through the German barrier. Each army fought more or less independently.

From the side of the 2nd shock army on June 23, the last effort was made to break through to the east. At the same time, the forces of the 52nd and 59th armies, used to cover the flanks from the north and south, ceased to control the situation (literally: kamen ... ins Rutschen - slipped, slid. In a fragment of the interrogation protocol published in the Military History Journal , a more gentle translation for the command of the 52nd and 59th armies, but not corresponding to the text of the German original, is given: “At the same time, units of the 52nd and 59th armies came from the north and south to cover the flanks.” - B.S .). On May 24 (probably a typo, it should be: June 24. - B.S.) the unified leadership of the 2nd shock army became impossible and the 2nd shock army breaks up into separate groups.

Lieutenant General Vlasov especially emphasizes the destructive effect of German aviation and the very high losses caused by barrage artillery fire.

According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, about 3,500 wounded from the 2nd shock army left the encirclement in the east, along with insignificant remnants of individual units.

Lieutenant General Vlasov believes that about 60,000 men from the 2nd Shock Army were either taken prisoner or destroyed. (in all likelihood, Vlasov is referring to the losses for March - June. For comparison: during this period, the 18th German army lost 10,872 people killed and 1,487 people missing, as well as 46,473 people wounded, and a total of 58,832 people , which is less than the irretrievable losses of Vlasov's army alone.German irretrievable losses turn out to be five times less than the irretrievable losses of the 2nd shock army alone.But Lindemann's army at that time fought against the 52nd and 59th armies, a significant part of the formations which also ended up in the cauldron and suffered no less damage than Vlasov's army.In addition, the 4th and 54th armies acted against the German 18. It can be assumed that the irretrievable losses of these three armies were at least three times more than the irretrievable losses 2nd shock. - B.S.). He could not provide any information about the number of units of the 52nd and 59th armies located in the Volkhov cauldron.

Intentions of the Volkhov Front.

The Volkhov Front wanted to withdraw the 2nd Shock Army from the Volkhov pocket to the east and concentrate it in the area of ​​Malaya Vishera for restoration, while holding the Volkhov bridgehead.

After the restoration of the 2nd shock army, it was planned to deploy it in the northern part of the Volkhov bridgehead in order to advance on Chudovo with the 2nd shock army from the south and the 54th and 4th armies from the north. In connection with the development of the situation, Lieutenant General Vlasov does not believe in the implementation of this plan.

According to Lieutenant General Vlasov, the plan for the military release of Leningrad will continue to be implemented.

The implementation of this plan will essentially depend on the restoration of the divisions of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts and on the arrival of new forces.

Vlasov believes that with the forces currently available, the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts are not in a position to launch a large-scale offensive in the Leningrad region. In his opinion, the available forces are barely enough to hold the Volkhov front and the line between Kirishi and Lake Ladoga.

Lieutenant General Vlasov denies the need for commissars in the Red Army. In his opinion, in the period after the Finnish-Russian war, when there were no commissars, the command staff felt better.

Part II

interrogation of the commander of the 2nd Soviet-Russian shock army, Lieutenant General Vlasov

Acquisition.

The oldest age group among those called, known to him, is born in 1898, the younger age group is born in 1923.

New formations.

In February, March and April, a large-scale deployment of new regiments, divisions and brigades was carried out. The main area of ​​the new formations should be in the south, on the Volga. He, Vlasov, is poorly versed in new formations within Russia.

military industry.

In the Kuznetsk industrial region, in the southeastern Urals, a significant military industry has been created, which is now reinforced by industry evacuated from the occupied territories. There are all the main types of raw materials here: coal, ore, metal, but no oil. In Siberia, there may be only small, little-used oil fields. Product production is increased by reducing the duration of the production process. Vlasov's opinion is that the industry in the Kuznetsk region will be enough to meet the minimum requirements of the Red Army for heavy weapons, even with the loss of the Donetsk region.

Food position.

The food situation can be said to be stable. It will be completely impossible to do without Ukrainian grain, but there are significant areas of land in Siberia that have recently been developed.

Foreign supplies.

The newspapers pay great attention to deliveries from England and America. According to newspaper reports, armaments, ammunition, tanks, aircraft, as well as food in large quantities are allegedly coming in. He had only American-made telephone sets in the army. He did not see a foreigner in his army.

About the creation of a second front in Europe, he heard the following: in Soviet Russia there is a general opinion, which was also reflected in the newspapers, that the British and Americans will create a second front in France this year. This was allegedly firmly promised to Molotov.

operational plans.

According to Stalin's order No. 130 of May 1, the Germans were to be finally expelled from Russia during this summer. The beginning of the great Russian summer offensive was the offensive near Kharkov. To this end, a large number of divisions were transferred to the south in the spring. The northern front was neglected. This may explain why the Volkhov Front was unable to obtain new reserves.

Timoshenko's offensive failed. Vlasov, despite this, believes that perhaps Zhukov will launch a medium or large offensive from Moscow. He still has enough reserves.

If Timoshenko's new tactics, "elastic defense" (to slip away in time), would have been applied on the Volkhov, then he, Vlasov, would probably have come out of the encirclement unscathed with his army. He is not competent enough to assess how widely these tactics can be applied, despite the existing installations.

According to Vlasov, Timoshenko is in any case the most capable leader of the Red Army.

When asked about the significance of our offensive on the Don, he explained that the supply of gasoline from Transcaucasia could be of critical importance for the Red Army, since a replacement for Transcaucasian oil could hardly be found in Siberia. Gasoline consumption within Russia is already strictly limited.

In general terms, he notes that it is quite remarkable that he, as commander of the army, was not informed of the operational situation on a larger scale; it is kept so secret that even the commanders of the armies have no knowledge of the plans of the command in their own areas of responsibility.

Armament.

He had not heard of the construction of super-heavy 100-ton tanks. In his opinion, the best tank is the T-34. The 60-ton KV, in his opinion, is too bulky, especially considering that its armor protection needs to be strengthened.

Relatives of defectors.

In principle, they have ceased to be shot in Russia, with the exception of relatives of defecting commanders. (Here Vlasov deliberately or accidentally misinformed the Germans. Order No. 270 of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of August 16, 1941 provided only for the arrest of the families of defectors, that is, those who voluntarily surrender to the enemy, and even then only if the defectors are commanders or commissars. True , G.K. Zhukov, when he was commander of the Leningrad Front, sent cipher message No. 4976 dated September 28, 1941 to the Political Directorate of the Baltic Fleet: “Explain to all personnel that all the families of those who surrendered to the enemy will be shot and upon returning from captivity they will also all be shot "". It is unlikely that this threat was not brought to the attention of the military on the Leningrad front. However, it had only propaganda value. In practice, Zhukov's hands were short to shoot the families of defectors. After all, the NKVD was engaged in executions, and it was guided by order No. 270, such severe repressions were not Vlasov could have heard something about the Zhukovsky order, formally canceled m as illegal only in February 1942. Perhaps he also knew about Stalin's telephone message to the military council of the Leningrad Front dated September 21, 1941, in which the leader demanded, without hesitation, to use weapons against women, the elderly and children, whom the Germans allegedly sent to the front lines of the Soviet troops to persuade them to surrender . However, there was nothing said about the possible execution of the families of defectors. It is possible that the former commander of the 2nd shock army was already thinking about entering the service of the Germans and was inflating his worth: they say, then I would have to risk the lives of my relatives and friends. - B.S.).

Attitude towards Russian prisoners of war in Germany.

People do not believe that Russian prisoners of war are shot in Germany. Rumors are spreading that under the influence of the Fuhrer, the attitude towards Russian prisoners of war has recently improved.

Leningrad.

The evacuation of Leningrad continues day and night. The city will be held by military means under any circumstances for reasons of prestige.

Personal information.

For about three months, Colonel-General Vasilevsky has been the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

Marshal Shaposhnikov resigned from this post for health reasons.

Marshal Kulik is no longer in command. He was stripped of his marshal rank.

Marshal Budyonny, according to unconfirmed information, received a new appointment - to form new formations in the rear of the army.

Voroshilov is a member of the Supreme Military Council in Moscow. He no longer has troops under his command."

Blessed memory of soldiers and commanders

2nd shock army, who fell in battles with the German

dedicated to the fascist invaders.

During the Great Patriotic War, seventy Soviet combined arms armies fought the enemy. In addition, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command formed five more shock troops - intended for operations in offensive operations in the directions of the main attack. At the beginning of 1942 there were four of them. The fate of the 2nd strike turned out to be tragic ...

The year two thousand was coming to an end. The clock impassively counted down the time remaining until the new millennium. TV channels and radio stations, newspapers and magazines squeezed out the theme of the millennium to the fullest. Predictions were made by politicians, scientists, writers, palmists, and sometimes outright charlatans.

The results were summed up. Lists of the “most-most” outstanding people and events of the past century, millennium were widely replicated. All different. Yes, it could not be otherwise in a world where momentary conjunctures constantly prevail over historical objectivity.

Russia was acutely worried about the Kursk tragedy. The society wanted to receive full information about the tragedy. So far, only versions have been expressed, rumors have multiplied ...

And in this huge stream of messages about past and future disasters, accomplishments and anniversaries, information about the opening on November 17 in the village of Myasnoy Bor, Novgorod Region, a monument-memorial to the soldiers of the 2nd shock army of the Volkhov front, was somehow lost, not being separated from a number of other news. Opened? Well, good. Thanks to the sponsors - they gave money for a holy cause.

Sounds cynical, doesn't it? But, nevertheless, life is life. World War II has long gone down in history. And there are fewer and fewer veterans of the Great Patriotic War on the streets. And more - quite young people with decorations for other wars - Afghan, Chechen. New time. New people. New Veterans.

So, the St. Petersburg authorities did not delegate anyone to the opening of the monument to the fighters of the 2nd shock. And again, from the point of view of modern bureaucratic formalism, it is true: a foreign region. And the fact that the army, by its actions, forced the Germans to finally abandon plans to capture Leningrad, played a crucial role in the operations to break through and completely lift the blockade, knocked out the last German units from the territory of the Leningrad Region in the battles near Narva ... Well, let them do it historians.

And historians did not deal with the combat path of the 2nd shock army separately. No, of course, in numerous monographs, memoirs, reference books, encyclopedias and other literature dedicated to the Second World Army, it is mentioned repeatedly, its combat operations in specific operations are described. But there is no research on the 2nd shock accessible to a wide circle of readers. To rummage through a pile of literature in order to get a real idea of ​​\u200b\u200bher combat path will only be graduate students preparing a dissertation on a specialized topic.

It gets amazing. The whole world knows the name of the Tatar poet Musa Jalil. And in literary, and in any "general" thick Large and Small encyclopedic dictionaries, you will read that in 1942, being wounded, he was taken prisoner. In a fascist prison, he wrote the famous “Moabit Notebook” - a hymn to the fearlessness and resilience of a person. But nowhere is it noted that Musa Jalil fought in the 2nd shock army.

However, writers still turned out to be more honest and persistent than historians. Pavel Luknitsky, a former special correspondent for TASS on the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, in 1976 published a three-volume book Leningrad is acting ... in the Moscow publishing house Soviet Writer. The author managed to overcome censorship obstacles, and from the pages of his most interesting book openly declared:

“The feats accomplished by the soldiers of the 2nd Shock, can not be counted!”

It would seem that in 1976 the ice broke. The writer, as far as he could, spoke in detail about the soldiers of the army, described their participation in operations. Now historians must pick up the baton! But... they were silent.

And the reason here is an ideological taboo. For a short time, the 2nd shock was commanded by Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, who later became a traitor to the Motherland. And although the term “Vlasovites”, which is usually used to characterize the fighters of the “Russian Liberation Army” (ROA), cannot in any way refer to veterans of the 2nd shock, they are still (so that the name of the traitor does not pop up once again in memory) from the history of the Great Patriotic War , as far as possible, tried to cross out. And the collection “2nd Shock in the Battle for Leningrad” published in 1983 in Lenizdat could not fill this gap.

Strange, you will agree, there was a situation. Books have been written about the traitor Vlasov, historical documentary films have been made. A number of authors are seriously trying to present him as a fighter against Stalinism, communism, a bearer of some kind of “high ideas”. The traitor has long been condemned and hanged, and the discussions around the personality of Vlasov do not subside. The last (!) veterans of the 2nd shock, thank God, are alive, and if they are remembered, then on Victory Day, along with other participants in the war.

There is a clear injustice, since the role of the 2nd shock and the role of Vlasov in the history of the Great Patriotic War are not comparable.

To see this, let's look at the facts.

... Army Group North was advancing towards Leningrad. Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb led to the city that Hitler so desired to destroy, the 16th and 18th armies of Colonel Generals Bush and von Küchler, the 4th Panzer Group of Colonel General Hoepner. Forty-two divisions in all. From the air, the army group was supported by over a thousand aircraft of the 1st Luftwaffe Fleet.

Oh, how the commander of the 18th Army, Colonel-General Karl-Friedrich-Wilhelm von Küchler, rushed forward! With his invincible fellows, he already passed in 1940 Holland, Belgium, marched under the triumphal arch in Paris. And here is Russia! Sixty-year-old Küchler dreamed of a field marshal's baton, which was waiting for him on the very first Leningrad street - it would be enough to bend down and pick it up. He will be the first of the foreign generals to enter this proud city with an army!

Let him dream. He will receive a field marshal's baton, but not for long. Kühler's military career would end ingloriously under the walls of Leningrad on January 31, 1944. Enraged by the victories of the soldiers of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, Hitler will throw Kühler, who by that time commanded the entire Army Group North, into retirement. After that, the field marshal will be shown to the world only once - in Nuremberg. To be judged as a war criminal.

In the meantime, the 18th Army is advancing. She has already managed to become famous not only for military successes, but also for brutal reprisals against civilians. The soldiers of the “great Fuhrer” did not spare either the inhabitants of the occupied territories or prisoners of war.

During the battles for Tallinn, not far from the city, the Germans discovered three reconnaissance sailors from a combined detachment of sailors and Estonian militias. During a short bloody battle, two scouts were killed, and a seriously wounded sailor from the destroyer "Minsk" Yevgeny Nikonov was captured in an unconscious state.

Yevgeny refused to answer all questions about the location of the detachment, and torture did not break him. Then the Nazis, angry at the stubbornness of the sailor, gouged out his eyes, tied Nikonov to a tree and burned him alive.

Having entered the territory of the Leningrad region after the hardest battles, the wards of von Küchler, whom Leeb called “a respected man, possessing fearlessness and composure,” continued to commit atrocities. I will give just one example.

As the documents of the Trial in the case of the Supreme High Command of the Nazi Wehrmacht irrefutably testify, “in the area occupied by the 18th Army ... there was a hospital in which 230 mental patients and women suffering from other diseases were placed. After a discussion in which the opinion was expressed that “according to German concepts” these unfortunates “were not worth living anymore”, a proposal was made to liquidate them, an entry in the combat log of the XXVIII Army Corps for December 25-26, 1941 shows that “ the commander agreed with this decision” and ordered that it be implemented by the SD forces.”

The prisoners in the army of the “respectable” and “fearless” Küchler were sent to clear the area, shot at the slightest suspicion of a desire to escape. Finally, simply starved. I will quote only one entry from the combat log of the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the 18th Army for November 4, 1941: “Every night 10 prisoners die from exhaustion.”

On September 8, Shlisselburg fell forty-first. Leningrad was cut off from southeastern communications. The blockade has begun. The main forces of the 18th Army came close to the city, but could not take it. The strength clashed with the courage of the defenders. This was forced to admit even the enemy.

General of the Infantry Kurt von Tippelskirch, who at the beginning of the war served as Oberkvartmeister IV (Chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate) of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, wrote angrily:

“German troops reached the southern suburbs of the city, but due to the stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatical Leningrad workers, the expected success was not. Due to the lack of forces, it was also not possible to oust the Russian troops from the mainland ... ”.

Continuing the offensive in other sectors of the front, units of the 18th Army came close to Volkhov in early December.

At this time, in the rear, on the territory of the Volga Military District, the 26th Army was formed anew - for the third time after the battles near Kyiv and in the Oryol-Tula direction. At the end of December, she will be transferred to the Volkhov Front. Here the 26th will receive a new name, with which it will pass from the banks of the Volkhov River to the Elbe, and will forever remain in the history of the Great Patriotic War - the 2nd shock!

I specifically described the methods of warfare by the 18th Army of the Nazis in such detail so that the reader understands what kind of enemy our 2nd shock army will have to meet. There was very little time left before the start of the most tragic operation in 1942 in the North-West of the country.

In the meantime, the results of the 1941 campaign were being assessed at headquarters on both sides of the front. Tippelskirch noted:

“In the course of heavy fighting, Army Group North, although it inflicted significant losses on the enemy, and partially destroyed its forces ... however, it did not achieve operational success. The planned timely support by strong formations of Army Group Center was not provided.

And in December 1941, Soviet troops launched a strong counterattack near Tikhvin, defeated and put to flight the Germans near Moscow. It was at this time that the defeat of the Nazis in the northwestern and Moscow directions was predetermined.

In military science there is such a concept - analytical strategy. It was developed by the Prussians - great experts in all kinds of teachings on how to kill better, faster and more people. It is no coincidence that all the wars with their participation, starting with the Battle of Grunwald, entered world history as the bloodiest. The essence of the analytical strategy, if you omit all the tricky and long explanations, boils down to the following: prepare - and win.

The most important component of the analytical strategy is the doctrine of the operation. We will dwell on it in more detail, since without it the course of the described operations and battles, the reasons for successes and failures will be difficult to understand.

Do not be too lazy to take a sheet of paper and set aside on it the coordinate system known from school. Now, just below the X axis, start drawing an elongated Latin capital letter S so that its "neck" makes an acute angle with the axis. At the intersection point, put the number 1, and at the top, at the point where the letter starts to bend to the right - 2.

So. Before point 1, the preparatory stage of the military operation is underway. At the very point it “starts” and begins to develop rapidly, at point 2 it loses pace and then fades. The attacking side seeks to go the way from the first to the second point as quickly as possible, attracting maximum forces and means. The defender, on the contrary, tries to stretch it out in time - the resources of any army are not unlimited - and, when the enemy runs out of steam, crushes him, taking advantage of the fact that at point 2 the saturation phase has begun. Looking ahead, I will say that this is exactly what happened during the Luban operation of 1942.

For the German divisions, the “neck” of the letter S on the way to Leningrad and Moscow turned out to be prohibitively long. The troops stopped at both capitals, unable to move on and - were beaten almost simultaneously - near Tikhvin and near Moscow

To wage the campaign of 1942 along the entire front of Germany, there were not enough forces. On December 11, 1941, German losses were estimated at 1 million 300 thousand people. As General Blumentritt recalled, in the autumn "... in the troops of the armies" Center "in most infantry companies, the number of personnel reached only 60-70 people."

However, the German command had the ability to transfer troops to the Eastern Front from the territories occupied by the Third Reich in the West (from June to December, outside the Soviet-German front, fascist losses amounted to about 9 thousand people). Thus, divisions from France and Denmark ended up in the location of the 18th Army of the Army Group North.

Today it is difficult to say whether Stalin was counting on the opening of a second front in 1942 at a time when the Stavka was planning a number of upcoming operations, including the de-siege of Leningrad. At least the correspondence between the Supreme Commander and the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister about the need to open a second front was fairly lively. And on January 1, 1942, in Washington, representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain, China and 22 other countries signed a United Nations declaration on an uncompromising struggle against the states of the fascist bloc. The US and British governments officially announced the opening of a second front in Europe in 1942.

Unlike Stalin, the more cynical Hitler was convinced that there would be no second front. And concentrated the best troops in the East.

“Summer is the decisive stage of the military dispute. The Bolsheviks will be thrown back so far that they can never touch the cultural soil of Europe ... I will see to it that Moscow and Leningrad are destroyed.”

Our Headquarters was not going to give Leningrad to the enemy. On December 17, 1941, the Volkhov Front was created. It included the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd and 59th armies. Two of them - the 4th and 52nd - have already distinguished themselves during the counterattack near Tikhvin. The 4th was especially successful, as a result of a decisive attack on December 9, which captured the city and inflicted serious damage on enemy manpower. Nine of its formations and units were awarded the Order of the Red Banner. In total, 1179 people were awarded in the 4th and 52nd armies: 47 - the Order of Lenin, 406 - the Order of the Red Banner, 372 - the Order of the Red Star, 155 - the medal "For Courage" and 188 - the medal "For Military Merit". Eleven soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union.

The 4th Army was commanded by General of the Army K.A. Meretskov, the 52nd - by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov. Now one army commander led the front, the other was to command the 2nd shock. The Headquarters set a strategic task for the front: to defeat the Nazi troops, with the help of units of the Leningrad Front, to break through and completely lift the blockade of Leningrad (this operation was called "Lubanskaya"). The Soviet troops did not cope with the task.

Let us give the floor to Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, who traveled to the Volkhov Front and is well acquainted with the situation. In the book “The Work of All Life”, the illustrious marshal recalls:

“Almost all winter, and then spring, we tried to break through the ring of the Leningrad blockade, striking at it from two sides: from the inside - by the troops of the Leningrad Front, from the outside - by the Volkhov Front in order to connect after an unsuccessful breakthrough of this ring in the Lyuban region. The main role in the Luban operation was played by the 2nd shock army of the Volkhovites. She entered the breakthrough of the German defense line on the right bank of the Volkhov River, but failed to reach Lyuban, and got stuck in forests and swamps. The Leningraders, weakened by the blockade, were all the more unable to solve their part of the common task. Things barely moved. At the end of April, the Volkhov and Leningrad Fronts were merged into a single Leningrad Front, consisting of two groups: a group of troops of the Volkhov direction and a group of troops of the Leningrad direction. The first included the troops of the former Volkhov Front, as well as the 8th and 54th Army, formerly part of the Leningrad Front. The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant-General M.S. Khozin, got the opportunity to unite actions to eliminate the blockade of Leningrad. However, it soon became clear that it was extremely difficult to lead nine armies, three corps, two groups of troops, divided by the zone occupied by the enemy. The decision of the Headquarters to liquidate the Volkhov Front turned out to be erroneous.

On June 8, the Volkhov Front was restored; it was again headed by K.A. Meretskov. L.A. Govorov was appointed to command the Leningrad Front. “For failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters on the timely and rapid withdrawal of the troops of the 2nd shock army, for the paper-bureaucratic methods of command and control of the troops,” the order of the Stavka said, for separating from the troops, as a result of which the enemy cut the communications of the 2nd shock army and the latter was put in an exceptionally difficult position, remove Lieutenant General Khozin from the post of commander of the Leningrad Front ”and appoint him commander of the 33rd Army of the Western Front. The situation here was complicated by the fact that the commander of the 2nd Army, Vlasov, turned out to be a vile traitor and went over to the side of the enemy.

Marshal Vasilevsky does not disclose the course of the Lyuban operation itself (there was little written about it at all), confining itself to stating the achieved negative result. But, mind you, neither he nor the Headquarters at their disposal make any accusations against the units of the 2nd shock. But the following quote is extremely far from objectivity. Although, to be honest, one cannot blame the authors of the capital work “Battle for Leningrad” for deliberate bias (and in our uncensored era, many adhere to this point of view). I quote:

“In the first half of May 1942. Fighting resumed on the western bank of the Volkhov River in the Luban direction. Our attempts to expand the breakthrough in the enemy's defenses in order to develop a subsequent strike on Lyuban were not successful. The fascist German command was able to bring large forces to this sector and, inflicting strong blows on the flanks of the advancing Soviet troops, created a real threat of their destruction. In mid-May 1942, the headquarters of the Supreme High Command ordered the troops of the 2nd shock army to be withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Volkhov River. However, as a result of the treacherous behavior of General Vlasov, who later surrendered, the army found itself in a catastrophic situation, and, with heavy fighting, it had to leave the encirclement.

So, from the above text it logically follows that the failure of the army is the result of Vlasov's betrayal. And in the book “On the Volkhov Front”, published in 1982 (and, by the way, published by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the Institute of Military History), the following is generally categorically stated:

“Inaction and betrayal of the Motherland and the military duty of its former commander, Lieutenant General A.A. Vlasov, is one of the most important reasons that the army was surrounded and suffered huge losses.”

But here is a clear overkill! The army was surrounded by no means through the fault of Vlasov, and the general was not going to surrender it to the enemy. Let's take a quick look at the operation.

The commander of the Volkhov Front, General of the Army K.A. Meretskov, made a well-founded decision to attack with two fresh armies - the 2nd shock and 59th. The offensive of the strike group had the task of breaking through the front of the German defense in the Spasskaya Polist area, reaching the line of Lyuban, Dubrovnik, Cholovo and, in cooperation with the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, defeating the Luban-Chudov grouping of the enemy. Then, having developed success, break the blockade of Leningrad. Of course, Meretskov, who held the post of chief of the general staff before the war, was aware that it would be extremely difficult to implement the decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters, but he made every effort for this - an order is an order.

The offensive began on 7 January. For three days, our troops tried to break through the German defenses, but did not achieve success. On January 10, the front commander temporarily stopped the attacking actions of the units. On the same day, the 2nd shock received a new commander.

“Although a change of command is not an easy task ... we nevertheless took the risk of asking the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to replace the commander of the 2nd shock army,” recalled K.A. Meretskov. Kirill Afanasyevich spoke about G.G. Sokolov not in the best way:

“He got down to business passionately, made any promises. In practice, he did nothing. It was evident that his approach to solving problems in a combat situation was based on long-obsolete concepts and dogmas.

It was not easy for Meretskov to apply to the Headquarters with a request to remove the commander. The former chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, who was repressed and only miraculously did not share the fate of many top military leaders, Kirill Afanasyevich proposed (before the start of a strategic operation!) To remove not just General Sokolov from his post, but, in the very recent past, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Sokolov.

However, precisely because it was before the offensive, Meretskov asked to replace the commander. And ... a few days later, G.G. Sokolov was recalled to Moscow. Open the latest edition of the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary - there you will find articles about all the commanders of the 2nd shock. Besides Sokolov...

But back to 1942. Forces were regrouped on the Volkhov front, and reserves were concentrated. On January 13, after an hour and a half of artillery preparation, the offensive resumed throughout the entire area of ​​\u200b\u200bdeployment of front troops from the village of Podberezye to the city of Chudovo in a northwestern direction from the starting lines. Unfortunately, only the 2nd Shock Army, commanded by Lieutenant General N.K. Klykov from January 10, had the main and only success in this operation.

Here is what Pavel Luknitsky, an eyewitness, writes in the Leningrad Diary:

“In January, in February, the initially excellent success of this operation was achieved under the command of ... G.G. ... front ...) and N.K. Klykov, who led it on the offensive ... The army had many brave, selflessly devoted to the Motherland soldiers - Russians, Bashkirs, Tatars, Chuvashs (the 26th Army was formed in the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ), Kazakhs and other nationalities”.

The war correspondent did not sin against the truth. The pressure was really terrible. Reinforced with reserves transferred from other sectors of the front, the second shock troops wedged in a narrow strip into the location of the enemy 18th army.

Having broken through the defense in depth in the zone between the villages of Myasnoy Bor - Spasskaya Polist (about 50 kilometers north-west of Novgorod), by the end of January, the advanced units of the army - the 13th Cavalry Corps, the 101st Separate Cavalry Regiment, as well as units of the 327th The 1st Infantry Division reached the city of Lyuban and engulfed the enemy grouping from the south. The remaining armies of the front practically remained at their starting lines and, supporting the development of the success of the 2nd shock army, fought heavy defensive battles. Thus, already then Klykov's army was left to itself. But it came!

In the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, Franz Halder, there were entries one more disturbing than the other:

January 27th. ... On the front of the Army Group "North" the enemy achieved tactical success on the Volkhov.

Feeling a serious threat of joining units of the 2nd shock with units of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, General I.I. Fedyuninsky, located 30 kilometers northeast of Lyuban, the Germans strengthen their 18th Army. In the period from January to June 1942, 15 (!) Full-blooded divisions were transferred to the area of ​​​​operations of the Volkhov Front to eliminate the offensive of the troops of the 2nd shock army. As a result, the command of Army Group North was forced to forever and ever abandon plans to capture Leningrad. But the tragic fate of the 2nd shock was a foregone conclusion.

On February 27, the Germans attacked the open flanks of the Soviet troops. Our units, which reached Ryabovo, were cut off from the main forces of the front and only after many days of fighting broke out of the encirclement. Let's take another look at Halder's diary:

2nd of March. ... Meeting with the Fuhrer in the presence of the commander of the Army Group "North", the commanders of the armies and commanders of the corps. Decision: go on the offensive on the Volkhov on March 7 (until 13.03.). The Fuhrer demands a few days before the start of the offensive to carry out aviation training (bombing warehouses in the forests with super-heavy caliber bombs). Having completed the breakthrough on the Volkhov, one should not waste energy on destroying the enemy. If we throw him into the swamp, it will doom him to death.”

And so, from March 1942 until the end of June, the troops of the 2nd shock army, being surrounded and cut off from their communications, fought fierce battles, holding the Germans in the southeast direction. It is enough to look at the map of the Novgorod region to make sure that the battles were fought in the conditions of a wooded and swampy area. In addition, in the summer of forty-second in the Leningrad region, the level of groundwater and rivers sharply increased. All bridges, even on small rivers, were demolished, swamps became impassable. Ammunition and food in extremely limited quantities were delivered by air. The army was starving, but the fighters and commanders honestly performed their duty.

Circumstances developed in such a way that in mid-April the commander N.K. became seriously ill. Klykov - he had to be urgently evacuated by plane across the front line. At that time, the deputy commander of the Volkhov Front, Lieutenant-General A.A. Vlasov (who, by the way, arrived at the front on March 9), was at the army’s location. And it was quite natural that he, who had proven himself well in the battles near Moscow, was appointed to act as commander of the encircled army.

The conditions under which they had to fight are evidenced by the veteran of the 2nd shock I. Levin in the notes “General Vlasov on this and that side of the front”:

“The situation was desperate with ammunition. When cars and carts could not get through the neck to us, the shells - two ropes over the shoulder - were carried by the fighters on themselves. "Junkers", "Heinkels", "Messers" literally hung over their heads and in daylight they hunted (I'm sure with passion) for every moving target - be it a soldier or a wagon. There was nothing to cover the army from the air ... there was nothing. He saved his native Volkhov forest: he allowed us to play hide and seek with the Luftwaffe.

In May, the situation worsened. Here is how the commander of the 327th Infantry Division, Colonel (later Major General) I.M. Antyufeev:

“The situation on the line occupied by the division was clearly not in our favor. The forest roads had already dried up, and the enemy brought tanks and self-propelled guns here. He also used massive mortar fire. And yet, for about two weeks, the division fought on this line ... Finev Lug changed hands several times. Where did the physical strength and energy of our soldiers come from! ... In the end, a critical moment came at this turn. To the left of us, between the lakes, a partisan detachment was defending, which was pushed back by the enemy. In order not to be completely surrounded, we were forced to withdraw. This time we had to part with almost all heavy weapons ... In the rifle regiments by that time there were no more than 200-300 people in each. They were no longer capable of any maneuver. On the spot, they were still fighting, literally clinging their teeth to the ground, but the movement was unbearably difficult for them.

In mid-May 1942, the command of the 2nd shock received a directive on the withdrawal of the army across the Volkhov River. This was more than difficult to accomplish. When the enemy closed the only corridor in the Myasny Bor area, the very possibility of an organized breakthrough became unlikely. As of June 1, in 7 divisions and 6 brigades of the army, there were 6777 commanding officers, 6369 junior officers and 22190 privates. A total of 35336 people - about three divisions. At the same time, it should be taken into account that the command lost operational control over the troops, the units were scattered. Nevertheless, the Soviet fighters offered heroic resistance to the enemy. The fighting continued.

On the night of June 24-25, 1942, as a result of the failed operation of the troops of the Volkhov Front and the remaining combat-ready units of the 2nd shock army to break through the encirclement from Myasnoy Bor and the withdrawal of the remaining groups of fighters and commanders, the army command decided to break through to its own, breaking into small groups (soldiers and officers of the army already did this).

When leaving the encirclement, the chief of staff of the 2nd strike colonel Vinogradov died under shelling. The head of the special department, major of state security Shashkov, was seriously wounded and shot himself. Surrounded by the Nazis, Zuev, a member of the Military Council, saved the last bullet for himself, and the head of the political department, Garus, also acted. The chief of communications of the army, Major General Afanasiev, went out to the partisans, who ferried him to the “mainland”. The Germans captured the commander of the 327th division, General Antyufeev (who refused to cooperate with the enemies, the division commander was subsequently sent to a concentration camp). And General Vlasov ... surrendered to the patrol of the 28th Infantry Corps in the village of Tukhovezhi (together with the chef of the dining room of the military council of the army, M.I. Voronova, who accompanied him).

But they were looking for him, trying to save the commander! On the morning of June 25, officers who emerged from the encirclement reported: Vlasov and other senior officers were seen in the area of ​​the narrow gauge railway. Meretskov sent his adjutant there - Captain Mikhail Grigorievich Boroda, a tank company with an infantry landing. Of the five tanks in the German rear, four were blown up by mines or were hit. M.G. Boroda on the last tank reached the headquarters of the 2nd shock - there was no one there. By the evening of June 25, several reconnaissance groups were sent to find the Army Military Council and withdraw it. Vlasov was never found.

After some time, a message was received from the partisans of the Oredezh detachment of F.I. Sazanov: Vlasov went over to the Nazis.

When, after many days, the surviving soldiers of the 2nd shock found out about this, they were simply shocked. “But how they believed this heroic general, scolder, joker, eloquent! The commander of the army turned out to be a contemptible coward, he betrayed everyone who, not sparing his life, went into battle on his orders, ”wrote Pavel Luknitsky.

“The question arises: how did it happen that Vlasov turned out to be a traitor?” Marshal Meretskov writes in his book “In the Service of the People”, “It seems to me that only one answer can be given. Vlasov was an unprincipled careerist. His behavior before that could well be considered a disguise, behind which was hiding indifference to the Motherland. His membership in the Communist Party is nothing more than a path to high positions. His actions at the front, for example, in 1941 near Kyiv and Moscow, are an attempt to distinguish himself in order to demonstrate professional abilities and move forward as soon as possible.

During the trial of the command of the ROA, to the question: why did he surrender, Vlasov answered briefly and clearly: “I was faint-hearted.” And you can believe it. Surrendering on July 12, the general, who did not have the courage to shoot himself, was already a coward, but not yet a traitor. Vlasov betrayed his homeland a day later, when he ended up at the headquarters of the commander of the 18th German army, Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann. It was to him that he described in detail the state of affairs on the Volkhov front. A photograph has been preserved: Vlasov bent over the map with a pointer, Lindemann standing next to him is carefully following his explanations.

Here we leave the traitor. He has nothing to do with the further fate of the 2nd shock.

Despite the betrayal of Vlasov, the whole army was not blamed for the failure of the Luban operation. And in those days, only the slightest suspicion of betrayal was enough for the very name “2nd shock” to disappear forever from the lists of the Red Army. In addition, none of the units of the army lost their battle flags.

This means that the Headquarters correctly assessed its role: despite the tragic outcome of the operation, the army buried the enemy's hopes of capturing Leningrad. The losses of the Nazi troops were too heavy. Pavel Luknitsky also reports this in the three-volume book “Leningrad is acting ...”:

“... she destroyed a lot of enemy forces (2nd shock bus): six German divisions drawn from Leningrad to Volkhov were bled to death by her, the fascist legions “Netherlands” and “Flanders” were utterly defeated, many remained in the swamps enemy artillery, tanks, planes, tens of thousands of Nazis...”.

And here is an excerpt from a leaflet issued by the political department of the Volkhov Front shortly after the 2nd shock fighters left the encirclement:

“Valiant warriors of the 2nd Shock Army!

In the fire and roar of guns, the clang of tanks, the roar of aircraft, the fierce battles with the Nazi scoundrels, you won the glory of the valiant warriors of the Volkhov frontiers.

Courageously and fearlessly, during the harsh winter and spring, you fought against the fascist invaders.

The military glory of the soldiers of the 2nd shock army is imprinted in gold letters in the history of the Great Patriotic War...”

However, Hitler, unlike his commanders, did not leave an obsession with taking and destroying Leningrad, demanded that the representative of the Wehrmacht at the Finnish headquarters, General Erfurt, achieve an offensive by the ally units from the north. But the Finnish command gave the Nazi envoy a turn, declaring: since 1918, our country has been of the opinion that the existence of Finland should not pose a threat to Leningrad. Apparently, the Finns, who carefully assessed both the international and military situation, then groped for grounds for getting out of the war into which Germany had dragged them.

But Hitler did not let up. He took an unprecedented step: from the southern borders he transferred the victorious 11th Army of Field Marshal von Manstein to Leningrad. Manstein took Sevastopol! Manstein "understood" the Kerch operation of the Russians! Let Manstein take Leningrad!.

Manstein has arrived. Leningrad did not take. In his memoirs he wrote:

“On August 27, the headquarters of the 11th Army arrived at the Leningrad Front, so that here, in the zone of the 18th Army, to find out the possibilities of striking and draw up a plan of attack on Leningrad. It was agreed that the headquarters of the 11th Army would then occupy the part of the front of the 18th Army facing north, while the eastern part of the front along the Volkhov remained behind the 18th Army.

And the 11th Army entered into heavy fighting with the Soviet troops, which lasted until the beginning of October. Actually. Manstein had to solve the tasks of the 18th Army, which was badly beaten during the Luban operation by parts of the 2nd shock and already incapable of large-scale operations.

The field marshal managed to destroy a number of our formations, but there was not enough strength to take the city. Manstein later recalled these autumn battles of the forty-second year:

“If the task of restoring the situation on the eastern sector of the front of the 18th Army was completed, then nevertheless the divisions of our army suffered significant losses. At the same time, a significant part of the ammunition destined for the attack on Leningrad was used up. Therefore, there was no question of an early offensive. Meanwhile, Hitler still did not want to part with the intention to take over Leningrad. True, he was ready to limit the tasks of the offensive, which, of course, would not have led to the final liquidation of this front, and in the end it all came down to this liquidation(highlighted by me - ed.). On the contrary, the headquarters of the 11th army believed that it was impossible to start an operation against Leningrad without replenishing our forces and generally without having a sufficient number of forces. October was spent discussing these issues and drawing up new plans.”

In November, the situation developed in such a way that the presence of the 11th Army was required in other sectors of the Eastern Front: the decisive battle for Stalingrad was approaching. Manstein's headquarters was transferred to Army Group Center. In addition to an unsuccessful attempt to take Leningrad, fate dealt the German commander another - terrible - blow. On October 29, the 19-year-old son of a field marshal, infantry lieutenant Gero von Manstein, who fought in the 16th Army, died on the Leningrad Front.

Many years later, the events described, while working on his book “Lost Victories”, the old field marshal, always stingy with praise to the enemy, will pay tribute to the heroic soldiers of the 2nd shock (the army at that time was only in name, fought with the enemy eight thousandth rifle division and one infantry brigade). He will appreciate their courage in a military way clearly and concisely:

"Losses of the enemy killed many times exceeded the number captured."

And in the forty-second year, another important event took place on the Volkhov Front, which at first glance has no direct relation to the development of hostilities. A song was born, which soon became popularly known and loved. Because it sounded true and, most importantly, already victorious!

Songs that raise the morale of soldiers sometimes mean more than new weapons, plentiful food, warm clothes. The time of their appearance rightly occupies a worthy place in military chronology. In 1941, this became “Get up, the country is huge!”, In 1942 - “Volkhovskaya feast” to the words of the front-line poet Pavel Shubin.

They didn't sing then.

Let's drink for the Motherland, let's drink for Stalin,

Let's drink and drink again!

They did not sing, because there were no such lines yet. but, you see, it sounded great:

Let's drink to meet the living!

These words fully applied to all soldiers of the 2nd shock army.

At the end of 1942, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided at the beginning of the next year to carry out an operation to de-siege Leningrad, better known in history as Operation Iskra.

From the side of the Leningrad Front, the 67th Army stood out in the shock group. The Volkhov Front again entrusted this task to the 2nd shock. The almost completely renewed army (only about ten thousand people left the encirclement) included: 11 rifle divisions, 1 rifle, 4 tank and 2 engineering brigades, 37 artillery and mortar regiments and other units.

The fully equipped 2nd shock continued its combat path. And he was great!

On January 18, 1943, the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front, in cooperation with the 67th Army of the Leningrad Front, broke through the blockade of Leningrad. The course of this operation is described in detail both in fiction and in special military literature. Numerous documentaries and feature films have been shot about her. Every year, January 18 was celebrated in Leningrad, is celebrated and will be celebrated in St. Petersburg as one of the main city holidays!

Then, in the cold January days of 1943, the main thing happened: conditions were created for land and transport communications with the whole country.

For courage and bravery shown during the breaking of the blockade, about 22 thousand soldiers of the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts received state awards. The 122nd tank brigade, which interacted with units of the 2nd shock brigade, became Red Banner. And in the army itself, the 327th Rifle Division was transformed into the 64th Guards Rifle Division. The chest of the commander of the newly minted guards, Colonel N.A. Polyakov, was decorated with the Order of Suvorov II degree. The commander of the 2nd shock lieutenant general V.Z. Romanovsky was awarded one of the highest commander's insignia - the Order of Kutuzov, I degree.

Since April 1943, already acting as part of the Leningrad Front, the army participated in the Leningrad-Novgorod offensive operation, and with its active participation from the Oranienbaum bridgehead in January 1944 ensured the final liberation of Leningrad from the blockade.

In February-March, she liberated Lomonosovsky, Volosovsky, Kingiseppsky, Slantsevsky and Gdovsky districts of the Leningrad Region, went to the Narva River and Lake Peipus. In April-August, she fought with German troops on the Narva Isthmus and successfully carried out an operation to liberate Narva. In September 1944, in the successful Tallinn operation, the territory of Estonia was liberated from the invaders.

And how were things with the no longer victorious 18th German Army? Tippelskirch writes:

“On January 18 (1944 - author), that is, a few days after the start of the Russian offensive on the northern sector of the front of the 18th Army, the troops of the Volkhov Front went on the offensive from a wide bridgehead north of Novgorod in order to strike at the flank of the 18th Army . It was impossible to prevent this breakthrough, and it led to the withdrawal of the entire army group. The very next day I had to leave Novgorod.

But, true to its tradition of smashing and destroying everything, the 18th Army continued the practice of “scorched earth”!: only fifty people survived from the almost fifty thousand population of Novgorod, and only forty out of 2500 buildings. Colonel-General Lindemann, already familiar to us, ordered the famous monument “Millennium of Russia”, which is still on the territory of the Novgorod Kremlin, to be dismantled and sent to Germany. They dismantled it, but they didn’t manage to take it out - they had to take their feet away from the rapidly advancing Soviet army.

Under the blows of the Soviet troops, the 18th Army rolled back farther and farther, until, together with the 16th Army, it was blocked as part of the Courland grouping. Together with her, the failed conquerors of Leningrad on the night of May 9 laid down their arms. And then a terrible panic began among the soldiers of the 16th and 18th armies. General Gilpert, who commanded the grouping, was also seriously cowardly. It turns out that the Nazis “miscalculated”. Pavel Luknitsky tells in his narration:

“Before accepting the ultimatum, Gilpert did not know that Marshal Govorov was in command of the Leningrad Front, he believed that they would surrender to Marshal Govorov, “commander of the 2nd Baltic Front,” this seemed to the Germans, who committed atrocities near Leningrad, not so terrible: “Baltic”, having not experienced the horror of the blockade, they have no reason to take such “merciless revenge” as the Leningraders are supposed to do.”

Previously, one had to think when they were butchering at the walls of the Neva stronghold, dying from hunger, but not surrendering!

On September 27, 1944, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, transferring the 2nd shock to the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, addressed its troops with the words:

“The 2nd shock army, as part of the troops of the front, played a big role in lifting the blockade of Leningrad, winning the Great Victory near Leningrad and in all the battles for the liberation of Soviet Estonia from the Nazi invaders.

The victorious path of the 2nd Shock Army on the Leningrad Front was marked by brilliant successes, and the battle banners of its units were fanned with unfading glory.

The working people of Leningrad and Soviet Estonia will always sacredly cherish in their memory the military merits of the 2nd Shock Army, its heroic warriors - the faithful sons of the Fatherland.

At the final stage of the war, the 2nd shock as part of the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front under the command of Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky fought in East Prussia, participated in the East Pomeranian operation. In his memoirs, Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky noted her skillful actions more than once:

“The 2nd shock army with a fight overcame a strong defensive line on the outskirts of Marienburg, which in the old days was a fortress of the crusaders, and on January 25 reached the Vistula and Nogat rivers. With part of her forces, she crossed these rivers in several places and captured small bridgeheads. The troops were unable to capture Elbing on the move... I.I. The fighting lasted for several days, until the 2nd shock captured the city.

Together with the 65th Army and a separate tank brigade of the Polish Army, the 2nd Shock Brigade played a decisive role in the assault on Danzig - the Polish city of Gdansk.

“On March 26, the troops of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, breaking through the enemy defenses to their entire depth, approached Danzig,” wrote K.K. Rokossovsky. If the ultimatum is not accepted, the residents were advised to leave the city.

The Hitlerite command did not respond to our proposal. The command was given to start the assault ... The struggle was for every house. The Nazis fought especially stubbornly in large buildings, factory and factory buildings ... On March 30, Gdansk was completely liberated. The remnants of the enemy troops fled to the swampy mouth of the Vistula, where they were soon taken prisoner. The Polish national flag hoisted over the ancient Polish city, which was hoisted by soldiers - representatives of the Polish Army.

From East Prussia, the path of the army lay in Pomerania. The Germans understood perfectly well that Soviet soldiers had every right to take revenge. The memories of how the Nazis treated prisoners of war and civilians were too fresh. And in the May days of 1945, living examples almost constantly appeared before my eyes.

On May 7, units of the 46th division of the 2nd shock cleared the island of Rügen from the Germans. Our soldiers discovered a concentration camp in which compatriots languished. In his book “From the Neva to the Elbe”, the division commander, General S.N. Borshchev, recalled the incident on the island:

“Our Soviet people, liberated from concentration camps, were walking along the road. Suddenly, a girl ran out of the crowd, rushed to our illustrious intelligence officer Tupkalenko and, embracing him, shouted:

- Vasil, you are my brother!

And our courageous, desperate intelligence officer, Vasily Yakovlevich Tupkalenko (full cavalier of the Order of Glory - author), on whose face, as they say, not a single muscle trembled, he cried ... ".

But the winners, to the surprise of the local population, did not take revenge. On the contrary, they helped as much as they could. And when a column of young men in fascist soldier's uniforms came across towards the 90th Infantry Division, the divisional commander General N.G. Lyashchenko simply waved his hand to the teenagers:

- Go to your mother, to your mother!

Naturally, they happily ran home.

And the Great Patriotic War ended for the 2nd strike with participation in the famous Berlin operation. And our soldiers had their own "meeting on the Elbe" - with the 2nd British Army. Soviet and British fighters celebrated it solemnly: with a football match!

During the four years of the war, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army were thanked twenty-four times by the Supreme Commanders, and the sky over Moscow was lit up with victorious volleys of salutes. For heroism, courage and courage, 99 formations and units were given the honorary names of the liberated and captured cities. 101 formations and units attached orders of the Soviet Union to their banners, and 29 formations and units became guards. 103 soldiers of the 2nd shock were awarded the title of Heroes of the Soviet Union.

History has given everyone their due. Soldiers, officers and generals of the 2nd Shock Army found themselves on the heroic pages of the annals of the Victory. And General Vlasov - to the gallows. The execution took place on the night of August 1, 1946 in the Taganskaya prison by the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. And on this we could part with the traitor, if not for some circumstances.

Our country entered the new millennium without a textbook on the history of Russia. Well - nothing surprising: too many idols in the previous decade were overthrown from their pedestals, not all heroes were taken out of oblivion. And the history of any state is made up of the actions of individuals.

But when scientists thoroughly shook the flask with the historical cocktail of the twentieth century, many strange, and sometimes terrible personalities appeared on the surface, whom, quick at hand, "independently thinking" pseudo-chroniclers, immediately began to present to us as heroes misunderstood by the people. A sort of Don Quixotes of modern history, not in the least caring that, unlike Mr. La Mancha, the knights are not a sad, but rather a bloody image.

General Vlasov was also included in the category of such “Don Quixotes”. His defense is built mainly on two positions (everything else is verbal husk): the general is not a traitor, but a fighter against the regime that collapsed anyway, and Vlasov is the Soviet analogue of Stauffenberg.

It is dangerous not to notice such statements. Our country is rightly called the most reading in the world. But to this it must be added that for the most part the Russian people are accustomed to believing the printed word: once it is written, so it is. That is why expositions are so popular among us and refutations often go unnoticed.

Not intending to deal with the refutation of the arguments of Vlasov's supporters in this narrative, I suggest that readers consider only the factual side of the matter.

So, Vlasov and Stauffenberg. The German colonel never fought Prussian militarism - the main opponent of Stauffenberg and his associates was the Nazi elite. A competent officer of the General Staff could not help but understand that preaching the idea of ​​the superiority of one nation, a “thousand-year Reich” cannot be built. It was planned to replace key figures with less odious ones, abandon the most unacceptable Nazi principles - and that's all. The world is in a certain period of time. More from a pupil of the German military school, initially accustomed to planning wars and offensive actions, could not be expected. Stauffenberg did not consider himself a traitor to Germany, as he ultimately acted in her interests.

Oath to the Fuhrer? But we should not forget: for the hereditary aristocrat Count Klaus Philipp Maria Schenk von Stauffenberg, son of the chief chamberlain of the Württemberg king and court lady of the queen, a descendant of the great Gneisenau, Hitler was a plebeian and an upstart.

Stauffenberg led the conspiracy of the military, being on the territory of his country, knowing full well the inevitability of death in case of failure. Vlasov - simply chickened out when the danger threatened him personally, surrendered. And the next day, he laid out to Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann not plans to fight the communist regime, but military secrets that he owned as deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

At the beginning of the war, Stauffenberg actively pushed through the General Staff his ideas for the creation of national volunteer armies. Consequently, Vlasov, who eventually led the ROA, was considered no more than the commander of one of these legions.

For the Germans, Vlasov was not a person; he was not assigned any serious role in military and political plans. Hitler repeated more than once: "The revolution is made only by those people who are inside the state, and not outside it." And at a meeting in the summer of 1943 he said:

“... I don’t need this General Vlasov in our rear areas at all ... I only need him at the front line.”

Leaders who are heavily staked on for a successful outcome of the war, as you know, are not sent there - it's dangerous. In the order of Field Marshal Keitel dated April 17, 1943, it was said:

“... in operations of a purely propaganda nature, the name of Vlasov may be required, but not his personality.”

At the same time, in the order, Keitel calls Vlasov a “prisoner of war Russian general” - and no more. But that's what they called him on paper. In colloquial speech, harsher expressions were chosen, for example: “This Russian pig Vlasov” (Himmler, at a meeting with the Fuhrer).

Finally, a significant role in the “perpetuation” of the memory of A.A. Vlasov was played, unwittingly, by Soviet historians, calling all the fighters of the ROA “Vlasovites”. In fact, they never were.

The “Russian Liberation Army” was formed from traitors and prisoners of war. But the soldiers surrendered and were captured by the enemy, and the traitors went to the service of the Germans, and not to Vlasov. Before the war, his name was not widely known in the USSR, and after the transition to the Germans, Vlasov was known only as a traitor. They did not go to him, as they went to Denikin or Kolchak, Petliura or Makhno - not the right figure.

Yes, and he did not behave like a leader. The same Denikin, at the end of the civil war, refused the English pension, rightly noting that only the Russian government could pay money to a Russian general. Vlasov - willingly ate in German kitchens, during his arrest in forty-five, thirty thousand Reichsmarks were found hidden in him “for a rainy day”. He lived comfortably - even got a German wife - the widow of an SS officer Adele Billinberg (after the war she will try to get a pension for her husband who was hanged, like a general's widow).

One of the commanders of the White Guard corps, General Slashchev, did not wear shoulder straps during the civil war, believing that the volunteer army had dishonored them with robberies and violence. Vlasov did not wear shoulder straps with the Germans either, but he gladly put on a comfortable overcoat of a Wehrmacht general. “Just in case,” he kept a book of the commanding staff of the Red Army and ... a party card.

Well, Vlasov was not a leader. But, perhaps, then a fighter for the happy lot of the people? Many refer to his so-called "Smolensk appeal" to the people, other propaganda speeches. But Vlasov himself subsequently explained that the texts of the appeals were composed by the Germans, and he only slightly edited them. The former general lamented:

“Until 1944, the Germans did everything themselves, and we were used only as a signboard advantageous to them.”

And, by the way, they did the right thing, because the unedited Vlasov would hardly have been perceived by Russian people as a patriot.

As already mentioned, in the spring of 1943 he made a "tour" in parts of Army Group North. One can judge by the incident at a banquet in Gatchina with what kind of “love for the Motherland” the speeches of the former army commander were imbued.

Believing in his own importance, the dispersed Vlasov assured the German command: if he was given two shock divisions now, he would quickly take Leningrad, as the inhabitants were exhausted by the blockade. And then he, Vlasov the winner, will arrange a luxurious banquet in the city, to which he invites the generals of the Wehrmacht in advance. As you already know, outraged by such impudence, Hitler recalled Vlasov from the front and even threatened him with the death penalty.

As a result, the Fuhrer still had to put the ROA into action - there was not enough “cannon fodder” at the front, and in the Reich even units were formed from teenagers. But the ROA no longer had any “liberating” character. And the German command did not place special hopes on her. The same Tippelskirch after the war will write that the “Vlasov army”, despite its large numbers, was a stillborn fetus.

And how the Soviet units perceived it is clearly evidenced by the memoirs of the veteran of the 2nd shock I. Levin:

“On the site of our 2nd shock army, I remember only one battle with the Vlasovites. Somewhere in East Prussia, near Koenigsberg, our tank landing came across a large German unit, which included a Vlasov battalion.

After a fierce battle, the enemy was scattered. According to reports from the front line: they took many prisoners, Germans and Vlasovites. But only the Germans reached the army headquarters. Not a single person with the ROA sign was brought. You can say a lot of words about this ... But no matter what they say, no one has the right to condemn our paratroopers who have not cooled down from the battle, who have just lost their friends at the hands of traitors ... ”.

The Vlasov army, in principle, had nothing to count on. In the thirties and forties of the twentieth century in our country, the power of personal example was of great importance for people. Hence - the Stakhanovite movement, the Voroshilov arrows. During the war years, soldiers deliberately repeated the feat Matrosova, pilots - Talalikhina, snipers - achievements Smolyachkova. And an example of civic courage for people was a feat Kosmodemyanskaya, and not the activities of Vlasov. He could not find a place in this row.

At that time, the word "SS man" was the worst curse - where is the sometimes gentle Russian mat. And Vlasov conducted propaganda with the help of SS Obergruppenführer Goebbels, equipped and armed the ROA under the leadership of the Reichsführer SS Himmler, and chose an SS widow as his life partner. And, finally, the very service certificate of the commander of the “Russian (!) Liberation Army” Vlasov was signed by SS General (!) Kroeger. Isn't the attraction to the security detachments of the Nazi Party too strong for a "bearer of lofty ideas", a fighter for a "free Russia"?

In the historical period described, a person who had anything to do with the SS could at best count on a place in a prison cell. But not on the political Olympus. And this opinion was held not only in the USSR.

After the war, traitors were tried all over Europe. Quisling was shot in Norway, the Belgian King Leopold III, who signed the surrender to Germany, was forced to abdicate. Marshal Petain in France was sentenced to death, then commuted to life imprisonment. According to the verdict of the people's tribunal, Antonescu was executed as a war criminal in Romania. If such a punishment befell traitors of the first magnitude, then what could smaller fry like Vlasov count on? Only on a bullet or a noose.

And to present today an obvious traitor in the role of a martyr and "sufferer for the people" means deliberately engaging in false patriotic propaganda. This is much worse than trading from the stalls of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Because it has long been customary - the sufferers in Russia are loved, pitied. But Vlasov is not a foolish cripple. And the scaffold instead of a tribune was erected for him according to his deserts.

Russia had other generals as well. During the Great Patriotic War, one of the leaders of the White Guard movement and the implacable enemy of the Soviet power, Lieutenant-General A.I. Denikin, urged the White emigrants to fight the Germans in order to support the Red Army. And the Soviet lieutenant general D.M. Karbyshev preferred martyrdom in a concentration camp to treason.

How did the fate of other commanders? Lieutenant-General Nikolai Kuzmich Klykov (1888-1968) after his recovery, from December 1942, was assistant commander of the Volkhov Front, participated in breaking the blockade of Leningrad. In June 1943, he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Moscow Military District. In 1944-1945 he commanded the troops of the North Caucasian Military District. Valery Zakharovich Romanovsky (1896-1967), who headed the 2nd shock army before the operation to break through the blockade ring, later became deputy commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, in 1945 he received the rank of colonel general. After the war, he commanded the troops of a number of military districts, worked in military schools.

Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant-General Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky (1900-1977), who replaced him as commander in December 1943, also commanded the troops of the districts in 1946-47 and 1954-65. He again had a chance to serve the Motherland on already peaceful German soil: in 1951-54, he was deputy and first deputy commander-in-chief of a group of Soviet troops in Germany. Since 1965, Army General Fedyuninsky worked in a group of inspectors general of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1969, as a participant in the battles in Mongolia, a veteran of the famous Khalkhin Gol, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Colonel-General Gerhard Lindemann (1884-1963), who opposed the 2nd shock at the head of the 18th German army - the one who wanted to take the Millennium of Russia monument out of Novgorod - on March 1, 1944, led the North army group, but for military setbacks in early July of the same forty-fourth was removed from his post. Commanding the German troops in Denmark at the end of the war, on May 8, 1945, he surrendered to the British.

Field Marshals Wilhelm von Leeb and Karl von Küchler were tried by the Fifth American Military Tribunal in Nuremberg as war criminals. On October 28, 1948, the sentence was pronounced: von Leeb (1876-1956) received an unexpectedly mild sentence - three years in prison. Von Küchler (1881-1969) was treated more severely. No matter how he lied, no matter how he dodged, no matter how he referred to only the exact execution of orders, the “respectable” and “fearless” field marshal, the tribunal turned out to be inexorable: twenty years in prison!

True, in February 1955, Küchler was released. From the beginning of the fifties, they began to release and amnesty many “fuhrer soldiers” - in 1954, the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO and “experienced specialists” were required to form parts of the Bundeswehr.

Something, but “experience” they were not to occupy! Suffice it to say that soon after the formation of the Bundeswehr, the fascist General Ferch, one of the leaders of the artillery shelling of Leningrad, was appointed its commander. In 1960, Major General of the Wehrmacht, the former head of the department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Adolf Heusinger, became chairman of the permanent military committee of NATO. The same Heusinger, who calmly gave orders for punitive expeditions and reprisals against the civilian population of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union.

However, times are different now. But, you see, historical facts are a stubborn thing. And it is necessary to remember them - evidence of the bloodiest war of the twentieth century!

Every year on May 9, Moscow salutes the Winners. Alive and dead. Majestic monuments and modest obelisks with red stars remind of their exploits.

And in Myasny Bor there is a memorial in memory of the feat of the soldiers of the 2nd shock army, which cannot be deleted from History!

2002-2003

P. S. HIS MEAT POR

In memory of N.A. Shashkova

Businessmen are different. Some people love to shine in front of TV cameras, others love to support "high-profile" projects, consecrated by the patronage of statesmen. Still others are engaged in charity, receiving laureate signs of various awards in return - from literary to fence-building (the main thing is to hang a beautiful diploma in the office).

My old friend Leonid Ivanovich Kulikov, general director of the BUR mining company, did not belong to any of the above categories. But if there was a need to support an interesting and necessary undertaking, he helped. True, after first making sure that the money will go to a good cause, and not into the pocket of the initiator.

Therefore, in Kulikov's office one could often meet writers and poets, officials, generals, and scientists. And I was absolutely not surprised when, several years ago, on one of the hot June days, I found a tall, gray-haired old man in the uniform of a vice admiral at Leonid Ivanovich's. He was talking animatedly as he walked around the table. The star of the Hero of the Soviet Union swayed above the medal bars in time with the movements.

- Shashkov. Nikolai Alexandrovich, - the admiral held out his hand. - It's good that he came. We are just discussing one important topic, - Leonid Ivanovich explained. - Of course, you have heard about the Second Shock Army?

- The Luban operation of 1942?

“You see!” exclaimed Shashkov. “He knows. And he didn’t tell me how this idiot (the name of one official sounded): the Vlasov army.

- Well, Vlasov is Vlasov, and the army is an army. In the end, she then broke through the blockade of Leningrad, participated in the East Prussian operation.

Because of Vlasov, little was written about her, but there was a lot to hear about the heroism of the fighters. Still, he worked as a city reporter for a long time. I met different people.

I know, for example, that the brother of the famous BDT artist Vladislav Strzhelchik fought in the Second Shock. The mother of the writer Boris Almazov, Evgenia Vissarionovna, was in 1942 the senior operating nurse of the army field hospital. In Yakutia - God grant him many years - lives a unique person - Sergeant Mikhail Bondarev. He was called up from Yakutia and went through the whole war as part of the Second Shock! A rare case, she was born again three times. And the son of Eduard Bagritsky - war correspondent Vsevolod - died during the Luban operation.

- Just like my father - Alexander Georgievich. He was the head of a special department of the army,” Shashkov interrupted.

We talked for a long time that day. About heroes and traitors. Memory and unconsciousness. The fact that the recently opened memorial to the dead soldiers in Myasnoy Bor needs to be equipped, but there is no money. The surviving veterans are very old people. Businessmen are not interested in them, so they do not seek to help.

“We’ll help, we’ll help,” Kulikov reassured Admiral every time.

We also talked about the search engines, which are absolutely disinterestedly engaged in a holy cause - they search for and bury the remains of fighters. About officials giving vague answers to all proposals for perpetuating the memory of the fallen.

They firmly stuck in their heads: the Vlasov army, - Shashkov got excited. - When I was still an assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, I spoke many times to the head of Glavpur (Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy - author) - it is necessary to prepare and publish a normal history of the Second Shock. And this capercaillie old answered me: let's see, let's wait. We waited…

Listen. I have read some of your historical essays. Maybe you can take it. You see, it is necessary to briefly and clearly reflect the entire military path. Young people will not read the Talmud. And she definitely needs to know this page of history.

What happens: they write about Vlasov, this bastard, a traitor, they make films. And they forgot about the army, which, in fact, saved Leningrad!

Since then, we have been seeing each other quite often.

In Nikolai Alexandrovich, they were struck, first of all, by irrepressible energy, purposefulness. He constantly dangled between St. Petersburg and Moscow. And not in the "SV" car - behind the wheel of your own "nine". He made his way to high offices - he persuaded, argued, signed the necessary papers. It seemed that, apart from perpetuating the memory of the fighters of the Second Shock, he no longer needed anything in this life. It was largely thanks to the efforts of Shashkov that a memorial appeared in Myasny Bor in the Novgorod region.

Many people wondered why a respected and honored person needs all this trouble. At such a venerable age, with such merits and, let's note in brackets, connections, you can safely rest on your laurels. And sometimes - to decorate the presidium of some important forum with your dress admiral's uniform.

But the fact of the matter is that Shashkov was not a "wedding general." In the full sense of the word, the combat commander (this was his submarine during the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1968 was ready to fire missiles at the Promised Land), he felt personally responsible for the return from oblivion of the names of his father's comrades-in-arms. With the help of the FSB, he installed a memorial plaque at the memorial. But how many nameless heroes still lie in the land of Novgorod! And Shashkov continued to act.

In Kulikov's office, which became our headquarters, Nikolai Alexandrovich prepared requests and letters, copied and sent out documents, and met with potential sponsors. Here we have made corrections to the manuscript of the story.

He came to this office on May 8, 2003, after a meeting with Valentina Ivanovna Matviyenko, who was then the presidential plenipotentiary in the North-West, joyfully excited:

– Valentina Ivanovna treated my proposals more attentively than expected. Now things are moving forward.

And indeed, it has moved. We were convinced of this a few months later, when we arrived on August 17 - the next anniversary of the opening of the memorial - in Myasnoy Bor.

Nikolai Alexandrovich told me what still needs to be done. And, knowing his ability to achieve his own, both I, and Kulikov, and everyone involved in this work by the admiral had no doubt: so be it.

Throughout the autumn, winter and spring, Shashkov was engaged in routine and, as he put it, bureaucratic work. On May 1, the phone rang in my apartment.

– Just arrived from Moscow. Lots of interesting news about the memorial. As I said earlier, a film about the Second Shock will be shot. Vladimir Leonidovich Govorov (General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union, Deputy Chairman of the Pobeda Foundation - author) is actively pushing this idea. By the way, I brought you a letter from him thanking you for the story.

Yes. Remember when you scanned my photos? So…

And we delved into the discussion of technical issues. In parting, Nikolai Alexandrovich reminded: we meet on May 9, in Myasny Bor. But fate decreed otherwise.

... On May 7, I stood in the large mourning hall of the crematorium and looked at the portrait of the admiral, exhibited in front of a closed coffin. The artificial light reflected dimly in the decorations resting on scarlet cushions.

The night after our conversation, a fire broke out in the Shashkovs' apartment. Nikolai Aleksandrovich and his wife Valentina Petrovna died in the fire. The apartment itself burned down completely.

... Volleys of farewell fireworks died down. The sailors removed the flag of the Navy from the coffin. Vice Admiral Shashkov has gone to eternity.

A man who fought all his life to preserve the names of fallen heroes in our history has left, leaving only a memory of himself. As about a real Patriot of the Motherland, a man of Honor and Duty.

How much it is, and not everyone is given ...

June 2004

Musa Jalil (senior political instructor Musa Mustafievich Dzhalilov) was executed in the terrible Nazi prison Moabit on August 25, 1944. Shortly before his death, the poet wrote the following lines:

I'm leaving life

The world may forget me

But I'll leave the song

Which will live.

The motherland did not forget Musa Jalil: in 1956 - posthumously - he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and the next year he was awarded the Lenin Prize. And today his poems are widely known in Russia.

After the war, one of the streets of Tallinn was named after the Hero of the Soviet Union Yevgeny Aleksandrovich Nikonov. Now on the map of the city you will not find a street with this name. In recent years, in Estonia, on the territory of which the Nazis destroyed 125,000 local residents, history has been carefully rewritten...

One of the best commanders of the Great Patriotic War, Kirill Afanasyevich Meretskov (1897-1968) - later Marshal of the Soviet Union, holder of the highest military order "Victory". After the war - Assistant Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since 1964, Marshal K.A. Meretskov, Hero of the Soviet Union, worked in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

As an example of Sokolov's "commander's skill" in his book "In the Service of the People", Marshal Meretskov cites an excerpt from the order of the commander No. 14 of November 19, 1941:

"one. Walking, like the crawling of flies in autumn, I cancel, and I order henceforth to walk in the army like this: a military step is a arshin, and they should walk. Accelerated - one and a half, and press.

2. Food is out of order. In the midst of the battle, they dine and the march is interrupted for breakfast. In war, the order is this: breakfast is dark, before dawn, and dinner is dark, in the evening. In the afternoon, it will be possible to chew bread or crackers with tea - it’s good, but not - and thanks for that, since the day is not particularly long.

3. Remember to everyone - both the chiefs, and the privates, and the old and the young, that during the day it is impossible to walk in columns more than a company, but in general in a war for a campaign it is night, then march.

4. Do not be afraid of the cold, do not dress up as Ryazan women, be well done and do not succumb to frost. Rub your ears and hands with snow.”

“Well, why not Suvorov?” comments K.A. limited mainly to orders.”

Of the 2100 people of the legion "Netherlands", 700 survived. As for the legion "Flanders", its strength was reduced by a factor of three in just a few days of fighting.

The war spares no one - neither marshals nor their children. In January 1942, the son of the famous Soviet commander Mikhail Vasilievich Frunze, Air Lieutenant Timur Frunze, died on the Leningrad Front. Pilot T.M. Frunze was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Here is the full text of the "Volkhovskaya Table" written by Pavel Shubin in 1942:

Rarely, friends, we have to meet,

But when it happened

Let's remember what happened, and drink, as usual,

As it happened in Russia!

Let's drink to those who for weeks long

In frozen dugouts lay,

Fought on Ladoga, fought on the Volkhov,

Didn't take a step back.

Let's drink to those who commanded the companies,

Who died in the snow

Who made his way to Leningrad by swamps,

Throat breaking the enemy.

Will forever be glorified in legends

Under a machine-gun blizzard

Our bayonets on the heights of Sinyavin,

Our regiments near Mga.

May the Leningrad family be with us

Sitting next to the table.

Let's remember how the Russian force of the soldiers

German for Tikhvin drove!

Let's get up and clink glasses, we're standing -

Brotherhood of combat friends,

Let's drink to the courage of the fallen heroes,

Let's drink to meet the living!

Around the same time, the traitor Vlasov, traveling around the German headquarters, visited Riga, Pskov, Gatchina. He spoke to the population with "patriotic" speeches. Hitler went berserk and ordered Vitya to be sent under house arrest: the 2nd shock strikes Wehrmacht units, and its former commander carries all sorts of nonsense about victory in the rear of the suffering Army Group North. By the way, the Fuhrer ordered the execution of Vlasov, if he allows something else like that. It is clear how “highly” he valued the traitor.

By May 14, 1945, 231,611 Germans with all weapons, including 436 tanks, 1,722 guns, and 136 aircraft, surrendered to the troops of the Leningrad Front in Courland.

All those who surrendered were guaranteed life, as well as the preservation of personal property.

Viktor Kokosov

These days, 73 years ago, the battles near Myasny Bor were coming to a sad end. The chain of events that followed the Luban offensive operation, which was carried out by units of the 2nd shock, 4th, 52nd, 54th and 59th Soviet armies, was ending. The purpose of this operation, which began back in winter, was to break through the blockade of Leningrad and defeat units of the 18th German army, and the capture of the city of Lyuban, after which the operation was later named, was a private task of a large offensive operation of the Volkhov Front. The center of defense of the German group in the Luban direction was the city of Chudovo. The 54th Army, with a strike from Pogostye to Lyuban, was supposed to meet there with units of the 2nd Shock Army, which had broken through the German front between the villages of Myasnoy Bor and Spasskaya Polist, which corresponded to the plan to encircle the enemy's Chudovskaya grouping.

Due to the voluntary surrender of the last commander of the 2nd shock army, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov and his subsequent activities to create the Russian Liberation Army, as well as the unsuccessful completion of the operation with a large number of dead and missing, these battles are poorly described in literature, and the soldiers of the 2nd shock, who survived in the meat grinder of the Volkhov boiler, but were captured, were branded traitors.

The situation that had developed by the beginning of spring 1942 in the area of ​​operations of the 2nd shock and 54th armies was a mirror image for the German and Soviet troops: the 2nd shock army broke through the German front north of Novgorod, cut the Novgorod-Chudovo and Novgorod-Leningrad railways, overcame half the distance to the positions of the troops defending the besieged city. The supply of Soviet troops passed through a narrow neck punched in the German positions at the very beginning of the operation, which was never expanded, despite repeated attempts; a corridor formed on the German side, in the center of which was the city of Luban. The Soviet troops made efforts to surround the Germans, and they, in turn, ate to cut the neck through which the 2nd shock army was supplied. The main and most important difference in the situation of the two opposing sides was in the ways of supplying the warring troops. The Red Army did not have a developed network of roads, the area between Spassky Polist and Myasny Bor was very swampy and with a large number of small rivers and streams. As long as the frosts were there, this was not a big problem, but with the onset of spring, the ice melted, and roads had to be built. Construction proceeded under constant shelling, and the delivery of goods to the 2nd shock army was intermittent, accompanied by great difficulties and losses. The Germans had a favorable situation for supplying their units, they controlled the section of the Leningrad-Moscow railway and the highway parallel in that place between the same cities, which made it possible to use both a large number of trucks and captured Soviet steam locomotives and wagons.

Map of the Luban offensive operation

As a result of bloody battles, the Soviet offensive ran out of steam by mid-April 1942, without reaching its goals. The troops suffered heavy losses, the units ended up in a semi-encirclement - a bag, and by the end of April the focus of the battles shifted to the supply corridor of the 2nd shock army, the battles took on a fierce character, often turning into hand-to-hand combat. At the same time, on April 20, 1942, Lieutenant General A. A. Vlasov was appointed to the post of commander of the 2nd shock army.

Major General A. A. Vlasov during the battles near Moscow

Vlasov was not a novice in the war, he fought on the Southwestern Front, first as commander of the 4th mechanized corps, and then commander of the 37th army, defended Kyiv, commanded the troops of the 20th army in the battle of Moscow, from March 8 In 1942 he was appointed to the post of deputy commander of the Volkhov Front.

Having taken command of the troops, Lieutenant General Vlasov assessed the current situation: the state of the troops inside the bag was rather deplorable, people were weakened and starving, there were problems with uniforms, especially with shoes, in parts there was a huge shortage of personnel, most of the units are such only on paper. In addition, the defense lines pass through areas flooded with meltwater and swamps, there are very few places where you can dry and warm yourself, in addition, such places are under regular artillery fire and bombing by German aircraft, problems with the evacuation of the wounded, there is a disdainful attitude towards the bodies of the dead, t .to. there are no forces and opportunities to remove and bury them, all this contributes to the spread of diseases and the fall in the morale of the troops. Nevertheless, the troops continue to fight, and there are no cases of mass surrender.