Hanko peninsula history. Hanko - unexpected Finland

Hanko is a man and a ship a peninsula and a town (in Finnish terms - a city) in the west of Finland, and in addition its southernmost point. In Russian, Hanko is called, imagine, Gangut. It happened nearby.

In general, this part of Finland is definitely worth a visit, if only because it is ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT from Finland, familiar to us. The climate here is transitional from maritime to temperate continental, and nature, first of all, makes you wonder - the coastline cut by the sea with numerous skerries, pine forests on sand dunes, but most importantly - oak forests! Numerous oak forests, which determined the name of the town nearby - Tammisari, which means "Oak Island".

But even more remarkable is the city of Hanko, located on the peninsula of the same name.

At the beginning of the 20th century, my great-grandfather rented a dacha in Gungenburg year after year. Gungenburg is located on the other side of the Gulf of Finland and is now called Ust-Narva. I went there last summer for the sake of interest and was somewhat horrified, not understanding what good great-grandfather found there. Now I think that the current Khanko is a kind of pre-revolutionary Ust-Narva, not brought by the Soviet authorities to its current deplorable state. But this will have to be written in a separate post.

However, Hanko also has a difficult history, and how, despite the circumstances, he was able to maintain his appearance as a resort of the 19th century is a mystery.

From 1809 to 1917 Hanko was part of the Russian Empire, since December 1917 belongs to Finland.

On April 3, 1918, it was in Hanko that German troops landed. The landing of the Germans marked the victory over the Reds and the end of the CIVIL war in Finland (there was one, but it did not last long - only 3.5 months).

In honor of this event, a monument was erected at the landing site in 1921 with voluntary donations collected from all over Finland. Sculptor Bertel Nilsson created a monument on which a bas-relief of a German soldier was carved, as well as the following text in Swedish, Finnish and German: "German troops landed in Hanko on April 3, 1918 to help our country in its struggle for freedom. Albeit in in times to come, this stone reminds us of our gratitude." The monument was solemnly opened with a large gathering of people.

But under the peace treaty concluded after the Winter War in 1940, Hanko, according to the diplomatic expression of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, was "leased by Finland for 30 years to the USSR, and a naval base was created on it."

“From the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45 to December 1941, the base garrison heroically defended Kh. and the islands adjacent to it for 165 days. Before the attack on the USSR, the fascist German command demanded that the Finnish command quickly capture Hanko ...
On the night of July 1, 1941, the enemy (that is, landlord) tried to take Hanko by sudden assault, but was repulsed and proceeded to a long siege, systematically bombarding Hanko with artillery and mortar fire. The enemy was actively defending, landing troops on the nearest islands; from July 5 to October 23, 18 islands were cleared of the enemy. ...
Under the 1947 peace treaty with Finland, the USSR renounced its rights to lease the Hanko Peninsula.

The border of the territory "leased" by the Soviet Union has been preserved, and at present there is a corresponding museum "Front Line" near the road leading to the city of Hanko.

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But back to the monument in honor of the end of the civil war. His fate turned out to be not as simple as that of which I wrote about earlier - the Finns and Swedes preserved the Russian monument by simply placing theirs next to it.

When the inhabitants of Hanko returned to the city after its liberation from tenants, the monument was dismantled. By 1943 it had been repaired and reinstalled. This time, the following text was written on it:
"The enemy defiled and destroyed the monument in 1940-1941. It was restored in 1943 as a confirmation of our intransigence.

In 1946, the monument was dismantled at the request of the Soviet control commission.

It was returned to its place in 1960 without the bas-relief depicting a German soldier and without the old text. Now it just says "For Freedom".

Let's hope that the dark times of Hanko are forever in the past. Now it is a charming resort town, spread out with its wooden villas on sandy dunes and granite rocks overgrown with pine forests. A city with 30 kilometers of sea beaches in charming bays separated by granite headlands.

Villas are scattered along the coast, and throughout the city.

Many of them have names, some are unnamed. Often used as boarding houses - in any case, you can see ads for renting rooms.

On a sunny day, it's hard to imagine that you are just a few hours drive from St. Petersburg to ... the north!

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The town has many cafes and restaurants with outdoor terraces and sell funny tourist souvenirs at ridiculous prices.

In summer, you almost never meet people on the streets, it seems that everyone is on the beach, although there are plenty of empty places on the purest sand.

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In such bays it is pleasant to drink a bottle of cool white and spend the day thinking about the eternal. Although I would probably start the morning with a cool brut.

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But the sights of Hanko are not limited to the monument described above. If you walk along the shore along a series of villas and go through a pine forest, you can come to another remarkable object.

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The history of the cafe, standing on a granite rock by the sea, is associated with the name of Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, with the period of his life when he temporarily retired from public affairs in the 1920s.

To quote the book "Mannerheim Lines":

"Since 1921, [Mannerheim] has been renting, and in the 26th, buying from the municipality an island with buildings two kilometers from Hanko, repairing and furnishing a house there. On the neighboring island there was a cafe" Africa ", where visitors ran into with smuggled alcohol in their pockets (From 1919 to 1932, "dry law" reigned in the country.) In the end, Mannerheim got bored with the restless motley audience: he rented this island together in a cafe, renamed the institution "The Hut of the Four Winds" and brilliantly played the role of the owner, hosting his guests, sometimes very noble - for example, the Dutch prince Henrik. Fascinated by the game of the owner of the estate, Mannerheim tried to plant flowers, but without much success - the flowers did not take root on the rocky ground, and besides, the islands were really blown through by all the winds.

By the way, Mannerheim himself violated the law on the prohibition of alcoholic beverages several times. He even received an amusing letter about this. Looking through the correspondence, the general often left notes - therefore, he read carefully. This time he underlined with a red pencil the phrases that contained the main pathos of this anonymous message, and marked the climax with an exclamation mark:

24.2.1925

Dear White General

Having read today that the presence of the White General at the party of the Invalid has aroused admiration among the former soldiers, I cannot but regret the circumstance due to which we, the mothers of Finland, cannot, as we ardently wish, make you an ideal of national dignity for our sons. .
Namely: it is well known that you do not honor some law established by the people, but appear at social events so moved by strong drinks that the public clearly notices it. (!)
Our sons need ideal personalities, whose example they would like to follow in life, and parents also need them, but they cannot tell their sons in the current situation: accept the White General as your life ideal - precisely for the above reason.
Is change possible in this truly lamentable matter?

Some mother.

Mannerheim believed that such statements were provoked by the propaganda directed against him by the left. Most likely, the way it was - it is unlikely that the general allowed himself to appear in public "so touched by strong drinks." After all, according to the testimony of many eyewitnesses, he knew how to drink without getting drunk.

The beginning of the heroic defense ( June 26 - December 2, 1941.) Hanko naval base.

Defense of the Hanko Naval Base (GANGUT) entered the history of Soviet naval art as an example of a heroic and skillful struggle in the skerry-island area. Together with it, no less heroic and no less skillful actions of the forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to evacuate the garrison of this base entered the history of naval art. With the outbreak of war, the Khanko naval base (base commander Major General S. I. Kabanov, military commissar Brigadier Commissar A. L. Rasskin) was tasked with defending the northern flank of the Central mine and artillery position and the base itself from land, sea and air (73). To repel sea and air assault, the territory of the base was divided into two combat areas controlled by mobile groups of ground forces (74). The ground defense of the base consisted of a system of barriers on the border of the leased zone, two equipped defensive lines and two lines of direct defense of the city of Hanko, one of which was facing the sea and was actually an antiamphibious defense line. The size of the territory of the base excluded the possibility of reaching a sufficient depth of the entire defensive system, but made it possible to create a significant density of defense.

By the beginning of the war, the 8th Rifle Brigade was on the peninsula, reinforced by an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, tank and engineer battalions, and a communications battalion. The coastal defense sector had several railway and stationary batteries with guns ranging in caliber from 305 to 45 mm. The air defense of the base consisted of 12 76-mm batteries and an air squadron (11 I-156 and I-15 aircraft). In the protection of the water area of ​​​​the base there were 3 patrol boats "MO-4" and several small boats. The total strength of the base garrison was 25,300 (75). In the Finnish war plan, coordinated with the Barbarossa plan, the capture of Hanko was considered as a special task of the Finnish armed forces, for which the Hanko strike group was created, consisting of the 17th Finnish infantry division with reinforcement units and a strong artillery group with guns caliber up to 305 mm (total 103 guns) (76). Finnish aviation in itself did not pose a serious threat, but the presence in Finland of a large number of airfields and landing sites created the possibility of widespread use against the base of German aircraft. It goes without saying that Finnish gunboats and boats could operate from the depths of the skerries and at the edge of them. The Finns began operations against Hanko on June 29.

The next day, they tried to break through the defenses on the isthmus (the land border of the base), but were driven back to their original position and suffered heavy losses. Subsequently, coordinating their actions with the offensive of the Nazi troops on Leningrad, the Finns repeatedly, but just as unsuccessfully, tried in various ways to break through the defense front of Hanko, and the Nazis tried to capture about. Osmussar. The enemy hoped to weaken the defenses of the base before the start of winter in order to capture the peninsula with the onset of freeze-up. After the departure of the main forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet from Tallinn in the conditions of the approaching winter period, the Central mine and artillery position lost its former operational significance.

The impending freeze-up could make the land defense front of Hanko circular. For the organization of defense, his base did not have sufficient forces and means. All this taken together, as well as the inexpediency of defense in the current situation at the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, predetermined the decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to evacuate the Hanko garrison (77). The defense of the naval base of Hanko is characterized by some peculiarities. The rapid liquidation of the naval base of Hanko was envisaged by the strategic deployment plan of the enemy, since, by preventing through communications in the Gulf of Finland, it forced the already insignificant naval forces of Finland to be split into two parts. In addition, the base pulled over a significant number of ground units. From the moment of organization throughout the existence of the base, the enemy threatened it from the north, northeast and northwest. This was precisely the reason for the early equipment of the Hanko land defense front, which was not done at any of the other forward bases. The relatively flat, in some places wooded terrain allowed the enemy to continuously view the territory of the base to a considerable depth by means of optical observation from observation towers and posts. Geographical and navigational-hydrographic features of the area of ​​the Hanko naval base also determined the forms of its defense, characteristic of a skerry-island position. An increase in the depth of defense of the skerry flanks of such a position was achieved by capturing a group of islands to the east and northwest of Khanko (19 islands in total). To the extent possible, by laying minefields, the maneuver of enemy ships in skerry fairways was constrained. All this prevented the Finns from using the undoubted advantages due to the nature of the skerry region. Having wasted time on unsuccessful attempts to storm the most stable land position of the base, they missed other opportunities and allowed the Soviet sailors to seize the initiative on the most vulnerable skerry flanks of the defense. The explosion of the Finnish coastal defense battleship Ilmarinen on the Soviet minefield forced the enemy to beware of the fire impact on the coastal batteries of the base from the skerries.

The defense of Hanko was favored by the preservation of the airfield on the peninsula. Even the relatively small number of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft that the command of the naval base had at its disposal greatly contributed to the success of firing coastal artillery, landings on the islands and repelling enemy aircraft. An exceptional role belonged to coastal artillery, which, in essence, was the basis of the defense of the naval base. The surface forces based at Hanko performed tasks related to daily combat activities within the borders of the base. All these circumstances and the high morale of the defenders of Hanko favored the active actions of the defense forces. They managed to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy and held it for a long time. After unsuccessful offensive attempts, the command of the Finnish strike group "Hanko" was convinced that it would not be able to capture the Soviet naval base with the forces at its disposal. The situation that developed near Leningrad and in the North did not allow him to count on reinforcements. The struggle for Hanko took on a positional character for the Finns, who during the pre-war twenty years were preparing for active operations in the skerry regions. Capturing Hanko turned out to be not such an easy task as the Finnish command assumed. Paying tribute to the successful active actions of the Hanko garrison, one cannot fail to mention the unsuccessful landing on about. Bengsher, which led to the death of the landing force, the destruction of the lighthouse, which served as a convenient reference point for Soviet ships, and had negative consequences for the defense of the base. Apparently, the successful landings of the previous landings served as a reason for underestimating the strength and capabilities of the enemy. The islands close to Bengsher were beyond the influence of the forces of the Hanko naval base, while the enemy used them to block and destroy the landing force. Some underestimation of the importance of destroyer aircraft for laying active minefields in skerry areas, which existed in our country in the 30s, on the one hand, and the forced use of KBF aviation in land directions, on the other, prevented the realization of potential opportunities to reliably clog skerry fairways and knots with mines . Such clogging (mainly against small ships) could limit the activity of the Finnish naval forces in the Gulf of Finland and stop their mine activity. In general, the actions of the diverse forces defending Hanko testify to the high level of combat training, courage, dedication and stamina of the personnel of the naval base, who showed their boundless devotion to the socialist Motherland and the Communist Party in an exceptionally difficult situation. For almost half a year, the forces of this advanced base waged a stubborn struggle on the distant approaches to Leningrad from the sea, contributing a lot to the stability of its defense.

The heroic actions of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet during the evacuation of the Hanko garrison are inextricably linked with the defense of this base. The plan for the evacuation of the garrison and some of the means of the Hanko naval base was based on the consistent removal of personnel and valuable cargo. The secrecy of the withdrawal of troops and the delivery of their means to the points of landing on ships was ensured by a number of camouflage measures, including active camouflage measures (alternating "hours of silence" with counter-battery fire when the enemy tried to take active actions). The implementation of the evacuation plan was facilitated by the situation on the land front of the base defense, which had developed since the second half of October, when the enemy was forced to transfer part of his ground forces to reinforce the troops on the Karelian Isthmus. The situation at sea was less favorable, where the enemy, using his capabilities, with impunity carried out mine laying in the middle part of the Gulf of Finland (in the western part of the Gogland reach and in the Yuminda region), building up the old and setting up new barriers from small surface minelayers and boats. The broad opportunities that the enemy had at that time in the Gulf of Finland allow us to assert that the mine danger in this area, given its navigational and hydrographic features, was the greatest during the Great Patriotic War and the Second World War. However, not only the mine danger determined the exceptional complexity of the situation at sea. Organizing the evacuation of the Khanko garrison, the KBF Military Council had to seriously reckon with enemy coastal artillery, which was able to fire on ships in several sections of possible routes when moving from Khanko to about. Gogland. German aviation also posed a no less serious threat to Soviet ships and transports. At night, the danger of counteraction by coastal artillery and aviation decreased, but the mine threat increased, due to the difficulties of night trawling.

The natural and navigation-hydrographic features of the crossing area, the onset of stormy weather and the appearance of ice in the bay also complicated the situation at sea. All these unfavorable factors, as well as the extremely limited number of transports and the complete absence of any modern landing vehicles, or even high-speed transports of small tonnage, made evacuation very difficult. However, this task was solved, and the difficulties that had to be overcome in carrying out it make the operation of evacuating the Hanko naval base one of the remarkable military events at sea, deserving a special place in the history of Soviet naval art. One of the characteristic features of this operation was that military transportation by sea was carried out mainly on warships. The regularity of this form of troop transportation in difficult conditions, envisaged by Soviet naval theorists in the prewar years, was confirmed. At the same time, the experience of evacuating the Hanko garrison showed the need to have special amphibious transport ships built for operations in tight and shallow water areas in the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Another feature of this operation was the forced repetition of convoy crossings, which was impossible to hide. This circumstance entailed a number of consequences, and above all, a further increase in the mine danger, since the enemy laid additional mine banks on the convoy routes he identified. Meanwhile, some convoys, especially the first ones, although the time intervals between them were about ten days, moved almost the same routes. The third feature of the operation to evacuate the Hanko garrison, which had no precedent in the history of naval art, was the passage of the last convoys in ice conditions under the escort of the icebreaker Yermak. In practice, this further increased the mine danger, since the ice situation excluded mine protection, made it difficult to maneuver to evade air attacks, as well as the anti-artillery zigzag.

	Finland: Hanko
	Evacuation of the naval base to Leningrad
Opponents
	Germany
	Finland
Commanders
S. I. Kabanov	Eino Koskimes
N. P. Simonyak
V. F. Tributs
Side forces
25,300 people	About 30 thousand people
unknown	unknown

Battle of Hanko or - the battle of the Second World War, was fought for 164 days from June 22 to December 2, 1941.

On June 22, 1941, after the start of the Barbarossa plan by Germany, the German air force and naval forces attacked the Soviet naval base on the Hanko Peninsula, which was defended by the combat units of the Red Army. After the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war on June 25, 1941, Finnish troops joined the fighting against the Red Army.

Previous events

On March 12, 1940, the Moscow Peace Treaty was signed between Finland and the USSR, which ended the Soviet-Finnish Winter War of 1939-1940. According to one of the terms of this agreement, the USSR received a lease of a part of the Khanko (Gangut) peninsula, including the city of Khanko and its port, and the sea area around it, with a radius of 5 miles to the south and east and 3 miles to the north and west, and a number of islands adjacent to it for a period of 30 years to create a naval base on it, capable of defending the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, protecting Leningrad. In order to protect the naval base, the Soviet Union was given the right to maintain there at its own expense the necessary number of ground and air armed forces.

The inhabitants of Hanko were given 10 days to leave the city.

On April 2, 1940, the first caravan of ships with cargo, materiel of artillery and other property departed from Leningrad to Hanko. 28,000 Soviet citizens arrived in the city, of which 5,000 were civilians.

On June 20, 1940, a resolution of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On approval of the organization of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and measures to strengthen the defense of the western regions of the Gulf of Finland" was approved and measures were outlined "to create an air defense organization on the Hanko Peninsula and ensure the construction of coastal defense on the islands of Ezel, Dago and southern coast of the Irben Strait.

On July 28, the Main Military Council of the USSR Navy considered and approved the defense plan in the Baltic states and on Hanko, developed by the commission of I. I. Gren, and approved the plan for military construction work at the Hanko naval base. For its implementation, a third special construction department was created (headed by G.S. Dubovsky).

In a short time, the Soviet military fortified the rented territory of Hankoniemi.

On the other side of the border, outside the village of Lappohya, Finnish soldiers built their line of defense. The task of this 40-kilometer Harparskog line (fin. Harparskogin linja) was to prevent the breakthrough of Soviet troops to Turku, Helsinki and Tampere.

In the early days of June 1941, the state of the naval base was checked by the commander of the Leningrad Military District, Lieutenant General M. M. Popov, the chief of staff of the district, Major General D. N. Nikishev, and the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, Vice Admiral V. F. Tributs and a representative of the military department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) N. V. Malyshev. The arrivals examined the construction of pillboxes, the coastal battery on the island of Heste-Busse and a number of other facilities.

The alignment of forces of the parties

USSR

With the outbreak of war, in front of the Khanko base (the commander of the garrison of the base, Major General (since September 16, 1941, Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service) S. I. Kabanov, the military commissar Brigadier Commissar A. L. Rasskin), the task of defending and repelling enemy attacks to ensure free actions of the Baltic Fleet in the area.

To repel sea and air assault, the territory of the base was divided into two combat areas controlled by mobile groups of ground forces. The ground defense of the base consisted of a system of obstacles on the border of the leased zone, two equipped defensive lines and two lines of direct defense of the city of Hanko, one of which was facing the sea and was actually the line of antiamphibious defense.

The size of the territory of the base excluded the possibility of reaching a sufficient depth of the entire defensive system, but made it possible to create a significant density of defense. By the beginning of the war, the 8th Rifle Brigade under the command of Colonel N.P. Simonyak was on the peninsula, reinforced by an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery battalion, tank and engineer battalions, and a communications battalion. The coastal defense sector had several railway and stationary batteries with guns ranging in caliber from 45 to 305 mm. The air defense of the base consisted of twelve 76-mm batteries and an air squadron (11 I-153 and I-15 aircraft). The base was directly subordinated to 3 MO-4 patrol boats and several small boats. The total strength of the base garrison was 25,300 men.

Finland and Germany

In accordance with the Barbarossa plan, the capture of Hanko was presented as a special task for the Finnish ground forces, for which the Hanko strike group was created. Initially, it consisted of the 13th brigade and the 4th coastal brigade, later the 13th brigade was replaced by the 17th Finnish infantry division with reinforcement units and a strong artillery group with guns up to 305 mm caliber (103 guns in total). Colonel Aarne Snellman was appointed commander of the group.

Finnish aviation, numbering only 500 aircraft by the beginning of the war, did not pose a significant threat, but a large number of airfields made it possible to transfer significant Luftwaffe forces to this area. Finnish gunboats and boats were able to operate not far from the coast. According to the plan to capture the base, the main emphasis was on the surprise of the attack and a quick assault from land.

Military actions

On June 22, 1941, Germany attacked the USSR, and the implementation of the Barbarossa plan began. On the same day, Italy and Romania declared war on the USSR, Slovakia on June 23, and Finland on June 25.

In the Baltic, to support Army Group North and operate against the Soviet Baltic Fleet, the German command allocated about 100 ships, including 28 torpedo boats, 10 minelayers, 5 submarines, patrol ships and minesweepers.

Events in Hanko began to unfold immediately after the start of Barbarossa. From June 22 to June 25, before Finland entered the war, Germany fought against Hanko. Its air force bombarded Hanko already on June 22 in the evening at 22:30 (20 aircraft participated in the raid) and in the afternoon of June 23 (30 aircraft), while the Finns only watched what was happening from the side. Similar activity during the period of the so-called "three-day neutrality" of Finland (June 22-25) was distinguished around Hanko by the German naval forces. Both detachments of German torpedo boats plied the waters of the Gulf of Finland every night, completely disregarding the diplomatic position of Finland.

These days, almost the entire civilian population was evacuated to Leningrad. To strengthen the defense of the base, two combat areas were created, and mine laying was carried out. In total, 367 mines were laid by boats and auxiliary vessels of the base. At the same time, the "small hunters" boats, carrying patrols, carried out anti-submarine defense on the approach fairways to Hanko.

The day of June 25 began with Soviet air raids on Finnish airfields, and an artillery duel broke out in the Hanko area. This indicated the spread of hostilities to the territory of Finland. At 10:45 p.m., Lieutenant General Erik Heinrichs gave Colonel General Valo Nihtilä a verbal order over the phone: "The commander-in-chief authorizes to respond to fire and destroy artillery positions, but not to cross the border." The war in Finland has begun.

On July 1, the base underwent the first land assault, but the attackers were driven back to their original position and suffered heavy losses. For a long time, the Finns repeatedly, but also unsuccessfully, tried in various ways to break through the Hanko defense front, and the Wehrmacht troops - to capture the island of Osmussaar.

To expand the defense of Hanko, amphibious assaults were landed under the command of Captain B. M. Granin, who occupied 18 islands adjacent to the peninsula. The aircraft base played an important role in the defense of Hanko. In extremely difficult conditions, she supported the actions of troops and landings, conducted reconnaissance, and struck at enemy ships, batteries and airfields. In the period from June 22 to August 28, the base aviation destroyed 24 enemy aircraft without losses from the enemy in the air. One aircraft (I-153) and two pilots were lost in accidents. The aviation of the Baltic Fleet also provided great assistance to the Hanko garrison.

On August 28, 1941, Soviet troops left Tallinn. This, as well as the approaching winter, have greatly changed the situation on Hanko. First, the central mine-artillery position, which closed the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, lost its significance. Secondly, due to ice formation, the ground defense of the base could become circular, since the base would lose contact with the Baltic Fleet. In connection with these reasons, as well as the inexpediency of defending the Gulf of Finland in the current situation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to evacuate the Hanko garrison.

Defense Features

On the eve of the war, the Finnish defense was significantly strengthened, the Soviet forces practically remained at the same level. The largest number of Finnish troops was at the beginning of July 1941. Then the defense zone was divided into six sectors. When the expected Soviet invasion did not occur, the troops from Hanko began to be transferred to other areas. The 17th division was transferred on July 17, 1941 to the Northern Ladoga region, after which only the 55th division remained. Eino Koskimes became the new commander.

A feature of the Finnish group of troops in Hanko were Swedish volunteers. In the end, there were so many of them that for their sake on August 10 they formed their own battalion. He got a name Svenska Frivilligbataljonen(SFB), its commander was Hans Bergen.

Almost all the time of the hostilities, the “Hanko group” planned to capture the Hanko Peninsula, but Mannerheim did not give an order for this. In Lappohya, the Finns nevertheless carried out reconnaissance in force. Both sides switched to trench warfare. It was reduced mainly to artillery duels. But on the islands adjacent to Hanko, there were bloody battles. Especially Soviet soldiers specialized in combat operations in the archipelago (landing forces), usually with the forces of one company. The biggest battle was for the Bengtskäri lighthouse, other battles were on Khorsø, on Morgonlahti, in Hästö.

The defense of the base forced the already small Finnish naval forces to split into two parts, preventing through communications in the Gulf of Finland. The base's 25,000-strong garrison held one enemy division.

From the first moment of the existence of the base, it was built with significant land fortifications due to its location on the territory of a potential enemy. The geographic, navigational and hydrographic features of the Hanko naval base area also determined the forms of its defense, characteristic of a skerry-island position. To the extent possible, by laying minefields, the maneuver of enemy ships in skerry fairways was constrained. The capture of 18 islands significantly strengthened the defense of the peninsula. Unsuccessful attempts at direct assaults from land forced the enemy to move to a long-term siege of the base and to lose the opportunity to attack from the flanks (occupied by that time by Soviet marines). The explosion of the Finnish coastal defense battleship Ilmarinen on the Soviet minefield forced the enemy to beware of the fire impact on the coastal batteries of the base from the skerries.

The defense of Hanko was favored by the preservation of the airfield on the peninsula. Even a relatively small number of fighter and reconnaissance aircraft, which the command of the naval base had, to a large extent contributed to the success of firing coastal artillery, landings on the islands and repelling enemy air raids.

Base evacuation

The evacuation of the base was carried out from October 26 to December 2, 1941 by the ships of the Baltic Fleet in the conditions of storms, ice cover and great mine danger with active opposition from the enemy.

By December 5, over 22 thousand people with weapons and military equipment were delivered to Leningrad and Kronstadt. The 8th Rifle Brigade was reorganized into the 136th Rifle Division.

During the evacuation, one of the worst tragedies at sea during the Great Patriotic War occurred - the explosion of the Soviet turbo-electric ship "Joseph Stalin" on its own mines, which was used as a military transport "VT-521".

On board the ship, despite the estimated 512 passengers, there were 5,589 Red Army servicemen (according to other sources, there were not only servicemen on board, but also women with children who were evacuated from Hanko).

In addition to "Joseph Stalin", during the evacuation of the base in Hanko, the cargo-passenger refrigerated ship "Andrey Zhdanov", as well as several smaller ships, were lost.

I have been wanting to visit Hanko for a long time. Even in early childhood, V. Rudny's book "Ganguttsy" was read about the defense of the Khanko naval base - perhaps the only grouping of the Red Army and the Navy that did not cede an inch of Soviet territory in the first months of the Second World War. At about the same time, exhibits and materials on the famous Gangut battle were carefully examined in the Leningrad Naval Museum (last week was the 300th anniversary of this battle).

To fulfill this desire, it was necessary 1) to bring down the iron curtain (they managed without me) and 2) the availability of free time. There were certain problems with the second point, but they were also resolved - 2 days and 3 nights were allocated for the action. After a thorough study of all possible options for landing, a night bus to Helsinki was chosen and a car was booked for rent from H. to Hanko and back. The return to St. Petersburg was planned in a more interesting way, but this is beside the point. Support along the way was provided by a specially trained friend (in the good sense of the word).

Morning in Helsinki. There are still 3 hours before the opening of the car rental ... I apologize for the quality of the photos - Nokia C7 is such a Nokia ...

Everything is calm in port X.

We picked up the car and in 1.5 hours we reached the Front Museum (Hanko Front Museum / Hangon Rintamamuseo) - our main goal. On the map, it is marked with a large red dot (near the isthmus, near the town of Lappvik - on the former border and, subsequently, the front line).

At the entrance there is a rather ancient cannon, caliber for a tired eye: 152 mm. Local vandals left their secret marks on the trunk.

The area around the museum is quite front-line.

Finnish anti-tank defense. The garrison of our naval base really had several tanks.

The museum itself is a neat hut full of interesting artifacts. It can be seen that local enthusiasts are engaged in business. There are few visitors.

On the walls are handicraft posters on the theme of Soviet-Finnish-German relations. Apparently, the Finns are unhappy that their country was then assigned to the Soviet zone of influence (according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact).

Many photos of our fighters and sailors.

Scheme of the battle at the Bengtscher lighthouse (one of the few successes of the Finns in the island operations near Hanko). The Finns then managed to bring reinforcements to the island almost simultaneously with our landing force and destroy it, as well as damage the guards. Here is the story of that fight.

Soviet "secret" map with unit designations.

Model of the railway artillery installation TM-3-12, which took part in the defense of Hanko. The Finns captured it, repaired it (they spent a lot of effort and money), and then the summer of 1944 suddenly came, and they asked for the installation back. I had to give up - without a single shot. Now the original is in the St. Petersburg Museum of Railway Engineering.

The museum has many stands that are not directly related to Hanko or even to Finland. For example, a stand about the battleship "Marat", seriously damaged on September 23, 1941 as a result of a German air raid. According to German historiography, it was destroyed - which is rather true, because the floating gun platform with the remaining three turrets was no longer a battleship.

I strongly suspect that some of the stands were prepared by local schoolchildren as assignments in history. However, the museum is interesting and I recommend visiting it.

Address: Hankoniementie, 10820 Hanko.
How to get there: by train from Helsinki or by car.
Working hours: usually in summer, this year from May 18 to August 31, daily from 11.30 to 18.30.
Ticket price: 4 Euro.
Official site: www.frontmuseum.fi (it hasn't been working for some time now, perhaps no one has noticed it yet - the Finns do).

The next day we toured the Soviet military cemetery near the city. My expectation to find the graves of the island's defenders there was not justified - it was a cemetery for prisoners of war who died on the peninsula after the Finns organized a prisoner of war camp there. The state of the cemetery is very well-groomed, thanks to the Finns and, probably, the relevant agreements with the Russian Federation / USSR.

The town of Hanko itself (the peninsula of the same name) is simply idyllic. Harbor view.

Lots of pretty coves with cottages.

St. Petersburg weather on Hanko (this was on the second day of our trip, before departure).

Monument to the German participants Freikorps (German Baltic division), who landed in April 1918 in the port to participate in the suppression of Red Finland (suppressed successfully, like their Bavarian Republic, which the Finns still do not regret). In 1941, Soviet political workers took revenge as far as they could: they threw the lions into the sea. After the evacuation of our naval base, the Finns, apparently, raised them and again put them in their rightful place.

Surrounded by dozens of small islands, the Khanko Peninsula, or Gangut (Gange-Udd), as it was called before, cuts into the sea at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland with a narrow tongue. The length of the peninsula is 23 km, the width is from 3 to 6 km.

The water area surrounding the peninsula had three raids available for the largest ships. The water area around the peninsula is the only one in Finland that sometimes does not freeze at all in warm winters, and in more severe ones it is covered with ice only for a short time. On average, the sea is ice-free here 312 days a year.

The name of this peninsula entered the history of Russia and the Russian fleet during the Northern War of 1700-1721. Here, in July 1714, the Russian galley fleet under the command of Peter I and his associates F. M. Apraksin, M. Kh. Zmaevich and others won their first victory. frigate and six enemy galleys. The victory at Gangut allowed the Russian fleet to occupy the Aland Islands and cut communications along the Gulf of Bothnia, connecting the mother country with the troops stationed in northern Finland, and force them to retreat to Swedish territory. The victory at Gangut ensured the lasting occupation of all of Finland.

The Gangut victory was solemnly celebrated in St. Petersburg, where ships taken from the Swedes were brought in triumph. All the officers and lower ranks participating in the battle were awarded medals, and Shautbenakht Petr Mikhailov was promoted to vice admiral. In 1719, the 90-gun ship "Gangut" entered the Russian fleet. In the future, the Russian fleet always included ships bearing the name "Gangut" or "St. Panteleimon "(on the day of this saint - July 27, the Gangut battle took place).

In memory of the battle in St. Petersburg in 1736-1739. the stone church of St. Great Martyr Panteleimon was built.

The strategically important area around Gangut became the scene of battles during the Russo-Swedish wars of 1741–1743 and 1788–1790.

The Gangut peninsula crossed a continuous belt of skerries, disconnected and disrupted communications between the defending detachments concentrated in the Abo skerries and in the Gulf of Finland.

On May 26, 1743, a Russian galley fleet under the command of Field Marshal P.P. Lassi arrived in Tverminne Bay on the Gangut Peninsula, leaving St. Petersburg at the beginning of the month. On the galleys were 9 regiments of infantry, 8 companies of grenadiers and 200 Cossacks, who were supposed to land on the coast of Sweden. But the further way to the west was blocked by the Swedish naval fleet (8 battleships, 6 frigates, 1 bombardment ship, 2 galliots and 1 shnyava), stationed at Gangut.

On June 6, 1743, the Russian naval fleet under the command of Admiral N.F. Golovin approached the peninsula (15 ships, 2 frigates and several small vessels). On the same day he had an artillery skirmish with the Swedish fleet. On June 7, the Russian fleet weighed anchor and, covering the rowing fleet, moved closer to the Swedes. Both fleets, built in the battle line, held out against each other for more than a day, but a quiet wind and fog allowed the Swedes to evade a decisive battle. Having set all the sails, the Swedes in the fog managed to break away and go to their bases. The way for Russian galleys to the coast of Sweden was opened. And only the beginning of peace negotiations stopped the landing on its territory.

After the Battle of Hogland on July 6, 1788 (during the war of 1788–1790), the Swedish squadron managed to break away from the Russian ships in the dark and went to Sveaborg under the protection of the fortress, where it was blocked by the Russian fleet. To cut off the communication of the Swedish rowing fleet between the coast of Sweden and Sveaborg through the Finnish archipelago, Admiral S.K. Greig on August 14, 1788 sent a detachment under the command of Captain 2nd Rank D. Trevenen to the area of ​​Cape Gangut, consisting of a ship of the line and three frigates. Then the detachment was reinforced by two ships of the line. On October 3 and 5, the Swedes tried to lead several rowing transports with food for their fleet blocked in Sveaborg from the Abo skerries past Gangut. The Russian ships that were at Gangut forced the Swedes to withdraw, and 14 ships that had run aground were burned.

The Swedes, who finally appreciated the significance of the Gangut position, worked hard throughout the winter to build batteries here. On May 4, 1789, the fortress was opened, which consisted of two forts (50 guns) on the islands of Gustavsvern and Gustav Adolf, covering the longitudinal skerry fairway.

A detachment of Russian ships that appeared a few days later to take up a position at Gangut was forced to return to Revel.

During the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-1809. Gangut May 9, 1808 was occupied by Russian troops. After the victory of Russia in this war, according to the Friedrichsham Peace Treaty of September 5, 1809, Finland became part of the Russian Empire.

According to the list of regular fortresses of Russia, Gangut was listed in the 2nd class. In 1832, the Inspector General of the Engineering Troops reported that "... I found in this fortress not fortifications, but only the ruins of them." At the same time, the Grand Duke Mikhail Pavlovich, who was in charge of the Russian artillery, received a report that, “despite the strategic importance of Gangut, which during the war is the only port where our fleet, with a core wind, can, in case of need, find shelter and which, moreover, , there is a key to the food line with skerries”, there are only five carriages in it, four of them are still Swedish, and all of them are “the worst”. Soon the fortress was somehow corrected: in some places they built new wooden parapets and refreshed artillery weapons.

After the start of the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853-1856. it was decided to bring the seaside fortresses, including the Ganges, into proper form. But there was neither time, nor artillery, nor garrisons in sufficient numbers.

Military operations in the Baltic theater began in the spring of 1854, immediately after the entry of England and France into the war against Russia. The Russian Baltic Fleet (26 battleships, 17 frigates and corvettes, including 11 steam ones), divided into three divisions, was located in Kronstadt (two divisions) and Sveaborg (one division). The rowing flotilla was also in Kronstadt.

For timely notification of the approach of the enemy along the entire coast of the Gulf of Finland, northern and southern, temporary signal telegraphs (semaphores) were installed.

The first to arrive in the Baltic Sea was the English squadron under the command of Vice-Admiral Nepier, consisting of 13 screw and 6 sailing ships of the line, 23 steam-frigates and steamers. On March 23, 1854, having stood in Knog Bay, on the eastern coast of the island of Zealand, Nepir sent a detachment of four screw ships to reconnoiter the outskirts of the Gangut Peninsula.

Having received a report that the Gulf of Finland to Helsingfors was free of ice, and that no Russian ships were found in this area, Nepir with a squadron headed for the Gulf of Finland. However, not having accurate maps of the Gulf of Finland and fearing banks and reefs, he moved to the Stockholm archipelago, where he stood until the end of the month. Only on April 23, the squadron of Nepira crossed to the Gangut Peninsula. She cruised between Gangut and Gotland, not daring to do anything serious against the Russian coast.

During this time, the Russian squadrons could join in Sveaborg and even go out, as some flagships were supposed to, to the sea to fight with the English squadron. But they remained standing in those ports where the war found them, and did not show any activity.

The fortifications of the Ganges consisted of several weak old forts. The main ones were on the islands of Gustavsvern, Gustav Adolf and Meyerfeld. And one fort, barracks, the commandant's house and the church were on the shore. In total, the fortress was armed with 100 guns. The garrison consisted of 25 officers and 1187 combatant lower ranks and 82 non-combatants. The commandant of the fortress, Lieutenant Colonel E. I. von Moller, who was in his 66th year, was wounded in the Battle of Borodino, the Gustavsvern artillery was commanded by the 70-year-old captain Semyonov. Lieutenant Colonel Moller, as best he could, prepared the fortress to repulse the enemy. In the event of an attack by superior enemy forces and the impossibility of holding out in any fort, it was ordered to withdraw troops at night and blow up the fortifications.

The enemy approached Gangut several times. On April 6, several English ships approached the peninsula. At about 11 o'clock the first shot of the enemy was heard. The alarm sounded in the fortress, the Russians responded with several shots, but no battle took place. The enemy ships stopped outside the cannon shots.

At 3 am on April 7, lights on the masts of ships were seen from the shore. After dawn, the defenders of the fortress saw only two steamers in the distance. The British took up the measurements of the raids, and when they approached the fortifications of the Ganges, they were met by nuclei.

On April 27, ships appeared again, but the matter did not come to a real skirmish. At the Ganges, the British stood for another two weeks, attacking the surrounding skerries and devastating coastal villages. Separate detachments of ships operated in the Gulf of Finland and Bothnia, off the coast of Courland.

In anticipation of the arrival of the French fleet, Nepir chose the Ganges as his temporary base. On May 8, the English squadron approached the Ganges and anchored in the roadstead, outside the zone of fire of the Russian advanced fortifications. On the island of Mosher, the British built a battery. Ensign Danilov with 30 volunteers attacked and destroyed it.

The English admiral was not going to attack the fortifications of the Ganges without the support of the ground forces. But the young officers of his squadron were eager to fight. Therefore, Napier was forced to allow the steamer-frigates "Dragon", "Magicienne", "Basilisk" and "Hecla" and two steamers to try their hand.

On May 10, the British launched a decisive attack on the Ganges. The advanced forts Gustavsvern and Gustav-Adolf were approached by two frigate steamers. Up to 26 ships remained in the roadstead, ready to support the attackers. The Russians could respond to the fire of the English steamer-frigates from Gustavsvern with the fire of two guns, and from Gustavus Adolf - only one gun. The commander of the Gustavsvern, Captain Sokolov, seeing that only two flanking guns could be answered, ordered the rest of the team to take cover in the casemates. The enemy ships came very close to both forts, but could not, despite heavy fire, silence them.

Fire from the Gustavsvern caused damage to a three-masted steamer-frigate that was shelling it. He was replaced by another, who was soon also forced to withdraw - the bomb hit him in the stern.

At this time, from behind the island, behind the fortification, another steamer was firing at Gustavsvern with mounted fire. Then coming out from behind the shelter, he was met with two well-aimed shots. However, he approached the damaged steamer, covered it with his hull, and then disappeared with him out of sight.

The core from Gustavus Adolphus hit the stern of the steamer and forced him to move away and do repairs.

The steamer, which was shelling Meyerfeld, passing by the fortifications of Gustavsvern, was also overtaken by two cores. The enemy withdrew to the squadron, which at 4 pm moved towards Sveaborg.

The enemy fired up to 1500 charges, firing 68- and 96-pound cannonballs and 3-pound bombs. Russian losses - 9 wounded.

The duel of three guns with six steam ships was won by Russian gunners. The garrison, inspired by the example of their commandant, acted with such composure and accuracy that the steamers were forced to retreat.

Having received a report on the behavior of E. I. von Moller and his garrison, the sovereign emperor on May 13 personally inscribed on it: “Commandant to major general, lower ranks three St. George crosses per battery and all 1 rub. silver."

The British were convinced that the Russians had a strong position in the Ganges, the batteries on the islands were especially important. They must first be brought to silence. Nepir believed that in general it was possible to take the Ganges, but with victims: people and ships.

The English admiral did not agree to this, not seeing any particular benefit in taking the Ganges, since it was impossible to keep the Ganges behind him without ground forces.

Nepir reported to the Admiralty: “... Yes, even in the Ganges it is possible, however, to force the Russians out of the advanced batteries, but nothing can be done with the fortress: I fired several shells from the ships into the fortress, but it was exactly as if throw peas at the granite walls."

But the complete unpreparedness of the fortress and the lack of land defense forced the Russian command to decide on its abolition. It was abolished due to the fact that the Ekenes detachment of Lieutenant General Ramsay was far away, and the forts could be easily taken from the northern land side. On August 15, 1854, all its fortifications were blown up by decree of Emperor Nicholas I. Fort Meyerfeld was the first to fly into the air, followed by the rest. 950 pounds of gunpowder were used for this explosion. 86 guns of the fortress were sunk in the bay. After the destruction of the forts in the Ganges, only Cossack patrols and grenadier patrols entered.

In the spring of 1855, an even more powerful Anglo-French fleet entered the Gulf of Finland. This year he tried to attack Kronstadt and bombarded Sveaborg. The British tried to approach the shore in those places where they did not expect to meet Russian troops. Small enemy landings appeared everywhere with the aim of destroying telegraphs, replenishing provisions and recruiting pilots.

On May 24, 1855, the English steam 20-gun frigate Cossack, approaching the Ganges, tried to land a landing party on a boat to destroy coastal telegraph posts (semaphore), capture local pilots and requisition food. At the time of the landing, the enemy was attacked by a local team (50 soldiers and 4 Cossacks under the command of ensign of the grenadier regiment I. D. Sverchkov), who sank the boat and captured the surviving people from the landing party - 11 sailors led by her boss. The next day, the frigate Cossack, making sure that its landing force was destroyed, fired at the Ganges to no avail, firing about 150 shells within 2 hours.

In subsequent years, the Ganges developed as a trading port. A railway line was brought to its harbor, the embankment was lined with granite. Steamboats with a draft of 25–30 feet (7.5–9.2 m) could moor directly to the wall. Only occasionally did Russian warships enter the Gangut raid. No fortifications were built on the peninsula and its surrounding islands.

After the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 as a result of which almost all the ships of the Baltic Fleet were killed or captured, most of the funds allocated for the fleet went to shipbuilding; The development of ports and coastal fortresses was not paid attention.

By 1907, the Naval General Staff (MGSH) developed the "Strategic Basis for the Plan of War at Sea". The MGSH came to the conclusion that the Revel-Porkallaud area, with proper fortification, could be a frontier on which the fleet would not allow the strongest enemy to break into the Gulf of Finland. The equipment of the skerry areas of the northern coast of the bay as a stronghold for destroyers, the location of the latter in the Abo-Moonzund-Riga region for operations behind enemy lines will give even greater stability to the defense.

The plan for the strategic deployment of the Baltic Fleet in the event of a European war in 1910 provided for the deployment of the 1st mine division in Tverminna. The skerry detachment was supposed to provide "protection of the entrances to the main skerry fairways, monitoring the latter."

At the end of 1911, the construction of two batteries (4 152 mm and 4 75 mm guns) began in the Twerminne area and one (152 mm) on the island of Heste-Busse. But then they were mothballed.

Two years later, the "Plan of operations of the naval forces of the Baltic Sea in the event of a European war in 1912" was developed. It provided for the containment of superior enemy forces through a defensive battle at a mine-artillery position, equipped in advance in the Nargen-Porkkala-Udd area, with the participation of all combat-ready surface ships and submarines. The creation of such a position was, according to the plan of the command, to make it easier for the Russian fleet to fight a stronger enemy, which was the German fleet. In 1912, the construction of the Revel fortress (Emperor Peter the Great) began. On the coast around Reval and the islands of Nargen and Makiluoto, batteries were built with a caliber from 120 to 305 mm.

A day before the start of the First World War, on July 31, 1914, Russian minelayers began setting up a central minefield. In the period from August 2 to 6, destroyers and minesweepers set up a number of minefields at the edge of Finnish skerries in the Gange-Porkkala-Udd section.

Due to the fact that the “Plan of Operations…. 1912" did not provide for the possibility of the Russian fleet holding the Moonsund and Aland Islands and the entire western part of the Gulf of Finland in the event of an offensive by large enemy forces, these areas were not fortified, and with the outbreak of the war they were brought into such a state as to make it as difficult as possible for the combat operations of the German fleet in them, if will try to invade the Gulf of Finland (navigation equipment was removed in a number of places in the skerry strip west of Lapvik, in places accessible for landing, minefields were put up).

But the main forces of the German fleet were in the North Sea. At the beginning of the war, 9 light cruisers, 16 destroyers, 4 submarines, 5 minelayers, several patrol ships and minesweepers operated in the Baltic Sea.

As soon as it became clear that the Germans were not going to launch decisive operations against the Gulf of Finland and limited themselves to demonstrative actions, the command immediately assessed the possibility of expanding the operational zone of the Baltic Fleet.

Now it was necessary not only to restore, but also to significantly expand the equipment of all these areas. On September 3, 1914, the equipment of the Abo-Aland region and the restoration of navigation equipment in the western part of the Gulf of Finland began. The work was carried out in a hurry, because the command of the fleet sought to start laying active minefields off the coast of Germany with the onset of long dark nights. By September 14, the navigation equipment for the entrance to the Ganges and Lapvik (Tverminne) raids, a 16-foot (5-meter) skerry fairway in the Ganges region, was completed.

When equipping the western part of the Gulf of Finland, special attention was paid to the defense of the Ganges as the most vulnerable section of the skerry communications between Helsingfors and the Abo-Aland region. For this purpose, a 152-mm battery No. 25 was installed on the island of Heste-Busse, which was supposed to cover not only the port of the Ganges, but also the skerry communications from the Abo-Aland region to the Gulf of Finland. The minefields put up at the beginning of the war between Lapvik and the Ganges were removed.

During the First World War, Hanko in Lapvik Bay (Tverminne) was a maneuver base for light forces and submarines of the Baltic Fleet.

In the campaign of 1915, a lot of work was done to strengthen the defense of the Gulf of Finland, the Moonsund and Abo-Aland regions. To reinforce the flank-skerry position on Russar Island, two batteries were installed in August (No. 28 - six 234-mm guns and No. 27 - six 75-mm guns).

The powerful batteries of Russare and Heste-Busse reported the stability of the flank position. It covered the longitudinal fairways of the area and, being supported from the east by the adjoining Makiloto fortifications (4 203-mm guns), and from the west by Ere (4 305-mm and 4 152-mm guns), formed a skerry area well protected from the sea.

At the beginning of July 1915, the installation of barriers of the so-called "forward position" between the Gangut Peninsula and Dago Island began.

At Gangut, the strategic skerry fairway ended, which went from the main base of the fleet - Helsingfors. Therefore, detachments of ships were formed on the Gangut roadstead before entering military operations in the Baltic Sea.

For the 1916 campaign, the fleet headquarters developed an operational defense plan, which provided for the defense of the forward mine and artillery position of Ere-Gange-Lapvik, which was supposed to serve as the first frontier for combat with the enemy fleet in an attempt to break into the Gulf of Finland.

Since the spring of 1917, Russian submarines of the 4th division have been based on the Ganges: AG-11, AG-12, AG-13 and AG-15 with their Oland base.

In the autumn of 1917, the Baltic Fleet occupied its usual wintering grounds. Everything was the same as last year, as it was two centuries ago. Most of the ships were concentrated in the main base of the Baltic Fleet - Helsingfors, and the rest in Reval, Ganga, Abo, Kotka, Kronstadt. But neither the command of the fleet, nor the sailors who arrived on warships from Helsingfors and Reval to Petrograd to participate in the coup on October 25 (November 7), could not foresee the consequences of this coup. And its result was the collapse of the army, the collapse of the front, the collapse of the Russian Empire, the separation of Finland from it, and then the Baltic countries. On December 18 (31), 1917, V. I. Lenin signed the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars recognizing the independence of the Republic of Finland. Thus, by the end of 1917, the Russian Baltic Fleet found itself on the territory of the independent sovereign state of Finland. Germany took advantage of this.

Back in October and November (before freezing), the fleet could easily, in a few days, move from bases in Finland and Estonia to Kronstadt and Petrograd.

But only two months later, in connection with the threat of the seizure by Germany of the ships of the Baltic Fleet, located in Revel, Helsingfors, Abo and Ganga, the Soviet government decided to transfer them to Kronstadt. On February 17, 1918, Tsentrobalt received a directive from the collegium of the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs, which ordered the transfer of ships from Reval to Helsingfors, and then to Kronstadt.

On February 18, 1918, German troops launched an offensive along the entire front. Parts of the German Northern Corps on February 20–21 from the Moonsund Islands crossed to the mainland and, having overcome the resistance of small detachments of the Red Guards and sailors, approached Revel.

Between February 19 and 27, 56 warships, auxiliary and transport ships were transferred from Reval to Helsingfors. Now almost all combat-ready ships of the Baltic Fleet were concentrated in Helsingfors: two battleship brigades (6 units), a cruiser brigade (5 units), a mine division, a submarine division, a minesweeping division, a barrage detachment, 2 divisions of patrol ships, a large number of auxiliary and transport courts.

On March 3, 1918, a peace treaty was signed in Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany. The Soviet government was forced to accept a number of humiliating conditions. So article 6 read: “... Finland and the Aland Islands are immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Red Guard, and Finnish harbors are cleared of the Russian fleet. As long as the sea is covered with ice and the possibility of withdrawing Russian ships is excluded, only a few teams should be left on these ships ... ". Thus, the ships frozen into the ice were to become easy prey for the Germans, which happened in the bases of Abo and Ganga.

The Germans insisted on the inclusion in the treaty of clauses according to which practically the entire coast of the Baltic Sea was torn away from Soviet Russia, with the exception of a small section between Sestroretsk and Narva. The Moonsund Islands, which came under the "protection of Germany", were cut off from the Republic of Soviets by the new maritime border.

On February 28, even before the signing of the treaty, a squadron consisting of three dreadnoughts, several cruisers, patrol ships, minesweepers and icebreakers left Danzig for the Alan Islands, escorting transports with the Baltic division of General Rüdiger von der Goltz. On March 5, after the signing of the peace treaty, German ships approached the Aland Islands. When approaching them, the Hindenburg icebreaker was blown up by a mine and sank. The Germans landed on the islands, but a detachment of their ships did not reach the Ganges, unable to overcome the thick ice.

On March 12, at 15:15, the first detachment of ships left Helsingfors. The famous ice campaign of the Baltic Fleet began. In total, as a result of the operation, which lasted until April 22, 236 ships and vessels were saved for the young Soviet Republic: 6 battleships, 5 cruisers, 59 destroyers and destroyers, 12 submarines, 25 patrol ships and minesweepers, 5 minelayers, 69 transports and auxiliary ships, 28 tugboats, 7 icebreakers and other vessels. The combat core of the fleet was saved and became the basis for the construction of the Soviet Navy.

Dealing with the withdrawal of the most valuable ships from Helsingfors, the fleet command and Tsentrobalt ignored the western bases - Abo and Gange. In the Ganges there were 4 submarines, the mother ship "Oland", 4 minesweepers, the port icebreaker "Sadko" and several auxiliary vessels. It was possible to try to withdraw these ships with the help of the Sadko icebreaker, while simultaneously sending an icebreaker from Helsingfors towards it. On April 2, the icebreakers Gorod Revel and Strongman left the main base in the Ganges. But time was lost, on the morning of April 3, icebreakers noticed about 20 German ships moving towards the Ganges. Both icebreakers turned to Helsingfors.

On the same day - April 3, a German squadron approached the Ganges, led by the Volynets icebreaker (former Russian, captured by the Finns). The division of Rüdiger von der Goltz landed from the transports. The Baltic sailors, unable to transfer their ships to Helsingfors, blew up four submarines and a floating base in the Hanko harbor. The crews of the ships reached Helsingfors by rail. The coastal battery on Heste-Busse was blown up by Russian gunners. The remaining batteries in the Hanko area were captured by German troops and then handed over to the Finns.

Since 1920, Hanko has been an important commercial port in Finland and a rapidly growing fashionable resort. In the 1930s in the area of ​​Hanko, the Finns created a fortified area. The 1st Separate Coastal Defense Artillery Battalion was based there. Its five batteries were located on the islands of Ute, Ere, Roussar and Luperte. The headquarters of the division was in Hanko. The most powerful were the 305 mm battery on Ere Island and the 234 mm battery on Russar Island. These batteries, built in 1915, were modernized by the Finns in 1935–1937.

Soviet-Finnish relations by the end of the 30s. continued to be unstable. The geographical position of Finland was convenient for organizing a powerful strike against the northwestern regions vital for our country. The state border on the Karelian Isthmus passed only 32 km from Leningrad. Finnish long-range artillery could hit any targets in Leningrad from its territory. An enemy bomber could cover the distance from the border with Finland to the center of Leningrad in just 4 minutes. Kronstadt and the ships in its harbors could fire not only long-range guns, but also medium-caliber guns.

The Finns owned islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, on which heavy guns could be mounted. The Finns could control the fairways on the Seyskar and East Gogland reaches, which under certain conditions made it impossible to deploy the forces of the Baltic Fleet to defend the approaches to Leningrad.

Finland was building naval bases, airfields, batteries, roads. The fortifications of the Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus were especially powerful.

The Soviet government has repeatedly negotiated with the government of Finland on issues of mutual security.

Even before the outbreak of World War II, in March 1939, negotiations began in Moscow between representatives of the USSR and Finland. From the Soviet side they were attended by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov, from the Finnish side - the envoy Irje Koskinen. But the negotiations ended in nothing.

As soon as the war began in Europe, the Soviet government began to take vigorous measures to strengthen the western borders. In September 1939, negotiations began with the then bourgeois governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on the possibility of deploying Soviet troops and basing a fleet on their territory. Already at the end of September, the ships of the Baltic Fleet were granted the right to be based in Tallinn, Libava and Vindava. In order to cover the bases, a little later the USSR received the right to deploy aviation on the islands of Sarema (Ezel) and Khiuma (Dago), and build coastal batteries. Opened access to the sea expanses of the Baltic. But the entire northern coast of the Gulf of Finland and the islands in its eastern part belonged to Finland.

On October 5, 1939, V. M. Molotov invited the Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Erkko to Moscow for negotiations "to discuss topical issues of Soviet-Finnish relations." Meanwhile, fearing that things were going to war with the Russians, the Finnish command announced a partial mobilization on October 6, which ended on October 11.

Finally, on October 12, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow for negotiations, but instead of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was headed by the Finnish Ambassador to Sweden, Yu. K. Paasikivi.

At the talks in the Kremlin on October 13, the Soviet side proposed a mutual assistance pact between Finland and the USSR. The Finnish delegation categorically rejected this proposal. Then, on October 14, the Soviet delegation proposed to lease the Hanko Peninsula to the USSR for the restoration of a Russian naval base on it. At the same time, it was proposed to exchange part of the Finnish territory (on the Karelian Isthmus, on the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas and a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland) for twice the territory in Soviet Karelia. However, the Finnish leadership did not even want to discuss these proposals. Negotiations due to the intransigence of the parties reached an impasse.

On November 26, the government of the USSR suggested that Finland, in order to ensure the security of Leningrad, withdraw its troops 20-25 km from the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but she did not accept this proposal.

On November 28, 1939, the Soviet government was forced to terminate the 1932 non-aggression pact. On November 29, the Finnish envoy in Moscow was presented with a note on the severance of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Finland. On November 30, at 8 o'clock in the morning, the troops of the Leningrad Front received an order to cross the border. The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940 began, which went down in history as the “winter war”.

Already on November 30, Soviet DB-3 bombers appeared over Hanko, which received the task of detecting and destroying the Finnish coastal defense battleships Ilmarinen and Väinemäinen. Having found armadillos in the roadstead near the island of Russare, the planes dropped bombs, but only two or three of them fell near the sides of the ships, the rest lay down with a flight.

Battleships - the largest ships of the Finnish Navy - defended throughout the war in the Abo-Aland skerries, periodically changing their moorings. From December 19 to March 2, a whole series of bombing attacks were carried out on them, but not one of the 1,100 bombs hit the target.

During the war, several bombs fell on the city of Hanko, killing six civilians. By the end of the war, about 6 thousand inhabitants were evacuated from the peninsula deep into Finland, more than 3 thousand remained.

December 1, 1939 - on the second day of the winter war between the USSR and Finland 1939–1940 - the Soviet cruiser "Kirov" approached Hanko, accompanied by two destroyers. Approaching the island of Russare at a distance of 110 cables, the cruiser lay down on a combat course of 240 °, which, as it turned out after the war, led directly to the minefield. At 10:55 a.m., the island's 234-mm battery opened fire on the Soviet ships. Having the order not to be under fire, the commander of the Light Forces Detachment (OLS) of the KBF, who was on the Kirov, ordered to increase the speed to 24 knots and lie on a course of 210 °, turning to starboard towards Russara. This saved the ship, otherwise it would have been on the mines. At 10.57 the cruiser returned fire on the Finnish battery. The first shells of the "Kirov" fell short of the sea. The next covered the position of the battery, mostly with overflights. In total, the Finns fired 15 (according to Soviet data - 25) shells. All shells fell to the right behind the stern of the cruiser. From close gaps, "Kirov" was damaged (the Finns claim to have achieved a direct hit). At 11.05 he turned sharply to the left and after several shots from the maximum distance at 11.10 he ceased fire, having used up 35 180-mm shells. The pier, barracks, lighthouse buildings were damaged on the island; the guns of the battery remained unharmed. "Kirov" lay down on a course of 185 ° and, together with the destroyers in the ranks of the wake, began to retreat to the southeast.

Sending the Kirov to fire on a large-caliber coastal battery without reconnaissance, without minesweepers and air cover could result in the loss of the only cruiser in the KBF. The purpose of the operation also remains unclear: even if the cruiser had destroyed the battery on Russar Island, this could not have affected the general course of hostilities that unfolded hundreds of kilometers to the east, on the Karelian Isthmus.

This was the only time during the 1939-1940 war when Soviet ships approached Hanko. Subsequently, hostilities took place in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland, on the Mannerheim Line and the Karelian Isthmus.

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