Franco-Prussian War (causes and consequences). Beginning of the Franco-Prussian War

After the Austro-Prussian war and the signing of a peace treaty in Prague in August 1866, significant changes took place in the center of Europe in favor of Prussia. Austria was no longer a member of the German Confederation, and Prussia could unite German states under its own auspices. However, there were contradictions within the German Confederation itself; if the northern countries of the German Union were interested in uniting around Prussia, then its southern members Baden, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hesse did not want to strengthen Prussia and were afraid to fall into its subordination. At the same time, a military agreement on joint defense was concluded between the northern and southern German states. Oppositional sentiments in the South German states were another of the reasons pushing Bismarck to prepare for a new war.

Bismarck closely followed the mood in Paris, London and St. Petersburg, where in turn they followed Bismarck's actions.

The main obstacle to the unification of all Germany around Prussia was France, where, even before the outbreak and during the Austro-Prussian war, many close associates of Napoleon III considered it essential that France enter the war against Prussia. But there were other opinions as well. As a result of Bismarck's maneuvers and discord in the French court, the moment was lost. For the neutrality of France, Napoleon tried to receive compensation. He wanted, with the consent of Prussia, to annex the Landau region and the Duchy of Luxembourg. However, times have changed, the neutrality of France was no longer needed, and Bismarck decided not to give anything to France, although in Biarritz he himself offered Napoleon III for the neutrality of Luxembourg.

Seeing that Prussia was strengthening its influence and sooner or later would unite the German states, France decided to take measures in order to at least somehow fence off or insure itself against the future powerful power. On August 8, 1886, the French Foreign Minister Drouin-de-Luis published a memorandum, the main idea of which was that it was necessary to create a neutral state on the left bank of the Rhine, which could play a buffer role between France and Prussia.

This proposal could not succeed, since Bismarck had long planned to merge the states on the left bank of the Rhine into a united Germany.

A few days later, Napoleon III put forward the idea of concluding a secret alliance between France and Prussia, through which France was going to annex Belgium. Negotiations in Berlin between the French ambassador Benedetti and Bismarck ended inconclusively. Bismarck again took the deft step of asking the ambassador to submit an official memorandum outlining all the French proposals that he could report to Wilhelm I. The French government sent an official message to Prussia, outlining France's desire to annex Belgium. Later Bismarck used this document against France. England immediately reacted to the news of the intentions of Napoleon III. The British ambassador in Paris met with the emperor, who immediately declared that France was not going to force the annexation of new territories.

The French then reported this to London officially. Because of the clumsy actions of the emperor and the foreign minister, France suffered significant damage.

The British government, formed after the death of Palmerston, believed that the strengthening of Prussia from the point of view of England was useful, as it would be a counterbalance to France. England at that time was wary of France in connection with the active actions of the Lesseps company, which was building the Suez Canal. London saw this as a threat to India.

Bad news for the Prussian chancellor came from St. Petersburg. Not only the far-sighted A. M. Gorchakov showed concern, but Emperor Alexander II also began to demonstrate a tendency to establish friendly relations with France.

However, events developed according to a different scenario through the fault of the French themselves. They had to pay for the adventures of Napoleon III and inept diplomacy. Bismarck succeeded in spoiling France's relations with both England and Russia. Despite this, Napoleon III continued to insist on the annexation of Luxembourg, Landau and Saarbücken to France.

Luxembourg was not included in the North German Confederation created in early 1867. The French managed to get the consent of Holland to include it in France. After that, French diplomacy shifted its main activities to Berlin. And here Bismarck again outwitted Napoleon III. He provoked a speech by the German opposition forces against Bismarck's concessions to the French purely German territories. In this situation, Bismarck refused to sign the treaty already agreed with the Dutch.

A. M. Gorchakov, seeing the loss of Napoleon III in the Luxembourg issue, took the initiative to convene a conference of the great powers. He wanted to use this conference to clarify the positions of the parties. Gorchakov, through the Russian ambassador to England, F. I. Brunnov, invited the British premier Derby to support his initiative. At the same time, the Russian draft treaty on Luxembourg was handed over to England. All powers agreed to convene the conference, and on May 7, 1867, it opened in London. It was attended by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Luxembourg. Russia guaranteed the neutrality of Luxembourg on the part of all countries participating in the conference, which was unanimously accepted. The rights of the king of Luxembourg were recognized as hereditary, and Luxembourg itself was declared forever a neutral state. The city of Luxembourg became open, in connection with which Prussia had to withdraw its troops from it.

Together with diplomatic miscalculations in Europe, the failure of the Mexican adventure also fell upon Napoleon III. Having suffered heavy casualties and spending huge sums, the French troops in the spring of 1867 began to return to their homeland. Napoleon's henchman Emperor of Mexico Maximilian suffered a series of defeats, was taken prisoner by the Republicans and shot. Dissatisfaction with Napoleon's policies grew within the country, where even his closest allies, representatives of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, stopped supporting him.

Thus, Napoleon found himself in a vacuum both in his own country and abroad. In Italy, where French troops were the main obstacle to the unification of the country, anti-French sentiments grew. In the event of a war with Prussia, Italy could oppose France and finally force the French troops to leave Rome. In Austria-Hungary, with which Napoleon again tried to reach an agreement, Chancellor Beist objected, whose main argument was Franco-Italian relations. He did not want Italy to change its attitude towards Austria because of France.

Russia did not provide assistance to France, and also because of the position of Napoleon, who did nothing to improve bilateral relations. France remained isolated.

In the summer of 1870, Prince Leopold, who belonged to the Hohenzollern family, was elected to the royal throne in Spain. Napoleon III immediately opposed, as the Hohenzollerns would rule not only in Prussia, but also in Spain. But here, too, Napoleon made diplomatic mistakes. Back in March, when discussing in Berlin the question of whether Leopold Hohenzollern should agree to the proposal to become king of Spain, it was decided to recommend that he accept the Spanish crown. Bismarck correctly calculated that Napoleon's wrath was imminent. He did not exclude the possibility that France might start a war against Prussia. By provoking Napoleon to attack, Bismarck ruled out the possibility of France getting help from Russia, since Prussia would be on the defensive.

In France, on the initiative of Napoleon, the publication of articles against Prussia began. Bismarck seemed to have achieved a certain goal. However, things turned out differently. The French ambassador Benedetti, having received instructions from Paris, urgently went to Ems, where William I was treated and received an audience with him. The Prussian king told the ambassador that he had never sought the Spanish crown for his relatives and would approve of Leopold's decision to refuse the proposed throne. It looked like Napoleon had finally won a diplomatic victory. But with his further actions, he immediately ruined everything and made an irreparable mistake.

On July 12, Leopold of Hohenzollern officially announced that he refused to take the Spanish throne. On the same day, a Council of High Dignitaries was held in Paris under the chairmanship of Napoleon III. It, in particular, discussed whether to consider the issue of Leopold finally resolved, or use it to aggravate relations with Prussia. The majority in the Soviet voted for a war between France and Prussia. Napoleon III instructed Ambassador Benedetti to head back to Ems and present a demand to William I, which was essentially an ultimatum. France offered the Prussian king to give a formal commitment that he would forbid Leopold to accept the Spanish crown, not only now, but also in the event of a second offer. Wilhelm I held talks with Benedetti, before returning to Berlin, ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform Bismarck about them. After receiving the telegraph message from Ems, Bismarck, as he himself admitted many years later in his memoirs, made adjustments to it, "deleting something from the telegram, but not adding or changing a word." The part where it was said that the negotiations would continue in Berlin was deleted. As a result, both the tone and meaning of the telegram changed dramatically. In a modified form, the text received from Ems was submitted for publication in newspapers. The new provocative actions of Bismarck were the burden from which the world, which was hanging by a thread, collapsed. The forgery of the Ems dispatch became a pretext for war and led to numerous casualties. On July 15, 1870, the French Legislative Assembly approved military credits. Five days later, on July 20, France formally declared war on Prussia. Bismarck literally forced Napoleon III to do it.

The war began in unfavorable conditions for France, when the country was actually isolated and even Russia, which could help France, did nothing because of Napoleon's policy. Alexander II was irritated by the actions of Napoleon. In addition, in St. Petersburg, as in all of Russia, the Crimean War was not forgotten.

For Prussia, the conditions were the most favorable. Immediately after the declaration of war, Bismarck published documents that exposed Napoleon III to the world as a supporter of forceful pressure on neighbouring countries, exposed his intention to include Belgium in France.

France needed a war to save the power of the emperor and those who supported him. Bismarck needed it in order to achieve national unification, to create a united Germany. He needed not only to win, but to defeat France, so that for many years she could not resist the new German state.

If in France they talked more about the coming war and did little to strengthen the army, then Germany strengthened the command, put all army units on alert. The difference in training immediately affected the course of hostilities.

At the very beginning of the war, France lost three border battles. The Germans quickly reached the Franco-Belgian border and surrounded the 120,000-strong French army near Sedan, which included the emperor himself. After a powerful artillery attack by the Germans, Napoleon was forced to surrender. Already the first reports of defeats in the border zone were met with indignation in the capital of France, and the next day after the shameful defeat at Sedan, the people filled the streets of Paris and the Third Republic was proclaimed in France.

The rapid success of Prussia dramatically changed the state of affairs in Europe. The bourgeois government created in France, fearing the growth of popular unrest, began to seek salvation from Prussia. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Jules Favre, having met with Bismarck, began to negotiate a truce. On February 26, 1871, a provisional peace was signed. France lost Alsace and Lorraine and pledged to pay 5 billion francs indemnity. The Prussian occupation troops were to be maintained by France until they were paid in full. The Germans received the right to send their troops to Paris and stay there until the ratification of the peace treaty.

Meanwhile, revolutionary events in France were intensifying. On March 18, 1871, a popular uprising won in Paris. After the elections to the Council of the Commune, all power on March 28 was transferred to her. The government of Thiers managed to gather troops and, having agreed with German command about letting them into besieged Paris, crushed the Commune.

Even before the war, France was negotiating a Franco-Italian alliance, in which Austria also took part. Bismarck, who closely followed the diplomatic actions of Paris and feared Italy's participation in the war against Prussia, supported the Italian republican movement in every possible way in order to create in this country internal difficulties. But events at the front led to a reassessment of values. The army of the Italian king did not attack Prussia, but the French troops, forcing them to leave Rome. Both in St. Petersburg and London, in connection with the defeat of France and the strengthening of Germany, they began to advocate a speedy end to the war and the conclusion of peace. A. M. Gorchakov did everything possible for this and tried to prevent immeasurably heavy demands from France. However, quick victories turned the heads of not only the German generals. A chauvinistic frenzy gripped the whole of Prussia. Everywhere there were calls to bring France to its knees and to annex a number of French territories.

The government of national defense of France began to ask Russia to help in the conclusion of peace and prevent it from being humiliating. Thiers urgently arrived in Petersburg. Russia, having received an answer from the German king, declared that peace was possible. Discussing his terms, Gorchakov told Thiers that after the defeat one should not lose courage. He was referring to the recent Crimean War and the position of France.

The French government sought to negotiate better conditions from Bismarck and bargained with him to the end. At the same time, Thiers urgently needed peace in order to gather all his strength to defeat the Paris Commune, and for this he was ready to make any concessions. Bismarck also wanted an early peace. He feared that an anti-Prussian coalition of European powers might emerge. Bismarck, who was not devoid of a realistic view, understood that sooner or later France would start a war against Germany in order to regain what she had lost.

As can be seen from the letter of the French Chargé d'Affaires de Gabriac to the French Foreign Minister, on August 14, 1871, Bismarck said that it was better for Germany that the war should start sooner rather than later. That Germany had taken Alsace and Lorraine from France, he said, would have been a mistake if the peace had lasted, since these two provinces were a burden to Germany. Bismarck looked far ahead.

Under the terms of the peace treaty concluded in Frankfurt am Main on May 10, 1871, the French, who lived in the territories that were ceded to Germany, could move to France with the preservation of their property. An indemnity of 500 million francs was to be transferred to Germany within 30 days "after the restoration of the French government in Paris", 1 billion francs were to be paid within a year and half a billion by May 1, 1872; another 3 billion were to be paid before March 2, 1874.

In accordance with Art. 111 of the peace treaty, the French and German governments established a mutually favored regime in their trade relations.

Taking advantage of the current favorable situation, on October 31, 1870, Gorchakov, listing the violations of the Paris Treaty by other countries, declared that Russia would no longer recognize those articles of it that limited its rights in the Black Sea. This caused a different reaction in European states. As a result of the negotiations, a conference was convened in January 1871 in London. She canceled articles Paris Treaty 1856, which imposed restrictions on the Russian Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, the conference confirmed the closure of the straits to foreign warships.

Franco-Prussian War significantly changed not only the map of Europe, but also the balance of power. Instead of a small Prussia in the center of Europe, a large, strong German state appeared. One war, the Franco-Prussian, led to the end of another war, in Italy, and to the unification of the country. The situation in Austria has deteriorated significantly. The war showed that in the future it would be difficult for France to stand against Germany without the support of Russia.

You would like me to tell you the impressions made on German society by the tremendous events that took place at the beginning of this memorable month - how far these impressions fell under my observation. I will not talk about explosions of national pride, patriotic joy, festivities, etc. You already know all this from the newspapers. I will try briefly and with due impartiality to explain to you the views of the Germans - firstly, on the change of government in France, and secondly, on the question of "war and peace."

To begin with, the resumption of the republic in France, the appearance of this, for many still so charming, form of government did not arouse in Germany even the shadow of that sympathy with which the republic of 1848 was once greeted. The Germans very soon realized that after the Sedan catastrophe, the empire became, at first, impossible, and that, apart from the republic, there was nothing to replace it. They do not believe (perhaps they are mistaken) that the Republic has deep roots in the French population, and do not count on its long existence; in general, they do not consider it at all without regard - an und fur sich, - but only from the point of view of its influence on the conclusion of peace, an advantageous and lasting peace - "dauerhaft, nicht faul", which now constitutes their idee fixe. It was from this point of view that the appearance of the republic even confused them: it replaced a certain governmental unit with which it was possible to negotiate with something impersonal and shaky, unable to provide proper guarantees. This is the very thing that makes them wish for an energetic continuation of the war and the speedy capture of Paris, with the fall of which, in their opinion, it will immediately and positively turn out to be exactly what France needs. With a remarkable, one might say unprecedented, unanimity that has taken possession of all of them - to hope to stop these growing, oncoming waves, to expect the victor to stop or even return back - is, to put it bluntly, childish; Victor Hugo alone could have had this idea - and even then, I believe, he only seized on the pretext to produce the usual verbiage. King Wilhelm himself has no power to turn this case otherwise: those waves carry him too. But, having decided to complete the settlement with France (Abreclmung mit Frankreich), the Germans are ready to explain to you the reasons why they should do this.

There are two reasons for everything in the world, obvious and secret, just and unjust (obvious are mostly unjust), and two justifications: conscientious and unscrupulous. I have lived with the Germans for too long and have become too close to them for them, in conversations with me, to resort to unscrupulous excuses - at least they do not insist on them. Demanding from France Alsace and German Lorraine (Alsace in any case), they soon abandon the argument of race, the origin of these provinces, since this argument is beaten by another, stronger one, namely, by the obvious and undoubted unwillingness of these same provinces to join their former homeland. But they maintain that they absolutely and forever must secure themselves against the possibility of attacks and invasions from France, and that they see no other security than the annexation of the left bank of the Rhine to the Vosges mountains. The proposal to destroy all the fortresses located in Alsace and Lorraine, the disarmament of France, reduced to an army of two hundred thousand, seems to them insufficient; the threat of eternal enmity, eternal thirst for revenge, which they will arouse in the hearts of their neighbors, does not affect them. “All the same,” they say, “the French will never forgive us for their defeats; it would be better if we warn them and, as the Cladderadatch drawing presented, we will cut the claws of the enemy, whom we still cannot reconcile with ourselves” . Indeed, the disenfranchised, impudently frivolous declaration of war by France in the month of July, as it were, serves as a confirmation of the arguments advanced by the Germans. However, they do not hide from themselves the great difficulties associated with the annexation of two hostile provinces, but they hope that time, patience and skill will help them here, as they helped in the Grand Duchy of Posen, in the Rhine and Saxon regions, in Hanover itself, and even in Frankfurt.

It is customary for us to shout with foam at the mouth against this German seizure; but, as The Times rightly remarks, can one doubt for one second that any people in the place of the Germans, in their present position, would have acted differently? Moreover, one must not imagine that the idea of returning Alsace came to them only as a result of their amazingly unexpected victories; this idea entered the head of every German immediately after the declaration of war: they had it even when they expected a long, stubborn defensive struggle within their own borders. On July 15th, in Berlin, I heard them speaking in this sense with my own ears. "We will not regret anything," they announced, "we will give all our blood, all our gold, but Alsace will be ours." - "And if you are beaten?" I asked. “If the French kill us,” they answered me, “let them take the Rhine provinces from our corpse.” The game began desperately; the stake was undoubtedly determined on each side, remember the announcement of Girardin, to which all France applauded, that the Germans must be thrown back behind the Rhine with rifle butts ... The game was lost by one player; is it any wonder that another player takes his bet?

So, you say, this is logic; but where is the justice?

I believe that the Germans are acting thoughtlessly and that their calculation is wrong. In any case, they have already made a big mistake by half-destroying Strasbourg and thereby completely restoring the entire population of Alsace against them. I believe that it is possible to find a form of peace which, having secured the peace of Germany for a long time, will not lead to the humiliation of France and will not contain the germ of new, still more terrible wars. And is it possible to assume that after terrible experience to which she has been subjected, will France again want to test her strength? Which Frenchman, in the depths of his soul, has not now renounced forever Belgium, the Rhine provinces? It would be worthy of the Germans - victorious Germans - also to abandon Lorraine and Alsace. In addition to material guarantees, to which they are fully entitled, they could be satisfied with the proud consciousness that, in the words of Garibaldi, the immoral ugliness of Bonapartism was thrown into the dust by their hand.

But at this moment in Germany only the extreme democratic party is renouncing Alsace and Lorraine; read the speech delivered by its chief representative, I. Jacobi, from Konigsberg, by this unshakable, grandiose doctrinaire, who is not in vain compared with Cato of Utica. This party is numerically weak - and is barely beginning to spread among the workers, without whom no democracy is inconceivable. Moreover, all the aspirations of Germany are now directed in the wrong direction: the unification of the German race and the strengthening of this unification is its slogan. It is now fulfilling consciously what happened much earlier and almost unconsciously among other peoples; who can blame her for this? And wouldn't it be better to accept and add to the present book of history this fact - as immutable and inevitable as any physiological, geological phenomenon?

And poor, torn, confused France, what will become of her? No country was in more desperate situation. There is no doubt that she is exerting all her strength for a deadly struggle, and the letters received by me from Paris testify to an unbending determination to defend herself to the end, like Strasbourg. The future of France now depends on the Parisians. “We will have to re-educate ourselves,” one of them writes to us, “we are infected by the empire to the marrow of our bones; we have fallen behind, we have fallen, we are mired in ignorance and conceit ... but this re-education is ahead: now we must save ourselves, we must really be baptized in that bloody font, which Napoleon only chattered about; and we will do it. I will say without hesitation that my sympathy for the Germans does not prevent me from wishing them failure at Paris; and this desire is not a betrayal of those sympathies: it is better for them if they do not take Paris. Without taking Paris, they will not be tempted to make that attempt at the restoration of the imperial regime, which some ultra-zealous and patriotic newspapers are already talking about; they will not spoil the best work of their hands, they will not inflict on France the most bloody insult that a conquered people has ever suffered ... This will be even worse than taking the provinces! “Waterloo can still be forgiven,” someone rightly remarked, “but never Sedan!” Damned - le maudit - in the mouth of a French soldier there is no other name for Napoleon; and could it be otherwise? Not to mention the fact that the people, so deeply, so mercilessly struck, must, according to the laws of psychology, choose the "goat of purification"; and that this time the "goat" is not an innocent creature, I believe that even Moskovskiye Vedomosti has no doubts.

The beginning of the war

The main reason that led to the fall of the Second Empire was the war with Prussia and the catastrophic defeat of the army of Napoleon III. The French government, given the strengthening of the opposition movement in the country, decided to solve the problem in the traditional way- Canalize discontent through war. In addition, Paris solved strategic and economic problems. France was vying for leadership in Europe, which was challenged by Prussia. The Prussians won victories over Denmark and Austria (1864, 1866) and resolutely moved towards the unification of Germany. The emergence of a new, strong united Germany was a strong blow to the ambitions of the regime of Napoleon III. The united Germany also threatened the interests of the French big bourgeoisie.

It is also worth considering that in Paris they were confident in the strength of their army and victory. The French leadership underestimated the enemy, there was no appropriate analysis of the latest military reforms in Prussia and changes in sentiment in German society, where this war was perceived as fair. In Paris, they were sure of victory and even expected to seize a number of lands on the Rhine, expanding their influence in Germany.

At the same time, internal conflict was one of the leading reasons for the desire of the government to start a war. One of the advisers of Napoleon III, Sylvester de Sassi, regarding the motives that pushed the government of the Second Empire in July 1870 to enter the war with Prussia, wrote many years later: “I did not resist an external war, because it seemed to me the last resource and the only means of salvation for the empire ... The most formidable signs of civil and social war... The bourgeoisie is obsessed with some kind of insatiable revolutionary liberalism, and the population of workers' cities is obsessed with socialism. It was then that the emperor risked a decisive stake - a war against Prussia.

Thus, Paris decided to go to war with Prussia. The reason for the war was the conflict that arose between the two great powers over the candidacy of the Prussian prince Leopold of Hohenzollern for the vacant royal throne in Spain. On July 6, three days after it became known in Paris that Prince Leopold had agreed to accept the proposed throne, French Foreign Minister Gramont made a statement in the Legislative Corps that sounded like an official challenge to Prussia. “We do not think,” Gramont declared, “that respect for the rights of a neighboring people obliges us to endure that an outside power, by placing one of its princes on the throne of Charles V ..., could upset the existing balance of power in Europe to our detriment and put under threat to the interests and honor of France ... ". In the event that such a "possibility" were realized, - continued Gramont, - then "strong with your support and the support of the nation, we will be able to fulfill our duty without hesitation and weakness." It was a direct threat of war if Berlin did not abandon its plans.

On the same day, July 6, the Minister of War of France, Leboeuf, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, made an official statement about the complete readiness of the Second Empire for war. Napoleon III read out the diplomatic correspondence of 1869 between the governments of France, Austria and Italy, which created the false impression that the Second Empire, entering the war, could count on the support of Austria and Italy. In reality, France had no allies in the international arena.

Austrian Empire, after the defeat in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, wanted revenge, but Vienna needed time to build up. The Prussian Blitzkrieg prevented Vienna from taking a tougher stance against Berlin. And after the battle of Sedan in Austria, thoughts of a war against the entire North German Confederation, led by Prussia, were generally buried. In addition, the deterrent for Austria-Hungary was the position Russian Empire. Russia, after the Crimean War, when Austria took a hostile position, did not miss the opportunity to repay the former treacherous ally. There was a possibility that Russia would intervene in the war if Austria attacked Prussia.

Italy remembered that France did not bring the war of 1859 to a victorious end, when the troops of the Franco-Sardinian coalition smashed the Austrians. In addition, France still held Rome, its garrison was located in this city. The Italians wanted to unite their country, including Rome, but France did not allow this. Thus, the French prevented the completion of the unification of Italy. France was not going to withdraw its garrison from Rome, thus she lost a possible ally. Therefore, Bismarck's proposal to the Italian king to remain neutral in the war between Prussia and France was received favorably.

Russia, after the eastern (Crimean) war, was guided by Prussia. Petersburg did not interfere in the wars of 1864 and 1866, nor did Russia intervene in the Franco-Prussian war. In addition, Napoleon III did not seek friendship and alliance with Russia before the war. Only after the outbreak of hostilities was Adolf Thiers sent to St. Petersburg, who asked for Russian intervention in the war with Prussia. But it was already too late. Petersburg hoped that after the war, Bismarck would thank Russia for its neutrality, which would lead to the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Peace of Paris in 1856. Therefore, at the very beginning of the Franco-Prussian war, a Russian declaration of neutrality was issued.

The British also decided not to get involved in the war. In London's view, the time had come to limit France, as the colonial interests of the British Empire and the Second Empire clashed across the world. France made efforts to strengthen the fleet. In addition, Paris laid claim to Luxembourg and Belgium, which were under the auspices of Britain. England was the guarantor of the independence of Belgium. Britain saw nothing wrong with strengthening Prussia to counterbalance France.

Prussia also sought war to complete the unification of Germany, which had been thwarted by France. Prussia wanted to capture the industrialized Alsace and Lorraine, as well as take a leading position in Europe, for which it was necessary to defeat the Second Empire. Bismarck, since the time of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, was convinced of the inevitability of an armed clash with France. “I was firmly convinced,” he later wrote, referring to this period, “that on the way to our further national development - both intensive and extensive - on the other side of the Main, we would inevitably have to wage war with France, and that in our internal and foreign policy, under no circumstances should we lose sight of this possibility. In May 1867, Bismarck frankly announced to his supporters about the impending war with France, which would be launched "when our new army corps is strengthened and when we have established stronger relations with various German states."

However, Bismarck did not want Prussia to look like an aggressor, which led to a complication of relations with other countries and had a negative effect on public opinion in Germany itself. It was necessary that France itself started the war. And he was able to pull this off. The conflict between France and Prussia over the candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern was used by Bismarck to provoke a further aggravation of Franco-Prussian relations and a declaration of war by France. For this, Bismarck resorted to a gross falsification of the text of a dispatch sent to him on July 13 from Ems by King Wilhelm of Prussia to be forwarded to Paris. The dispatch contained the answer of the Prussian king to the demand of the French government that he officially approve the decision expressed the day before by the father of Prince Leopold to renounce the Spanish throne for his son. The French government demanded, moreover, that Wilhelm give a guarantee that claims of this kind would not be repeated in the future. Wilhelm agreed to the first demand and refused to satisfy the second. The text of the Prussian king's reply dispatch was deliberately changed by the Prussian chancellor in such a way that the dispatch, as a result, acquired an offensive tone for the French.

On July 13, the day the dispatch from Ems was received in Berlin, Bismarck, in a conversation with Field Marshal Moltke and the Prussian military von Roon, frankly expressed his dissatisfaction with the conciliatory tone of the dispatch. “We must fight ...,” said Bismarck, “but success largely depends on the impressions that the origin of the war will cause in us and others; it is important that we be the ones attacked, and Gallic arrogance and resentment will help us in this. By falsifying the original text of the so-called Ems dispatch, Bismarck achieved his intended goal. The defiant tone of the edited text of the dispatch played into the hands of the French leadership, which was also looking for a pretext for aggression. War was officially declared by France on July 19, 1870.

Calculation of mitraliasis Reffy

The plans of the French command. State of the armed forces

Napoleon III planned to start the campaign with a swift invasion of French troops into German territory before the completion of mobilization in Prussia and the connection of the troops of the North German Union with the troops of the South German states. This strategy was facilitated by the fact that the French cadre system allowed for a much faster concentration of troops than the Prussian landwehr system. In an ideal scenario, a successful crossing of the Rhine by French troops would disrupt the entire further move mobilization in Prussia, and forced the Prussian command to throw all available forces to the Main, regardless of their degree of readiness. This allowed the French to beat Prussian connections in parts, as they arrive from different parts of the country.

In addition, the French command hoped to seize communications between north and south Germany and isolate the North German Confederation, preventing the states of South Germany from joining Prussia and maintaining their neutrality. In the future, the South German states, given their concerns about the unification policy of Prussia, could support France. Also on the side of France, after successful start war, Austria could also come forward. And after the transition of the strategic initiative to France, Italy could also come out on its side.

Thus, France counted on a blitzkrieg. fast moving French army was to lead to the military and diplomatic success of the Second Empire. The French did not want to drag out the war, since a protracted war led to destabilization of the internal political and economic situation of the empire.

French infantrymen in uniform from the Franco-Prussian war

Prussian infantry

The problem was that the Second Empire was not ready for a war with a serious enemy, and even on its own territory. The second empire could only afford colonial wars, with an obviously weaker opponent. True, in his speech from the throne at the opening of the legislative session of 1869, Napoleon III asserted that the military power of France had reached the "necessary development", and its "military resources are now at high level corresponding to its world purpose”. The emperor assured that the French land and sea armed forces were "strongly constituted", that the number of troops under arms was "not inferior to their numbers under previous regimes." “At the same time,” he said, “our weapons have been improved, our arsenals and warehouses are full, our reserves have been trained, the mobile guard is being organized, our fleet has been transformed, our fortresses are in good condition.” However, this official statement, like other similar statements by Napoleon III and the boastful articles of the French press, were only intended to hide from their own people and from the outside world serious problems French armed forces.

The French army was supposed to be ready for the campaign on July 20, 1870. But when Napoleon III arrived in Metz on July 29 to transport troops across the border, the army was not ready for the offensive. Instead of the 250,000 army necessary for the offensive, which should have been mobilized and concentrated on the border by this time, there were only 135-140 thousand people here: about 100 thousand in the vicinity of Metz and about 40 thousand near Strasbourg. It was planned to concentrate 50,000 people in Chalons. a reserve army in order to push it to Metz in the future, but they did not have time to collect it.

Thus, the French were not able to carry out a quick mobilization in order to pull the forces necessary for a successful invasion to the border in a timely manner. The time for an almost calm offensive almost to the Rhine, while the German troops were not yet concentrated, was lost.

The problem was that France was not able to change the outdated system of manning the French army. The viciousness of such a system, which Prussia abandoned back in 1813, was that it did not provide for the advance recruitment, in peacetime conditions, of combat-ready military units that could be used in the same composition during the war. The so-called French "army corps" in peacetime (there were seven of them, which corresponded to the seven military districts into which France was divided since 1858) were formed from heterogeneous military units located on the territory of the respective military districts. They ceased to exist with the transition of the country to martial law. Instead, they began to hastily form combat formations from units scattered throughout the country. As a result, it turned out that the connections were first disbanded, and then re-created. Hence confusion, confusion and loss of time. As General Montauban, who, before the start of the war with Prussia, commanded the 4th corps, the French command "at the moment of entering the war with a power that had long been ready for it, had to disband the troops that were part of large formations, and re-create from them acting army corps under the command of new commanders, who were hardly known to the troops and in most cases did not know their own troops well.

The French command was aware of the weakness of its military system. It was discovered during the military campaigns of the 1850s. Therefore, after the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, an attempt was made to reform the mobilization plan of the French army in case of war. However, the new mobilization plan prepared by Marshal Niel, which proceeded from the presence of permanent army formations suitable for both peacetime and wartime, and also assumed the creation of a mobile guard, was not carried out. This plan remained on paper.

The French are preparing to defend the estate, barricading the gates and punching loopholes with pickaxes for firing in the wall

Judging by the orders of the French command of July 7 and 11, 1870, at first there was talk of three armies, they were proposed to be created according to Niel's mobilization plans. However, after July 11, the plan of the military campaign was radically changed: instead of three armies, they began to form one united Rhine army under high command Napoleon III. As a result, the previously prepared mobilization plan was destroyed, and this led to the fact that the Army of the Rhine, at the moment when it was supposed to go on a decisive offensive, turned out to be unprepared, understaffed. Due to the absence of a significant part of the formations, the Army of the Rhine remained inactive on the border. The strategic initiative was given to the enemy without a fight.

The formation of reserves was especially slow. Military warehouses were, as a rule, at a distance from the places of formation of combat units. To get uniforms and the necessary equipment, the reservist had to travel hundreds, and sometimes thousands of kilometers, before he arrived at his destination. Thus, General Vinoy noted: “During the war of 1870, persons who were in the reserve regiments of the Zouaves located in the departments of northern France were forced to travel through the whole country in order to board a steamer in Marseilles and head to Colean, Oran, Philippeville (in Algiers) to receive weapons and equipment, and then return to the unit located in the place where they left. They made in vain 2 thousand km by rail, two crossings, at least two days each. Marshal Canrobert painted a similar picture: “A soldier called up at Dunkirk was sent to equip himself in Perpignan or even in Algeria, in order to then be forced to join his military unit located in Strasbourg.” All this deprived the French army of precious time and created a certain mess.

Therefore, the French command was forced to start concentrating mobilized troops on the border before the mobilization of the army was fully completed. These two operations, which were carried out simultaneously, overlapped each other and mutually violated one another. This was facilitated by the chaotic work of the railways, the preliminary plan for military transportation of which was also violated. On the railways of France in July - August 1870, a picture of disorder and confusion reigned. It was well described by the historian A. Shuke: “Headquarters and administrative departments, artillery and engineering troops, infantry and cavalry, personnel and reserve units, packed into trains to capacity. People, horses, materiel, provisions - all this was unloaded in great disorder and confusion at the main collection points. For a number of days the railway station at Metz presented a picture of chaos that seemed impossible to sort out. People did not dare to release the wagons; the arriving provisions were unloaded and loaded again into the same trains in order to be sent to another point. From the station, the hay was transported to the city warehouses, while from the warehouses it was transported to the railway stations.

Often the echelons with troops were delayed on the way due to the lack of accurate information about their destination. Troops in a number of cases changed the points of concentration of troops several times. For example, the 3rd Corps, which was supposed to be formed in Metz, received an unexpected order on July 24 to go to Bouley; The 5th Corps instead of Bich had to be drawn to Sarrgemin; imperial guard instead of Nancy - in Metz. A significant part of the reservists got into their military units with a great delay, already on the battlefield or even stuck somewhere along the way, never reaching their destination. The reservists, who were late and then lost their part, formed a large mass of people who wandered along the roads, huddled where they had to and lived on alms. Some began to loot. In such confusion, not only soldiers lost their units, but also generals, unit commanders could not find their troops.

Even those troops that managed to concentrate on the border did not have full combat capability, since they were not provided with the necessary equipment, ammunition and food. The French government, which for several years considered a war with Prussia inevitable, nevertheless frivolously did not pay due attention to such an important issue as the supply of the army. From the testimony of the quartermaster general of the French army, Blondeau, it is known that even before the start of the Franco-Prussian war, when the plan of the campaign of 1870 was discussed in the state military council, the question of supplying the army "did not occur to anyone." As a result, the question of supplying the army arose only when the war began.

Therefore, from the first days of the war, numerous complaints about the insecurity of military units with food rained down on the address of the Ministry of War. For example, the commander of the 5th Corps, General Fahy, literally called for help: “I am in Biche with 17 infantry battalions. No funds, a complete lack of money in the city and corps cash desks. Send hard money for the upkeep of the troops. Paper money has no circulation. The division commander in Strasbourg, General Ducrot, telegraphed the Minister of War on July 19: “The food situation is alarming ... No measures have been taken to ensure the delivery of meat. I ask you to give me the authority to take measures dictated by the circumstances, or I will not be responsible for anything ... ". “In Metz,” a local commissary reported on July 20, “there is no sugar, no coffee, no rice, no alcoholic drinks, not enough fat, crackers. Send at least one million daily rations to Thionville urgently." On July 21, Marshal Bazin telegraphed to Paris: “All commanders insistently demand Vehicle, camp supplies with which I am not able to supply them. The telegrams reported on the lack of ambulances, wagons, bowlers, camping flasks, blankets, tents, medicines, stretchers, orderlies, etc. The troops arrived at the places of concentration without ammunition and camping equipment. And there were no stocks on the ground, or they were extremely lacking.

Engels, who was not only a famous Russophobe, but also a major specialist in the field of military affairs, noted: “Perhaps, we can say that the army of the Second Empire was defeated so far only by the Second Empire itself. Under such a regime, in which its adherents are generously paid by all means of the long-established system of bribery, it could not be expected that this system would not affect the commissariat in the army. The real war... was prepared long ago; but the provision of stores, especially equipment, seems to have received the least attention; and just now, at the most critical period of the campaign, the disorder that prevailed in this particular area caused a delay in action for almost a week. This slight delay created a huge advantage in favor of the Germans."

Thus, the French army turned out to be unprepared for a decisive and quick attack on the territory of the enemy, and missed a favorable moment for a strike due to disorder in its own rear. The plan for an offensive campaign collapsed because the French themselves were not ready for war. The initiative passed to the Prussian army, the French troops had to defend themselves. And in a protracted war, the advantage was on the side of the North German Confederation, led by Prussia. German troops completed the mobilization and could go on the offensive.

France has lost its main advantage: the superiority of forces at the stage of mobilization. The wartime Prussian army outnumbered the French. The French active army at the time of the declaration of war totaled on paper about 640 thousand people. However, it was necessary to subtract the troops that were stationed in Algeria, Rome, the garrisons of fortresses, the gendarmerie, imperial guard, and personnel of the military administrative departments. As a result, the French command could count on about 300 thousand soldiers at the beginning of the war. It is understood that in the future the size of the army increased, but only these troops could meet the first enemy strike. The Germans, on the other hand, concentrated about 500 thousand people on the border in early August. Together with the garrisons and spare military units in the German army, according to its commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Moltke, there were about 1 million people. As a result, the North German Confederation, led by Prussia, received a numerical advantage at the initial, decisive stage of the war.

In addition, the location of the French troops, which would be good in case offensive war, was not suitable for defense. French troops were stretched along the Franco-German border, isolated in fortresses. The French command, after the forced abandonment of the offensive, did nothing to reduce the length of the front and create mobile field groups that could fend off enemy attacks. Meanwhile, the Germans had grouped their forces into armies concentrated between the Moselle and the Rhine. Thus, the German troops also received a local advantage, concentrating troops in the main direction.

The French army was significantly inferior to the Prussian in terms of its fighting qualities. General atmosphere degradation, corruption, which was characteristic of the Second Empire, also engulfed the army. This affected fighting spirit and combat training of troops. One of the most prominent military experts in France, General Tuma, noted: “The acquisition of knowledge was not held in high esteem, but cafes were held in high esteem; officers who stayed at home to work were suspected of being alienated from their comrades. To succeed, it was necessary, first of all, to have a smart appearance, good manners and proper posture. In addition to these properties, it was necessary: in the infantry, standing in front of the authorities, to keep, as it should be, hands at the seams and direct their eyes 15 steps forward; in the cavalry - to memorize the theory and be able to ride a well-trained horse through the courtyard of the barracks; in artillery - to have deep contempt for technical classes... Finally, in all types of weapons - to have recommendations. A truly new scourge has fallen on the army and on the country: recommendations ... ".

It is clear that the French army had well-trained officers, people who conscientiously treated their duties, commanders with combat experience. However, they did not define the system. The high command did not cope with its tasks. Napoleon III did not possess either military talents or personal qualities necessary for the skillful and firm leadership of the troops. In addition, by 1870, his health had deteriorated significantly, which had a detrimental effect on his clarity of mind, decision-making and operational coordination of government actions. He was being treated (for urinary tract problems) with opiates, which made the emperor lethargic, sleepy and indifferent. As a result, the physical and mental crisis of Napoleon III coincided with the crisis of the Second Empire.

The French General Staff at that time was a bureaucratic institution that had no influence in the army and could not rectify the situation. In the years preceding the Franco-Prussian war, the French General Staff was almost completely excluded from participating in the military activities of the government, which were conceived mainly in the bowels of the War Ministry. As a result, when the war began, the officers of the General Staff were not ready to fulfill their main task. The generals of the French army were cut off from their troops, often they were not known. Command posts in the army were distributed to persons who were close to the throne, and did not distinguish themselves by military success. So, when the war with Prussia began, seven of the eight corps of the Army of the Rhine were commanded by generals who belonged to the emperor's inner circle. As a result, the organizational skills and the level of military-theoretical training of the command staff of the French army lagged far behind the military knowledge and organizational skills of the Prussian generals.

In armament, the French army was practically not inferior to the Prussian. The French army adopted a new Chasseau rifle of the 1866 model of the year, which was several times superior in many respects to the Prussian Dreyse needle rifle of the 1849 model of the year. Chassault rifles could conduct aimed fire at distances up to a kilometer, and the Prussian Dreyse needle guns fired at only 500-600 meters and misfired much more often. True, the French army, due to the poor organization of the quartermaster service, the extreme disorder in the army supply system, did not have time to completely re-equip these rifles, they accounted for only 20-30% of the entire armament of the French army. Therefore, a significant part French soldiers was armed with rifles of obsolete systems. In addition, the soldiers, especially from the reserve units, did not know how to handle the guns of the new system: the low level of military training of the rank and file of the French army made itself felt. In addition, the French were inferior in artillery. The bronze gun of the La Gitta system, which was in service with the French, was significantly inferior to the German Krupp steel guns. The La Gitta cannon fired at a distance of only 2.8 km, while the Krupp guns fired at a distance of up to 3.5 km, and, unlike them, were loaded from the muzzle. But the French had 25-barreled mitrailleuses (shotguns) - the forerunners of machine guns. Reffy's mitrailleuses, extremely effective in defense, hit for one and a half kilometers, throwing bursts of up to 250 bullets per minute. The Germans did not have such weapons. However, there were few of them (less than 200 pieces), and mobilization problems led to the fact that they could not collect the calculations. Many of the crews were not sufficiently trained in the handling of mitrailleuses, and sometimes they had no combat training at all, and they also had no idea about either sighting or rangefinding characteristics. Many commanders did not even know about the existence of this weapon.

NAPOLEON III (Louis Napoleon Bonaparte) (1808-73), French emperor in 1852-70. Nephew of Napoleon I. Using the dissatisfaction of the peasants with the regime of the Second Republic, he achieved his election as president (December 1848); On December 2, 1851, with the support of the military, he carried out a coup d'état. 12/2/1852 proclaimed emperor. Adhered to the policy of Bonapartism. Under him, France participated in Crimean War 1853-56, in the war against Austria in 1859, in the interventions in Indochina in 1858-62, in Syria in 1860-61, Mexico in 1862-67. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, he surrendered in 1870 with a 100,000-strong army captured near Sedan. Deposed by the September Revolution of 1870.

FRANCO-PRUSIAN WAR 1870-71, between France, which sought to maintain its hegemony in Europe and prevented the unification of Germany, and Prussia, which acted jointly with a number of other German states; during the war, the Second Empire in France fell and the unification of Germany under the leadership of Prussia was completed. The French army was defeated. Prussian troops occupied a significant part of French territory and participated in the suppression of the Paris Commune of 1871. The Franco-Prussian War ended with the Frankfurt Peace Treaty of 1871, which was predatory in relation to France.

FRANCO-PRUSIAN WAR 1870-71, a war between France and Prussia, in alliance with which other German states also acted.

background

Both sides were striving for war and had been preparing for it since 1867. Prussia in the 1860s fought for the unification of Germany under her leadership. In 1866, having won the war against Austria, she took a leading position among the states of the German Confederation. In 1867 the North German Confederation (excluding Austria) was formed, uniting the German lands north of the Main. Outside it remained the South German states, which during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 took the side of Austria. The chancellor of the North German Confederation, O. von Bismarck, now expected to annex these lands and complete the unification of Germany. France, striving to maintain its hegemony in continental Europe and fearing the strengthening of Prussia, intended to counteract this. In addition, the Second Empire was experiencing an internal crisis that pushed Napoleon III and his entourage to war, which they saw as a means of overcoming difficulties.

In May 1870, a diplomatic conflict broke out between France and Prussia. The Spanish government offered a relative of the Prussian king Wilhelm I, the German prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmarinen, to take the vacant Spanish throne. This angered France. Prince Leopold at first agreed, but then, under the influence of Wilhelm I, who did not want complications, refused. The French government, seeking to aggravate the situation, demanded guarantees from Prussia for the future. Expecting to settle the conflict, Wilhelm I conducted negotiations with the French ambassador in Ems. Bismarck, provoking the war, distorted the text of the message about these negotiations sent to him from Ems on July 13, 1870, giving it a sense that was offensive to the French government. The "Emskaya dispatch" served as a pretext for war.

The beginning of the war

On July 19, 1870, France declared war on Prussia. From the very beginning, the war turned into a Franco-German one: France was opposed not only by Prussia, but also by the states of the North German Confederation connected with it, as well as the South German states. The French command, led by Napoleon III, planned a swift invasion of its troops into Germany in order to prevent the connection of the North German troops with the South German ones. However, in France, the mobilization was slow and disorganized, the offensive could not be launched on schedule. Meanwhile, the southern and northern German armies managed to link up. They were concentrated on the French border, on the middle Rhine, between Metz and Strasbourg, and began to act according to a plan drawn up by the head of the Prussian general staff H. K. Moltke the Elder. The forces of the parties were not equal. German troops in total numbered approx. 1 million people, the French army - only 300 thousand people. Although the French army had guns latest system Shaspeau, superior in combat qualities to German guns, far from the entire army was provided with them. In addition, the steel rifled guns of the Prussian artillery far exceeded the French bronze guns in terms of firing range.

On August 4, 1870, German troops launched an offensive in Alsace, within three days they defeated 4 of the 8 corps of the French army and occupied part of Alsace and Lorraine. The French army, forced to start a retreat, was divided into two groups. One of them, under the command of Marshal Bazin, was driven back to Metz and blocked there. Another group of French troops, after a series of contradictory actions, which were dictated by both military and political considerations of its commander, Marshal P. McMahon, moved to Metz. However, the German armies blocked her path and pushed her to the outskirts of Sedan.

Sedan

On September 1, 1870, near Sedan, the German troops, having numerical superiority, positional advantages, and excellent artillery, inflicted a crushing defeat on the courageously fighting French army of MacMahon. Napoleon III surrendered. The army suffered heavy losses: 3 thousand killed, 14 thousand wounded, 83 thousand prisoners. On September 2, General Wimpfen and General Moltke signed the act of surrender of the French army. On September 3, in Paris, they learned about the Sedan catastrophe, and on September 4, a revolution broke out. The government of Napoleon III was overthrown, France was proclaimed a republic. Was formed "Government of National Defense" led by the military governor of Paris, General L. Trochu.

End of the war

However, Germany did not stop the war, hoping to seize Alsace and Lorraine from France. On September 2, German troops set out from Sedan and moved towards Paris. On September 19, they laid siege to it and began a 130-day artillery shelling of the French capital. To lead the struggle against the invaders, the Trochu government created its own delegation in Tours. On October 9, the Minister of the Interior, L. Gambetta, flew there from Paris in a balloon. 11 new corps numbering 220 thousand people were formed. The Loire army managed to recapture Orleans from the Germans and advance towards Paris, but a month later Orleans had to be abandoned. The new units were also defeated near Paris. On October 27, the 173,000-strong army of Bazaine, locked in Metz, surrendered to the enemy. The Trochu government found itself unable to organize an effective rebuff to the enemy and unwillingness to use the unfolding in the country partisan movement frantieres (free shooters). In the besieged capital, suffering from hunger and cold, unrest broke out in October 1870 and January 1871. The government conducted secret peace negotiations with the enemy. For his part, Bismarck, fearing the intervention of neutral states, also sought to end the war. On January 28, 1871, the parties signed an armistice, under which the German troops received most of the Parisian forts, a lot of weapons and ammunition. Only the eastern French army still continued to fight, but in early February it crossed the border with Switzerland and was interned there. On February 26, 1871, a peace treaty was signed at Versailles, which provided for the secession from France of a significant part of Lorraine with the fortresses of Metz and Thionville and all of Alsace, with the exception of the city and fortress of Belfort. France pledged to pay Germany a military indemnity in the amount of 5 billion francs. On May 10, the Frankfurt Peace Treaty of 1871 was concluded between France and Germany, confirming the main terms of the Versailles Agreement.

Outcomes and results of the war

The Franco-Prussian War changed the balance of power in Europe. France was weakened and lost its leading role. At the same time, the ideas of revenge, the restoration of national honor and the return of the seized lands pushed the ruling circles to search for allies. The unified, rapidly developing German Empire (proclaimed in January 1871) sought to become the leader of Europe and secure itself complex system alliances isolating France. Although peace continued for the next 40 years, the contradictions between France and Germany were the source of constant voltage in Europe, becoming one of the causes of the First World War 1914-18.

Changes in military art

New technical conditions of war ( railways, steam fleet, rifled weapons, balloons, telegraph) made significant changes in the art of war. It became possible in a short time to form large armies, reduce the time for mobilization and deployment of military formations, and their mobility increased. The appearance of rifled weapons led to an increase in the power of fire, which changed the nature of the battle and tactics. Defensive positions began to be equipped with trenches. The tactics of fighting in columns gave way to the tactics of loose fighting and rifle chains.

Literature:

Shneerson L. M. The Franco-Prussian War and Russia. From the history of Russian-German and Russian-French relations in 1867-71 Minsk, 1976.

Obolenskaya S. V. The Franco-Prussian War and public opinion Germany and Russia. M., 1977.

Der Deutsch-franzosischer Krieg, 1870-1871. Berlin, 1872-1881. bd. 1-5.

La guerre de 1870-1871. Paris, 1901-1913. v. 1-24.

Dittrich J. Bismarck, Frankreich und die spanische Thronkandidatur der Hohenzollern. Die "Kriegsschuldfrage" 1870. Munchen, 1962.

Howard M. The Franco-Prussian war. New York, 1962.

Jaures J. La guerre franco-allemande 1870-1871. Paris, 1971.

Gall L. Bismarck: der weisse Revolutionar. Munchen, 1980.

Kolb E. Der Weg aus dem Krieg: Bismarcks Politik im Krieg und die Friedensanbahnung, 1870-1871. Munchen, 1989.

S. V. Obolenskaya

FRENCH REVOLUTIONS OF THE 19TH CENTURY. Having destroyed the socio-economic basis of the old order and cleared the way for the development of the capitalist economy, the Great French Revolution was unable to fully realize the principles of a democratic state proclaimed by it. Becoming, however, an integral part of the French political tradition, these principles throughout the 19th century. were realized in the course of revolutions, the results of which, in contrast to the results of the Great french revolution, were reduced mainly to purely political transformations.

July Revolution 1830

Revolution of 1848

Literature:

A. V. Chudinov

July Revolution 1830

After the collapse of Napoleon's empire and the restoration of the Bourbons, a constitutional monarchy was established in France. The Charter of 1814 guaranteed basic civil liberties. The king shared legislative power with a hereditary chamber of peers and an elected chamber of deputies on the basis of a property qualification. During the reign of Louis XVIII (1814-24), the government, usually backed by a centrist party of constitutionalists ("doctrinaires"), managed more or less successfully to maintain the status quo. The right opposition was made up of ultra-royalists who wanted the restoration of absolutism, the left - liberals ("independents"), who demanded the democratization of the regime.

At the end of the reign of Louis XVIII, and especially under Charles X (1824-30), the influence of the right on government policy increased. In August 1829, the cabinet was headed by the ultra-royalist prince O. J. A. Polignac. On March 18, 1830, the Chamber of Deputies, with the votes of constitutionalists and liberals, adopted an appeal to the monarch, demanding the resignation of the cabinet. On May 16, the king dissolved the House. However, new elections (late June - early July) brought victory to the opposition. On July 25, the king signed ordinances dissolving the newly elected chamber, abolishing freedom of the press, and introducing an even less democratic electoral system. On the 26th, liberal journalists called on the people to resist the authorities. On the 27th, after the opposition newspapers were shut down by the police, the building of barricades began throughout Paris. We walked all day on the 28th street fighting. On the 29th, the rebels formed the National Guard under Lafayette and took the Louvre by evening. Opposition deputies and journalists, gathered at the banker J. Laffite, offered the crown to the Duke of Orleans. On the 31st, he was proclaimed viceroy of the kingdom. On August 2, Charles X abdicated in favor of his grandson. On the 9th, Louis Philippe d'Orléans ascended the throne, signing the renewed Charter.

Revolution of 1848

The first half of the reign of Louis Philippe (1830-40) was marked by steady economic growth and relative political stability. The successive cabinets relied on the support of the parliamentary majority, which consisted of the “right center” (former “doctriners”) headed by F. P. Guizot and the moderately liberal “left center” L. A. Thiers.

In the Chamber of Deputies, the right-wing opposition of the Legitimists (supporters of the Bourbons) and the left-liberal "dynastic opposition" headed by O. Barro were in the minority. The extra-parliamentary opposition of the secret neo-Jacobin and communist societies (A. Barbès, L. O. Blanqui) was crushed by the police after local uprisings organized by them and attempts on the life of the king.

In 1840-47, the conservative course of the Guizot government led to a narrowing of the social base of the regime and the expansion of the opposition, which united in its ranks the adherents of Thiers, Barrot and republicans of all shades: the "tricolors" (advocates of pure political reforms rallied around the newspaper "National") and the "reds" (supporters of social change, grouped around the newspaper "Reforme"). The campaign of banquets launched by the opposition in 1847 in support of the reform of the electoral system caused an increase in political tension, which was aggravated economic crisis.

On February 21, 1848, the authorities banned a banquet scheduled for the next day and a demonstration of the opposition. Despite the fact that its leaders obeyed the ban, on the 22nd a spontaneous demonstration took place, which led to clashes between the people and the police. At night, barricades were built in many areas of Paris. The National Guard supported the rebels. On the 23rd, the king dismissed Guizot. The uprising began to decline, but soon flared up with renewed vigor after a clash between soldiers and demonstrators on the Boulevard des Capucines caused by an accidental shot, which caused numerous casualties among civilians. On the night of the 24th, Louis Philippe instructed Thiers and Barraud to form a government, agreeing to call new elections and carry out electoral reform. But the rebellion continued, and the king abdicated in favor of his grandson. After the insurgents captured the Palace of Bourbon, where the chamber met, the left deputies formed the “Provisional Government of the French Republic”, which included the “tricolor” (heads of government A. Lamartine, L. A. Garnier-Pages, D. F. Arago, etc.) and the "Reds" (A. O. Ledru-Rollin, F. Flocon) Republicans, as well as the socialists L. Blanc and A. Albert. The government decreed civil and political freedoms and universal suffrage. At the request of the socialists and under pressure from the "lower classes", the right to work was proclaimed, national workshops and a government commission for workers ("Luxembourg Commission") were created.

In the elections to the Constituent Assembly (April 23), the majority of seats were won by the Republicans. On May 9, a new government was formed (Lamartine, Garnier-Pages, Arago, Ledru-Rollin, A. Marie). On May 15, it hardly suppressed the action of the workers, who, having occupied the Bourbon Palace, tried to dissolve the assembly and transfer power to a revolutionary government consisting of Albert, Blanc, Blanca, Barbès, and others. On June 21, the government closed the national workshops. On the 23rd, the working-class districts of Paris revolted. The assembly granted dictatorial powers to General L. E. Cavaignac, who managed, after bloody street fighting (June 23-26), to suppress the uprising.

On October 4, the Constitution was adopted, giving the president of the republic the widest powers. The presidential election on December 10 was won by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, Napoleon's nephew. He collected 5,434,226 votes, Cavaignac - 1,498,000, Ledru-Rollin - 370,000, the socialist F. V. Raspail - 36,920, Lamartine - 7,910. The President and the Barro government appointed by him relied on the monarchists (Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists ) and were in constant conflict with the Republican majority Constituent Assembly.

In the elections to the Legislative Assembly (May 13, 1849), two-thirds of the seats were won by the monarchists. After the June 13 dispersal of a demonstration of left-wing Republicans protesting against the reactionary foreign policy President, with Ledru-Rollin at the head, some of the left-wing deputies were put on trial, others emigrated.

On March 16, 1850, the Legislative Assembly introduced church supervision over education, on May 31 established the residence requirement for voters, and on July 16 restricted the freedom of the press.

Openly striving for the restoration of the Empire, Bonaparte in the fall of 1850 entered into a conflict with the Legislative Assembly, which deepened throughout 1851. The deputies, split into three opposing and approximately equal factions (Bonapartists, Republicans and the alliance of legitimists with Orléanists), were unable to offer him effective resistance. December 2, 1851 Bonaparte carried out a military coup, dissolved the assembly and arrested the leaders of the republican and monarchist opposition. Scattered armed resistance in Paris and the provinces was crushed. Having restored universal suffrage, Bonaparte legally secured the results of the coup in a plebiscite on November 20, 1852 (7,481,280 - "for"; 647,292 - "against"). According to the results of the plebiscite on November 20, 1852 (7,839,000 - "for"; 253,000 - "against"), he was proclaimed Emperor Napoleon III.

Literature:

Revolutions of 1848-1849. M., 1952. T. 1-2.

Paris Commune 1871 M., 1961.

History of France. M., 1973. T. 2.

FRENCH REVOLUTIONS OF THE 19TH CENTURY. Having destroyed the socio-economic basis of the old order and cleared the way for the development of the capitalist economy, the Great French Revolution was unable to fully realize the principles of a democratic state proclaimed by it. Becoming, however, an integral part of the French political tradition, these principles throughout the 19th century. were implemented in the course of revolutions, the results of which, in contrast to the results of the French Revolution, were reduced mainly to purely political transformations.

July Revolution 1830

At the end of the reign of Louis XVIII, and especially under Charles X (1824-30), the influence of the right on government policy increased. In August 1829, the cabinet was headed by the ultra-royalist prince O. J. A. Polignac. On March 18, 1830, the Chamber of Deputies, with the votes of constitutionalists and liberals, adopted an appeal to the monarch, demanding the resignation of the cabinet. On May 16, the king dissolved the House. However, new elections (late June - early July) brought victory to the opposition. On July 25, the king signed ordinances dissolving the newly elected chamber, abolishing freedom of the press, and introducing an even less democratic electoral system. On the 26th, liberal journalists called on the people to resist the authorities. On the 27th, after the opposition newspapers were shut down by the police, the building of barricades began throughout Paris. Street fighting went on all day on the 28th. On the 29th, the rebels formed the National Guard under Lafayette and took the Louvre by evening. Opposition deputies and journalists, gathered at the banker J. Laffite, offered the crown to the Duke of Orleans. On the 31st, he was proclaimed viceroy of the kingdom. On August 2, Charles X abdicated in favor of his grandson. On the 9th, Louis Philippe d'Orléans ascended the throne, signing the renewed Charter.

Revolution of 1848

In 1840-47, the conservative course of the Guizot government led to a narrowing of the social base of the regime and the expansion of the opposition, which united in its ranks adherents of Thiers, Barraud and republicans of all shades: the “tricolors” (advocates of purely political reforms who rallied around the newspaper “National”) and the “reds”. ” (supporters of social transformations, grouped around the newspaper “Reforme”). The campaign of banquets launched by the opposition in 1847 in support of the reform of the electoral system caused an increase in political tension, which was exacerbated by the economic crisis.

On February 21, 1848, the authorities banned a banquet scheduled for the next day and a demonstration of the opposition. Despite the fact that its leaders obeyed the ban, on the 22nd a spontaneous demonstration took place, which led to clashes between the people and the police. At night, barricades were built in many areas of Paris. The National Guard supported the rebels. On the 23rd, the king dismissed Guizot. The uprising began to decline, but soon flared up with renewed vigor after a clash between soldiers and demonstrators on the Boulevard des Capuchins caused by an accidental shot, which caused numerous casualties among civilians. On the night of the 24th, Louis Philippe instructed Thiers and Barraud to form a government, agreeing to call new elections and carry out electoral reform. But the rebellion continued, and the king abdicated in favor of his grandson. After the insurgents captured the Palace of Bourbon, where the chamber met, the left deputies formed the “Provisional Government of the French Republic”, which included the “tricolor” (heads of government A. Lamartine, L. A. Garnier-Pages, D. F. Arago, etc.) and the "Reds" (A. O. Ledru-Rollin, F. Flocon) Republicans, as well as the socialists L. Blanc and A. Albert. The government decreed civil and political freedoms and universal suffrage. At the request of the socialists and under pressure from the "lower classes", the right to work was proclaimed, national workshops and a government commission for workers ("Luxembourg Commission") were created.

In the elections to the Legislative Assembly (May 13, 1849), two-thirds of the seats were won by the monarchists. After the June 13 dispersal of a demonstration of left-wing republicans protesting against the reactionary foreign policy of the president, led by Ledru-Rollin, some of the left-wing deputies were put on trial, others emigrated.

Revolution of 1870 and the Paris Commune of 1871

In the 1860s the prestige of the Second Empire steadily declined. Devastating wars and voluntaristic economic policy frustrated finances. The parliamentary opposition, uniting Legitimists, Orleanists (Thiers) and Republicans (J. Favre, E. Picard, L. Gambetta), from election to election increased the number of its members in the Legislative Corps (1857-5; 1863-35; 1869-90) . At the same time, all attempts by the leaders of the communist underground (Blanquis and others) to raise the people to revolt did not meet with support in society.

Starting the Franco-Prussian War, the authorities hoped that victory would increase the popularity of the regime. However, on September 4, 1870, when it became known that the emperor and the army had capitulated at Sedan, an uprising broke out in Paris. The deputies of the opposition proclaimed a republic and formed a government of national defense (Favre, Picard, Garnier-Pages, Gambetta, and others), which was headed by General L. Trochu.

On September 16, the Germans laid siege to Paris. Apart from regular army up to 300 thousand of the national guard, which included almost all the adult men of Paris, participated in the defense. Motley in composition, brave, but poorly disciplined, she was very susceptible to anti-government propaganda launched by members of revolutionary societies who had come out of the underground. On October 31, in the wake of the indignation caused by the unsuccessful sortie and the news of the surrender of Metz, the Blanquists tried, with the help of some parts of the national guard, to seize power. The government crushed the uprising and confirmed its authority by holding a plebiscite (559,000 - "for"; 62,000 - "against"). The deprivations caused by the siege and the unsuccessful leadership of the defense by Trochu led to an increase in discontent among the population, which was again taken advantage of by the Blanquists, who made another attempt to overthrow the government on January 22, 1871.

On January 23, an armistice was concluded with the Germans. On February 8, elections were held for the National Assembly (opened in Bordeaux on the 12th), which appointed Thiers as the head of the executive branch. On the 26th a preliminary peace was signed. On March 1, the National Assembly confirmed the deposition of Napoleon III.

Paris only nominally recognized the power of Thiers. The National Guard retained its weapons and was really subordinate only to the Central Committee elected by itself. On March 18, the national guards, having learned about the attempt of government troops to take the cannons out of Paris, rebelled and executed two generals. The government, troops loyal to it and a significant part of the population fled to Versailles. 22nd National Guard shot down a demonstration protesting against the seizure of power by the Central Committee.

On March 26, elections were held for the Paris Commune. Most of the seats were won by Blanquists, Proudhonists (adherents of the socialist theory of P. J. Proudhon) and neo-Jacobins. Due to the fundamental differences in their socio-economic views, the Commune did not take any significant measures in this area and only took into account some of the private wishes of the workers. On political issues in the Commune there was a sharp struggle between the "majority" (Blanquists and neo-Jacobins) striving for dictatorship and centralization and the Proudhonist "minority" who preferred a democratic federation.

April 2, on the outskirts of Paris began fighting between the Versaillese and the Communards. The courage and enthusiasm of the rebels could not compensate for their lack of discipline, weak military leadership and organizational impotence. revolutionary authorities. On May 21, the Versaillese entered the city. On the 28th, after a week of brutal street fighting ("bloody week"), the Commune was ended.

This outbreak civil war forced the most far-sighted part of the ruling circles to take a course towards strengthening democracy, capable of reconciling the interests of various sections of society.

Literature:

Revolutions of 1848-1849. M., 1952. T. 1-2.

The Paris Commune of 1871 M., 1961.

History of France. M., 1973. T. 2.

Furet F. La Revolution: De Turgot a Jules Ferry. 1770-1880. Paris, 1988.