V. Abakumov. Head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) "SMERSH"

SMERSH is an abbreviation for "Death to Spies", the so-called number of counterintelligence agencies of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. SMERSH was created on April 19, 1943 and lasted only 3 years, until 1946. However, even this historically insignificant period was enough for a part of the liberal-minded public to register SMERSH in the repressive and punitive bodies of the Stalinist regime. How did SMERSH deserve this? It is difficult to say for sure, perhaps because Red Army soldiers returning from captivity passed through it, through the sieve of filtration camps, or the fact that the most famous dissident of the Soviet era, A.I. Solzhenitsyn was arrested by SMERSH. The service of the operational staff of the SMERSH GUKR was extremely dangerous - on average, the operative served for 3 months, after which he retired due to death or injury. Only during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing.
The activities of this organization now, in the last two or three years, have aroused increased interest, even the cinema has burst into a couple of series on this topic, in fairness, it is worth saying that in terms of quality this film production is inferior to the adaptation of Bogomolov's Moment of Truth. In general, it is worth considering the work of SMERSH closely and there is nothing more objective than the documents of SMERSH itself, which at one time were not intended for a wide range of readers.

The tasks assigned to SMERSH were as follows:

• “a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;
• b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;
• c) taking the necessary agent-operational and other [through the command] measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;
• d) the fight against betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army [going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];
• e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;
• f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;
• g) fulfillment of special tasks of the people's commissar of defense.
• Smersh bodies are exempted from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section " (from the Decree of the State Defense Committee on the approval of the regulation on the Smersh State Defense Committee of the NPO of the USSR)

Why did the need to create such a counterintelligence service as SMERSH arose precisely in 1943?

It was high from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War. In 1942, the German special services began to sharply increase the scale of operations against the USSR; in 1942, up to 1,500 people were trained at the same time in special schools and training centers of the Abwehr and SD. The training lasted from one and a half (for the so-called ordinary spies) to three (for radio spies and saboteurs) months. Taken together, all intelligence schools, points and courses produced approximately 10 thousand spies and saboteurs per year. The task was to study the changes in the infrastructure to a much greater depth, they started talking about the need to obtain data on everything related to the mobilization and strategic deployment of the reserves of the Armed Forces of the USSR, their morale, level of discipline and training. They demanded not only to assess the state of defense and the concentration of technical means in the direction of the main attack, but also to find out the ability of the Soviet economy to cope with the urgent needs of the troops in conditions when the massive movement of industrial enterprises and research institutes to the eastern regions of the country continues. In cooperation with the SD, the Abwehr had to launch active sabotage activities in industry and transport in order to destroy communications, transport hubs, disable mines, power plants, defense plants, fuel and lubricants storage facilities, and food warehouses. The Abwehr moved on to more aggressive and offensive activities. The mass recruitment of agents, the unprecedented size of their deployment, were considered at that time proof of the ability of the leaders of Hitler's intelligence to analyze, learn about changing conditions and adapt to them.

In 1943, the activity of the Abwehr reached its peak. The head of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, made a trip to the Eastern Front in June 1943. At a meeting in Riga, attended by the leaders of the Abverstelle and field intelligence agencies, the heads of reconnaissance and sabotage schools, Canaris positively assessed the activities of the Abwehr III department - he was impressed by the message from the head of the Abwehrkommando-104, Major Gezenregen, about the mass arrests and executions of Russians who did not accept the "new order." Canaris said so: "Our counterintelligence service is helping the Fuhrer to strengthen the new order." As for the first and second departments of the Abwehr in the Nord army group, he assessed their actions as unsatisfactory. “Our undercover intelligence department and sabotage service,” he said, “have lost their offensive spirit, which I have always insisted on. We do not have agents in the Soviet headquarters, but they should be there. I resolutely demand a massive dispatch of agents. I have created for you as many schools as you need…”

In 1943, the scale of the deployment of agents to the Soviet rear increased by almost one and a half times compared to 1942 ...

I must say that the Abwehr did not care much about the quality of agents, the quality of training was sacrificed for the sake of quantity. Perhaps the Abwehr professed a philosophical law about the inevitable transition of quantity into quality. But, in any case, such "Stakhanov methods" of throwing spies and saboteurs into the rear of the Red Army inevitably led to the tension of all counterintelligence services of the Red Army and the NKVD, created favorable conditions for the work of the most valuable and experienced agents. It is interesting that the leadership of the Abwehr sometimes suffered from clearly adventurous plans, putting before their agents, frankly, tasks of a cosmic scale. So in August 1943, a group was abandoned in the Kazakh SSR, which, relying on the help of local nationalist elements, was supposed to launch agitation among the population for the separation of Kazakhstan from the Soviet Union and for the formation, no more, no less, of an independent state under the protectorate of Germany. Another example, on May 23, 1944, in the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe village of Utta, Astrakhan Region, the landing of an enemy super-powerful aircraft was recorded, from which a detachment of saboteurs in the amount of 24 people was landed, led by an official German intelligence officer, Captain Ebergard von Scheller. This group was sent by the German intelligence agency Wally I "to prepare a base on the territory of Kalmykia for the transfer of 36 (!) Squadrons of the so-called "Kalmyk Corps of Doctor Doll" to organize an uprising among the Kalmyks.

Photo of a staff member of the German intelligence Hauptmann Eberhard von Scheller, captured during the operation "Aryans"

From the memorandum of the UKR "Smersh" of the Bryansk Front, Deputy.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR B.C. Abakumov on the results of operational checksRussian
events codenamed "Treason to the Motherland"
June 19, 1943

Top secret
In May of this year. most affected by treason were the 415th and
356th SD of the 61st Army and 5th SD of the 63rd Army, of which they went over to the opposition
niku 23 military personnel.
One of the most effective measures to deal with cheaters
Motherland, among others, was carrying out operations on staged
under the guise of group surrenders to the enemy of military personnel,
which were carried out at the initiative of the Directorate] of counterintelligence
"Smersh" front under the guidance of experienced operatives
army counterintelligence departments.
The operations took place on June 2 and 3 of this year. in sections 415 and 356
sd with the task: under the guise of surrendering our military personnel to bring-
Xia with the Germans, throw grenades at them so that the enemy in the future
each transition to his side of a group or single traitors
met with fire and destroyed.
For operations were selected and carefully checked
we are three groups of servicemen of the 415th and 356th divisions. To each group
included 4 people.
In the 415th Rifle Division, one group consisted of division scouts,
the second - from the penalty box.
In the 356th Rifle Division, one group of scouts from the division was created.

Interesting stuff. It should not be surprising that there were defectors in June 1943; this also happened in 1945. Both the Germans and ours scattered throughout the war millions of leaflets-passes for prisoners. Here is what Helmut Klaussmann, 111th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht, recalled: "Generally defectors were on both sides, and throughout the war. Russian soldiers also ran across to us after Kursk. And our soldiers ran across to the Russians. I remember that near Taganrog two soldiers stood guard and went to the Russians, and a few days later, we heard their appeal on the radio with a call to surrender. I think the defectors were usually soldiers who just wanted to stay alive. They usually ran across before big battles, when the risk of dying in the attack overcame the feeling of fear of the enemy. Few people ran across their convictions both to us and from us. It was such an attempt to survive in this huge carnage. They hoped that after interrogations and checks you would be sent somewhere to the rear, away from the front. And there life is somehow formed. ”

Leaflet. Pass. Bayonets to the ground. VIII/42

The main motive for such an act was cowardice. What is surprising in this memorandum is that "penalties" were involved in such an operation!

Here is another interesting memo

Special message of the OVTs of the 13th Army to the head of the UKR "Smersh"
Central Front A.A. Vadis’ on the results of the perusal of the correspondence
pondents of military personnel for July 5 - 6, 1943
July 8, 1943.

Top secret
Department of military censorship of the NKGB of the 13th army for July 5 and 6
censored outgoing correspondence 55,336 letters, of which
in the national languages ​​of the peoples of the USSR - 6914.
Of the total number of checked correspondence, it was found
negative statements 21 related to complaints about lack of
in nutrition and the absence of tobacco.
1 A special message was also sent to the head of the Smersh ROC of the 13th army
Kovnik Aleksandrov and to the Military Council of the 13th Army.
All other correspondence in the amount of 55,315 letters -
patriotic nature, reflecting devotion to our Motherland
and love for the Fatherland.
Fighters and commanders are eager to immediately enter into re-
decisive battle with the hated enemy of all progressive human
quality.
The letters express hatred for the Nazi troops of the German
imperialism, ready to give their lives for the cause of Communist
party and the Soviet government. Apply on the master-
in, training and strength of the formidable weapon created by the workers of the social
static rear.
Excerpts from letters coming from the army to the rear, reflecting the patri-
otic moods are given below:
“Hello, my beloved: mother, Lidushka, Vanechka
and Vovochka! Before yesterday's letter, I would like to add that I am now
glad and happy, finally, my restless soul waited for its
share. Today, the offensive began in our sector. We are soon
we will fight. Joy is very great and noble. I have long wanted
elk to attach his hatred and strength to the comrades who will,
like me, smash the enemy. Wish me luck…”
Sender: 01097 p/p, Olshansky.
Recipient: Tbilisi, Olshanskaya.
“Hello, dear mother Natalya Vasilievna! .. Today,
July 5, where my battalion stood, the German went on the offensive,
launches hundreds of planes and tanks. But darling don't worry, it's not
1941. Already from the first hour they felt the power of our weapons.
Our planes fell on him like a formidable cloud, and now, when I write
this letter, the air is filled with the roar of the engines of our planes. fights,
mom, they will be very serious, but don’t worry too much, I’ll be alive -
I will be a hero, but if they kill me, there's nothing to be done. But believe [those] me, mother,
I will not disgrace your gray hairs ... "
Sender: 39982-y p / p, Muratov.
Recipient: Ryazan region, Tumsky district, Muratova.
“Hello, dad and mom! I am alive and well. July 5 went
to battle. We are chasing the German. Goodbye. I kiss Fedor firmly ... "
Sender: 78431-d p / p, Fedorov.
Recipient: Moscow, Fedorov.
“Hello, dear Nina! Especially to paint now
will. I will be concise. The Germans begin their general offensive.
Violent battles begin. Of course, we will win, although there will be
big sacrifices. Now I'm going into the thick of the fighting. Maybe from me
for a long time there will be no letter these days. Don't worry, dear. Now everywhere
unbelievable hum and roar. There are hundreds of our and German planes in the sky.
The Messerschmitts are falling one by one. The mood is combative and
taken, as before going on stage ... "
Sender: 01082-6 p/n, Lazarev V.L.
Recipient: Akmola region, Buzyrikhina.
“My dears! Probably in a few hours or maybe
be even minutes, a great heat will begin. All preconditions for this
on the face. The mood is quite cheerful, somewhat upbeat. We all
We have been patiently waiting for this moment for a long time. Who knows what will happen. Life
wonderful, and it will be even better ... "
Sender: 01082-х p/p, Shemyakin B.V.
Recipient: Ryazan region, Kasimov, Shemyakina.
“Hello, dear comrades! Today, July 5, we are entering
in battle with a hated enemy. My first shots are well aimed
by Fritz. Will I be alive or not? But if you die, then victory hurts, for
homeland. Greetings, Peter…”
Sender: 01082-d p/p, Gorbachev P.M.
Recipient: Chelyabinsk, Gregushnikov.
“... Good afternoon, dear mother! .. Bless me in the last
ny decisive battle with the German occupiers. Not long left
wait for our victory over fascism. Soon all the people will breathe
full chest. So, I'm going to fight. I kiss you tightly, your Mitya ... "
Sender: 01082-zh p/n, Zobov D.N.
Recipient: Saratov region, Bunilina.
Head of the department of the NKGB Computing Center of the 13th Army

What SMERSH did perusal of letters it’s not a secret from the front, the fate of Captain Solzhenitsyn is an example of this, but it turns out that SMERSH’s sphere of interest included assessing the morale of the troops. In addition, it turned out to be important for history that living human speech has come down to us from the dry reports of counterintelligence.

special messageUNKVDonKurskareasPeople's CommissardomesticaffairsUSSRL.P.Beriaaboutabandonmenton theterritoryareasGermanparatroopers-saboteurs

2 August 1943 Absolutely secret

In the period from 14 to 30 July this year. in the area of ​​​​the Moscow - Donbass railway, Stary Oskol - Valuiki station, the enemy dropped three parachute groups of saboteurs with a total number of 18 people, with the task of destroying the railway track, artificial structures and undermining echelons with military cargo.

As a result of the measures taken, 5 saboteurs were detained and 5 people voluntarily came to the Soviet authorities.

The detained and voluntarily appeared saboteurs were dressed in the uniform of the Red Army, provided with documents from units and hospitals of the Voronezh Front.

All saboteurs are armed with foreign-made pistols and are supplied with explosives and incendiary materials packed in bags from gas masks, moreover, incendiary substances are camouflaged packaged under the guise of food concentrates. Initial interrogations of the detainees established that all of them were trained for sabotage work in the Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye reconnaissance and sabotage schools of the enemy and received the task - after committing acts of sabotage, penetrate into the units of the active Red Army, get with these units to the front

for the subsequent transition to the side of the enemy. For this purpose, the saboteurs are equipped with German passes, sewn up in shoulder straps, as well as in various places of clothing.

Various photographs were found with the saboteurs, on the back of which conditional entries were made indicating the objects of sabotage work.

From the testimonies of the detainees, it is also known that in the first days of August, another 5 people trained in the Zaporozhye school are expected to be thrown out with similar tasks, and also that 20 replenishment people arrived at the Dnepropetrovsk school, with whom work has begun to prepare for the implementation of sabotage tasks.

The following measures have been taken to eliminate the ejected and expected to be ejected sabotage groups:

1. In the areas adjacent to the railway line Kursk - Kastornoye of the Southern Railway and Kastornoye - Valuyki Moscow - Donbass Railway, experienced employees of the anti-banditry and criminal investigation department were sent with the task of creating undercover barriers in settlements located along the entire line of the railway roads.

2. Instructions were given to the railway militia of the Southern Railway to strengthen the protection of the railway track and anti-sabotage work on artificial structures.

3. At the district departments of the NKVD Shchigry and Kastornoe, military groups from the 19th brigade of the internal troops of the NKVD are concentrated, intended for the event of military events.

4. Responsible operatives of the NKVD and a commander from the headquarters of the 19th brigade of the NKVD troops were sent to the places to manage intelligence and military activities in the areas where the search for saboteurs was carried out.

5. The counterintelligence agencies "Smersh" of the units of the active Red Army, the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear of the Voronezh Front and the organs of the NKGB located in the areas of the operation, were oriented.

6. The plan of intelligence and military activities with a list of detained, wanted and expected to be thrown out saboteurs was sent to the Department for Combating Banditry of the NKVD of the USSR.

Head of the NKVD Directorate of the Kursk Region Colonel of State Security

Trofimov

special messageOKR"Smersh" 69-tharmiesinMilitaryarmy council about workdetachmentsfrom 12by 17July 1943

18 July 1943Absolutelysecret

AT the procedure for completing the task of detaining a private and On July 12, 1943, from the personnel of a separate company, 7 detachments were organized from the personnel of a separate company, 7 people each, headed by 2 operational worker.

These detachments were deployed in the villages of Alekseevka - Prokhodnoye, Novaya Slobodka - Samoilovka, Podolkhi - Bolshie Podyarugi, the Bolshoi farm - Kolomiytsevo, Kashcheevo - Pogorelovka, Podkopaevka - the southern outskirts of the city of Korocha - Pushkarnoe.

As a result of the work carried out by detachments from 12 to 17 July this year. inclusive, 6956 people of ordinary and commanding staff were detained, who left the battlefield or left the encirclement of enemy troops.

The above number of detainees by formations and units is distributed as follows:

92nd Guards Rifle Division	-	2276 people
305th SD	_	1502 people
183rd SD	-	599 people
81st Guards Rifle Division	-	398 people
89th SD	_	386 people
107th SD	__	350 people
93rd Guards Rifle Division	-	216 people
94th Guards Rifle Division	-	200 people
290th amp	-	200 people
375th SD	-	101 people
	Total:	6228 people

The remaining 728 detainees belong to other units and formations.

The largest number of detainees was from the 92nd Guards Rifle Division - 2276 people, and from the 305th Rifle Division - 1502 people.

It should be noted that the number of detained military personnel, starting from July 15, has sharply decreased compared to the first days of the work of the detachments. If on July 12 2842 people were detained, and on July 13 - 1841 people, then on July 16 394 people were detained, and already on July 17 only 167 people were detained, and then those who had left the encirclement of enemy troops. The mass retreat of the rank and file, commanding officers from the battlefield by detachments organized by us, which began at five o'clock on July 12, 1943, was basically stopped at 16 o'clock on the same day, and subsequently completely stopped.

In the process of hostilities, there were cases of unauthorized abandonment of the battlefield by entire units on the part of the military personnel of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division, the 305th Rifle Division and the 290th Mining Regiment. So, for example, a detachment of vrayones. New Slobodka July 14 this year 3 units of the 305th Rifle Division were detained, such as: a battery of 76-mm cannons, a howitzer battery and a sapper company.

Another detachment in the area of ​​vil. Samoilovki were detained by 3 mortar batteries of the 290th army mortar regiment.

A detachment in the area with. Kashcheyevo, two convoys of the 92nd Guards Rifle Division were detained in the amount of 25 carts with a personnel of 200 people.

Of the detainees, 55 people were arrested, of which:

suspicious for espionage - 20 people,

on terror - 2 - "-,

traitors to the motherland - 1 - "-,

cowards and alarmists - 28 - "-,

deserters - 4 - «-.

The rest of the detainees were sent to their units.

In view of the fact that the withdrawal of military personnel from the battlefield has been stopped, I have removed the detachments, and their personnel have been sent to perform their direct military duties.

Head of the Counterintelligence Department

NPO "Smersh" of the 69th Army

colonel

74 years ago, April 19, 1943 , the legendary department of the Soviet military counterintelligence "SMERSH" was created.

April 19, 1943 By a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR, the legendary department of the Soviet military counterintelligence "SMERSH" was created. The abbreviation for the slogan "Death to spies" was adopted as the name of the organization.
Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) "SMERSH" was transformed from the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR with the transfer to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. Commissar of State Security (GB) of the 2nd rank Viktor Abakumov, who led the Directorate of Special Departments, became the head of the SMERSH Directorate of Special Departments. Nikolay GB commissioners became deputy heads of SMERSH Selivanovsky, Pavel Meshik, Isai Babich, Ivan Vradiy. In addition to deputies, the head of the GUKR had 16 assistants, each of whom oversaw the activities of one of the front-line counterintelligence departments.
SMERSH did not last long, about three years - from April 1943 to May 1946. However, the experience accumulated by counterintelligence officers in these times is being studied and applied by counterintelligence agencies around the world. It is noteworthy that over the three years of the existence of SMERSH in the ranks of counterintelligence officers there were no cases of betrayal, going over to the side of the enemy. Not a single enemy agent could infiltrate their ranks.
SMERSH (from the abbreviation "Death to spies!")- the name of a number of independent counterintelligence organizations in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War.
1. The main department of counterintelligence "SMERSH" in the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) of the USSR - military counterintelligence, head - V.S. Abakumov. Reported directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR I.V. Stalin.
2. Department of counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, head - Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service P.A. Gladkov. Subordinated to the people's commissar of the fleet, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov.
3. Department of counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, head - S.P. Yukhimovich. Subordinated to People's Commissar L.P. Beria.
Main Directorate "SMERSH" Reported directly to Joseph Stalin as chairman of the State Defense Committee.
At the same time, on the basis of the 9th (naval) department of the NKVD, a SMERSH subdivision was created in the fleet - the Counterintelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the USSR Navy. The Department of Counterintelligence of the Navy was headed by the Commissar of State Security Pyotr Gladkov. The unit was subordinated to the people's commissar of the fleet of the USSR Nikolai Kuznetsov.

Organization
Transformed from the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD by a secret Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 19, 1943. The same Decree created the Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the NKVMF of the USSR and the Counterintelligence Department "SMERSH" of the NKVD of the USSR. On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created with its transfer to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.
On April 21, 1943, I. V. Stalin signed the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3222 ss / s on the approval of the regulation on the Smersh State Defense Committee of the NPO of the USSR. The text of the document consisted of one phrase:
Approve the regulation on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" - (Death to spies) and its local bodies.

Attachment to document disclosed in detail the goals and objectives of the new structure, and also determined the status of its employees:
"The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO (Smersh) is the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, is directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense and carries out only his orders."

"Bodies" Smersh " are a centralized organization: on the fronts and districts, the Smersh bodies (the Smersh Directorates of the NPOs of the fronts and the Smersh departments of the NPOs of the armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other formations and institutions of the Red Army) are subordinate only to their higher bodies.
The Smersh organs inform the Military Councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army on issues of their work: on the results of the fight against enemy agents, on the anti-Soviet elements that penetrated the army, on the results of the fight against treason and treason, desertion, self-mutilation "
Tasks to be solved:
a) combating espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;
b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;
c) taking the necessary agent-operational and other [through the command] measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;
d) the fight against betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army [going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and generally facilitating the work of the latter];
e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;
f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;
g) fulfillment of special tasks of the people's commissar of defense.
Smersh bodies are exempted from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section "

Bodies "Smersh" have the right:
a) conduct intelligence and information work;
b) to seize, search and arrest soldiers of the Red Army, as well as persons associated with them from the civilian population who are suspected of criminal activity, in accordance with the procedure established by law [The procedure for arresting military personnel is defined in Section IV of this Appendix];
c) conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested with the subsequent transfer of cases, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the relevant judicial authorities or the Special Conference under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR;
d) apply various special measures aimed at revealing the criminal activities of foreign intelligence agents and anti-Soviet elements;
e) to summon, without prior agreement with the command, in cases of operational necessity and for interrogations, the rank and file and command and command personnel of the Red Army.

"Organs" Smersh ""are completed at the expense of the operational staff of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and the special selection of military personnel from among the commanding and political staff of the Red Army." In this connection, “employees of the Smersh bodies are assigned military ranks established in the Red Army,” and “employees of the Smersh bodies wear uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia established for the corresponding branches of the Red Army troops.”

The first order on the personnel of the GUKR "Smersh", On April 29, 1943, (order No. 1 / ssh), the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin established a new procedure for conferring ranks on the officers of the new Glavka, who had mainly "Chekist" special titles:
“In accordance with the regulations approved by the State Defense Committee on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People’s Commissariat of Defense “SMERSH” and its local bodies, - P I C A Z Y V A YU:
1. Assign the military ranks established by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the following order to the personnel of the SMERSH bodies:
a) having the rank of junior lieutenant of state security - ML LIEUTENANT;
b) having the rank of lieutenant of state security - LIEUTENANT;
c) having the rank of senior lieutenant of state security - ST.LEUTENANT;
d) having the rank of captain of state security - CAPTAIN;
e) having the rank of major of state security - MAJOR;
f) having the rank of lieutenant colonel of state security - LIEUTENANT COLONEL;
f) having the rank of colonel of state security - COLONEL.

2. The rest of the commanding officers with the rank of commissar of state security and above - to assign military ranks on a personal basis.
However, at the same time, there are enough examples when military counterintelligence officers - "Smershevites" (especially senior officers) wore personal ranks of state security. So, for example, lieutenant colonel of the State Security Service G.I. Polyakov (the rank was awarded on February 11, 1943) from December 1943 to March 1945 headed the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the 109th Infantry Division.

April 19, 1943 By Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138ss, on the basis of the Office of Special Departments (UOO) of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the following were formed:
1. Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (Head - Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank V. S. Abakumov).
2. Office of counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR (Head - Commissar GB P. A. Gladkov).
A little later, on May 15, 1943, in accordance with the aforementioned decision of the Council of People's Commissars, for the intelligence and operational services of the border and internal troops, the police and other armed formations of the People's Commissariat, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. Commissioner of State Security S. P. Yukhimovich).
Employees of all three Smersh departments were required to wear the uniform and insignia of the military units and formations they serve.

So, during the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union there were three counterintelligence organizations called "Smersh". They did not report to each other, were in different departments, these were three independent counterintelligence bodies: the Smersh Main Directorate of Counterintelligence in the People's Commissariat of Defense, which was headed by Abakumov and about which there are already quite a lot of publications. This "Smersh" was subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Stalin. The second counterintelligence body, which also bore the name "Smersh", belonged to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, subordinated to the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov and no one else. There was also a department of counterintelligence "Smersh" in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which was directly subordinate to Beria. When some researchers claim that through counterintelligence "Smersh" Abakumov controlled Beria, this is not so - there was no mutual control. Smersh did not control Beria Abakumov through these bodies, much less Abakumov could control Beria. These were three independent counterintelligence units in three law enforcement agencies.
26 May 1943 By Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 592 of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (published in print), senior officials of the Smersh bodies (NPO and NKVMF) were awarded general general ranks. Head of the Main Directorate of the NPO of the USSR "Smersh" V.S. Abakumov, the only "army smershevets", despite his appointment, concurrently, as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (he held this post for a little over a month - from 19.04 to 05.25.1943), retained until July 1945 the "Chekist" special title COMMISSIONER GB 2nd rank.
Head of the UKR NKVMF USSR "Smersh" P.A. Gladkov 07/24/1943 became a major general of the coastal service, and the head of the ROC of the NKVD of the USSR "Smersh" S.P. Yukhimovich - remained until July 1945 as the commissar of the GB.

However, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. The GUKR SMERSH had nothing to do with the persecution of the civilian population, and could not do it, since working with the civilian population was the prerogative of the territorial bodies of the NKVD-NKGB. Contrary to popular belief, the SMERSH authorities could not sentence someone to imprisonment or execution, as they were not judicial authorities. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting of the NKVD.

Detachments under the bodies of "Smersh" were never created, and Smersh employees never headed them. At the beginning of the war, protective measures were carried out by the NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Army in the field. In 1942, military barrage detachments began to be created for each army at the front. In fact, they were intended to maintain order during the fighting. Only at the head of the detachments of the Stalingrad and South-Western fronts in September-December 1942, were employees of special departments of the NKVD.
To ensure operational work, guarding places of deployment, escorting and guarding those arrested from parts of the Red Army, Smersh military counterintelligence bodies were allocated: for the Smersh front department - a battalion, for the army department - a company, for the department of the corps, division and brigade - a platoon. As for the detachments, the army's barrage services were actively used by Smersh employees to search for enemy intelligence agents. For example, on the eve of the offensive operations of the fronts, measures taken by the frontier service with the participation of the Smersh organs acquired a large scope. In particular, military garrisons were combed, up to 500 or more settlements with adjacent forests, non-residential premises, thousands of abandoned dugouts were inspected. During such “cleansing operations”, as a rule, a large number of undocumented persons, deserters, as well as military personnel who had documents in their hands with signs indicating their production in the Abwehr, were detained.

Military counterintelligence "Smersh" sometimes they not only performed their direct duties, but also directly participated in the battles, often at critical moments they assumed command of companies and battalions that had lost their commanders. Many army security officers died in the line of duty, assignments of the command of the Red Army and the Navy.
For example, Art. Lieutenant A.F. Kalmykov, who promptly served the battalion of the 310th sd. was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the following feat. In January 1944, the personnel of the battalion tried to storm the village of Osiya, Novgorod Region. The advance was halted by heavy enemy fire. Repeated attacks yielded no results. By agreement with the command, Kalmykov led a group of fighters and penetrated from the rear into the village, defended by a strong enemy garrison. The sudden blow caused confusion among the Germans, but their numerical superiority made it possible to surround the daredevils. Then Kalmykov called on the radio "fire on himself." After the liberation of the village, in addition to our dead soldiers, about 300 corpses of the enemy were found on its streets, destroyed by the Kalmykov group and the fire of our guns and mortars.

In total, during the war years, only 4 SMERSH employees were awarded the highest award - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union: Senior Lieutenant Pyotr Anfimovich Zhidkov, Lieutenant Grigory Mikhailovich Kravtsov, Lieutenant Mikhail Petrovich Krygin, Lieutenant Vasily Mikhailovich Chebotarev. All four were awarded this title posthumously.
Activities and weapons
The activities of the GUKR SMERSH also included the filtering of soldiers returning from captivity, as well as the preliminary cleaning of the front line from German agents and anti-Soviet elements (together with the NKVD Troops for the protection of the rear of the Army and the territorial bodies of the NKVD). SMERSH took an active part in the search, detention and investigation of Soviet citizens who acted in anti-Soviet armed groups who fought on the side of Germany.

The main opponent of SMERSH in his counterintelligence activities were: the Abwehr department of the High Command of the Armed Forces - the German military intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919-1944, the intelligence department "Foreign Armies of the East" of the High Command of the Ground Forces, the military field gendarmerie and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the RSHA, Finnish military intelligence.
The service of the operational staff of the SMERSH GUKR was extremely dangerous - on average, the operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. Only during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing. The first front-line counterintelligence officer awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) was Art. Lieutenant Zhidkov P.A. 1999 - 1999 - detective of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the motorized rifle battalion of the 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

Activities GUKR SMERSH characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence, in terms of performance, SMERSH was the most effective intelligence service during World War II. From 1943 until the end of the war, only 186 radio games were conducted by the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front-line departments. During these games, over 400 staff members and German agents were brought to our territory, and dozens of tons of cargo were captured.
However, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. Contrary to popular belief, the SMERSH authorities could not sentence someone to imprisonment or execution, as they were not judicial authorities. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR. The counterintelligence officers were supposed to receive sanction for the arrests of the middle command staff from the Military Council of the army or the front, and the senior and senior commanding staff from the people's commissar of defense. At the same time, SMERSH performed the function of a security service in the troops, each formation had its own special officer who dealt with soldiers and officers with problematic biographies and recruited his intelligence agents. The SMERSH agents, along with everyone else, also showed heroism on the battlefield, especially in a dangerous and difficult situation.

SMERSH operatives in investigative practice preferred individual firearms, since a lone officer with a machine gun at all times aroused the curiosity of others. The following weapons were the most popular:
Revolver system "Nagant" self-cocking model 1895, caliber 7.62 mm
Pistol TT model 1933 caliber 7.62 mm
7.65mm Walther PPK pistol
Pistol Luger (Parabellum-08) caliber 9 mm
Pistol Walther P38 caliber 9 mm
Pistol Beretta M-34 caliber 9 mm.
Special small-sized pistol Lignose caliber 6.35 mm.
7.65 mm Mauser pistol
Pistol "ChZ" caliber 7.65 mm.
Pistol Browning HP sample 1935 caliber 9 mm
Heads of GUKR SMERSH
Head: Abakumov, Viktor Semenovich (April 19, 1943 - May 4, 1946), commissar of the State Security Service of the 2nd rank, from July 9, 1945 - Colonel General. The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) "SMERSH" reported directly to I.V. Stalin as People's Commissar for Defense.
Deputy chiefs
Selivanovsky, Nikolai Nikolaevich (April 19, 1943 - May 4, 1946), commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank, from May 26, 1943 - lieutenant general.
Meshik, Pavel Yakovlevich (April 19, 1943 - December 17, 1945), commissar of the State Security Service of the 3rd rank, since May 26, 1943 - lieutenant general.
Babich, Isai Yakovlevich (April 19, 1943 - May 4, 1946), Commissar of the State Security Service, since May 26, 1943 - lieutenant general.
Vradiy, Ivan Ivanovich (May 26, 1943 - May 4, 1946), major general, since September 25, 1944 - lieutenant general.
Chief's assistants
In addition to deputies, the head of the SMERSH GUKR had 16 assistants, each of whom oversaw the activities of one of the SMERSH front-line counterintelligence departments.
Avseevich, Alexander Alexandrovich (April-June 1943), colonel of the State Security Service, from May 26, 1943, major general.
Bolotin, Grigory Samoilovich (1943 - May 4, 1946), Colonel of the State Security Service, from May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Rogov, Vyacheslav Pavlovich (May 1943 - July 1945), major general.
Timofeev, Pyotr Petrovich (September 1943 - May 4, 1946), Major General, since 1944 - Lieutenant General (Ukr SMERSH Stepnoy, from 10/16/1943 of the 2nd Ukrainian Front).
Prokhorenko, Konstantin Pavlovich (April 29, 1943 - October 4, 1944), Colonel of the State Security Service, from May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Moskalenko, Ivan Ivanovich (May 1943 - May 4, 1946) Colonel of State Security, from May 6, 1943 - Major General, from July 21, 1944 - Lieutenant General.
Misyurev, Alexander Petrovich (April 29, 1943 - May 4, 1946), Colonel of the State Security Service, from May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Kozhevnikov, Sergei Fedorovich (April 29, 1943 - May 4, 1946), Colonel of the State Security Service, from May 26, 1943 - Major General.
Shirmanov, Viktor Timofeevich (as of July 1943), colonel, since July 31, 1944 - major general. (UKR SMERSH of the Central, from 10/16/1943 of the Belorussian fronts).
Structure
Since April 1943, the Smersh GUKR has included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3 / ssh of the People's Commissar of Defense I. Stalin:
1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Defense (head - Colonel GB, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich)
2nd department - work among prisoners of war, checking the soldiers of the Red Army who were in captivity (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich)
3rd department - the fight against agents thrown into the rear of the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Utekhin Georgy Valentinovich)
4th department - work on the side of the enemy to identify agents thrown into the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Timofeev Petr Petrovich)
5th department - management of the work of the Smersh bodies in the military districts (head - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich)
6th Department - Investigation (Head - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Alexander Georgievich Leonov)
7th department - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NPOs, NKVMF, cipher workers, admission to top secret and secret work, verification of workers sent abroad (head - Colonel Sidorov A. E. (appointed later, no data in the order))
8th department - operational equipment (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich)
9th department - searches, arrests, surveillance (head - lieutenant colonel of the State Security Committee Alexander Evstafievich Kochetkov)
10th department - Department "C" - special assignments (head - major GB Zbrailov Alexander Mikhailovich)
11th department - encryption (head - Colonel GB Chertov Ivan Aleksandrovich)
Political Department - Colonel Sidenkov Nikifor Matveyevich
Personnel Department - Colonel GB Vradiy Ivan Ivanovich
Administrative, Financial and Economic Department - Lieutenant Colonel GB Polovnev Sergey Andreevich
Secretariat - Colonel Chernov Ivan Aleksandrovich
The number of the central apparatus of the GUKR "Smersh" NPO was 646 people.
The history of SMERSH ended in May 1946. Then, by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "SMERSH" joined the Ministry of State Security of the USSR as an independent 3rd Main Directorate. The real activities of the Soviet military counterintelligence during the Great Patriotic War still remain in the shadows.

Most of our contemporaries about the SMERSH special service either know very little or know almost nothing. As a rule, information about it is drawn either from films and series, most of which have no real basis, or from pseudo-historical works, where SMERSH appears as a punitive body.
Much less is written about the real history of SMERSH. Counterintelligence agents generally do not like loud speeches and spotlights - their activities do not imply publicity. In the Soviet period, many brilliant operations carried out by SMERSH during the war years were classified as "secret".
Broken Abwehr map
At the same time, it should be remembered that very experienced and resourceful opponents from the German special services, including from the Abwehr - German military intelligence, opposed the Soviet counterintelligence officers. By the beginning of 1943, about 200 German intelligence schools were preparing agents for being sent to the Soviet rear. The fact that their activities in the end could not have a significant impact on the course of the war is entirely the merit of SMERSH.

In the same 1943, the Abwehr and the SD developed a plan, according to which a full-scale civil war was to be launched in the Soviet rear, playing the "national card". Kalmykia, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Crimea, according to the plan of German intelligence officers, were to become an arena in which radical nationalists would stab the USSR in the back.
In the Soviet period, historians tried not to focus on such painful issues, but you can’t erase the words from the song - thousands of Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Kalmyks and representatives of other peoples during the war years opposed the Soviet government with weapons in their hands, collaborating with German agents.

In the era of perestroika, the topic of “repressed peoples” was revealed rather one-sidedly, and what caused the extremely harsh government measures was not mentioned at all.
Meanwhile, at least three nationalist groups operated on the territory of Karachay-Cherkessia alone, whose activities were inspired by German intelligence - "Free Karachay", "For the Religion of Karachay" and "Balkarian Army", and in neighboring Kabardino-Balkaria a national government was formed in led by Prince Shadov.
The fact that individual gangs did not turn into a whole army was ensured by the efforts of SMERSH.
A separate item in the history of "SMERSH" are "radio games". These are operations when conscious disinformation is transmitted to the enemy through previously captured agents. From 1943 to 1945, counterintelligence officers conducted 186 such radio games, in fact, completely cutting off the Germans' access to Soviet military secrets, and neutralizing over 400 German intelligence officers. Nothing like this can boast of any counterintelligence in the world.
Filter "SMERSH"
Those who describe the history of SMERSH as a punitive and repressive body usually emphasize such a function of counterintelligence as the "filtering" of former prisoners of war. This implies that the SMERSH employees ruthlessly dealt with the prisoners, sending them after the Nazis immediately to the Stalinist camps.
This is not entirely true. Here is an example related to the captured 36 Soviet generals, who were checked by SMERSH in May-June 1945. All of them were brought to Moscow, and a decision was made on each in accordance with the available materials on their behavior in captivity.
25 generals who were captured were not only fully acquitted, but also re-enlisted in the army, having received assistance in treatment and household arrangements. True, not all of them were able to continue their service - health undermined in captivity did not allow. And only 11 generals, in respect of whom the facts of cooperation with the Nazis were proven, were put on trial.
If we talk about the results of "filtering" people with a lower rank, then for example, the results of such activities at the SMERSH collection and transit points of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the period from February 1 to May 4, 1945. 58,686 citizens who ended up on enemy territory passed through a sieve of checks, of which 16,456 people were former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, and 12,160 people were Soviet citizens of military age who were driven by the enemy to work in Germany.

According to the results of the check, all persons, subject to conscription into the army, were drafted into it, 1117 citizens of other states were repatriated to their homeland, and 17,361 people not subject to military conscription returned to their homes. Of the nearly 60 thousand people who passed the test, persons involved in cooperation with the Nazis, in the service in the ROA and other Nazi units, there were only 378 people. And all of them were... no, not hanged without trial, but handed over to investigators for a more in-depth investigation.
Dry statistics show that the vast majority of Soviet citizens who were tested by SMERSH were not arrested or persecuted. Even those about whom there were doubts were checked more carefully by the investigating authorities. And we can say with confidence that SMERSH was not engaged in political repression.
During the war years, counterintelligence officers managed to neutralize about 30 thousand enemy agents, more than 3,500 saboteurs and 6,000 terrorists. Up to 3,000 agents worked behind enemy lines, neutralizing the activities of his intelligence agencies. Over 6,000 military counterintelligence officers were killed in battles and during the performance of special tasks. Only during the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing.

SMERSH activity, the unique operations carried out by Soviet counterintelligence officers have not yet received a worthy reflection either in cinema or in literature. One of the few exceptions is the novel by Vladimir Bogomolov "The Moment of Truth" ("In August 1944"), where, probably, the difficult and extremely important routine activities of SMERSH in the field were shown for the first time.
Organs "SMERSH" they could not sentence anyone to imprisonment or execution, since they were not judicial bodies. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting of the NKVD. "SMERSH" evtsy, if necessary, were called upon only to ensure the protection and escort of the arrested.

At the disposal of GUKR "SMERSH" there were units responsible for encryption communications, as well as for the selection and training of personnel for military counterintelligence, including for the double recruitment of identified enemy agents.

Employees of "SMERSH" conducted counterintelligence work on the side of the enemy, recruited into Abwehr schools and other special agencies of Nazi Germany. As a result, military counterintelligence officers were able to detect enemy plans in advance and act in advance.
The special role of Soviet intelligence officers played in disrupting the German offensive operation "Citadel" in the summer of 1943, having received and forwarded to the Center data on the deployment of large enemy tank forces in the area of ​​Orel, Kursk and Belgorod.

Organs "SMERSH" they were engaged in exposing enemy agents in the liberated territories, checking the reliability of Soviet servicemen who had escaped from captivity, left the encirclement and ended up in the territory occupied by German troops. With the transfer of the war to German territory, military counterintelligence was also entrusted with the responsibility of checking civilian repatriates.

On the eve of the Berlin offensive in the SMERSH counterintelligence department, special operational groups were created for the number of districts of Berlin, whose task was to search for and arrest the leaders of the German government, as well as to establish depositories of valuables and documents of operational importance. In May-June 1945, the SMERSH task force in Berlin discovered part of the archives of the RSHA, in particular, materials with information on the foreign policy of Nazi Germany and information about foreign agents. The Berlin operation "SMERSH" helped capture prominent figures of the Nazi regime and punitive departments, some of whom were subsequently charged with crimes against humanity.

In modern history The activities of the SMERSH military counterintelligence unit are ambiguously assessed. However, the generally recognized result of the existence of the SMERSH GUKR was the complete defeat of the intelligence agencies of Germany, Japan, Romania and Finland in World War II.
In May 1946 As part of the general reform that took place in the People's Commissariats for State Security and Internal Affairs, the SMERSH counterintelligence agencies were reorganized into special departments and transferred to the newly created Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR.

Most of our contemporaries know very little about the SMERSH special service, or know nothing at all. As a rule, information about it is drawn either from films and series, most of which have no real basis, or from pseudo-historical works, where SMERSH appears as a punitive body that destroyed tens of thousands of innocent citizens.

Direct reporting service

Much less is written about the real history of SMERSH. Counterintelligence officers generally do not like loud speeches and spotlights - their activities do not imply publicity. In the Soviet period, many brilliant operations carried out by SMERSH during the war years were classified as “secret”, and in the post-Soviet period, counterintelligence officers began to be accused of all mortal sins, attributing to them even what they, in principle, could not be guilty of.

The decision to create the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR was made on April 19, 1943.

By that time, a radical turning point was outlined in the war - the Germans suffered a crushing defeat near Stalingrad.

The methods of the enemy also changed: the Nazis began to pay great attention to reconnaissance and sabotage activities in the deep rear of the Soviet troops. It was up to the employees of SMERSH to fight this new and extremely dangerous threat.

According to the decision of the State Defense Committee, SMERSH was created by reorganizing the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD.

Unlike the previous structure, the head of SMERSH received the post of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and reported directly to the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin by following his orders. Accordingly, on the ground, the SMERSH bodies were also subordinate only to their higher structures.

Thanks to this scheme, the military counterintelligence turned into a powerful special service capable of solving the tasks assigned to it without bureaucratic interference.

The name "SMERSH" had an extremely formidable decoding - "Death to spies!" It is this phrase that will subsequently fascinate foreign writers, including the famous "Papa Bond", who will begin to compose an extremely spreading "cranberry" about the activities of the Soviet special service.

Against spies and traitors

The tasks of SMERSH were formulated as follows:

Combating espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

The fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and administrations of the Red Army;

Taking the necessary agent-operational and other (through the command) measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

Fighting betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army (going over to the side of the enemy, harboring spies and generally assisting the work of the latter);

Fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;

Checking military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

Fulfillment of special tasks of the People's Commissar of Defense.

In accordance with the emergency conditions of wartime, the Smersh bodies were endowed with broad rights and powers. They carried out a full range of operational-search activities using all the operational forces and means characteristic of the special services. Military counterintelligence officers were able to carry out seizures, searches and arrests of military personnel and associated civilians suspected of criminal activity.

General became the head of SMERSH Victor Semyonovich Abakumov.

For the first time, SMERSH demonstrated its strength during the Battle of Kursk. Thanks to the work of counterintelligence, the plans of the Soviet military command remained secret for the Nazis, and sabotage activity in the rear of the Soviet troops was reduced to a minimum.

Broken Abwehr map

At the same time, it should be remembered that very experienced and resourceful opponents from the German special services, including from the Abwehr - German military intelligence, opposed the Soviet counterintelligence officers. By the beginning of 1943, about 200 German intelligence schools were preparing agents for being sent to the Soviet rear. The fact that their activities in the end could not have a significant impact on the course of the war is entirely the merit of SMERSH.

In the same 1943, the Abwehr and the SD developed a plan according to which a full-scale civil war was to be launched in the Soviet rear, playing the “national card”. Kalmykia, the North Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Crimea, according to the plan of German intelligence officers, were to become an arena in which radical nationalists would stab the USSR in the back.

In the Soviet period, historians tried not to focus on such painful issues, but you can’t throw out the words from the song - thousands of Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Kalmyks and representatives of other peoples opposed the Soviet government with weapons in their hands during the war, collaborating with German agents.

In the era of perestroika, the topic of “repressed peoples” was revealed rather one-sidedly, and what caused the extremely harsh state measures was not mentioned at all.

Meanwhile, at least three nationalist groups operated on the territory of Karachay-Cherkessia alone, whose activities were inspired by German intelligence - "Free Karachay", "For the Religion of Karachay" and "Balkarian Army", and in neighboring Kabardino-Balkaria a national government was formed in led by Prince Shadov.

The fact that individual gangs did not turn into a whole army was ensured by the efforts of SMERSH.

A separate item in the history of "SMERSH" are "radio games". These are operations when conscious disinformation is transmitted to the enemy through previously captured agents. From 1943 to 1945, counterintelligence officers conducted 186 such radio games, in fact completely blocking the Germans from access to Soviet military secrets, and neutralizing over 400 Nazi intelligence agents. Not a single counterintelligence service in the world can boast of anything like this.

Filter "SMERSH"

Those who describe the history of SMERSH as a punitive and repressive body usually emphasize such a function of counterintelligence as the "filtering" of former prisoners of war. This implies that the employees of "SMERSH" ruthlessly dealt with the prisoners, sending them instead of the Nazis to the Stalinist camps.

This, to put it mildly, is not entirely true. Here is an example related to captured Soviet generals, of whom 36 SMERSH officers discovered in May-June 1945. All of them were taken to Moscow, and a decision was made for each in accordance with the available materials about their behavior in captivity. 25 generals who were captured were not only fully acquitted, but also re-enlisted in the army, having received assistance in treatment and household arrangements. True, not all of them were able to continue their service - health undermined in captivity did not allow. And only 11 generals, in respect of whom the facts of cooperation with the Nazis were proven, were put on trial.

If we talk about the results of "filtering" people with a lower rank, then for example, the results of such activities at the SMERSH collection and transit points of the 3rd Ukrainian Front in the period from February 1 to May 4, 1945. 58,686 citizens who ended up on enemy territory passed through a sieve of checks, of which 16,456 people were former soldiers and officers of the Red Army, and 12,160 people were Soviet citizens of military age who were driven by the enemy to work in Germany. According to the results of the check, all persons subject to conscription into the army were drafted into it, 1,117 citizens of other states were repatriated to their homeland, and 17,361 people who were not subject to military conscription returned to their homes. Of the nearly 60 thousand people who passed the test, persons involved in cooperation with the Nazis, in the service in the ROA and other Nazi units, there were only 378 people. And all of them were ... no, not hanged without trial, but handed over to the investigators before conducting a more in-depth investigation.

Dry statistics show that the vast majority of Soviet citizens who were tested by SMERSH were not arrested or persecuted. Even those about whom there were doubts were checked more carefully by the investigating authorities. All this, of course, does not exclude mistakes and abuses, but it can be said with confidence that SMERSH was not engaged in political repressions.

Fleming never dreamed

During the war years, counterintelligence officers managed to neutralize about 30 thousand enemy agents, more than 3,500 saboteurs and 6,000 terrorists. Up to 3,000 agents worked behind enemy lines, neutralizing the activities of his intelligence agencies. Over 6,000 military counterintelligence officers were killed in battles and during the performance of special tasks. Only during the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing.

The activities of SMERSH, the unique operations carried out by Soviet counterintelligence officers, have not yet received a worthy reflection either in cinema or in literature. One of the few exceptions is the novel by Vladimir Bogomolov "The Moment of Truth" ("In August 1944"), where, probably, the difficult and extremely important routine activities of SMERSH in the field were shown for the first time.

In 1946, SMERSH was included in the Ministry of State Security as its 3rd Main Directorate.

The short but glorious history of military counterintelligence as a special separate structure has ended. However, the army counterintelligence itself does not stop its work for a single day, even in peacetime.

And finally, one completely real fact that even an inventive Ian Fleming.

Lieutenant served in the department of military counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the Guards Cavalry Regiment Oleg Ivanovsky.

He worked professionally, fought bravely, finished the war in Czechoslovakia, and in 1946 was declared unfit for military service due to the consequences of his injuries. The medical verdict handed down to the 24-year-old officer read: "Fit for work in civilian institutions with a reduced working day without heavy physical and mental stress."

15 years later, on April 12, 1961, the former SMERSH officer, and at that time the leading designer of Vostok-1, Oleg Ivanovsky, will personally close the hatch of the spacecraft, sending it on a historic flight.

SMERSH (short for "Death to Spies!") - The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO) of the USSR - military counterintelligence.

Transformed from the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD by a secret Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 19, 1943. The same Decree created the Directorate of Counterintelligence "SMERSH" of the NKVMF of the USSR and the Counterintelligence Department "SMERSH" of the NKVD of the USSR. On April 19, 1943, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" was created with its transfer to the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR.

On April 21, 1943, Joseph Stalin signed the Decree of the State Defense Committee No. 3222 ss / s on the approval of the regulation on the SMERSH NPO of the USSR.

The text of the document consisted of one phrase:

"Approve the regulation on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH - and its local bodies."

The appendix to the document disclosed in detail the goals and objectives of the new structure, and also determined the status of its employees:

• "The head of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the NPO SMERSH is the deputy people's commissar of defense, is directly subordinate to the people's commissar of defense and carries out only his orders"
• “Smersh bodies are a centralized organization: on the fronts and districts, the SMERSH bodies (Smersh Directorates of NPOs of the fronts and departments of the Smersh NPOs of armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts and other formations and institutions of the Red Army) are subordinate only to their higher authorities"
• "SMERSH" bodies inform the Military Councils and the command of the relevant units, formations and institutions of the Red Army on issues of their work: on the results of the fight against enemy agents, on the anti-Soviet elements that penetrated the army, on the results of the fight against treason and betrayal, desertion, self-mutilation »
• Tasks to be solved:

“a) the fight against espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other subversive activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;

b) the fight against anti-Soviet elements that have penetrated the units and institutions of the Red Army;

c) taking the necessary agent-operational and other measures to create conditions on the fronts that exclude the possibility of enemy agents passing through the front line with impunity in order to make the front line impenetrable to espionage and anti-Soviet elements;

d) the fight against betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the Red Army;

e) the fight against desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts;

f) verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy;

g) fulfillment of special tasks of the people's commissar of defense.

- Smersh bodies are exempted from carrying out any other work not directly related to the tasks listed in this section "

• Bodies "Smersh" have the right:

“a) conduct intelligence and information work;

o b) carry out, in accordance with the procedure established by law, seizures, searches and arrests of soldiers of the Red Army, as well as persons associated with them from the civilian population who are suspected of criminal activity;

c) conduct an investigation into the cases of those arrested with the subsequent transfer of cases, in agreement with the prosecutor's office, for consideration by the relevant judicial authorities or the Special Conference under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

d) apply various special measures aimed at revealing the criminal activities of foreign intelligence agents and anti-Soviet elements;

e) to summon, without prior agreement with the command, in cases of operational necessity and for interrogations, the rank and file and command and command personnel of the Red Army.

• "Smersh bodies" are "staffed at the expense of the operational staff of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR and a special selection of military personnel from among the commanding and political staff of the Red Army." In this connection, "employees of the Smersh bodies are assigned military ranks established in of the Red Army", and "employees of the Smersh bodies wear uniforms, shoulder straps and other insignia established for the respective branches of the Red Army."

On April 19, 1943, by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 415-138ss, on the basis of the Directorate of Special Departments (UOO) of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, the following were formed: 1. The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (Head - Commissar of State Security 2nd rank V.S. Abakumov). 2. Office of counterintelligence "Smersh" of the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR (Head - Commissar GB P. A. Gladkov).

A little later, on May 15, 1943, in accordance with the aforementioned decision of the Council of People's Commissars, for the intelligence and operational services of the border and internal troops, the police and other armed formations of the People's Commissariat, by order of the NKVD of the USSR No. Commissioner of State Security S. P. Yukhimovich).

Employees of all three Smersh departments were required to wear the uniform and insignia of the military units and formations they serve.

For some, it will be a revelation that during the Great Patriotic War in the Soviet Union there were three counterintelligence organizations called Smersh. They did not report to each other, were in different departments, these were three independent counterintelligence bodies: the Smersh Main Directorate of Counterintelligence in the People's Commissariat of Defense, which was headed by Abakumov and about which there are already quite a lot of publications. This "Smersh" was indeed subordinate to the people's commissar of defense, directly to the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Stalin. The second counterintelligence body, which also bore the name "Smersh", belonged to the Counterintelligence Directorate of the People's Commissariat of the Navy, subordinated to the People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov and no one else. There was also a department of counterintelligence "Smersh" in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which was directly subordinate to Beria. When some researchers claim that Abakumov controlled Beria through Smersh counterintelligence, this is sheer absurdity. There was no mutual control. Smersh did not control Beria Abakumov through these bodies, much less Abakumov could control Beria. These were three independent counterintelligence units in three law enforcement agencies.

Some modern sources state that, in addition to obvious successes in the fight against German intelligence, SMERSH gained ominous fame during the war years thanks to a system of repressions against the civilian population, which was occupied on the territory of the USSR temporarily occupied by German troops or in forced labor in Germany.

In 1941, I. V. Stalin signed a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on the state check (filtration) of the Red Army soldiers who were captured or surrounded by enemy troops. A similar procedure was carried out with regard to the operational composition of the state security agencies. The filtration of military personnel provided for the identification of traitors, spies and deserters among them. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 6, 1945, departments for repatriation affairs began to function at the headquarters of the fronts, in which employees of the Smersh bodies took part. Collection and transit points were created to receive and check Soviet citizens liberated by the Red Army.

It is reported that from 1941 to 1945. about 700,000 people were arrested by Soviet authorities - about 70,000 of them were shot. It is also reported that several million people passed through the “purgatory” of SMERSH and about a quarter of them were also executed.

To monitor and control dissent, SMERSH created and maintained a whole system of surveillance of citizens in the rear and at the front. Death threats led to cooperation with the secret service and to baseless accusations against military personnel and civilians.

Also today it is reported that SMERSH played a big role in the spread of the Stalinist system of terror to the countries of Eastern Europe, where regimes friendly to the Soviet Union were established. For example, it is reported that in the territory of Poland and Germany after the war, some former Nazi concentration camps continued to function “under the auspices” of SMERSH as a place of repression of ideological opponents of the new regimes (as a justification, information is given that in the former Nazi concentration camp Buchenwald for several years after the war, more than 60,000 opponents of the socialist choice).

However, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. The GUKR SMERSH had nothing to do with the persecution of the civilian population, and could not do this, since work with the civilian population is the prerogative of the territorial bodies of the NKVD-NKGB. Contrary to popular belief, the SMERSH authorities could not sentence someone to imprisonment or execution, as they were not judicial authorities. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting of the NKVD.

The detachments under the bodies of "Smersh" were never created, and the employees of "Smersh" never led them. At the beginning of the war, protective measures were carried out by the NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Army in the field. In 1942, barrage detachments began to be created with each army at the front. In fact, they were intended to maintain order during the fighting. Only at the head of the detachments of the Stalingrad and South-Western fronts in September-December 1942, were employees of special departments of the NKVD.

To ensure operational work, guarding places of deployment, escorting and guarding those arrested from parts of the Red Army, Smersh military counterintelligence bodies were allocated: for the Smersh front department - a battalion, for the army department - a company, for the department of the corps, division and brigade - a platoon. As for the detachments, the barrage services were actively used by Smersh employees to search for enemy intelligence agents. For example, on the eve of the offensive operations of the fronts, measures taken by the frontier service with the participation of the Smersh organs acquired a large scope. In particular, military garrisons were combed, up to 500 or more settlements with adjacent forests, non-residential premises, thousands of abandoned dugouts were inspected. During such “cleansing operations”, as a rule, a large number of undocumented persons, deserters, as well as military personnel who had documents in their hands with signs indicating their production in the Abwehr, were detained.

Military counterintelligence officers "Smersh" sometimes not only performed their direct duties, but also directly participated in the battles with the Nazis, often at critical moments took over the command of companies and battalions that had lost their commanders. Many army security officers died in the line of duty, assignments of the command of the Red Army and the Navy.

For example, Art. Lieutenant A.F. Kalmykov, who promptly served the battalion of the 310th rifle division. was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner for the following feat. In January 1944, the personnel of the battalion tried to storm the village of Ognya, Novgorod Region. The advance was halted by heavy enemy fire. Repeated attacks yielded no results. By agreement with the command, Kalmykov led a group of fighters and penetrated from the rear into the village, defended by a strong enemy garrison. The sudden blow caused confusion among the Germans, but their numerical superiority made it possible to surround the daredevils. Then Kalmykov called on the radio "fire on himself." After the liberation of the village, in addition to our fallen soldiers, about 300 corpses of the enemy were found on its streets, destroyed by the Kalmykov group and the fire of our guns and mortars.

The activities of the GUKR Smersh also included the filtering of soldiers returning from captivity, as well as the preliminary cleaning of the front line from German agents and anti-Soviet elements (together with the NKVD Troops to protect the rear of the Army and the territorial bodies of the NKVD). SMERSH took an active part in the search, detention and investigation of Soviet citizens who acted in anti-Soviet armed groups that fought on the side of Germany, such as the Russian Liberation Army.

The main opponent of SMERSH in its counterintelligence activities was the Abwehr, the German intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919-1944, the field gendarmerie and the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of the RSHA, the Finnish military intelligence.

The service of the operational staff of the SMERSH GUKR was extremely dangerous - on average, the operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. Only during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing. The first front-line counterintelligence officer awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) was Senior Lieutenant Zhidkov P.A., detective of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the motorized rifle battalion of the 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

Since April 1943, the Smersh GUKR has included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3 / ssh of the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin:

• 1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Defense (head - Colonel GB, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich)
• 2nd department - work among prisoners of war, checking the soldiers of the Red Army who were in captivity (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich)
• 3rd department - the fight against agents thrown into the rear of the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Utekhin Georgy Valentinovich)
• 4th department - work on the side of the enemy to identify agents thrown into the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Timofeev Petr Petrovich)
• 5th department - management of the work of the Smersh bodies in the military districts (head - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich)
• 6th Department - Investigation (Head - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Alexander Georgievich Leonov)
• 7th department - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NPOs, NKVMF, cipher workers, admission to top secret and secret work, verification of workers sent abroad (head - Colonel Sidorov A. E. (appointed later, no data in the order))
• 8th department - operational equipment (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich)
• 9th department - searches, arrests, surveillance (head - lieutenant colonel of the State Security Committee Alexander Evstafievich Kochetkov)
• 10th department - Department "C" - special assignments (head - major GB Zbrailov Alexander Mikhailovich)
• 11th department - encryption (head - Colonel GB Chertov Ivan Aleksandrovich)
• Political Department - Colonel Sidenkov Nikifor Matveyevich
• Personnel Department - Colonel GB Vradiy Ivan Ivanovich
• Administrative, Financial and Economic Department - Lieutenant Colonel GB Polovnev Sergey Andreevich
• Secretariat - Colonel Chernov Ivan Aleksandrovich

The number of the central apparatus of the GUKR "SMERSH" NPO was 646 people.

The activities of the GUKR SMERSH are characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services; in terms of performance, SMERSH was the most effective special service during World War II. From 1943 until the end of the war, only 186 radio games were conducted by the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front departments. During these games, over 400 cadres and Nazi agents were brought to our territory, and tens of tons of cargo were captured.

However, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. Contrary to popular belief, the SMERSH authorities could not sentence someone to imprisonment or execution, as they were not judicial authorities. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR. The counterintelligence officers were supposed to receive sanction for the arrests of the middle command staff from the Military Council of the army or the front, and the senior and senior commanding staff from the people's commissar of defense. At the same time, SMERSH performed the function of the secret police in the troops, each unit had its own special officer who dealt with soldiers and officers with problematic biographies and recruited agents. Often SMERSH agents showed heroism on the battlefield, especially in a situation of panic and retreat.

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" Death to Spies "

On April 19, 1943, the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence "Smersh" - "Death to Spies" was formed.

The main directorate of counterintelligence "SMERSH" (abbreviated as "Death to spies!") was created on April 19, 1943 by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR. By this decree, the Directorate of Special Departments (UOO) from the NKVD was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense (NPO), where the SMERSH GUKR was organized on its basis. Stalin appointed the 35-year-old Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank Viktor Abakumov to lead the created structure.

Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov

By the same decree, the naval department of the UOO NKVD was transformed into the Smersh Counterintelligence Department of the NK Navy (headed by Lieutenant General of the Coastal Service P. Gladkov), and a little later, in May, the former 6th department of the UOO NKVD was reorganized into the counterintelligence department Smersh »NKVD (head S. Yukhimovich). Thus, during the war there were three organizations under the general name "SMERSH".

Thanks to the broad powers and personal patronage of Stalin, V. Abakumov turned the SMERSH GUKR (Main Directorate of Counterintelligence) into a powerful department. In 1943, the GUKR "SMERSH" had the following tasks:

- combating espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other activities of foreign intelligence services in units and institutions of the Red Army;
- ensuring the impenetrability of the front line for intelligence officers and agents of the enemy's special services;
- prevention of betrayal and treason in the units and institutions of the army, desertion and self-mutilation on the fronts, verification of military personnel and other persons who were captured and surrounded by the enemy.

Historians assess the results of military counterintelligence activities during the Second World War in different ways. The generally recognized result of the existence of the SMERSH GUKR was the complete defeat of enemy intelligence: Abwehr (headed by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris), Zeppelin, Waffen SS Jagdferband (Otto Skorzeny), Romanian SSI, as well as Japanese and Finnish intelligence and counterintelligence .

In general, more than 130 reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence teams of the SD and the Abwehr operated on the Eastern Front, about 60 schools functioned, preparing agents for being thrown into the rear of the Red Army.

Four territorial bodies of German intelligence were formed in the occupied regions of the USSR: Abverstelle-Ostland, Abverstelle-Ukraine, Abverstelle-South of Ukraine, and Abverstelle-Crimea. They identified Soviet intelligence officers and underground fighters, as well as people who were simply hostile to Nazi Germany, fought against the partisan movement and trained agents for the front teams of the Abwehr. In large cities occupied by the Wehrmacht, which were of great strategic and industrial importance, such as Tallinn, Kaunas, Minsk, Kyiv and Dnepropetrovsk, local counterintelligence offices were stationed - abvernebenstelle (ANST), and their branches were located in small cities convenient for dropping agents - Ausenstelle.

In June 1941, in order to organize reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, a special command body "Abwehr-Abroad" was created on the Soviet-German front, conventionally called the "Walli Headquarters", to which the Abwehrkommandos attached to the "North" army groups were subordinate , "Center", "South" Each team had from 3 to 8 Abwehrgroups.

The Abwehr had at its disposal special military formations: the Brandenburg-800 division and the Elector Regiment, which carried out sabotage and terrorist acts and intelligence work in the rear of the Red Army.

When performing the task, the saboteurs changed into the uniform of the Red Army, armed with Soviet weapons, and were supplied with cover documents. In March 1942, a special reconnaissance and sabotage body "Zeppelin" was formed in the Main Directorate of Imperial Security of Germany (RSHA) to work against the USSR. In May-June 1944, the Waffen SS Jagdverband detachment was established as part of the RSHA to prepare and carry out especially important tasks of terror, espionage and sabotage in the Red Army, led by Otto Skorzeny.

Friedrich Wilhelm Canaris

Otto Skorzeny

According to the data given by the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper, the Soviet counterintelligence agents accounted for 30,000 exposed German agents, about 3,500 saboteurs, and 6,000 terrorists. From 1943 to 1945, 250 radio games were conducted, during which the enemy received misinformation.

Operation Monastery

“In the summer of 1941, Soviet intelligence officers began an operation that is still considered “aerobatics” of a secret struggle and entered the textbooks on reconnaissance craft. It lasted almost the entire war and was called differently at different stages - “Monastyr”, “Couriers”, and then "Berezino". Its plan was originally to bring to the German intelligence center a purposeful "misinformation" about an anti-Soviet religious-monarchist organization allegedly existing in Moscow, to force enemy intelligence officers to believe in it as a real force. And thus penetrate into the intelligence network of the Nazis in the Soviet Union.On the eve of the 55th anniversary of the Victory, the FSB declassified the materials of this operation.
The Chekists recruited a representative of a noble noble family, Boris Sadovsky, to work. With the establishment of Soviet power, he lost his fortune and, naturally, was hostile to it. He lived in a small house in the Novodevichy Convent. Being an invalid, he almost did not leave it. In July 1941, Sadovsky wrote a poem, which soon became the property of counterintelligence, in which he addressed the Nazi occupiers as "liberator brothers", urging Hitler to restore Russian autocracy. They decided to use him as the head of the legendary Throne organization, especially since Sadovsky was really looking for an opportunity to somehow contact the Germans.
In order to "help" him, Alexander Demyanov, a secret agent of the Lubyanka, who had the operational pseudonym "Heine", was included in the game.

Alexander Petrovich Demyanov

His great-grandfather Anton Golovaty was the first chieftain of the Kuban Cossacks, his father was a Cossack captain who died in the First World War. Mother, however, came from a princely family, graduated from the Bestuzhev courses at the Smolny Institute for Noble Maidens, and in the pre-revolutionary years was considered one of the brightest beauties of aristocratic living rooms in Petrograd. Until 1914, Demyanov lived and was brought up abroad. He was recruited by the OGPU in 1929. Possessing noble manners and a pleasant appearance, "Heine" easily converged with film actors, writers, playwrights, poets, in whose circles he rotated with the blessing of the Chekists. Before the war, in order to suppress terrorist attacks, he specialized in developing relations between the nobles who remained in the USSR and foreign emigration. An experienced agent with such data quickly won the trust of the poet-monarchist Boris Sadovsky.
On February 17, 1942, Demyanov - "Heine" crossed the front line and surrendered to the Germans, declaring that he was a representative of the anti-Soviet underground. The intelligence officer told the Abwehr officer about the Throne organization and that it had been sent by its leaders to communicate with the German command. At first they did not believe him, they subjected him to a series of interrogations and thorough checks, including an imitation of execution, tossing a weapon from which he could shoot his tormentors and escape. However, his endurance, a clear line of conduct, the persuasiveness of the legend, backed up by real people and circumstances, finally made the German counterintelligence believe.
It also played a role that even before the war, the Moscow Abwehr residency took note of Demyanov as a possible candidate for recruitment and even gave him the nickname "Max". Under it, he appeared in the card file of the Moscow agents in 1941, under it, after three weeks of learning the basics of espionage, on March 15, 1942, he was parachuted into the Soviet rear. Demyanov was to settle in the Rybinsk region with the task of conducting active military-political intelligence. From the Throne organization, the Abwehr expected the activation of pacifist propaganda among the population, the deployment of sabotage and sabotage.
For two weeks there was a pause in the Lubyanka, so as not to arouse suspicion among the Abwehrs at the ease with which their new agent was legalized. Finally "Max" relayed his first disinformation. Soon, in order to strengthen Demyanov's position in German intelligence and to supply the Germans through him with false data of strategic importance, he was appointed a communications officer under the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Shaposhnikov.
Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, considered it his great fortune that he had acquired a "source of information" in such high spheres, and could not help but boast of this success to his rival, the head of the RSHA VI Directorate, SS Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg.

In his memoirs written after the war in English captivity, he testified with envy that military intelligence had "its own man" near Marshal Shaposhnikov, from whom a lot of "valuable information" was received.
In early August 1942, "Max" informed the Germans that the transmitter in the organization was becoming unusable and needed to be replaced. Soon, two Abwehr couriers came to the secret apartment of the NKVD in Moscow, delivering 10 thousand rubles and food. They reported the location of the radio they had hidden. The first group of German agents remained at large for ten days, so that the Chekists could check their appearances and find out if they had any connections with anyone else. Then the messengers were arrested, the walkie-talkie delivered by them was found. And the Germans "Max" radioed that the couriers had arrived, but the transmitted radio was damaged upon landing.
Two months later, two more messengers with two radio transmitters and various spy equipment appeared from behind the front line. They had the task not only to help "Max", but also to settle in Moscow themselves, collect and transmit their intelligence information via the second radio. Both agents were recruited, and they reported to the headquarters of the "Valli" - the Abwehr center - that they had successfully arrived and started the task.

a German agent works under the control of a counterintelligence officer

From that moment on, the operation developed in two directions: on the one hand, on behalf of the monarchist organization Throne and the resident Max, on the other hand, on behalf of Abwehr agents Zyubin and Alaev, who allegedly relied on their own connections in Moscow. A new stage of the secret duel has begun - Operation Couriers.
In November 1942, in response to a request from the headquarters of "Valli" about the possibility of expanding the geography of the organization "Throne" at the expense of the cities of Yaroslavl, Murom and Ryazan and sending agents there for further work, "Max" conveyed that the city of Gorky, where a cell was created, was better suited "Throne". The Germans agreed to this, and the counterintelligence officers took care of the "meeting" of the couriers. Satisfying the requests of the Abwehrites, the Chekists sent them extensive disinformation, which was being prepared at the General Staff of the Red Army, and more and more enemy intelligence agents were called to front safe houses.
In Berlin, they were very pleased with the work of "Max" and the agents introduced with his help. On December 20, Admiral Canaris congratulated his Moscow resident on being awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st degree, and Mikhail Kalinin signed the Decree on awarding Demyanov with the Order of the Red Star. The result of the radio games "Monastery" and "Couriers" was the arrest of 23 German agents and their accomplices, who had with them more than 2 million rubles of Soviet money, several radio stations, a large number of documents, weapons, equipment.

A.P. Demyanov in the radio game "Berezino" controls the agent

In the summer of 1944, the operational game received a new continuation called "Berezino". "Max" reported to the headquarters of "Valli" that he was "seconded" to Minsk, which had just been occupied by Soviet troops. Soon the Abwehr received a message from there that numerous groups of German soldiers and officers, who had been surrounded as a result of the Soviet offensive, were making their way through the Belarusian forests to the west. Since the radio interception data testified to the desire of the Nazi command not only to help them break through to their own, but also to use them to disorganize the enemy rear, the Chekists decided to play on this. Soon the People's Commissar of State Security Merkulov reported to Stalin, Molotov and Beria a plan for a new operation. "Good" was received.
On August 18, 1944, the Moscow radio station "Throne" informed the Germans that "Max" accidentally ran into a military unit of the Wehrmacht emerging from encirclement, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Sherhorn.

"Encircled" are in great need of food, weapons, ammunition. Seven days in the Lubyanka they waited for an answer: the Abwehr, apparently, made inquiries about Sherhorn and his "army". And on the eighth, a radiogram came: "Please help us contact this German unit. We intend to drop various cargoes for them and send a radio operator."
On the night of September 15-16, 1944, three Abwehr envoys landed by parachute in the area of ​​​​Lake Pesochnoe in the Minsk region, where Sherhorn's regiment was allegedly "hiding".

Soon two of them were recruited and included in the radio game. Then the Abwehrs transferred two more officers with letters addressed to Sherhorn from the commander of the army group "Center" Colonel-General Reinhardt and the head of the "Abwehrkommando-103" Barfeld.

Georg Hans Reinhard

The flow of cargo "breaking out of the encirclement" increased, with them more and more "auditors" arrived, who had the task, as they later admitted during interrogations, to find out whether these were the people they pretended to be. But everything was done cleanly. So pure that in the last radiogram to Sherhorn, transmitted from the "Abwehrkommando-103" on May 5, 1945, after the surrender of Berlin, it was said: "It is with a heavy heart that we are forced to stop providing you with you radio communications. Whatever the future brings us, our thoughts will always be with you." "

These events contributed to the success of the Battle of Kursk, the Belorussian, Iasi-Kishinev, Baltic and Vistula-Oder operations.
The history of military counterintelligence "SMERSH" lasted only 3 years and ended in May 1946, when, in accordance with the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the SMERSH GUKR merged into the USSR Ministry of State Security as an independent main department (military counterintelligence).

The first order on the personnel of the Smersh GUKR, April 29, 1943, (order No. 1 / ssh) of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR I.V. Stalin solved the problem of the ranks of the officers of the new Glavka, who had mainly "Chekist" special titles:

“In accordance with the regulations approved by the State Defense Committee on the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence of the People’s Commissariat of Defense “SMERSH” and its local bodies, - ORDERS: 1. Assign the military ranks established by the Decree to the personnel of the SMERSH bodies Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in the following order: TO THE OFFICIAL STRUCTURE OF SMERSH BODIES: b) having the rank of lieutenant of state security - LIEUTENANT; c) having the rank of senior lieutenant of state security - ST.LEUTENANT; d) having the rank of captain of state security - CAPTAIN; e) having the rank of major of state security - MAJOR; f) having the rank of lieutenant colonel of state security - LIEUTENANT COLONEL; f) having the rank of colonel of state security - COLONEL. 2. The rest of the commanding officers with the rank of commissar of state security and above - to assign military ranks on a personal basis.

On May 26, 1943, by Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 592 of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (published in print), senior officials of the Smersh bodies (NPO and NKVMF) were awarded general ranks. The head of the Main Directorate of the NPO of the USSR "Smersh" V. S. Abakumov, the only "army Smershev", despite his appointment, concurrently, as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense (he held this post for a little over a month - from 19.04 to 25.05.1943), retained behind him until July 1945 "Chekist" special title COMMISSIONER GB 2nd rank.

On July 24, 1943, the head of the UKR of the NKVMF of the USSR "Smersh" P. A. Gladkov became a major general of the coast service, and the head of the ROC of the NKVD of the USSR "Smersh" S. P. Yukhimovich remained until July 1945 the commissar of the State Security Service.

V.S. Abakumov, V.N. Merkulov, L.P. Beria

SMERSH: repressive or intelligence agency?

Some modern sources claim that, in addition to obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services, SMERSH gained “sinister” fame during the war years thanks to a system of repressions against civilians who were occupied on the territory of the USSR temporarily occupied by German troops or in forced labor in Germany . Statements are also made that the slightest suspicion of cooperation led to arrests and executions among the military and civilians. For example, it is reported that from 1941 to 1945. about 700,000 people were arrested by Soviet authorities - about 70,000 of them were shot. It is also reported that several million people passed through the “purgatory” of SMERSH and about a quarter of them were also executed.
Indeed, in the conditions of war, the investigation was difficult. Therefore, today one can hear or read that large groups of people were arrested and were illegally and often groundlessly repressed; that the repressive nature of SMERSH is also indicated by the “standard” term of imprisonment for many convicts of 25 years; that such terms of conviction were received not only by those suspected of collaborating with the Germans, but also by Soviet citizens who returned to their homeland from forced labor in Germany; that in order to spy on and control dissent, SMERSH created and maintained a whole system of surveillance of citizens in the rear and at the front; that death threats led to cooperation with the secret service and to baseless accusations against military personnel and civilians.

It is also believed today that SMERSH played a big role in the spread of the Stalinist system of terror to the countries of Eastern Europe, where regimes friendly to the Soviet Union were established. However, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature.

The GUKR SMERSH had nothing to do with the persecution of the civilian population, and could not do it, since work with the civilian population is the prerogative of the territorial bodies of the NKVD-NKGB.

Contrary to popular belief, the SMERSH authorities could not sentence someone to imprisonment or execution, as they were not judicial authorities. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting of the NKVD. Troika of the NKVD also had nothing to do with SMERSH, and it could not give terms of imprisonment over 8 years.
Today, not only the activities of the Smersh bodies are falsified, but also the results of the Great Patriotic War. This kind of "research" is carried out, in particular, in Ukraine. Their results are sometimes taken at face value. However, in everything related to Smersh, there is a lot of speculation and distortion of the truth.

Distortions of historical truth concern, first of all, detachments, which were never created under the Smersh bodies, and Smersh employees never led them.

At the beginning of the war, protective measures were carried out by the NKVD troops to protect the rear of the Army in the field. In 1942, barrage detachments began to be created with each army at the front. In fact, they were intended to maintain order during the fighting. Only at the head of the detachments of the Stalingrad and South-Western fronts in September-December 1942, were employees of special departments of the NKVD.

However, to ensure operational work, guard the places of deployment, escort and guard those arrested from the Red Army units, the Smersh military counterintelligence bodies were allocated: for the Smersh front department - a battalion, for the army department - a company, for the corps department, division and brigade - a platoon . As for the detachments, the barrage services were actively used by Smersh employees to search for enemy intelligence agents. For example, on the eve of the offensive operations of the fronts, measures taken by the frontier service with the participation of the Smersh organs acquired a large scope. In particular, military garrisons were combed, up to 500 or more settlements with adjacent forests, non-residential premises, thousands of abandoned dugouts were inspected. During such “cleansing operations”, as a rule, a large number of undocumented persons, deserters, as well as military personnel who had documents in their hands, with signs indicating their production in the Abwehr, were detained.

The difficult situation at the front, especially in the first two years of the war, left a certain imprint on the activities of special departments, which, along with the internal troops, were granted extraordinary powers during the war by the highest bodies of state power and administration - the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, to shoot them. in place.

This was due to the emerging catastrophic situation on the fronts. For example, from the beginning of the war to October 1941, special departments and detachments of the NKVD troops 657,364 servicemen were detained who had fallen behind their units and fled from the front. In this mass, 1505 spies and 308 saboteurs were identified and exposed. As of December 1941, special departments arrested traitors - 4647 people, cowards and alarmists - 3325, deserters - 13887, spreaders of provocative rumors - 4295, self-shooters - 2358, for banditry and looting - 4214 (that is, a little more than 5% of detainees in general). Under these conditions, in critical situations, individual employees of special departments committed abuses, violations of the law, including executions, but these were exceptional cases. However, facts of this kind do not give the right to indiscriminately criticize the military counterintelligence as a whole, and even more so to transfer this criticism to the Smersh organs. Smersh employees participated in the detention of deserters, then they were transferred to military tribunals, where their fate was decided.
The Smersh military counterintelligence officers did not sit in the rear units, but were constantly in the combat formations of the troops, not only performed their direct duties, but also directly participated in the battles with the Nazis, often at critical moments took over the command of companies and battalions that had lost their commanders . Many army security officers died in the line of duty, assignments of the command of the Red Army and the Navy.

To illustrate what has been said - just one example, in relation to Art. Lieutenant Kalmykov A.F., who promptly served the battalion of 310 rifle divisions. In January 1944, the personnel of the battalion tried to storm the village of Osnya in the Novgorod region. The advance was halted by heavy enemy fire. Repeated attacks yielded no results. By agreement with the command, Kalmykov led a group of fighters and penetrated from the rear into the village, defended by a strong enemy garrison. The sudden blow caused confusion among the Germans, but their numerical superiority made it possible to surround the daredevils. Then Kalmykov called on the radio "fire on himself." After the liberation of the village, in addition to our fallen soldiers, about 300 corpses of the enemy were found on its streets, destroyed by the Kalmykov group and the fire of our guns and mortars. Command Kalmyks was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Often, criticism is heard against the Smersh bodies in connection with the filtration work they carried out. In 1941, I. V. Stalin signed a decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR on the state check (filtration) of the Red Army soldiers who were captured or surrounded by enemy troops.

A similar procedure was carried out with regard to the operational composition of the state security agencies. The filtration of military personnel provided for the identification of traitors, spies and deserters among them.

By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 6, 1945, departments for repatriation affairs began to function at the headquarters of the fronts, in which employees of the Smersh bodies took part. Collection and transit points were created to receive and check Soviet citizens liberated by the Red Army. Filtration work demanded from Smersh employees not only the highest professionalism, but also great civic courage. It was especially difficult to conduct it among the former commanders and fighters of the Red Army. The interrogations of the "Smershevites" seemed to them insulting and unfair.

In the process of filtration work, the Smersh authorities identified several thousand agents of the Nazi special services, exposed tens of thousands of punishers and fascist accomplices.

But the main result was that the stigma of "enemy of the people" was removed from a million Soviet people.

Activities and weapons

The activities of the GUKR SMERSH also included the filtering of soldiers returning from captivity, as well as the preliminary cleaning of the front line from German agents and anti-Soviet elements (together with the NKVD troops and the territorial bodies of the NKVD). SMERSH took an active part in the search, detention and investigation of Soviet citizens who acted in anti-Soviet armed groups who fought on the side of Germany, such as ROA

The main opponent of SMERSH in his counterintelligence activities was Abwehr German intelligence and counterintelligence service in 1919-1944, field gendarmerie and General Directorate of Imperial Security RSHA, Finnish military intelligence.

The service of the operational staff of the SMERSH GUKR was extremely dangerous - on average, the operative served for 3 months, after which he dropped out due to death or injury. Only during the battles for the liberation of Belarus, 236 military counterintelligence officers were killed and 136 went missing. The first front-line counterintelligence officer awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously) was Art. lieutenant P. A. Zhidkov - detective of the SMERSH counterintelligence department of the motorized rifle battalion of the 71st mechanized brigade of the 9th mechanized corps of the 3rd guards tank army.

Zhidkov Petr Anfinovich
1904 - 6. 11. 1943 Hero of the Soviet Union

The activities of the GUKR SMERSH are characterized by obvious successes in the fight against foreign intelligence services; in terms of performance, SMERSH was the most effective special service during World War II. From 1943 until the end of the war, only 186 radio games were conducted by the central apparatus of the GUKR SMERSH NPO of the USSR and its front departments. During these games, over 400 cadres and Nazi agents were brought to our territory, and tens of tons of cargo were captured. However, the reputation of SMERSH as a repressive body is often exaggerated in modern literature. Contrary to popular belief, the SMERSH authorities could not sentence someone to imprisonment or execution, as they were not judicial authorities. Sentences were passed by a military tribunal or a Special Meeting under the NKVD of the USSR. The counterintelligence officers were supposed to receive sanction for the arrests of the middle command staff from the Military Council of the army or the front, and the senior and senior commanding staff from the people's commissar of defense. At the same time, SMERSH performed the function of the secret police in the troops, each unit had its own special officer who dealt with soldiers and officers with problematic biographies and recruited agents. Often SMERSH agents showed heroism on the battlefield, especially in a situation of panic and retreat.

SMERSH operatives in search practice preferred individual firearms, since a lone officer with a machine gun aroused the curiosity of others at all times (A. Potapov “Pistol firing techniques. Smersh practice”). The following pistols were the most popular:

1. Revolver of the "Nagant" officer self-cocking model 1895 2. TT pistol sample 1930-1933 3. Walter PPK 4. Borchard-Luger (Parabellum-08) 5. Walter pistol, model 1938 6. Pistol " Beretta M-34" caliber 9 mm. 7. Special operational-sabotage small-sized pistol Lignose, caliber 6.35 mm. 8. Mauser Hsc pistol 9. Czech Zbroevka caliber 9 mm. 10. Browning, 14 rounds, model 1930.

Type “Lignose”	automatic pistol (with recoil blowback)
Caliber, mm
Length, mm
Barrel length, mm
Weight without cartridges, g
Drum/Magazine Capacity	Since April 1943, the Smersh GUKR has included the following departments, the heads of which were approved on April 29, 1943 by order No. 3 / ssh of the People's Commissar of Defense Joseph Stalin: * 1st department - intelligence and operational work in the central office of the People's Commissariat of Defense (head - Colonel GB, then Major General Gorgonov Ivan Ivanovich) * 2nd department - work among prisoners of war, checking the soldiers of the Red Army who were in captivity (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kartashev Sergey Nikolaevich) * 3rd department - the fight against agents thrown into the rear of the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Utekhin Georgy Valentinovich) * 4th department - work on the side of the enemy to identify agents thrown into the Red Army (head - Colonel GB Timofeev Petr Petrovich) * 5th department - management of the work of the Smersh bodies in the military districts (head - Colonel GB Zenichev Dmitry Semenovich) * 6th department - investigative (head - Lieutenant Colonel of State Security Leonov Alexander Georgievich) * 7th department - operational accounting and statistics, verification of the military nomenclature of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, NGOs, NKVMF, cipher workers, admission to top secret and secret work, verification of workers sent abroad (head - Colonel Sidorov A. E. ( appointed later, no data in the order)) * 8th department - operational equipment (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Sharikov Mikhail Petrovich) * 9th department - searches, arrests, surveillance (head - Lieutenant Colonel GB Kochetkov Alexander Evstafievich) * 10th department - Department "C" - special assignments (head - major GB Zbrailov Alexander Mikhailovich) * 11th department - encryption (head - Colonel GB Chertov Ivan Aleksandrovich) * Political Department - Colonel Sidenkov Nikifor Matveyevich * Personnel Department - Colonel GB Vradiy Ivan Ivanovich * Administrative, Financial and Economic Department - Lieutenant Colonel GB Polovnev Sergey Andreevich * Secretariat - Colonel Chernov Ivan Aleksandrovich The number of the central apparatus of the GUKR "Smersh" NPO was 646 people. Top secret In order to identify among the former soldiers of the Red Army who are in captivity and surrounded by the enemy, traitors to their homeland, spies and deserters, the State Defense Committee decides: 1. To oblige the People's Commissariat of Defense (comrade Khrulev) to create collection and transit points within the army rear for former Red Army soldiers who were captured and surrounded by the enemy, found in areas liberated by Red Army units from enemy troops. 2. To oblige the Military Councils of the fronts, armies and the command of formations and subunits of the military units of the Red Army, when cities, villages and other areas are liberated from enemy troops, former Red Army servicemen, both those who were in captivity and surrounded by the enemy, to detain and send to the disposal chiefs of collection and transit points of the People's Commissariat of Defense. 3. For the maintenance of the above categories of former Red Army servicemen and providing them with filtration, the NKVD of the USSR organize special camps: In the Vologda region - for the Karelian, Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts; in the Ivanovo region - for the Western and Kalinin fronts; In the Tambov region - for the Bryansk and Southwestern fronts; In the Stalingrad region - for the Southern Front, appointing experienced NKVD operatives as camp chiefs. 4. To ensure the work of checking the former Red Army soldiers and identifying traitors to their homeland, spies and deserters among them, the NKVD of the USSR organize Special Departments in each of the above camps. 5. Persons in respect of whom, after checking them by the Special Departments, no compromising materials are found, the heads of the camps should be transferred to the appropriate military commissariats - according to territoriality. 6. The provision of camps organized by the NKVD with premises, barracks equipment, bedding, food, heating, necessary uniforms and sanitation should be entrusted to the People's Commissariat of Defense (comrade Khrulev). 7. Assign the transportation of former Red Army servicemen from collection points to special camps of the NKVD to the Department of Military Communications of the Red Army (comrade Kovalev), and their escort along the way, as well as guarding the camps - to the troops of the NKVD of the USSR. Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. Stalin The three-year history of the SMERSH bodies is an example of how, at a fateful moment for the state, the military counterintelligence apparatus was rebuilt into an effective special service. It was focused on carrying out not only traditional counterintelligence, but also intelligence and subversive activities, and clearly coordinated its activities with the army command. Although, of course, looking back, we can say that the SMERSH model should have been introduced as early as 1941. Fight after victory After signing on May 8, 1945 by the representative of the USSR, Marshal G.K. Zhukov of the Act of Unconditional Surrender of Germany, military counterintelligence faced the task of searching for foreign intelligence agents abandoned on Soviet territory and surrounded by occupation troops in all countries of the fascist bloc. In addition, it was necessary to identify traitors, accomplices, former employees of the German and Romanian occupation institutions and other state criminals hiding from retribution after the end of the war. To completely eliminate the threat from the armed groups, an unprecedented operation was carried out to clear the rear of the already disbanded front. Starting from May 12, the forces of 37 divisions combed the area by passing a continuous front with a deployed chain of fighters. The military operation was led by the commanders of the armies, and counterintelligence support in each battalion was led by the security officer "Smersh". As a result of the operation, by July 6, 1945, operational groups had identified weapons and ammunition depots, detained 1277 German agents, saboteurs and active fascist accomplices. arrest of fascist policemen Parade on Red Square To commemorate the victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces over Nazi Germany, on June 24, 1945, a historic Victory Parade took place in Moscow. It was attended by combined regiments of the fronts, various branches of the armed forces and troops of the NKVD, people's commissariats of defense and the Navy, parts of the Moscow garrison and military educational institutions. Military counterintelligence officers, along with other special services, took the necessary measures to ensure the security of this grandiose event. Employees of Smersh, like other participants in the parade, could be proud of the awards of the Motherland. The first awarding of counterintelligence officers took place in the fall of 1943. Then orders and medals were awarded to 1656 employees, and 1396 of them represented the operational staff of the Smersh counterintelligence agencies. Later, in 1944, 386 employees were awarded, and in February 1945 - 559. The defeat of the Kwantung group Already in the summer of 1945, the Soviet Union, true to its allied obligations, began practical steps to enter the war against militaristic Japan. After the Japanese government rejected the offer of surrender contained in the Potsdam Declaration of the Allied Powers, on August 9 the USSR declared war on Japan. Together with the army, military counterintelligence was also preparing for operations on the Soviet-Japanese front. From August 9 to September 2, 1945, the forces of the Far Eastern Front, the Pacific Fleet and the Amur military flotilla, with the participation of the MPR army, carried out the Manchurian strategic offensive operation to defeat the Japanese Kwantung Army. During its implementation, the Smersh counterintelligence bodies used the operational capabilities of the intelligence and counterintelligence of the Far East and the combat experience gained by the army security officers in the fight against German intelligence. The Soviet security agencies had extensive data on the structure, deployment and methods of subversive activities of Japanese intelligence. The main efforts of the counterintelligence officers were aimed at defeating the Japanese special services stationed in the immediate vicinity of the USSR border, as well as White émigré anti-Soviet organizations in Manchuria, which closely cooperated with enemy intelligence. In the course of hostilities and the offensive of the Red Army troops, operational-search activities were carried out in the liberated territory. The Smersh counterintelligence operational groups, which had lists of persons to be wanted and arrested, moving along with the landing troops and advancing units, seized the premises of the former Japanese intelligence and police agencies, white émigré organizations and individuals identified at the addresses received or when filtering prisoners of war. After the defeat of Japan in the liberated territory of China, Korea and Manchuria, there remained many Japanese intelligence officers, leaders of white émigré organizations and other anti-Soviet individuals. Military counterintelligence officers took vigorous measures to search for enemy agents. On the results of this work in the liberated territory of Manchuria and Korea, the head of the Smersh GUKR periodically informed the country's leadership. So, a memorandum dated February 27, 1946 by the head of the Smersh Main Directorate of Krepakt in the NPO of the USSR stated that the Smersh bodies of the Transbaikal-Amur, Primorsky and Far Eastern military districts in the territory of Manchuria and Korea occupied by Soviet troops, as of February 25, 1946, arrested 8745 employees and agents of Japanese intelligence, as well as leading and active members of the White Guard and other enemy organizations that carried out subversive activities against the Soviet Union, of which: employees and agents of Japanese intelligence and counterintelligence agencies - 5921 people; leading and active members of the White Guard and other enemy organizations, as well as traitors to the Motherland - 2824 people. From "Smersh" to the 3rd Main Directorate of the MGB For objective reasons of peacetime, a new reform was brewing in the bodies of the military counterintelligence "Smersh", in the people's commissariats of state security and internal affairs. Since March 1946, all people's commissariats were renamed ministries. The Ministry of State Security (MGB) of the USSR was created, which included all the structures of the former NKGB of the USSR, and the military counterintelligence agencies "Smersh" of the NPO and the NKVMF of the USSR were transformed into the 3rd Main Directorate of the new ministry with the tasks of counterintelligence support for the army and navy. Colonel-General V.S. was approved as Minister of State Security. Abakumov, and the head of military counterintelligence - N.N. Selivanovsky. The main department of counterintelligence "Smersh" of the NPO, the UKR of the NK VMF, the ROC of the NKVD legally existed for about three years. From the point of view of history - the period is extremely small. But these three years were filled with hard selfless work to ensure the security of the rear of the Army in the field, to search for saboteurs and spies, and to fight deserters. During the Great Patriotic War, Smersh counterintelligence officers wrote one of the most glorious pages in the history of Soviet military counterintelligence. Vasily KHRISTOFOROV, Doctor of Law About the operation “Smersh” to prevent the assassination attempt on I.V. See Stalin on the website: Life Safety Spurs - Miscellaneous - Operation Zeppelin.