Biographies Characteristics Analysis

Cuban military contingent in Angola. Participation of the USSR in hostilities

Civil War in Angola

The Angolan Civil War is one of the conflicts of the Cold War era. Lasted during 1975 - March 30, 2002. Participants in the conflict: MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola - Labor Party) with half-support from the USSR and Cuba, UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) with support from the USA, Zaire. South Africa and SWAPO (South West African Peoples' Organization) also took part in the conflict. The struggle was mainly between three rival factions: MPLA, UNITA and FNLA. Result: victory of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola - the Labor Party.

Even before Angola declared independence, on September 25, 1975, troops from Zaire entered Angola from the north, supporting FNLA units, and on October 14, 1975, South African troops entered Angola from the south, supporting UNITA units (due to the fact that the MPLA supported SWAPO, which fought for the independence of Namibia, neighboring Angola, from South Africa). At the same time, detachments of the Portuguese crossed the Angolan border from the territory of Namibia. liberation army(ELP), who acted on the side of forces hostile to the MPLA. Their destination was Luanda.

In this situation, MPLA Chairman Agostinho Neto turned to the USSR and Cuba for help. Cuban leader Fidel Castro reacted immediately by sending volunteer Cuban troops to Angola to help. The arrival of Cuban military specialists in Angola enabled the MPLA to quickly form 16 infantry battalions and 25 anti-aircraft and mortar batteries of the armed forces of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA). By the end of 1975, the USSR sent about 200 military specialists to help, and warships of the USSR Navy also arrived on the Angolan shores. The USSR and its allies also supplied weapons.

By the end of March 1976, the armed forces of the NRA, with the direct support of a 15,000-strong contingent of Cuban volunteers and the assistance of Soviet military specialists, managed to oust the troops of South Africa and Zaire from Angola.

During the 1980s, Angola experienced periodic escalation of conflict. In August 1981, South African troops numbering 11 thousand people, supported by tanks, artillery, airplanes and helicopters, invaded the Angolan province of Cunene, advancing to separate areas for 150-200 km. In the area of ​​the city of Cahama, their path was blocked by FAPLA (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) units. During this period, an attempt was made to capture the settlements of Kuvelay and Letala. At the end of 1982, the Angolan and South African governments began negotiations on a ceasefire, but on January 31, 1983, units of the South African army entered the province of Benguela and blew up a hydroelectric power station, which led to a new round of escalation of the conflict. Only in March 1984 did the parties sign a ceasefire agreement in Lusaka. But the war with UNITA, i.e. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola continued.

In the summer and autumn of 1987, another large-scale FAPLA offensive failed, the goal of which was to finally put an end to the UNITA partisans. In November 1987, UNITA troops attacked the government garrison in Cuito Cuanavale. Cuban units came to the aid of government troops, and then the South African army intervened in the battle. Fighting continued until August 5, 1988, when a ceasefire agreement was reached in Geneva with the South African government. The South Africans and UNITA were unable to dislodge the government troops. J. Savimbi did not recognize the decisions of the peace agreement and continued the war.

On June 31, 1991, the Lisbon Treaties were concluded peace agreements between MPLA and UNITA on holding free elections. In the summer of 1992, the MPLA won the elections. J. Savimbi refused to admit defeat and resumed hostilities. The most intense fighting took place in the province of Huambo. Intense battles continued until mid-1994 and ended due to the serious injury of J. Savimbi. Soon a truce was signed. From time to time war broke out with new strength.

They were given a simple stamp on their military ID with the number of the military unit, and listeners perceived stories about bloody battles in Africa as ordinary tales of tipsy men. Because “they weren’t there.”

The Cold War is still perceived by many as a period of a conventional arms race, when the USSR and Western countries tried to demonstrate their military power by introducing new tanks, missile and artillery systems, as well as their own achievements in the field of aviation and space technology. In fact, there wasn't a single day on this cold war no people died. It just happened in “neutral territories” in Korea, Vietnam, Palestine, Afghanistan... Angola cannot be removed from this list.

Illegal fighters of the Angolan army

IN Lately I somehow forgot that Soviet military advisers took an active part in a series of armed conflicts in Africa. The longest and bloodiest of them was the civil war in Angola, which lasted from 1975 to 1992 (some historians believe that it ended only in 2002).

The exact number of soldiers and officers of the Soviet army who took part in the conflict from its very beginning until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 is still unknown. These fighters were on the territory of Angola in a semi-legal position and could not count on state help if captured by rebels supported by the West. They were not awarded orders and medals. There were no insignia on their uniforms, and there were no identification documents in the pockets of their uniforms. These young, pale-faced men differed from the fighters of the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) only in their skin color and military training, which allowed them to find ways out of even the most incredible situations.

War for three

The civil conflict began in 1975 with the banal desire of the leaders of the FNLA movement, supported by neighboring Zaire and its dictator, to come to power Mobutu Sese Seko. Their opponents were the pro-Western organization UNITA, on whose side was the Republic of South Africa, which sought to protect the diamond-rich colony of Namibia from liberation sentiments.

The third party to the conflict was the MPLA - the then ruling Labor Party in Angola, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, which tried to maximize the influence of socialist ideology and supported all the pro-communist movements in the world.

In fact, the war in Angola was started by Zaire, whose troops crossed the border and began advancing towards the capital of the country, Luanda. Not wanting to be left without a piece of the tasty pie, on October 14, South African troops crossed the border from the Namibian side and also went to Luanda.

Freedom at any cost

Realizing his doom to defeat, MPLA Secretary General Agostinho Neto asked for military assistance from the USSR and Cuba. Or maybe they themselves persistently offered help.

In 1975, relations between the USSR and the USA began to gradually normalize, and Russians and Americans fraternized in space orbit as part of the Soyuz-Apollo program. Therefore, the USSR officially refused to introduce its military contingent to the USSR, declaring neutrality. But we did not abandon our like-minded communists in trouble, sending the most trained military personnel of various branches of the military to southwest Africa, as well as a large number of military equipment.

In the first months, Angola helped maintain independence Fidel Castro, without further ado, sent a limited contingent of 25 thousand seasoned fighters to Africa. It was the Cubans who formed the backbone of the Angolan army, which inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of Zaire on the night of November 10-11. After the Battle of Quifangondo, the opposition FNLA ceased to be a full-fledged party to the conflict, and the surviving fighters hastily crossed the border of Zaire and disappeared into its territory.

African battle for Moscow

The situation was much more dangerous in the south, where columns of well-trained South African troops managed to penetrate more than 700 km from the border. The decisive battle took place on November 17, 1975 in the area of ​​​​the city of Gangula, where 200 Soviet military experts (remember, they were not officially there!), together with Cuban volunteers, completely defeated an armored column of South African Zulu troops.

The subsequent battles, thanks to which until December 5 it was possible to push the intervention troops 100 km from Luanda, are called by some military historians the “African Battle of Moscow” due to their influence on the course of the entire war and by coincidence of some dates.

As in 1941 near Moscow, the battle on the Keva River near the city of Gangula was not a victory, but only the beginning of a long-term struggle of the Angolan people for liberation from foreign invaders. Soviet Union Until the end of his existence, he helped the ruling party of Angola with weapons, equipment and food, and Cuban volunteers were always ready to come to the aid of their brothers in the struggle.

The masts of Soviet merchant ships towering above the surface of Luanda Bay still remind us of the cruelty and mercilessness of this war. They all became victims sabotage activities South African underwater special forces. And the number of civilian casualties during this time reached half a million people.

The war that they tried to forget about

Officially, this war, unknown to many, ended with the signing of a peace treaty on June 31, 1991, less than six months before the collapse of the USSR. It was won by the MPLA, which managed not only to preserve freedom for its country, but also to achieve liberation from colonial oppression in neighboring Namibia.

All these years, Soviet military advisers stood shoulder to shoulder with FAPLA fighters, putting their lives and health in serious danger. Only through the Tenth Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, from 1975 to 1991, 10,985 military personnel passed through Angola, although their real number was probably several times higher.

But officially we were not there. Many servicemen were brought home in zinc coffins, but their families never learned about the heroism of their children and brothers. If you meet a gray-haired man today talking about his service in Angola, don't dismiss him as an annoying dreamer. It is quite possible that this is a real hero of the Angolan war, who never managed to become needed by his state.

The second half of the 20th century was marked significant changes in the development of African states. It's about about activation against the colonialist policies of European states. All these trends were reflected in the events that took place since 1961 in Angola.

Angola on the map of Africa: geographical location

Angola is one of the African states created after World War II. In order to navigate the situation that existed in this state throughout the second half of the 20th century, you must first understand where Angola is located on the map and what territories it borders on. Modern country located in

It borders in the south with Namibia, which until the end of the 1980s was completely subordinate to South Africa (this is a very important factor!), and in the east with Zambia. In the north and northeast there is a state border with the Democratic Western border - the Atlantic Ocean. Knowing which states Angola borders with, it will be easier for us to understand the ways of invasion of the territory of the state by foreign troops.

Reasons for the start of the war

The war in Angola did not start spontaneously. From 1950 to 1960, three different groups formed within Angolan society, which considered their task to be the struggle for the independence of the state. The problem is that they could not unite due to ideological incompatibility.

What are these groups? The first group - MPLA (stands for the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) - considered Marxist ideology as the ideal for the development of the state in the future. Perhaps Agostinho Neto (the leader of the party) did not see the ideal in the state system of the USSR, because the purely economic views of Karl Marx were slightly different from what was presented in the Union as Marxism. But the MPLA relied on international support from the countries of the socialist camp.

The second group is the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), whose ideology was also interesting. FNLA leader Holden Roberto liked the idea of ​​independent development, borrowed from Chinese philosophers. By the way, the activities of the FNLA posed some danger for Angola itself, because Roberto’s rise to power threatened the country with collapse. Why? Holden Roberto was a relative of the President of Zaire and promised to give him part of the territory of Angola if he won.

The third group - UNITA (National Front for the Total Independence of Angola) - was distinguished by its pro-Western orientation. Each of these groups had certain support in society and a different social base. These groups did not even try to make peace and unite, because each of the parties envisioned too different ways of fighting the colonists, and most importantly, the further development of the country. It was these contradictions that led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1975.

Beginning of the war

The war in Angola began on September 25, 1975. It’s not for nothing that at the beginning of the article we talked about the geographical location of the country and mentioned its neighbors. On this day, troops entered from Zaire and came out in support of the FNLA. The situation worsened after October 14, 1975, when South African troops entered Angola (from the territory of South African-controlled Namibia). These forces began to support the pro-Western UNITA party. The logic of this political position of South Africa in the Angolan conflict is obvious: there have always been many Portuguese in the leadership of South Africa. The MPLA also initially had outside support. We are talking about the SWAPO army, which defended the independence of Namibia from South Africa.

So, we see that at the end of 1975, in the country we are considering, there were troops of several states at once, which opposed each other. But the civil war in Angola could also be perceived in a broader sense - as a military conflict between several states.

War in Angola: Operation Savannah

What did you do immediately after crossing the border with Angola? That's right - there was active promotion. These battles went down in history as Operation Savannah. South African troops were divided into several strike groups. The success of Operation Savannah was ensured by the surprise and lightning speed of the actions of the Zulus and other units. In a few days they conquered the entire southwest of Angola. The Foxbat group was stationed in the central region.

The army captured the following objects: the cities of Liumbala, Kakulu, Catenge, Benguela airport, several MPLA training camps. The victorious march of these armies continued until November 13, when they occupied the city of Novo Redondo. Also, the Foxbat group won a very difficult battle for bridge No. 14.

The X-Ray group overpowered the Cuban army near the cities of Xanlongo, Luso, captured the Salazar Bridge and stopped the advance of the Cubans towards Cariango.

USSR participation in hostilities

Having analyzed the historical chronicle, we will understand that the inhabitants of the Union practically did not know what the war in Angola was. The USSR never advertised its active participation in the events.

After the introduction of troops from Zaire and South Africa, the leader of the MPLA turned to the USSR and Cuba for military assistance. The leaders of the countries of the socialist camp could not refuse help to the army and the party, which professed socialist ideology. Military conflicts of this kind were to some extent beneficial to the USSR, because party leadership still did not abandon the idea of ​​​​exporting the revolution.

Great international assistance was provided to Angola. Officially, it took part in the battles from 1975 to 1979, but in reality our soldiers took part in this conflict until the collapse of the USSR. Official and real data on losses in this conflict differ. The documents of the USSR Ministry of Defense directly indicate that during the war in Angola, our army lost 11 people. Military experts consider this figure to be very underestimated and are inclined to think about more than 100 people.

Fighting in November-December 1975

The war in Angola at its first stage was very bloody. Let's now analyze the main events of this stage. So, several countries sent in their troops. We already know about this. What happens next? from the USSR and Cuba in the form of specialists and equipment, significantly strengthened the MPLA army.

The first serious success of this army took place in the battle of Quifangondo. The opponents were the troops of Zaire and the FNLA. The MPLA army had a strategic advantage at the start of the battle, because the Zairian weapons were very outdated, and the socialist army received new models of military equipment to help from the USSR. On November 11, the FNLA army lost the battle and, by and large, gave up its positions, practically ending the struggle for power in Angola.

The MPLA army had no respite, because at the same time the South African army was advancing (Operation Savannah). Its troops advanced into the interior of the country by approximately 3000-3100 km. The war in Angola did not calm down! A tank battle between MPLA and UNITA forces took place on November 17, 1975 near the city of Gangula. This clash was won by the socialist troops. The successful part of Operation Savannah ended here. After these events, the MPLA army continued its offensive, but the enemy did not give up, and permanent battles took place.

The situation at the front in 1976

Military conflicts continued the following year, 1976. For example, already on January 6, MPLA forces captured an FNLA base in the north of the country. One of the socialists' opponents was actually defeated. Of course, no one thought about ending the war, so Angola faced many more years of disaster. As a result, the FNLA troops, completely disunited, left Angola in about 2 weeks. Left without a fortified camp, they were unable to continue an active campaign.

The MPLA leadership had to solve an equally serious problem further, because regular units of the armies of Zaire and South Africa did not leave Angola. By the way, very interesting position to justify its military claims in Angola from South Africa. South African politicians were convinced that the unstable situation in neighboring country may have negative consequences for their state. Which? For example, they were afraid of the intensification of protest movements. These rivals were dealt with until the end of March 1976.

Of course, the MPLA itself with the regular armies of the enemy could not have accomplished this. The main role in pushing opponents beyond the borders of the state belongs to 15,000 Cubans and Soviet military specialists. After this, systematic and active military operations were not carried out for some time, because the UNITA enemy decided to conduct guerrilla warfare. With this form of confrontation, mostly minor clashes occurred.

Guerrilla stage of the war

After 1976, the nature of the fighting changed slightly. Until 1981, foreign armies did not conduct systematic military operations in Angola. The UNITA organization understood that its forces would not be able to prove their superiority over FALPA (Angolan Army) in open battles. Speaking about the Angolan army, we must understand that these are actually MPLA forces, because the socialist group has officially been in power since 1975. As Agostinho Neto noted, by the way, it’s not for nothing that the Angolan flag is black and red. Red color was most often found on the symbols of socialist states, and black is the color of the African continent.

Clashes 1980-1981

At the end of the 1970s, we can only talk about clashes with UNITA partisan corrals. In 1980-1981 The war in Angola intensified. For example, in the first half of 1980, South African troops invaded Angolan territory more than 500 times. Yes, it wasn't any strategic operations, but still, these acts significantly destabilized the situation in the country. In 1981, South African troop activity increased to the point of a full-scale military operation, which was named "Protea" in history books.

Units of the South African army advanced 150-200 km deep into Angolan territory, and there was a question of capturing several settlements. As a result of the offensive and serious defensive actions, more than 800 Angolan soldiers were killed under targeted enemy fire. It is also precisely known (although in official documents this cannot be found anywhere) about the death of 9 Soviet servicemen. Until March 1984, hostilities periodically resumed.

Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

A few years later, full-scale war resumed in Angola. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale (1987-1988) was a very important turning point in the civil conflict. Soldiers took part in this battle People's Army Angola, Cuban and Soviet military - on the one hand; UNITA partisans and the South African army - on the other. This battle ended unsuccessfully for UNITA and South Africa, so they had to flee. At the same time, they blew up a border bridge, making it difficult for the Angolans to possibly pursue their units.

After this battle, the serious peace talks. Of course, the war continued into the 1990s, but it was the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale that was a turning point in favor of the Angolan forces. Today Angola exists as an independent state and is developing. The flag of Angola speaks of the political orientation of the state today.

Why was it not beneficial for the USSR to officially participate in the war?

As you know, in 1979 the intervention of the USSR army in Afghanistan began. Fulfilling an international duty seemed to be considered necessary and prestigious, but this kind of invasion, interference in the life of another people was not very supported by the people of the USSR and the world community. That is why the Union officially recognized its participation in the Angolan campaign only in the period from 1975 to 1979.

After the 2nd World War, an era of geopolitical confrontation began between the two superpowers of the world - the socialist USSR and the capitalist USA. Therefore, almost everything local wars The 2nd half of the 20th century ultimately split into a confrontation of forces, behind which the figure of the “Russian Ivan” was visible on one side, and the “American Uncle Sam” on the other.
In March 1961, in the old Portuguese colony, the largest after liberated Brazil - in Angola - an armed national liberation war against Portugal began. It was led by four main organizations:
1. MPLA(People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola). It was the oldest of the organizations in this colony. She considered Marxist ideology to be the ideal for the development of the state. Perhaps party leader Agostinho Neto did not see an ideal model in the USSR state system, but the MPLA counted on international political, military and economic support from the countries of the socialist camp and therefore declared its orientation towards the Soviet Union. And, as it turned out, I was right. Thanks to serious and versatile assistance from the USSR, Cuba, the GDR and even Sweden, the MPLA won commanding heights in the national liberation movement of the colony. This was also facilitated by the presence understandable a poorly educated population of a political program and the absence of inter-tribal nationalism, which distinguished the FNLA and UNITA. The USSR, China and Cuba began supporting the MPLA long before Angola declared independence - back in 1958! The USSR helped the rebels mainly with weapons and equipment. The first Cuban military “advisers”, consisting of two detachments, arrived in Angola on November 7, 1961 and immediately began training guerrilla fighters. China, like the Soviet Union, supported the MPLA with supplies of weapons and equipment, but at the same time it pursued a policy of “not putting all its eggs in one basket” - military specialists from the PRC and North Korea began training militants from FNLA units in 1973.
2. FNLA(Front for the National Liberation of Angola), created in 1962 by Holden Roberto on the basis of the Union of Peoples of Angola and Democratic Party Angola, had an exotic ideology. H. Roberto liked the idea of ​​independent development, borrowed from the philosophers of China. In addition, he secured support for himself in neighboring Congo (Zaire), where increasingly strong influence conquered by the African nationalist Mobutu, who managed to take the post of commander-in-chief. Israeli intelligence services also began to help Roberto, and the United States of America provided secret support. By the way, the activities of the FNLA posed a risk to the very future of Angola; Roberto’s rise to power threatened the country with civil war and collapse, since Roberto, being a relative of the President of Zaire, promised to donate part of the territory of Angola to a neighboring country in the event of his victory.
3. UNITA(National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), which appeared in 1964 as a national liberation organization, differed from others in its pronounced pro-Western orientation. It was created by Jonas Savimbi, who left the ranks of the FNLA. Savimbi’s organization expressed the interests of not only the West, but also the third largest people in Angola, the Ovimbundu, and operated mainly in the south of Angola, fighting against the FNLA and MPLA. Savimbi’s political position represented a special, “third way”, alternative to both the traditionalist conservatism of the FNLA and the Marxism of the MPLA. Savimbi professed an eclectic mixture of Chinese Marxism (Maoism) and African nationalism. UNITA soon entered into open confrontation with the pro-Soviet MPLA, and this provided the organization with support from the United States and then from Angola’s southern neighbor, South Africa.
4. FLEC(Cabinda Liberation Front), being a regional organization, quickly lost importance in the global confrontation.
Each of these groups had some support among the population of the colony and special social support. The divergence of goals, the different bases of each of the movements, and other factors, including personal ones of their leaders, separated these organizations and often led to armed clashes between them, putting an insurmountable barrier to the unification of anti-Portuguese forces. In the 1970s, Angola became a site of intense confrontation between superpowers. The struggle for influence in Angola was carried out at all levels and floors. About two or three months before November 11, 1975, when Angolan independence was declared, Cuban leader Fidel Castro decided to secretly transfer his soldiers to Angola, which was still formally under the jurisdiction of a member state of the North Atlantic Alliance. And since Havana made such a decision without agreement with Moscow, it can count on supplies Soviet weapons I haven't had to yet. And the Cubans decided to use their own reserves. Three ships were supplied with various military equipment, including anti-tank guns, mortars, trucks and fuel. In addition to military equipment, 300 “instructors” boarded the ships. This is what former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. Adamishin said about this, subsequently confirming that the Cubans appeared in Angola without the knowledge and permission of the USSR government.

Aggravation of the situation and the beginning of open struggle

After the armed forces of the MPLA established control over the country's capital, Luanda, on the eve of the declaration of independence, the breakdown of the Alvor agreements on a coalition government previously concluded between the rebel militants became obvious. The civil war began on September 25, 1975 with the invasion of foreign troops. On this day, the troops of President Mobutu entered Angola from the territory of Zaire and came out in support of the FNLA and relative J. Roberto.
The position of the MPLA became more complicated after October 14, 1975, when a 1,500-strong contingent of South African troops armed with French and American military equipment entered Angola from the territory of South African-controlled Namibia. Since the Marxist MPLA collaborated with SWAPO (the Namibian rebel army fighting South Africa), South Africa decided to support UNITA, which opposed the MPLA in the south of the country. At the same time, small but militant detachments of the Portuguese Liberation Army (ELA), also opposing the MPLA, crossed the Angolan border from Namibia. The goal of their advance was the capital Luanda. South Africa's political position in the Angolan conflict was quite clear: there have always been quite a few Portuguese in the leadership circles of South Africa. The MPLA also initially had external force support - the SWAPO army, which fought for the independence of Namibia from South Africa and, naturally, became the first foreign military contingent after the Cubans to support the MPLA.
After the introduction of troops from Zaire and South Africa, MPLA leader Agostinho Neto turned to the USSR and Cuba for official military assistance. Military conflicts of this kind were beneficial to the USSR, because the party leadership still did not abandon the idea of ​​​​exporting the revolution, which Lenin and later Stalin had professed since 1917. According to Viktor Suvorov, it was this idea that led to the 2nd World War. The first group of Soviet military personnel consisted of 40 people. In Angola they were allowed to act according to circumstances, including fighting if the situation required it. In general, great assistance was provided to the communists of Angola. The USSR acted quickly and effectively. Over the course of 3 months in 1975, about thirty large transports loaded with weapons, ammunition, and military equipment arrived in Angola. But the USSR, unlike Cuba, while negotiating with the United States on strategic arms limitation, did not advertise its active participation in the events. Although the participation of the USSR took place even before Angola’s formal declaration of independence. Military translator Andrei Tokarev recalls that on November 1, 1975, a group of specialists, in which he was part, arrived in the capital of the Congo. And the day before they were informed at the General Staff that the MPLA controls only the capital of Angola and a number of provinces. Moreover, this control was unreliable. Zaire, which supports the MPLA's rival FNLA, purchased Mirages from France, and therefore air raids on Luanda are possible. And therefore, the command of the Soviet Army sends specialists to maintain the Strela MANPADS, including translators, to Luanda. Later, a group of specialists for servicing other military equipment was added to them. According to journalist Ruben Urribarez, he arrived in the Congo in October soviet ship, who delivered the first part of weapons for the MPLA. Among the weapons that arrived were 10 BRDM-2 armored vehicles and 12 76 mm guns. The USSR soon promised to send a new batch, which, according to Urribarez, should have included, among other things, 10 T-34 tanks, 5 BM-21 multiple launch rocket vehicles and 2 aircraft.
So, at the end of 1975 in Angola, the civil war clearly manifested itself as a military confrontation between several external military-political forces.
South African troops immediately after crossing the border with Angola quickly moved north. This operation was codenamed “Savannah”. Its success was due to the surprise and lightning speed of the strike. Within a few days, South Africa captured the entire southwest of Angola, including several MPLA training camps, as well as the cities of Liumbala, Cakulu, Catengue and Benguela Airport. Military assistance from the USSR and Cuba in the form of specialists, equipment, and ships of the USSR Navy significantly strengthened the MPLA army.

The first stage of the war (1975 – 1976)

The first serious success of the pro-communist army was achieved in the battle of Quifangondo. The opponents were Zairean troops and FNLA troops. The latter consisted of poorly trained Bakongo soldiers and were armed with outdated Chinese weapons. The most combat-ready unit of the FNLA was the “ wild geese” – mercenaries recruited into Western Europe. However, it was small in number and did not have heavy weapons. On the night of November 10-11, the troops of the FNLA and Zaire suffered a crushing defeat in the battle of Quifangondo. On November 11, 1975, the independence of Angola was declared under the rule of the MPLA.
The FNLA, having lost the battle, practically stopped the struggle for power in Angola. But the MPLA army did not get a break, since on November 12 the South African army began to attack from the south (Operation Savannah). Its troops advanced 3000 - 3100 km. The Foxbat military group of the South African Army won a very difficult battle for bridge No. 14. The X-Ray group took over the Cuban army near the cities of Xanlongo and Luso and captured the Salazar Bridge. Then the X-Ray group stopped the advance of the Cubans towards Cariango. The victorious advance of the South African army continued until November 13, when they occupied the city of Novo Redondo.
The USSR leadership closely monitored the situation in Angola. Trying to strengthen its position in Africa, it did its best to assist yesterday's Portuguese colony in the formation of a combat-ready army, intending to turn the leadership of this country into its socialist puppets. Fidel Castro recognized that Angola would have no prospects of defeating its rivals without the help of the USSR. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the rulers of the USSR decided to mold Angola into an exemplary socialist state for the entire Black Continent. This was important from a strategic point of view: the country occupied an advantageous position and had significant reserves of oil, diamonds, and iron ore. For analysts of the USSR and the USA, it was clear: whoever takes control of Angola will receive the keys to all of Africa. Giving these keys to the Americans would be a complete disaster for the USSR's African policy.
After Angola declared independence, the USSR urgently recognized the new state and immediately signed several important documents with its leadership. One of them was the use of the entire military infrastructure of Angola by the USSR army. Just as quickly, Soviet operational squadrons were dispatched to Angolan naval bases, and aviation was dispatched to airfields. Thousands of USSR military personnel (they were called “advisers” for camouflage) landed on the Angolan coast. In fact, the Soviet “silent occupation” of Angola took place under the camouflage of MPLA power.
On November 17, 1975 took place tank battle between the MPLA forces with the Cubans, on the one hand, and UNITA with South Africa, on the other. MPLA troops managed to stop an enemy armored column at the bridge over the Keve River, north of the city Gangula. The successful part of Operation Savannah ended here. After these events, the MPLA army launched a victorious counter-offensive. A few days later, MPLA troops began advancing in the Porto Ambain area. By December 5, the combined forces of the FAPLA (MPLA army) and the Cubans pushed both opponents back 100 km north and south of the capital.
On January 6, 1976, MPLA forces captured the FNLA base (still existing) in the north of the country. After this, one of the opponents of the communists was finally defeated. FNLA troops left Angola in complete disarray within 2 weeks. Left without a fortified camp, they were disorganized and could not continue an active campaign. And the MPLA was able to transfer significant forces to the south. At the beginning of February 1976, fighting on the northern front was already taking place near the border with Zaire. With the capture of Pedro da Feitiso on February 18, FAPLA forces gained control of the country's northern border. However, before the withdrawal of troops from Angola, FAPLA did not have any major air battles with South African or Zairian aviation. By the end of March 1976, FAPLA, with the participation of 15 thousand Cubans and Soviet military specialists, managed to oust the troops of South Africa and Zaire from the territory of the country.
The USSR understood perfectly well that the weapons and equipment supplied to Angola, supposedly for FAPLA, were intended specifically for the Cubans. At that time, FAPLA, whose fighters only had experience in guerrilla warfare, did not have fighters capable of working with military equipment. Only the Cubans had experienced fighters. From October 1975 to April 1976, the USSR supplied the following to Angola for FAPLA and the Cubans:

  • about 100 122-mm and 140-mm multiple launch rocket launchers BM-21 and BM-14,
  • 200 T-54/55 tanks (modernized T-54B, the very ones for which the name “tanks of the Third World” was assigned),
  • 50 amphibious tanks PT-76,
  • 70 T-34-85 tanks,
  • more than 300 BTR-152, BTR-60PB, BMP-1 and BRDM-2.

Long-range 122-mm D-30 howitzers, mortars, Strela-2 MANPADS, anti-aircraft guns and huge quantities of modern small arms and ammunition were also sent from the USSR to Angola. The aircraft supplies also looked impressive: 30 Mi-8 helicopters, 10 MiG-17F fighters and 12 MiG-21MF. The coordinator of the US CIA operation to assist the UNITA and FNLA movements in the period 1974 - 1976, John Stockwell, admitted that for 7 ships from the USSR with weapons for FAPLA, there was only 1 American, and for 100 flights of Soviet transport aircraft, the United States countered only 7 American ones... So that the economy of “Uncle Sam” predetermined the victory of “Russian Ivan” on the Angolan front.
Of course, the poorly trained semi-partisan FAPLA, in confrontation with the regular armies of its neighbors, even with enormous military-technical assistance from outside, would not have been able to prevail. And the main role in pushing enemy armies beyond the borders of Angola fell on 15,000 Cubans and Soviet troops.

Guerrilla period of military conflict (1976 – 1987)

After the withdrawal of the armies of South Africa and Zaire from Angola, the war here was continued by the UNITA movement led by Jonas Savimbi, which, due to forced circumstances, managed to quickly transform into a partisan army. From now on there were only minor clashes. Until 1981, foreign armies did not enter Angola. major operations. UNITA understood that its forces would not be able to defeat FAPLA, Cuban and Soviet forces in open battles. However, South Africa carried out local raids on Angola territory several times, hoping to tear off at least some piece of territory from it. We went into battle elite units, a total of about 20 thousand soldiers, up to one and a half hundred units of military equipment and up to four dozen artillery pieces. They were supported from the air by about 80 planes and helicopters. The United States provided its ally with weapons, also sending its advisers.
In 1980–1981, the war in Angola intensified again. In the first half of 1980, South African troops invaded Angolan territory more than 500 times; in 1981, the activity of South African troops increased to a full-scale operation called “Protea”. Units of the South African army advanced 150–200 km deep into Angola, and several settlements were under threat of capture. Then, until March 1984, fighting periodically flared up again.

"Angolan Stalingrad" (1987 - 1988)

A full-scale war broke out on August 14, 1987, with Angolan troops carrying out the military operation “Meet October,” aimed at UNITA, which had strengthened itself in the southeast of the country and was supported by the South African army. It was supposed to destroy the main UNITA supply airfield in the village of Mavinge, cut it off from the border with South Africa, and then completely crush it. The operation was developed by military advisers from the USSR and did not initially involve the use of Cuban units. The FAPLA offensive in a southern direction began in the area of ​​​​the village of Cuito Cuanavale with the forces of the 25th brigade, which by that time had already been deployed east of the Cuito River, and brigades No. 16, 21, 47, 59, 66, 8, and 13, which were involved to the operation. The total number of advancing FAPLA troops was about 10,000 people and 150 tanks. Each infantry brigade included a tank company of 7 T-54/T-55. In addition, the motorized brigades included infantry fighting vehicles. The first separate tank battalion in the military history of Angola took part in the offensive, consisting of 22 tanks - 3 companies of 7 vehicles each plus 1 command tank.
The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale continued more than a year, became an important turning point in the civil war. The battle involved soldiers of the Angolan army, Cuban and Soviet soldiers on the one hand; UNITA partisans and the South African army on the other. During this time, Angolan pilots flew about 3 thousand combat sorties, about 4 dozen South African planes and helicopters were destroyed, and the number of deaths on both sides was in the thousands. In the end, everything ended unsuccessfully for UNITA and South Africa, they had to flee. In doing so, they blew up a bridge near the border, making it difficult for FAPLA to pursue their units.
After this, peace negotiations began, ending with the signing on December 22, 1988 in New York of an agreement on the phased withdrawal of South African troops from Angola. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point in the conflict in favor of the pro-Soviet Angolan forces.

The last period of the war and its end (1989 – 2002)

However, UNITA leader J. Savimbi did not recognize the decisions of the peace agreement in New York even after the defeat in the “Battle of African Stalingrad” and since then he waged a war on his own, which lasted throughout the 1990s.
Since 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the Angolan pro-Soviet government was left without financial and military support from the USSR and from now on focused only on internal opposing forces and foreign interests interested in the events. politicians, now represented almost exclusively by the countries of the Western (capitalist) world. Accordingly, no one was thinking about any construction of socialism, although Fidel Castro’s fighters remained in Angola.
Through the 10th Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, from 1975 to 1991, 10,985 military personnel from generals to privates passed through the war in Angola. The documents of the USSR Ministry of Defense indicate that during the war in Angola, the Soviet army lost 11 people. Military experts consider this figure to be excessively underestimated and are inclined to believe that more than 100 people died.
General J. Savimbi was killed in February 2002 during Operation Kissonde, carried out near the Zambian border. After him, Savimbi’s deputy headed UNITU for a short time, but he also died from his wounds. The civil war is over.

Replenishment of museum collections with “trophies”

Captured samples of South African-UNITA equipment by Angolan fighters and Soviet specialists ended up in tank training ground and a museum in Kubinka. Captured Soviet technology UNITA fighters replenished the collections of tank museums in NATO countries

The current state of the Angolan Armed Forces, armored vehicles

The Angolan ground forces are divided into five military districts - Luanda, North, Center, East, South. They include the 1st Army Corps, five infantry divisions (2nd - 6th) and the 101st Tank Brigade.

The tank park includes:

  • Soviet T-54/55 from 200 to 400 pcs.
  • T-62 - from 50 to 364 pcs.
  • T-72 - 22 pieces (relatively new)
  • PT-76 - light floating, from 12 to 65 units.
  • BRDM-2 - from 200 to 427,
  • BMP-1 and BMP-2 - approximately 250 units.
  • BTR-80 - 11 pcs., relatively new
  • BTR-60PB - from 60 to 430, old
  • MTLB - 31 pcs.
  • old Czech OT-62 - up to 50 units.
  • newer OT-64 - 9 units.
  • Armored personnel carrier - 48 South African "Casspir" up to 250

Artillery and air defense

  • 50 units Self-propelled guns (12 2S1 (122 mm),
  • 4 units 2S3 (152 mm),
  • 34 pcs. 2S7 (203 mm)
  • 450 towed guns (up to 277 D-30 (122 mm), up to 170 M-46 (130 mm), 22 D-20 (152 mm)),
  • more than 700 mortars (from 250 to 460 82 mm), 500 (120 mm)), more than 100 MLRS (from 50 to 93 Soviet BM-21, 58 Czech RM-70 (122 mm))
  • 90 units ZSU (up to 40 ZSU-57-2 (57 mm), up to 49 ZSU-23-4 (23 mm))

Tank museum in Saumur and armored vehicles of the conflict

The tank museum has three halls directly related to the war in Angola, where armored vehicles of all warring parties are exhibited:

  • "" - equipment of France and its allies
  • "" - tanks and armored vehicles of the USSR
  • "" - armored vehicles of NATO countries

Climate, nature of TBD

The climatic conditions, flora and fauna of this Theater of Operations (TBO) are well represented in two French zoos:

  • "Menagerie" (1) at the National Botanical Garden
  • (2) - in the Bois de Vincennes

Angola, a former colony of Portugal in Africa, is located in the southwestern part of the African continent. It also includes the enclave of Cabinda, a province separated from the main part of Angola by the Congo River and part of the territory of Zaire.

Angola's important geostrategic position was highly valued back in the 19th century. Portugal and Great Britain. The importance of the African state has not diminished even today, especially after the discovery of oil and diamond deposits in Cabinda. Along with these, the most profitable industries became the mining of iron ore and the cultivation of cotton. Angola became the object of keen interest of the Americans, French, Belgians and Portuguese.

The lion's share of Angola's natural resources floated to the West, especially to Portugal, which could not but affect the relationship between the metropolis and its African possessions.

In March 1961, an armed national liberation war began in Angola. It was led by several organizations: MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola), FNLA (Front for the National Liberation of Angola), UNITA (National Union for the Liberation of Angola) and FLEC (Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave). However, the divergence of goals, the different social and ethnic base of each of the movements and other factors separated these organizations and often led to armed clashes between them, preventing the unification of anti-colonial forces.

The most progressive movement, which, unlike others, reflected national goals, was the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which advocated the independence and territorial integrity of the country and the transfer of its wealth to national control.

The USSR, as well as China and Cuba, began supporting the MPLA, given its Marxist orientation, back in 1958. The first Cuban specialists, consisting of two units, arrived in Angola on November 7, 1961 and immediately began training partisan detachments. By that time, the Cubans were already in Algeria, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique.

Many Angolan rebels underwent military training both in socialist countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union) and in Algeria. The guerrillas' fighting consisted mainly of organizing ambushes on the roads and striking Portuguese garrisons. They were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, as well as light mortars and cannons.

China supported the MPLA with supplies of weapons and equipment, but military specialists from the PRC and the DPRK at the same time (since 1973) began training rebel units from the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA).

In 1958 - 1974 The USSR also helped the armed forces of the MPLA. These were mainly supplies of weapons and equipment.

After the signing of an agreement recognizing Angolan independence in January 1975 in Portugal, almost immediately (since March) serious clashes began between representatives of three Angolan rebel groups. Portugal's quick abandonment of its colony turned the Angolan War of Independence into a civil war.

The situation in the country has become critical. In September, fierce fighting began between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA units for control of the capital. From the north, FNLA formations were approaching Luanda with the support of units of the regular Zairian army and foreign mercenaries, and from the south, South African units were rapidly advancing, with which UNITA units were moving.

Luanda was generally under the control of the MPLA, but it did not have enough forces and means to resist, and the Portuguese garrison remaining in the capital occupied a neutral position. In this situation, MPLA Chairman Agostinho Neto turned to the USSR and Cuba for help.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro immediately responded to the MPLA leader's request. Many Cubans signed up for international volunteer units, which were hastily transferred to Angola. They directly participated in hostilities, which took on the character of armed struggle with the use of tanks, artillery and aviation.

The arrival of Cuban military specialists in Angola enabled the Angolans to quickly form 16 infantry battalions and 25 anti-aircraft and mortar batteries.

The successful development of events allowed A. Neto, on the night of November 10-11, 1975, in the presence of many thousands of Angolans and representatives of a number of foreign countries, to proclaim the birth of the 47th independent state of Africa - the People's Republic of Angola (PRA). On the same day she was recognized large group states, including the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, the war continued. On November 15, the Angolan border was crossed by a contingent of 1,500 South African troops, armed with French and American military equipment, supported by transport helicopters with specially equipped machine gun mounts. The supply of ammunition was carried out from bases located in Namibia. In November - December, the grouping of South African troops was significantly strengthened.

In this situation, at the request of the Angolan government, on November 16, the first group of Soviet military specialists, numbering (together with translators) about 40 people, arrived in Luanda and were tasked with assisting in the training of the armed forces of the NRA. Quite quickly, together with the Cubans, they managed to organize several training centers in Luanda, where the training of local military personnel began. At the same time, by air and sea routes from the USSR, Yugoslavia and the GDR were sent to Luanda Combat vehicles, weapons, equipment, food and medicine. Military equipment was also delivered by military transport aircraft. Warships of the USSR Navy also arrived on the Angolan shores. The number of Soviet military specialists increased by the end of 1975 to 200 people. In 1976, the USSR supplied a significant number of helicopters, airplanes, tanks, armored personnel carriers and small arms to Angola. Multiple rocket launchers, artillery pieces and mortars, anti-tank missiles and other weapons were also transferred to the Angolan side.

By the end of March 1976, the armed forces of the NRA, with the direct support of a 15,000-strong contingent of Cuban volunteers and the assistance of Soviet military specialists, ousted the troops of South Africa and Zaire from the territory of Angola, capturing large settlements and military installations.

During active hostilities from November 1975 to November 1979, thousands of Soviet military specialists visited Angola. This war was not without losses on our part. Seven officers, two warrant officers and two SA employees died in the line of duty, from wounds and illnesses. Soviet soldiers, who fulfilled their international duty to the end, are revered by the Angolan people on a par with their heroes.

Soon the civil war in Angola broke out with renewed vigor. Moreover, the confrontation took place at three levels - national (MPLA - UNITA), regional (NRA - South Africa) and global (USA - USSR and their allies) - and persisted until the end of the 80s, until the Angolan problem found its resolution. According to eyewitnesses, the period from 1986 to 1988. was the bloodiest in the history of the civil war in Angola. It further increased the tragic list of our compatriots who died on Angolan soil.

On November 20, 1994, in the capital of Zambia, Lusaka, the final protocol on the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the country was signed between the Angolan government and the leadership of UNITA. This event was preceded by the withdrawal of the Cuban military contingent and the closure of the Soviet military mission.

“You couldn’t be there...”

The most controversial period of Soviet-Angolan cooperation was the late eighties and early nineties. Against the background of the unstable internal political situation in the USSR, the curtailment, and in fact the collapse of previous ties with the countries of the socialist camp, our military advisers and specialists continued to honestly fulfill their duty in this African country. How was their work justified? This and other questions from Red Star are answered by the former first deputy, and then the Chief Military Advisor in Angola in 1988 - 1991. Colonel General V.N. Belyaev.

- Valery Nikolaevich, what goals did we pursue by providing international assistance to Angola?

Today we can talk as much as we like about the advisability of our assistance to Angola and other developing countries. My personal opinion is that in the military-political situation, when in the mid-seventies the USSR began to support Angola, which had embarked on the socialist path of development, this decision was completely justified. And, of course, the main goals that we pursued were political. Historically, among the five African Lusophone countries, Angola has held its powerful position in all respects. Therefore, it was quite logical to consider it as a kind of springboard for the spread of socialism in southern Africa.

Economically, this country was also very attractive to the USSR. Angola is a real African “Klondike” with rich deposits of high-quality oil, diamonds, uranium, and molybdenum. Extensive plantations of coffee, mahogany and ebony. Rich fish stocks. At that time, an entire flotilla of Soviet fishing vessels operated in the Angolan sector of the Atlantic, which caught hundreds of thousands of tons of fish annually.

Geographical position Angola also played into our hands militarily. An operational brigade of naval surface ships was permanently based at the Soviet naval base in Luanda, which allowed us to control the main sea routes from Indian Ocean to the Atlantic and from Africa to North and South America. Navy ships and submarines performing missions in the Southern Hemisphere periodically came to the base to rest and refuel, and communication with them was provided by a powerful zonal communications center we built in Angola. In addition, Soviet Tu-95RTs naval reconnaissance aircraft regularly landed at the airfield in Luanda, which, operating along the route Severomorsk - Havana - Luanda - Severomorsk, gave a complete “picture” of the situation in the Atlantic.

What was our help to the NRA! How effective was the interaction between Soviet military specialists and the Angolan and Cuban military command?

We provided Angola with mainly military assistance. Actually, the young armed forces of the NRA - FAPLA were built according to our model and likeness. Between 1975 and 1991. About 11 thousand military advisers and specialists worked in Angola. At the same time, 54 of them died and died. Soviet military advisers worked under all the main and central departments FAPLA, front-line and individual combat zones. Our main tasks were to study and analyze the situation, develop proposals in various areas military activities from intelligence to logistics support. Provided direct assistance in the preparation and conduct of front-line operations. During my work in Angola, we successfully carried out four front-line offensive operations, which seriously affected the balance of power in the region. Among them, the most significant was Operation Zebra to capture the city of Mavinga, the main stronghold of the Unitists. For 15 years, all attempts by NRA government forces to capture it ended in failure and heavy losses. Taking into account the experience of previous mistakes, we carried out a number of measures for operational camouflage, disinformation, misled the enemy and developed success with minimal losses.

Our military equipment, which we supplied to Angola, has proven itself to be excellent. And, first of all, the T-54B and T-55 tanks, which are unpretentious and have good combat power; BMP-1. Artillery systems performed well - 122-mm D-30 howitzer, 85-mm SD cannon, self-propelled anti-aircraft guns, small arms - ATS-17, PKT, RPK, AK, Stechkin submachine gun.

Aviation also operated without problems - MiG-21 BIS, MiG-23ML, Su-22MI aircraft, Mi-17 (Mi-8 MT), Mi-24 helicopters. The Angolan Navy successfully operated Soviet small and medium-sized landing ships, torpedo, missile and artillery boats.

We developed strong cooperation and mutual understanding with the FAPLA command. The Angolans valued us as experienced specialists in military affairs. Among the Angolan officers and generals themselves, contrary to prevailing prejudice, there were many talented military leaders. Chief of the General Staff A. dos Santos França, chief of the main operational management Colonel F.I. Lopes de Carneiro, Air Force Commander A. Nego, Chief of Logistics Colonel Ice, Front Commanders: J.B. de Matos, Colonels Armando and Faceira.

We came into contact with the Cubans only in matters of the construction of FAPLA, as we carried out various combat missions. With their thirty thousand strong contingent they guarded southern borders Angola from possible aggression from South Africa, but we helped in the battles against the Unites.

- What were the UNITA armed formations opposing government troops like?

Regular guerrilla units formed from the local population and South African mercenaries. They had light small arms, grenade launchers, Stinger MANPADS, Rover trucks and SUVs. Sometimes they were supported by South African artillery from adjacent territory. The main tactics of the Unitists were mining communications, shelling convoys, and raids on the rear of FAPLA.

As you can see, in Angola, domestic military equipment once again confirmed the right to be called the best in the world. What can you say about our officers? What personal and professional qualities did they display in that rather difficult environment?

By the time I arrived in Angola, the apparatus of military advisers and specialists was already a tightly knit group of real military professionals. Among them, I would like to note the advisers to the head of the main operational directorate of the FAPLA General Staff, Colonel R. Gadzhiev, to the head of intelligence, Colonel N. Sanivsky, to the head of the industrial service, Colonel A. Moroz, Colonel S. Ilyin, Major General N. Snyatovsky, captain 1st rank I Kulinich, translators V. Migovich, S. Antonov, A. Pobortsev.

It was the most difficult for the specialists who worked at the front. Since 1987, in accordance with the order of the Minister of Defense, all of them were ordered to be directly in the combat formations of the troops, and not at command posts, as was previously the case. And in what conditions did they live? It was painful to see our colonels huddled in dugouts that more closely resembled holes. On top of that, there are constant interruptions in the supply of essentials and debilitating illnesses. Despite this, the overwhelming majority of officers and warrant officers fulfilled the tasks assigned to them with honor. At times they showed examples of courage and professionalism. As an example, we can cite the case of the summer of 1985 in the port of Luanda. At the entrance to the bay, enemy swimmers mined a German cargo ship with 10 thousand tons of ammunition. Fortunately, only one of the four mines worked and the load did not detonate. Having learned about this, the Angolans fled in all directions, because the ship was essentially a floating Hiroshima. It was possible that the remaining mines could have had a clock mechanism. The chief of staff of our brigade of surface ships, Captain 1st Rank A. Kibkalo, dived with scuba gear, tied the mines with a nylon cord, and then tore them off the ship on a speedboat and towed them “at full speed” to the sea. Three days later (!) a “useful” encrypted telegram arrived from Moscow: “You are advised to: cut out the mined areas of the side within a radius of three meters and tow them to a safe distance without vibrations...”.

- The separation from the Motherland, the difficult situation in the country, the harsh climate probably brought people closer together...

We lived as one family. We worked and rested together. We held cultural events with the families of our employees and tried to help them. Maybe it’s not fashionable to talk about it now, but we had a strong party committee that took on the lion’s share of this work. We received great support from the embassy headed by Ambassador V. Kazimirov and the military attache. I would like to especially thank the wives of officers and diplomats. Thanks to them for enduring difficult conditions and helping us do our job.

1991 - 1992. Our military and civilian specialists are hastily leaving settled Angola. How did the Angolans react to our departure from the country?

We began to understand that our Angolan epic would soon end back in 1989. Then official Moscow announced to the whole world that Soviet military advisers do not participate in hostilities abroad. But at that time, dozens of our officers fought in the south of Angola, in the Menongue area, Cuito Cuanavale. And a month later a song was born, the lines from which will help you understand what we were experiencing at that time:

“...This city in the distant savannah is a mirage:
He appeared and melted away again in the hot fog.
This city in the distant savannah is not ours,
But they will order - and he will be ours, no matter what.

Where have you and I taken us, my friend?
Probably a big and necessary thing?
And they tell us: “You couldn’t be there,”
And the foreign land did not turn red with Russian blood...”

Overall, I find it difficult to endorse and evaluate the management. We are military people and followed orders. Of course, it was painful to see our many years of work crumble. We were already well versed in Angola, from the theater of operations to the local ethnic characteristics. There was also a negative aspect in our conclusion. social aspect: many officers did not know where to return, since they did not have housing in Russia.

As for the Angolans, they did not accuse us of betrayal. By leaving the NRA, we fully fulfilled our duty to the Motherland and this distant country.

Once upon a time, in the bowels of the USSR Ministry of Defense, an order was developed that clearly defined the time frame for the participation of our advisers and specialists in combat operations in hot spots of the world: Angola, Ethiopia, Vietnam, Egypt, etc. The order was needed by financiers, because they needed it was clear to whom and how much to pay “combat”, how to calculate pensions and benefits. It still works today. According to this document, it turns out that they fought in Angola only “from 1974 to 1979”, and no more.

Meanwhile, the war in Angola did not stop for a single day. Dramatic events unfolded in the Angolan province of Cuan do Cubango, near the small town of Cuito Cuanavale, on the border with South African-occupied Namibia in the mid-80s. Then the Angolan army - FAPLA - became so strong that it decided to give a real battle to the armed opposition in the person of UNITA, led by Savimbi. With the direct participation of Soviet advisers and specialists, an operation to destroy UNITA rear bases was planned and carried out. But the regular South African army intervened in the course of events.

“This never happened even in Afghanistan...”

Zhdarkin Igor Anatolyevich, military translator, completed accelerated one-year courses in Portuguese at the Military Institute foreign languages. In 1986 - 88 was on a business trip to People's Republic Angola, participant in the defense of Cuito Cuanavale (an outpost of Angolan government forces in the south of the country). Awarded the medal "For the Defense of Cuito Cuanavale". Currently, he is an employee of the Institute of Military History of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

This is my second month in the 6th arrondissement, ten days of which are in Cuito Cuanavale. This is our main base. But the situation in the city is by no means peaceful. In the twentieth of August, a sabotage group of the South African army blew up a bridge over the Kuito River. Often the Unitovites get so close that they fire at the city and the airfield with mortars.

On October 1, our advisers from the 21st and 25th FAPLA brigades returned from the operation in Cuito Cuanavale. They have losses. During the battle on the Lomba River, translator of the 21st brigade Oleg Snitko had his leg broken and his arm torn off. A day and a half later he died. Four more were wounded and shell-shocked. On October 8 there was a flight from Luanda, everyone was sent to the hospital.

And on October 9, we, who arrived to replace them, went out with the Angolan convoy for the operation. There are 6 people in the group. Senior - Advisor to the commander of the 21st brigade Anatoly Mikhailovich Artemenko. “Mikhalych” is the most experienced of us, he has already fought in war, and was even wounded. Advisor to the chief of artillery of the brigade - Yuri Pavlovich Sushchenko, technician - Sasha Fatyanov, two specialists in the combat use of the mobile air defense system "Osa-AK": Slava and Kostya and I - the translator of the brigade.

Yesterday we walked about eleven kilometers, and at 10.30 we arrived at the checkpoint of the 25th brigade. The column moves very slowly. Faplovites prefer not to travel on well-worn roads: UNITA is constantly mining them.

Around seven o'clock in the evening I "caught" on the Mayak receiver, they were broadcasting a pop concert. The songs are old and well-known, but here, on the Angolan savannah, as they say, they touch the soul.

During the next stop at 19 kilometers from Cuito Cuanavale, our column was fired at by a group of Unitists from mortars and machine guns. This was our first fight.

Today was eventful. At 6.00 in the morning the column lined up for the march; they stood for half an hour waiting for news from the scouts. And at 6.30 UNITA began shelling with mortars. They shot mostly with incendiary mines, hoping to set fire to the cars.

South African Air Force aircraft appeared twice during the day. The first time is at 11.10 and then at 14.30. Our Osa-AK complex accompanied them, but did not launch them. Air defense systems of the 21st brigade shot down two aircraft. Keep it up!

At 15.35 the column was again attacked by Unit units. A battle ensued that lasted almost 40 minutes. The side guards worked well and discovered the bandits in time.

This morning at 6.45 the column was again attacked by Unitovites. But the return fire of our weapons (B-10, 120-mm mortars, BM-21, Grad-1P) did not allow the enemy to conduct targeted fire. At 10.40 South African aircraft appeared again. It bombed the location of the 21st Brigade. Apparently, they are taking revenge for yesterday.

We came quite close to the South African positions. Their conversations can be clearly heard on the R-123 radio station. They speak mostly English. And today they suddenly started talking on air... in Polish. I made out several phrases: “Tso pan khtse (what does the pan want)? “Barzodobzhe” (very good) and then: “I listen respectfully (I listen carefully).” The answers from the second correspondent were not heard.

They wondered for a long time what this meant, until they agreed that it must have been South Africans of Polish origin communicating on air. Or maybe Polish mercenaries?

Today at 5.10 a.m. 4 South African aircraft appeared over the area where the 21st and 59th brigades were located. The Angolans opened furious fire on them from all types of weapons. The whole sky resembled both a rainbow and fireworks. As a result, one plane was shot down, and the second one was hit by a rocket from Strela-3 in the engine nozzle, but he was able to escape.

Our Osa-AK began work at 4.30 am. South African aviation is operating as scheduled. On the same day there were three more raids: at 12, 15 and 17 hours. In the evening we settled down for the night at an abandoned Unit base. There, huts, communication passages, and trenches resembling deep holes have been preserved intact. In a word, a whole fortress.

Today at 7.30 am we finally arrived at the checkpoint of the 21st FAPLA brigade. We met here the advisers of the 47th brigade and Osa-AK specialists (9 people in total). We heard enough “horrors” and learned details about that battle on the banks of Lomba, where translator Oleg Snitko died.

The 47th brigade was deployed along the river bank. The South Africans and UNITA units attacked suddenly, launching three attacks one after another. The Faplovites could not stand it and ran in panic. There were many reasons: the fact that ammunition was running out, and the lack of clear control, and the cowardice of officers and the fear of ordinary soldiers of the South Africans, especially of their long-range artillery. But the decisive factor, according to our advisers, was the crossing of the river. Everyone knew about her. If she hadn’t been there, maybe the soldiers wouldn’t have run, because there was nowhere to go.

Here in the district, in combat brigades, among Soviet specialists, many went through Afghanistan. Here is their opinion: “We have never seen such horrors as here in Afghanistan.” One said this: “When the South African artillery started firing, I thought this was the worst thing. However, then the aircraft attacked, and there was simply no place left for us on the ground. But the worst began when the Angolans ran and began to throw away their weapons and equipment..."

During the crossing of Lomba, the 47th brigade abandoned 18 tanks, 20 armored personnel carriers, 4 D-30 guns, 3 BM-21, 4 Osa-AK combat vehicles, 2 Osa-AK TZM, P-19 station, trucks, radio stations, mortars, grenade launchers, about 200 small arms...

Loud words about the safety of “assessors” (advisers and specialists) were forgotten. Their armored personnel carrier was the second to last to go to the crossing, on the orders of the brigade commander without cover, with only 11 guards. After 15 minutes, a South African AM1-90 burst into the position he occupied.

There was terrible panic and confusion all around. The South Africans fired without sparing ammunition. No one really knew where to run or what to do. The only thing everyone wanted was to quickly cross to the other side. T.N. The “commission” created to manage the crossing was one of the first to escape.

3 Strela-10s, 2 armored personnel carriers, 2 EE-25 vehicles, one Land Rover and that’s all crossed the other bank of Lomba. Nothing else could be saved. And even if the South Africans had transported at least a company to the other bank and opened fire on the river, the entire brigade would have remained at the bottom of the Lomba.

But the troubles did not end with crossing to the opposite bank.

The Soviet “assessors” had to set fire to and abandon their armored personnel carrier, and then crawl on their bellies for 1.5 km along the “shana” - this is what the Angolans call the open, swampy floodplain of the river. They crawled under fire, abandoned everything except their weapons, and the South Africans hit them with direct fire. Then the swamp began. Ours had almost overcome it too; there was very little left to the shore. They, completely exhausted, decided to take a break. The South Africans, having estimated the time, considered that they had already crossed and began to hit the shore. The shells exploded 10 - 20 meters from ours, and three fell into the swamp 5 meters from them. What saved them was that the shells and mines fell into the swamp and onto the “shana” (and it is also viscous and swampy), first sank, and then exploded. This is the only reason why no one was injured, except for small fragments.

The defeat of the 47th brigade had a serious impact on the position of the 16th, 21st and 59th brigades and on the entire situation as a whole. Now the brigades are on the line of the Kunzumbia River.

In the morning at 6.50, while we were still sitting in our “dining room,” a South African plane suddenly appeared. Angolan observers “missed” him, and air defense systems opened fire very late. He struck in front of the 1st Infantry Battalion's leading edge. Fortunately, there were no losses.

The second raid took place at 8.15. Both times the anti-aircraft gunners did not have time to react. The fact is that the South Africans have become more cunning. Their pilots know that the Osa-AK complex is stationed here and are afraid of it. Therefore, planes fly at low altitude along the riverbed, so that the Osa radar does not “see” them, and then turn around to bomb.

At 10.10 there was a third raid, four Mirages struck the brigade in the area of ​​the 3rd battalion. This time our anti-aircraft gunners did a great job. They crashed two planes, one from Strela-10, and the other from ZU-23-2. Both fell not far from us.

The brigade commander immediately sent a reconnaissance group to search for aircraft and pilots. We are waiting for the results. In the evening, the scouts reported that they had not found the planes; they did not know where they were. And, most likely, they didn’t look, they were afraid to run into the Unitovites.

Today is Sunday. Mikhalych declared it a day of rest. We hope that South African aircraft will not bomb. Pilots are people too, should they rest too? The day passed calmly.

Early in the morning we went to the brigade commander to clarify the situation. He showed us the wreckage of a plane that had been shot down earlier over the Kunzumbia River. According to him, the body of the South African pilot was badly burned, and no documents could be found.

At 8.30 the artillery of our brigade fired several salvos at pre-planned targets. They fired from BM-21 and D-30 howitzers from temporary positions, after which, on the advice of our Mikhalych, they were quickly replaced. Less than an hour later, the South Africans “covered” this place with 155-mm long-range howitzers S-5 and O-6.

This morning we received an order to urgently move away and move towards the location of the 59th on the Mianei River. At 11 o'clock we formed columns and left. We had not walked even three kilometers when we heard explosions behind us: the South Africans began to fire at our former positions, believing that we were still there.

Next to us, a few kilometers away, is the 59th Brigade. At about 5 p.m. it was bombed by aircraft. The South Africans have developed a new tactic: first they begin shelling, all the Angolans hide in shelters, including the anti-aircraft gunners. And then suddenly aviation appears and starts hammering. The planes fly away faster than the anti-aircraft gunners get out of their shelters.

The Angolans caught a goat somewhere and brought us a whole leg as a gift. We stewed it with potatoes for dinner. It turned out so tasty that we “swept up” the entire pan. Before we finished dinner, “Kentron” started muttering. This is a South African anti-personnel rocket launcher. Range - up to 17 km. The shells are filled with many small steel balls (about 3.5 thousand). Killer stuff. But we have already worked out the “standard for shelling” clearly: in a matter of seconds there was no one left at the table. The South Africans shot a little and calmed down. Apparently, they just decided to “wish us a bon appetit.”

At 14.00 we received terrible news on the radio. At 13.10 the enemy fired at the 59th brigade with shells filled with chemical agents. Many Angolan soldiers were poisoned, lost consciousness, and the brigade commander was coughing up blood. Our advisers were also affected. The wind was blowing in their direction, many complained of severe headaches and nausea.

This news seriously alarmed us, because we don’t even have the most stocked gas masks, not to mention OZK! The radio asked for the district. They asked to send gas masks and provide the entire brigade with protective equipment. No answer yet.

The night passed peacefully. Today is the birthday of the eldest of our group, Anatoly Mikhailovich. He turned 40 years old. The Nouarites managed to ruin our celebration. At 12 o'clock there was an air raid on the nearby 59th brigade, dropping more than a dozen 500-kilogram bombs on its position. We don't know about losses yet.

Our artillerymen received reconnaissance data and decided to suppress the enemy’s 155-mm howitzer battery. South Africa's S-5 and O-6 howitzers are causing a lot of problems for the Angolans. They strike from afar (the projectile range is about 47 km), quickly change positions (O-6 is self-propelled and can move at speeds of up to 90 km/h). The Angolans fired a salvo from the BM-21. In response, the angry South Africans opened fire with all their howitzers. They hit very accurately, with short breaks. During one of these breaks, the senior and I went to the brigade commander to find out what new task he had received.

We were sitting in his so-called dugout office, when suddenly the shelling began again. One of the shells exploded very close (it hit a tree, about seven meters from the brigade commander’s dugout). I sat near the entrance blast wave threw me to the ground, first hitting my head and then my shoulder on the wooden frame at the bottom of the makeshift table. At first I didn’t understand what was going on, the dugout was crumbling, you couldn’t see anything because of the dust, my ears were ringing like Easter. At that moment, one of the soldiers burst into the dugout; he was standing in the trench. Covered in blood: a shrapnel pierced his hand. The brigade commander sent him to the first aid station. Having got out of the dugout, I discovered that I had clothes and right hand in blood. Thank God, the blood is not mine, but this soldier’s, apparently, in the turmoil he smeared me.

As Mikhalych later said, we were “born a second time.” After shelling within a radius of 30 m from the brigade commander’s dugout, all bushes and small trees were completely cut off by shrapnel.

I have trouble hearing in my right ear. Besides, my shoulder hurts a lot: I hit it. The older one has a little “noise” in his head. This is how the South Africans “congratulated” him on his birthday.

At 13.20, the 1st battalion of our brigade, sent to comb the area, discovered a UNITA base. As a result of the battle, seven Unit members were killed, a radio station, 13 machine guns and one anti-tank missile were captured. There are no losses on our side.

At the base, Angolan soldiers found one of the issues of the Unit’s printed organ, the Kwacha magazine. And in it is a photo of the former chief of staff of the 16th FAPLA brigade, Captain Luis Antonio Mangu, who defected to UNITA. Mikhalych knows him well; he worked with him last year, when he was still “ours.” And in April of this year he “escaped to UNITU.” This is how it happens!

Today the 1st battalion returned from a raid to scratch the area. At the same base they found another radio station and documents of the 4th regular battalion. UNITA: combat log from June 1986 to September 1987. And what’s interesting is that it quite accurately lists the entire grouping of FAPLA troops, its composition and command, the results of battles, and losses. There is a map of the Cunjamba area, made from aerial photographs in Lisbon, and a hand-drawn diagram of the Cuito Cuanavale area. Whatever you say, their reconnaissance is well done.

At night, from 21.00 to 23.00, the enemy again fired at the brigade’s positions using Kentrons and mortars. As a result, two Faplovites were killed and one was wounded.

Today we received a telegram from Quito with congratulations on the upcoming Great October holiday. Unfortunately, we will probably celebrate again under bombs. I caught Moscow on the radio. The country is preparing for the celebrations, there is not a word about the war in Angola.

At about 15.00 the enemy began firing from howitzers with shells with a remote fuse. This is the kind of nasty thing that explodes in the air before reaching the ground, and showers everything around with deadly fragments. This is something new!

At 16.30 a column of the 25th brigade arrived to us, they brought food to the Fallovites and letters to us.

All night we could hear the roar of engines and close explosions of shells: the 59th brigade was approaching us, and the South African artillery was “accompanying” it.

In the morning we met with colleagues from the 59th. Everything is fine with them. After the South Africans gassed them, the people more or less recovered. The faces are joyful, because they are returning “home” to Kui-to. We hung out in the woods for almost 4 months. It’s hard to imagine, you have to experience it yourself.

Today is exactly a month since we wandered through the Angolan forests, and I have the feeling that half my life has passed. All days merge into one. If it’s suddenly quiet, then you start to “go crazy” - why don’t they shoot? What else are you planning? The shelling begins, you wait for it to end.

This morning we were visited by aviation. Apparently, the “Boers” simply wanted to congratulate us on the 12th anniversary of the declaration of independence of Angola, and, of course, they brought their “gifts”.

And yesterday all evening we watched the flights of shells from 155-mm South African howitzers. They are active-reactive and glow during the reactive phase of flight. They are shelling the area where the 59th brigade is located on the other side of the Shambinga. Our specialists were able to calculate the distance to the howitzers and determine their approximate coordinates. The coordinates were transmitted by radio to the district.

This morning I got in touch and found out that Cuito Cuanavale was fired at at night from long-range guns. Fortunately, there were no casualties among ours, the runway was not damaged.

Something incomprehensible is happening: the Angolan troops are almost completely demoralized, the brigades are 45 percent staffed, they can respond to 10-15 enemy shells with one, and even then not always, our reconnaissance is poor, and the enemy knows everything about us. The Angolans are afraid of the South Africans like fire, and if they hear that “Buffalo” is coming to attack, they drop everything in a panic and run. (“Buffalo” is a South African battalion of mercenary thugs, which has proven itself with atrocities on the territory of Angola. It consists of 12 companies of 100 people each. Each company has its own code name: “Lion”, “Fox”, “Wolf”, etc. . Mainly covers the regular units of the South African Army from the rear and flanks. But often acts independently).

South African artillery and aviation act with impunity at any time, but our aviation is afraid to fly here, and if it does appear, it is at high altitude. And, despite all this, orders continue to come from the district: take up defensive positions, create a strong reserve (of what?) for operations on the flank and rear of the advancing enemy, etc. and so on.

This morning a prisoner was taken in the area of ​​the 3rd battalion. He turned out to be an artillery reconnaissance spotter of the 4th regular battalion of UNITA. He himself is a black man, his name is Eugenio Cayumba, he has served in UNITA for 3 years, he comes from the province of Huambo. Together with him, the English-made radio station 8NA-84 was captured.

According to him, the South Africans operate in the second echelon, and UNITA units are deployed ahead. If things get tough for them, regular South African units enter the battle, artillery opens fire, and aviation appears. He said that he was forcibly taken by the Unitists to their “capital” Zhamba and there he was sent to the Tikre artillery training center, which is 20 km from Zhamba. South African advisers trained. He gets confused in his testimony and lies a lot.

This morning a combat order came to advance to the area of ​​the source of the Ube. It beautifully describes who should attack and where, with what forces, and how to use tanks. True, for some reason the order does not say that all tanks in the brigade do not have planetary rotation mechanisms (PMS) and only one is started from the battery.

It is difficult to describe what happened over these two days (November 16 and 17), you had to experience it. These are the darkest days of the 21st Brigade. We ourselves don’t understand how we stayed alive and escaped from this hell. During the night of November 15-16, the enemy apparently conducted good reconnaissance, deployed fire spotters, and carried out sightings of the area. In general, I did everything I needed to do.

On November 16 at 6.00 am we lined up in a column and stood waiting for the movement to begin. At this time, a tanker approached to refuel the Soviet armored personnel carrier. Our oldest was outside when it all started. The first shell exploded ten meters from the armored personnel carrier. How Mikhalych remained alive, probably only God knows. He jumped into the armored personnel carrier as if stung. My artillery advisor and I were sitting inside when a wave of hot air mixed with sand hit us in the face.

And then the shelling began, the likes of which we had never seen before. The South Africans fought like hell. As the shells exploded, our armored personnel carrier was thrown from side to side, and we were able to leave the shelling zone only after 40 minutes. We managed to remove part of the column led by the brigade from under the shelling. He could not give an intelligible answer to any of the questions and stuttered heavily.

Finally, the brigade commander appeared and began to restore order: he indicated the assembly area and the route of movement. With great difficulty, they assembled the column and moved to the Ube River. And then the South Africans again attacked us from prepared positions. The brigade, or what was left of it, found itself pressed against the shana. The enemy was positioned in a semicircle in front, he was conducting intense shelling, and behind us there was this damn thing, the vehicles couldn’t cross it, the brigade commander ordered to lay down a road. A small detachment was sent to the other side to provide cover from a possible enemy attack.

There was a battle ahead, a small handful of Angolans held back the frantic onslaught of the South Africans, and the remnants of the brigade huddled near the Shana with their eyes “square” with fear. The shelling and attacks continued with short breaks. We prepared for the worst. They collected their duffel bags and burned all the documents and extra papers. It was decided, in the event of a breakthrough by the South Africans, to blow up our armored personnel carriers and BRDMs, and then leave on foot through the “shana” in the direction of Kuito.

There was, however, still little hope for the 25th Brigade, which was coming to our aid. But she, too, collapsed when we heard the voice of the brigade commander’s adviser on the radio. He covered the Faplovites with a seven-story curse, almost crying: “They’re running, bastards... They’re throwing everything away: equipment, weapons, your mother!”

When the road through the shana was almost ready, the enemy began to fire at it, and then the fighters of our barrier, crushed by the enemy, appeared on the other bank. The trap thus slammed shut and we found ourselves surrounded.

The commander of the NTeleka brigade looked questioningly at Mikhalych: “What do you say, kamarada assessor?” At a short meeting, it was decided to gather all the available forces into a fist, put in a line everything that was left and could fire: guns, armored personnel carriers, tanks and... So they repulsed four attacks.

Soon they found a weak spot in the enemy’s battle formations and moved to break through. At about 3 pm we finally escaped from this hell. It’s strange, but the South Africans didn’t pursue us, or maybe they were just tired of messing with us?

The cars huddled together, the exhausted soldiers fell onto the grass. Next to us, twenty meters away, a damaged Faplov tank was burning. The shells and cartridges remaining in it exploded for almost an hour. The spectacle is not for the faint of heart.

At 16.00, advisers to the 25th got in touch and reported that they had managed to break away from the pursuit of the South Africans. They come to us to connect.

In the evening, reconnaissance brought in a captured Unit member. He turned out to be the captain, the rear man. He reported that in this battle a brigade of regular South African troops, the Buffalo battalion and a regular UNITA battalion acted against us. When the swimmers saw the prisoner, soldiers from both brigades came running. Their eyes were burning, everyone shouted: “Finish him! Why are you standing there, kill him!” With great difficulty we managed to drag away the excited soldiers and restore order. They decided to send the prisoner under guard to Quito.

All night from November 16 to 17, we walked without closing our eyes, trying to get away from the South Africans and reach the crossing of the Shambinga River. The enemy constantly accompanied the column with fire. By four o'clock in the morning on November 17 we approached the crossing. But they couldn’t cross because a truck overturned on the bridge and there was no way they could pull it off.

And so until eleven o’clock we stood under fire, waiting for the crossing, not getting enough sleep, hungry, angry as hell. It was the worst feeling: to go through so much, only to be hit by a stray shell at the very end?!

Finally, at about eleven, this truck was pushed off the bridge, and the entire column rushed to the crossing. We managed to drive up to her among the first.

The enemy first hit the approaches to the crossing, then the tail of the column, then transferred fire to its head. He fired from a Valkyrie rocket launcher with the goal of punching out tires, knocking out drivers, stopping the convoy and then shooting it without much difficulty.

Ahead of us the tank was being dragged by a faulty armored personnel carrier. He constantly stopped, because of this the column stopped. And shells exploded from all sides. The enemy fired with everything they could: mortars, recoilless rifles, 155-mm howitzers, and Valkyries.

Even when the column began to move away from the crossing, the enemy accompanied it with fire.

On November 18, they continued to collect the scattered Fapplov men and equipment and count the losses. On November 16 alone, our brigade lost 17 people killed and 86 wounded. And also: 1 tank, two E-25 vehicles, 2 B-10 guns, 1 ZU-23-2.

On November 17 we lost: 5 people killed and 31 wounded. On all three OSA-AK vehicles, the guidance equipment was disabled by Valkyrie shells. There were no casualties among Soviet advisers.

Yesterday evening we were listening to the radio and quite by chance caught the news of some Western radio station, it looks like the BBC, but on Portuguese. They conveyed something about South Africa’s aggression in Angola, i.e. about us.

It was said that South Africa continues to increase its aggressive actions against Angola. In the north of Namibia, on the border with the province of Kwan do Cubango (this is where we are located), 30 thousand personnel, 400 guns of various calibers, and more than 80 aircraft are concentrated. The 8th shock armored battalion entered the territory of the province of Quan do Cubango. We reported all this to the district. In response, we received a telegram with an order to mine tank-hazardous areas and create a density of anti-tank weapons of 5 pieces per 1 kilometer. How much fun we had! There are almost no mines left in the brigade, and anti-tank weapons - “the cat cried”: 1 B-10, 1 BM-21, 2 Grad-1P, 2 tanks, not counting company anti-tank grenade launchers. And with this we all need to fight off the South African tanks!

In the evening, they shot at us, as if reluctantly, lazily. And Quito is constantly being hammered, trying to damage the runway.

That night I woke up to the sound of the earth humming. Since we sleep under an armored personnel carrier, in a hole dug under it, the hum was clearly audible. Obviously, somewhere nearby there is an enemy column.

In the afternoon, Angolan radio news reported that the Angolan Foreign Minister, speaking at the UN, accused South Africa of using chemical munitions against the Angolan army. This happened on October 29 on the Mianei River, when the South Africans used these ammunition against the 59th brigade standing next to us. The UN adopted a resolution obliging South Africa to withdraw all its troops from Angola by December 10. They wanted to sneeze at this resolution, even if the UN Secretary General himself came to Angola. Then we came across a radio station from South Africa. The speech of South African Foreign Minister Botha was broadcast. The essence of this speech was that his country would not allow the spread of communism in southern Africa, would take care of its security and would withdraw troops from Angola only after the Cubans and Russians left the country.

And on Soviet radio there is deathly silence about Angola. We catch every day and nothing.

Today they sent a telegram to the district asking for my replacement. The consequences of the concussion on November 1st continue to affect me: my right ear hurts, my left shoulder is apparently dislocated, headaches and dizziness have become more frequent.

All night and morning there was an exhausting, exhausting silence: not a single shot, not the sounds of a running engine, nothing. Because of this we couldn't sleep. And at 6.00 we learned that Quito was being shelled again. As a result of the shelling, our adviser Colonel Gorb, a specialist in mob operations, was killed. He was a good man, already older, very calm, kind and courteous. Everyone respectfully called him “Uncle.” I spent a little over a year in Angola.

It’s the beginning of winter in the Soviet Union, but here it’s hot and it’s starting to rain. We have long lost count of the days, we have been wandering through the forests for almost two months, all the days are alike, like two peas in a pod. On Sunday, however, we do our daily routine: we wash, we do laundry, we put ourselves in order as much as possible.

Today we moved to a new place. We spent the whole day setting up our camp to make our camp at least somewhat similar to the home of civilized people. They drove in stakes and pulled up an awning so that they could hide from the rain and sun. Tables for dishes and cooking were knocked down. In a word, we are settling in.

Yesterday there were fights again among the neighbors, but the Faplovites managed to fight back. The 59th brigade set fire to two AM1-90 armored personnel carriers, and the 25th brigade inflicted “great damage in manpower” on the enemy. (We later learned that in these battles, the adviser to the commander of the 59th brigade, Gorbach, was wounded, and two of our other specialists were shell-shocked).

Today the brigade headquarters is summing up the results. Before this, we listened on the radio to a press conference in Luanda, organized for Angolan and foreign journalists. The speaker was the same UNIT captain whom our brigade captured on the Ube River. He said that a colonel-instructor, one of the South African aces, was killed in one of the planes shot down by the Angolans.

With this I end this chronicle. While everything is calm with us, we are standing in the forest. What will happen next? Apparently no one knows this. We have not received letters from home for 1.5 months.

Russia and Angola: a new page in relations between the two countries

The protracted military conflict in Angola, which has continued since the country declared independence in 1975, has cost the lives of more than 500 thousand people; soldiers and pilots took part in it South Africa, regular armed forces personnel Cuban forces GDR pilots, North Korean and Chinese instructors and advisers (on the UNITA side), Rhodesian helicopter pilots, French mercenaries (including the legendary Bob Denard) - on the UNITA side, Portuguese and South African mercenaries, US CIA operatives (first with Holden Roberto, an incorrigible alcoholic , and later with Savimbi, who received portable anti-aircraft guns missile systems"Stinger"), and Air America pilots who once became famous for their participation in CIA covert operations in Vietnam, as well as instructors and money from a variety of countries, including Brazil, Morocco, Zaire and Saudi Arabia.

Under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in October 1976, the Soviet Union provided economic and military assistance to Angola.

In May 1995, a Russian delegation led by the Secretary of the Security Council Oleg Lobov visited Angola. After the visit to Moscow, a “Protocol of Intent to further strengthen cooperation” was signed.

A V In June 1995, an airmobile detachment of the Russian ground forces was sent to the republic to assist in the work of the UN Verification Mission. As part of the Russian aviation group(RAG) there were about 130 Russian helicopter pilots. The crews of 7 Mi-8 helicopters were stationed at six regional airfields: from Lubango to Uige. The best aviation pilots of the Russian ground forces served in Angola, flying over Afghanistan, Karabakh, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South and North Ossetia and Chechnya.

Recently, military-technical cooperation between Angola and Russia has intensified. At the end of November 1998, military transport aircraft of the Russian Air Force began transporting MiG-23 multirole fighters purchased by this country from Russia to Angola. According to the terms of the contract, the MiGs, previously stored at Russian bases for conservation, were delivered to Angola during December, assembled, tested and transferred to the personnel of the national air force. Besides, Russian specialists took upon themselves the restoration of the combat readiness of the MiG-23 and MiG-21 that Angola previously had.

Missing Russian pilots

If you believe the scant official data from the Angolan side, the An-26B aircraft of the Perm Motors airline, which carried out air transportation on domestic air lines Angola, under contract with the company Prestavia (Angola), suffered an accident during a flight on September 3, 1998 on the route Luanda - Cafunfo - Luanda after taking off from Cafunfo airport. According to Angolan television, citing the country's General Staff, the plane was shot down by a unit of the UNITA movement, which is in opposition to the official authorities of Angola. The AN-26 caught fire and fell into territory controlled by UNITA militants. According to unconfirmed reports, the plane made an emergency landing. Since then, there has been no information about the fate of the airliner’s commander Vitaly Viktorovich Dudko, navigator Pavel Viktorovich Pushkarev, pilot Valery Anatolyevich Chuvyrin and flight mechanic Valery Gennadievich Semkov. Conducted by the Angolan side search activities brought no results. Later, according to information from the Russian Ambassador to Angola, V.N. Raevsky, the crash site of the plane was discovered (1 km south of the Cafunfu-Luanda highway). At the beginning of October 1998, crew commander Dudko got in touch with the Il-76 flying to Dunda and conveyed the following information: “The crew is in captivity field commander UNITA in Zaire. One crew member is injured. The crew flies from a base in Zaire to Angola to UNITA airfields. Operating in parallel with the AN-26 is the AN-12, previously hijacked from Angola to Zaire.”

The AN-12B aircraft, owned by the State Scientific Center of the Russian Federation Flight Research Institute named after. MM. Gromov, carried out air transportation on domestic air routes of Angola under a contract with the company “Maweva” (Angola). The crew of the aircraft: commander Yuri Ivanovich Kutyavin (Citizen of the Republic of Belarus), pilot Georgiy Viktorovich Stadnik, navigator Evgeniy Mikhailovich Romanovsky, flight engineer Alexander Mikhailovich Mityaev.

On October 26, 1998, the plane took off from Nzaghi airport to Luanda. 20 minutes after takeoff, communication with the crew was lost; there were no distress signals or requests for help from the plane. According to the Angolan press (Adoga newspaper), the plane is currently in the city of Kisangani, a rebel stronghold in the Congo, the fate of the crew is unknown. According to some operational data, this aircraft continued to be operated in Zaire.

On May 12, 1999, after takeoff from the Luzam airfield (30 km south of Kafunfo), UNITA militants shot down an An-26 plane and captured its crew of 3 Russian pilots (commander Alexander Zaitsev). An interview with crew members was shown on South African TV. Russian representatives in Angola established contact through South Africa with UNITA and reached an agreement on the return of the crew.

At the end of June 1999, the situation was exactly repeated after an emergency landing, the crew of the downed plane, consisting of 4 Russian citizens, was captured. One of the pilots later died from his burns.

As a result of measures taken by the Russian Embassy in Angola to search for the missing aircraft, search and rescue operations were organized with the involvement of army units of the Angolan Armed Forces and aircraft of the UN Observer Mission in Angola, which were unsuccessful. main reason The problem that hampered an effective search was that intense fighting continued in the supposed area where the planes crashed.

The issue of missing Russian aircraft was brought up for discussion by the UN Security Council, which in its statement on December 23, 1998 clearly formulated a demand for all interested parties, especially UNITA, to “closely cooperate in the investigation of incidents involving missing aircraft, including the search for their crews and passengers.” .

Soviet military advisers and specialists who died in Angola

BAKIN Nikolay Alekseevich, Born in 1929. Russian. Colonel, Advisor to the Chief of Operations of the Military District of the Angolan Armed Forces. Died in the line of duty on September 24, 1977.

BELAN Arkady Eliseevich, Born in 1927. Ukrainian. Colonel, Chief's Advisor technical service Military District of the Angolan Armed Forces. Died of illness on April 24, 1979.

BELOGORTSEV Alexander Nikolaevich, Born in 1929. Russian. Lieutenant Colonel, Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Military District of the Angolan Armed Forces. Died of wounds on August 15, 1978.

DANILOV Leonid Alekseevich, Born in 1943. Udmurt. Lieutenant Colonel, Advisor to the Chief of Operations of the Angolan Armed Forces Brigade. He died of illness on November 7, 1978. He was buried in the cemetery in the village of Atiaz, Alnashsky district, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

DROZD Alexander Danilovich, Born in 1937, Belarusian SSR, Grodno region, Korelichi district, Mir. Called by Lomonosov OGVK Leningrad region. Captain 2nd rank, military adviser in the Angolan Armed Forces. Died on January 15, 1979. He was buried in the cemetery in Lomonosov, Leningrad Region.

SAMOSUSHEV Viktor Varfolomeevich, Born in 1941, Perm region, Cherdynsky district, village. Pontino. Russian. SA employee, aviation mechanic of the group of MiG-17f aircraft assemblers. Died on February 9, 1976. Buried in the cemetery in Novobad, Leninsky district of the Tajik SSR.

SKAKUN Grigory Ivanovich, 1941 SSR, Cherkasy region, Zolotinsky district, village. M. Kaevtsy. Ukrainian. Called by the Chernobaevsky RVC of the Cherkasy region. Ensign, specialist in the operation of portable shooting range equipment. Died of wounds on March 13, 1979. Buried on March 18, 1979 in a cemetery in Cherkasy.

STRELKOV Petr Dmitrievich, Born in 1941, Belarusian SSR, Bykhovsky district, village. Skinny. Belarusian. SA employee, senior driver-mechanic of the office of the chief military adviser in the Angolan armed forces. Died on August 4, 1978. Buried at the Volkovsky cemetery, Mytishchi district, Moscow region.

SUVEIKA Nikolai Vasilievich. Captain 3rd rank, head of the workshop. Died of illness on November 6, 1978.

PATTERN Victor Ivanovich, Born in 1947, Ukrainian SSR, Sumy region, village. Nizhnyaya Syrovatka. Ukrainian. Called up by the Mukachevo Regional Military Committee of the Transcarpathian region. Ensign, specialist in anti-tank guided missile simulator in the Angolan Armed Forces. Died in February 1976. Buried on March 10, 1976 in the cemetery in the village. Borodivka, Mukachevo district.