Brest peace conditions. Brest peace: who won, who lost

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Surrender at Brest-Litovsk

Brest peace, Brest-Litovsk (Brest) peace treaty - a separate peace treaty signed on March 3, 1918 in Brest-Litovsk by representatives of Soviet Russia, on the one hand, and the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) - on the other . It marked the defeat and exit of Russia from the First World War.

On November 19 (December 2), the Soviet delegation, headed by A. A. Ioffe, arrived in the neutral zone and proceeded to Brest-Litovsk, which housed the Headquarters of the German command on the Eastern Front, where it met with the delegation of the Austro-German bloc, which included also representatives of Bulgaria and Turkey.

The building where the peace talks were held

Armistice negotiations with Germany began in Brest-Litovsk on November 20 (December 3), 1917. On the same day, N. V. Krylenko arrived at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in Mogilev, who assumed the post of Commander-in-Chief.

Arrival of the German delegation to Brest-Litovsk

the truce is concluded for 6 months;
hostilities are suspended on all fronts;
German troops are being withdrawn from Riga and the Moonsund Islands;
any transfer of German troops to the Western Front is prohibited.
As a result of the negotiations, an interim agreement was reached:
the truce is concluded for the period from November 24 (December 7) to December 4 (17);
troops remain in their positions;
all transfers of troops are stopped, except for those that have already begun.

Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Arrival of Russian delegates. In the middle is A. A. Ioffe, next to him is secretary L. Karakhan, A. A. Bitsenko, on the right is L. B. Kamenev

Peace negotiations began on December 9 (22), 1917. The delegations of the states of the Quadruple Union were headed by: from Germany - Secretary of State of the Foreign Office R. von Kühlmann; from Austria-Hungary - Minister of Foreign Affairs Count O. Chernin; from Bulgaria, Minister of Justice Popov; from Turkey - Chairman of the Majlis Talaat Bey.

The officers of the Hindenburg headquarters meet the arriving delegation of the RSFSR on the platform of Brest in early 1918

The conference was opened by the Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, and Kühlmann took the chair.

Arrival of the Russian delegation

The Soviet delegation at the first stage included 5 commissioners - members of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee: the Bolsheviks A. A. Ioffe - the chairman of the delegation, L. B. Kamenev (Rozenfeld) and G. Ya. Sokolnikov (Brilliant), the Socialist-Revolutionaries A. A. Bitsenko and S. D. Maslovsky-Mstislavsky, 8 members of the military delegation (quartermaster general under the Supreme Commander of the General Staff, Major General V. E. Skalon, General Yu. General Staff Rear Admiral V. M. Altvater, Head of the Nikolaev Military Academy of the General Staff General A. I. Andogsky, Quartermaster General of the Headquarters of the 10th Army of the General Staff General A. A. Samoilo, Colonel D. G. Fokke, Lieutenant Colonel I. Ya. Tseplit , captain V. Lipsky), secretary of the delegation L. M. Karakhan, 3 translators and 6 technical employees, as well as 5 ordinary members of the delegation - sailor F. V. Olic, soldier N. K. Belyakov, Kaluga peasant R. I. Stashkov , worker P. A. Obukhov, warrant officer of the fleet K. Ya. Zedin.

The leaders of the Russian delegation arrived at the Brest-Litovsk station. From left to right: Major Brinkmann, Joffe, Mrs. Birenko, Kamenev, Karakhan.

The resumption of armistice negotiations, which involved agreeing on conditions and signing a treaty, was overshadowed by the tragedy in the Russian delegation. Upon arrival in Brest on November 29 (December 12), 1917, before the opening of the conference, during a private meeting of the Soviet delegation, a representative of the Stavka in a group of military consultants, Major General V. E. Skalon, shot himself.

Armistice in Brest-Litovsk. Members of the Russian delegation after arriving at the Brest-Litovsk station. From left to right: Major Brinkman, A. A. Ioffe, A. A. Bitsenko, L. B. Kamenev, Karakhan.

Proceeding from the general principles of the Decree on Peace, the Soviet delegation already at one of the first meetings proposed to adopt the following program as the basis for negotiations:

No forced annexation of territories captured during the war is allowed; the troops occupying these territories are withdrawn as soon as possible.
The full political independence of the peoples who were deprived of this independence during the war is being restored.
National groups that did not have political independence before the war are guaranteed the opportunity to freely decide the question of belonging to any state or their state independence through a free referendum.
Cultural-national and, under certain conditions, administrative autonomy of national minorities is ensured.
Refusal of contributions.
Solution of colonial issues on the basis of the above principles.
Prevention of indirect restrictions on the freedom of weaker nations by stronger nations.

Trotsky L.D., Ioffe A. and Rear Admiral V. Altvater are going to the meeting. Brest-Litovsk.

After a three-day discussion by the countries of the German bloc of Soviet proposals on the evening of December 12 (25), 1917, R. von Kuhlmann made a statement that Germany and its allies accept these proposals. At the same time, a reservation was made that nullified Germany's consent to peace without annexations and indemnities: “It is necessary, however, to indicate with complete clarity that the proposals of the Russian delegation could be implemented only if all the powers involved in the war , without exception and without reservation, certain period pledged to strictly observe the conditions common to all peoples.

L. Trotsky in Brest-Litovsk

Noting that the German bloc had joined the Soviet formula of peace “without annexations and indemnities,” the Soviet delegation proposed a ten-day break, during which one could try to bring the Entente countries to the negotiating table.

Near the building where the negotiations were held. Arrival of delegations. Left (with beard and glasses) A. A. Ioffe

During the break, however, it became clear that Germany understands a world without annexations differently than the Soviet delegation - for Germany, it is not at all about the withdrawal of troops to the borders of 1914 and the withdrawal of German troops from the occupied territories of the former Russian Empire especially since, according to the German statement, Lithuania and Courland have already declared themselves in favor of secession from Russia, so that if these three countries now enter into negotiations with Germany about their future fate, this will by no means be considered an annexation by Germany.

Peace talks in Brest-Litovsk. Representatives of the Central Powers, in the middle Ibrahim Hakki Pasha and Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Khudenitz on their way to negotiations

On December 14 (27), the Soviet delegation at the second meeting of the political commission made a proposal: “In full agreement with the open statement of both contracting parties that they have no conquest plans and that they want to make peace without annexations. Russia is withdrawing its troops from the parts of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Persia it occupies, and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance from Poland, Lithuania, Courland and other regions of Russia. Soviet Russia promised, in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nations, to provide the population of these regions with the opportunity to decide for themselves the question of their state existence - in the absence of any troops other than national or local militia.

German-Austrian-Turkish representatives at the talks in Brest-Litovsk. General Max Hoffmann, Ottokar Czernin von und zu Hudenitz (Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister), Mehmet Talaat Pasha (Ottoman Empire), Richard von Kühlmann (German Foreign Minister), unknown participant

The German and Austro-Hungarian delegation, however, made a counterproposal - the Russian state was invited to "take note of the statements expressing the will of the peoples inhabiting Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estland and Livonia, about their desire for complete state independence and for the allocation of from the Russian Federation" and acknowledge that "these statements under the present conditions must be regarded as an expression of the people's will." R. von Kuhlmann asked if the Soviets would agree to withdraw their troops from all of Livonia and from Estland in order to give the local population the opportunity to connect with their fellow tribesmen living in the areas occupied by the Germans. The Soviet delegation was also informed that the Ukrainian Central Rada was sending its own delegation to Brest-Litovsk.

Peter Ganchev, Bulgarian representative on the way to the place of negotiations

On December 15 (28) the Soviet delegation left for Petrograd. The current state of affairs was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), where by a majority of votes it was decided to drag out peace negotiations as long as possible, in the hope of an early revolution in Germany itself. In the future, the formula is refined and takes next view: "We hold on until the German ultimatum, then we surrender." Lenin also invites the People's Commissariat Trotsky to go to Brest-Litovsk and personally lead the Soviet delegation. According to Trotsky's memoirs, "the prospect of negotiations with Baron Kuhlmann and General Hoffmann was not very attractive in itself, but 'to drag out negotiations, you need a delayer,' as Lenin put it."

The Ukrainian delegation in Brest-Litovsk, from left to right: Nikolay Lyubinsky, Vsevolod Golubovich, Nikolay Levitsky, Lussenty, Mikhail Polozov and Alexander Sevryuk.

At the second stage of the negotiations, the Soviet side was represented by L. D. Trotsky (leader), A. A. Ioffe, L. M. Karakhan, K. B. Radek, M. N. Pokrovsky, A. A. Bitsenko, V. A. Karelin, E. G. Medvedev, V. M. Shakhrai, St. Bobinsky, V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, V. Terian, V. M. Altvater, A. A. Samoilo, V. V. Lipsky

The second composition of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk. Sitting, from left to right: Kamenev, Ioffe, Bitsenko. Standing, from left to right: Lipsky V. V., Stuchka, Trotsky L. D., Karakhan L. M.

The memoirs of the head of the German delegation, Secretary of State of the German Foreign Ministry Richard von Kühlmann, who spoke of Trotsky as follows, have also been preserved: “not very large, sharp and piercing eyes behind the sharp glasses of glasses looked at his counterpart with a boring and critical look. The expression on his face clearly indicated that he [Trotsky] would have been better off ending the unsympathetic negotiations for him with a couple of grenades, throwing them over the green table, if this was in any way consistent with the general political line ... sometimes I wondered if he generally intends to make peace, or he needed a platform from which he could propagate Bolshevik views.

During negotiations in Brest-Litovsk.

A member of the German delegation, General Max Hoffmann, ironically described the composition of the Soviet delegation: “I will never forget the first dinner with the Russians. I was sitting between Joffe and Sokolnikov, then Commissar of Finance. Opposite me sat a worker, who, apparently, a lot of appliances and utensils caused great inconvenience. He clutched at one thing after another, but he used the fork exclusively for brushing his teeth. Diagonally from me, next to Prince Hoenloe, sat the terrorist Bizenko [sic], on the other side of her was a peasant, a real Russian phenomenon with long gray curls and a beard overgrown like a forest. He caused a certain smile in the staff when, when asked whether he prefers red or white wine for dinner, he answered: “Stronger” ”

Signing of a peace treaty with Ukraine. Sitting in the middle, from left to right: Count Ottokar Czernin von und zu Khudenitz, General Max von Hoffmann, Richard von Kühlmann, Prime Minister V. Rodoslavov, Grand Vizier Mehmet Talaat Pasha

On December 22, 1917 (January 4, 1918), German Chancellor H. von Gertling announced in his speech at the Reichstag that a delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada had arrived in Brest-Litovsk. Germany agreed to negotiate with the Ukrainian delegation, hoping to use this as leverage both against Soviet Russia and against its ally, Austria-Hungary. Ukrainian diplomats who held preliminary talks with German general M. Hoffmann, chief of staff of the German armies on the Eastern Front, at first announced claims to join the Kholm region (which was part of Poland), as well as the Austro-Hungarian territories - Bukovina and Eastern Galicia, to Ukraine. Hoffmann, however, insisted that they reduce their demands and limit themselves to one Kholm region, agreeing that Bukovina and Eastern Galicia form an independent Austro-Hungarian crown territory under the rule of the Habsburgs. It was these demands that they defended in their further negotiations with the Austro-Hungarian delegation. Negotiations with the Ukrainians dragged on so much that the opening of the conference had to be postponed to December 27, 1917 (January 9, 1918).

Ukrainian delegates communicate with German officers in Brest-Litovsk

The Germans invited a Ukrainian delegation to the next meeting, which took place on December 28, 1917 (January 10, 1918). Its chairman, V. A. Golubovich, announced the declaration of the Central Rada stating that the power of the Council of People's Commissars of Soviet Russia does not extend to Ukraine, and therefore the Central Rada intends to independently conduct peace negotiations. R. von Kuhlmann turned to L. D. Trotsky, who headed the Soviet delegation at the second stage of negotiations, with the question of whether he and his delegation intended to continue to be the only diplomatic representatives of all of Russia in Brest-Litovsk, and also whether the Ukrainian delegation should be considered part of Russian delegation or it represents an independent state. Trotsky knew that the Rada was actually at war with the RSFSR. Therefore, by agreeing to consider the delegation of the Ukrainian Central Rada as independent, he actually played into the hands of the representatives of the Central Powers and provided Germany and Austria-Hungary with the opportunity to continue contacts with the Ukrainian Central Rada, while negotiations with Soviet Russia were marking time for another two days.

Signing of documents on a truce in Brest-Litovsk

The January uprising in Kyiv put Germany in a difficult position, and now the German delegation demanded a break in the meetings of the peace conference. On January 21 (February 3), von Kuhlmann and Chernin went to Berlin for a meeting with General Ludendorff, where they discussed the possibility of signing peace with the government of the Central Rada, which does not control the situation in Ukraine. decisive role played a difficult situation with food in Austria-Hungary, which without Ukrainian grain was threatened with starvation. Returning to Brest-Litovsk, the German and Austro-Hungarian delegations on January 27 (February 9) signed peace with the delegation of the Central Rada. In exchange for military assistance against Soviet troops The UNR undertook to supply Germany and Austria-Hungary by July 31, 1918 with one million tons of grain, 400 million eggs, up to 50 thousand tons of cattle meat, lard, sugar, hemp, manganese ore, etc. Austria-Hungary also undertook to create an autonomous Ukrainian region in Eastern Galicia.

Signing of a peace treaty between the UNR and the Central Powers on January 27 (February 9), 1918

The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Ukraine - the Central Powers was a major blow to the Bolsheviks, in parallel with the negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, did not abandon attempts to Sovietize Ukraine. On January 27 (February 9), at a meeting of the political commission, Chernin informed the Russian delegation about the signing of peace with Ukraine represented by the delegation of the Central Rada. Already in April 1918, the Germans dispersed the government of the Central Rada (see Dispersal of the Central Rada), replacing it with the more conservative regime of Hetman Skoropadsky.

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At the insistence of General Ludendorff (even at a meeting in Berlin, he demanded that the head of the German delegation stop negotiations with the Russian delegation within 24 hours after the signing of peace with Ukraine) and by direct order of Emperor Wilhelm II, von Kühlmann presented Soviet Russia in an ultimatum form with a demand to accept the German peace conditions. On January 28, 1918 (February 10, 1918), at the request of the Soviet delegation how to resolve the issue, Lenin confirmed the previous instructions. Nevertheless, Trotsky, violating these instructions, rejected the German terms of peace, putting forward the slogan "Neither peace, nor war: we do not sign peace, we stop the war, and we demobilize the army." The German side stated in response that Russia's failure to sign a peace treaty automatically entails the termination of the truce. After this statement, the Soviet delegation defiantly left the negotiations. As a member of the Soviet delegation A. A. Samoilo points out in his memoirs, who were part of the delegation former officers The General Staff refused to return to Russia, remaining in Germany. On the same day, Trotsky gives the Supreme Commander Krylenko an order demanding that the army immediately issue an order to end the state of war with Germany and general demobilization, canceled by Lenin after 6 hours. Nevertheless, the order was received by all fronts on 11 February.

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On January 31 (February 13), 1918, at a meeting in Homburg with the participation of Wilhelm II, the Imperial Chancellor Gertling, the head of the German Foreign Office von Kühlmann, Hindenburg, Ludendorff, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Vice Chancellor, it was decided to break the truce and launch an offensive on the Eastern front.
On the morning of February 19, the offensive of the German troops rapidly unfolded on the entire Northern Front. Through Livonia and Estland, the troops of the 8th German army(6 divisions), a separate Northern Corps stationed on the Moonsund Islands, as well as a special army unit operating from the south, from Dvinsk. For 5 days, German and Austrian troops advanced inland Russian territory at 200-300 km. “I have never seen such an absurd war,” Hoffmann wrote. - We were practically on trains and cars. You put a handful of infantry with machine guns and one cannon on the train and you go to the next station. You take the station, arrest the Bolsheviks, put more soldiers on the train and go on.” Zinoviev was forced to admit that "there is evidence that in some cases unarmed German soldiers dispersed hundreds of our soldiers." “The army rushed to run, leaving everything, sweeping away in its path,” the first to write about these events in the same 1918. Soviet commander in chief Russian front-line army N. V. Krylenko.

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After the decision to accept peace on German terms was made by the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b), and then passed through the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the question arose of the new composition of the delegation. As Richard Pipes notes, none of the Bolshevik leaders was eager to go down in history by putting his signature on a treaty shameful for Russia. Trotsky by this time had already resigned from the post of People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Sokolnikov G. Ya. proposed the candidacy of Zinoviev G. E. However, Zinoviev refused such an “honor”, ​​proposing in response the candidacy of Sokolnikov himself; Sokolnikov also refuses, promising to leave the Central Committee in the event of such an appointment. Ioffe A. A. also flatly refused. After long negotiations, Sokolnikov nevertheless agreed to head the Soviet delegation, the new composition of which took the following form: Sokolnikov G. Ya., Petrovsky L. M., Chicherin G. V., Karakhan G. I. and a group of 8 consultants (among them, Ioffe A. A., former chairman of the delegation). The delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk on March 1, and two days later signed the contract without any discussion.

Postcard depicting the signing of the ceasefire agreement by the German representative, Prince Leopold of Bavaria. Russian delegation: A.A. Bitsenko, next to her A. A. Ioffe, as well as L. B. Kamenev. Behind Kamenev in the form of captain A. Lipsky, secretary of the Russian delegation L. Karakhan

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The German-Austrian offensive, which began in February 1918, continued even when the Soviet delegation arrived in Brest-Litovsk: on February 28, the Austrians occupied Berdichev, on March 1, the Germans occupied Gomel, Chernigov and Mogilev, and on March 2, Petrograd was bombed. On March 4, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed, German troops occupied Narva and stopped only on the Narova River and west bank Lake Peipus 170 km from Petrograd.

A photocopy of the first two pages of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, March 1918

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In its final version, the agreement consisted of 14 articles, various annexes, 2 final protocols and 4 additional agreements (between Russia and each of the states of the Quadruple Union), according to which Russia was obliged to make many territorial concessions, also demobilizing its army and navy.

The Vistula provinces, Ukraine, provinces with a predominantly Belarusian population, Estland, Courland and Livonia provinces, the Grand Duchy of Finland were torn away from Russia. Most of these territories were to become German protectorates or become part of Germany. Russia also pledged to recognize the independence of Ukraine represented by the UNR government.
In the Caucasus, Russia conceded the Kars region and the Batumi region.

The Soviet government ended the war with the Ukrainian Central Council (Rada) of the Ukrainian People's Republic and made peace with it. The army and navy were demobilized. The Baltic Fleet was withdrawn from its bases in Finland and the Baltic. The Black Sea Fleet with all the infrastructure was transferred to the Central Powers. Russia paid 6 billion marks in reparations, plus the payment of losses incurred by Germany during the Russian revolution - 500 million gold rubles. The Soviet government pledged to stop revolutionary propaganda in the Central Powers and allied states formed on the territory of the Russian Empire.

Postcard showing the last page of signatures on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

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The appendix to the treaty guaranteed a special economic status for Germany in Soviet Russia. Citizens and corporations of the Central Powers were removed from the scope of the Bolshevik decrees on nationalization, and those who had already lost their property were restored to their rights. Thus, German citizens were allowed to engage in private business in Russia against the background of the general nationalization of the economy that was taking place at that time. This state of affairs created, for a time, the opportunity for Russian owners of enterprises or securities to evade nationalization by selling their assets to the Germans.

Russian telegraph Brest-Petrograd. In the center is the secretary of the delegation L. Karakhan, next to him is Captain V. Lipsky

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Fears of Dzerzhinsky F. E. that “By signing the conditions, we do not guarantee ourselves against new ultimatums”, are partially confirmed: the advance of the German army was not limited to the boundaries of the zone of occupation defined by the peace treaty. German troops captured Simferopol on April 22, 1918, Taganrog on May 1, and Rostov-on-Don on May 8, causing the fall of Soviet power on the Don.

A telegrapher sends a message from a peace conference in Brest-Litovsk

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In April 1918, diplomatic relations were established between the RSFSR and Germany. On the whole, however, Germany's relations with the Bolsheviks were not ideal from the outset. In the words of Sukhanov N. N., “the German government was quite thoroughly afraid of its“ friends ”and“ agents ”: it knew very well that these people were the same“ friends ”to it, as well as to Russian imperialism, to which the German authorities tried to“ palm off ”them keeping them at a respectful distance from their own loyal subjects." From April 1918, the Soviet ambassador Ioffe A.A. engaged in active revolutionary propaganda already in Germany itself, which ends with the November Revolution. The Germans, for their part, are consistently eliminating Soviet power in the Baltic States and Ukraine, providing assistance to the “White Finns” and actively contributing to the formation of a hotbed white movement on the Don. In March 1918, the Bolsheviks, fearing a German attack on Petrograd, transferred the capital to Moscow; after the signing of the Brest Peace, they, not trusting the Germans, did not begin to cancel this decision.

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While the German General Staff came to the conclusion that the defeat of the Second Reich was inevitable, Germany managed to impose on the Soviet government, in the context of the growing civil war and the beginning of the intervention of the Entente, additional agreements to the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty. On August 27, 1918, in Berlin, in the strictest secrecy, a Russian-German supplementary treaty to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and a Russian-German financial agreement were concluded, which were signed on behalf of the government of the RSFSR by Plenipotentiary A.A. I. Krige. Under this agreement, Soviet Russia was obliged to pay Germany, as compensation for damage and expenses for the maintenance of Russian prisoners of war, a huge indemnity - 6 billion marks - in the form of "pure gold" and credit obligations. In September 1918, two "gold echelons" were sent to Germany, which contained 93.5 tons of "pure gold" worth over 120 million gold rubles. It didn't make it to the next shipment.

Russian delegates buying German newspapers in Brest-Litovsk

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Trotsky is learning to write. German caricature of L.D. Trotsky, who signed the peace treaty in Brest-Litovsk. 1918

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Political cartoon from the American press in 1918

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Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian troops enter the city of Kamyanets-Podilsky after the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

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Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: German troops under the command of General Eichhorn occupied Kyiv. March 1918.

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Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian military musicians perform on the main square of the city of Proskurov in Ukraine

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Consequences of the Brest peace: Odessa after the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian troops. Dredging in Odessa port

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Consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Austro-Hungarian soldiers on Nikolaevsky Boulevard. Summer 1918

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Photo taken by a German soldier in Kyiv in 1918

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October 26, 1917 II All-Russian Congress of Soviets at the suggestion of V.I. adopted the famous "Decree on Peace", which outlined the program for Russia's withdrawal from the First World War. In particular, this document contained a proposal to all the governments of the belligerent countries to immediately stop hostilities on all fronts and start negotiations on the conclusion of a general democratic peace without annexations and indemnities and on conditions of complete self-determination of the peoples regarding their future fate.

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In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, G. Nikolnikov, N. Yakupov, A. Bovin), the "Decree on Peace" was traditionally considered as the first and important stage in the formation and development of "Lenin's peace-loving foreign policy Soviet state based on the cornerstone principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. In reality, Lenin's "Decree on Peace" could in no way lay the foundations for a new foreign policy doctrine of Soviet Russia, because:

He pursued a purely pragmatic goal - the withdrawal of dilapidated and exhausted Russia from the state of war;

The Bolsheviks considered the revolution in Russia not as an end in itself, but as the first and inevitable stage in the beginning of the world proletarian (socialist) revolution.

November 8 People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky sent the text of the "Decree on Peace" to the ambassadors of all the allied powers, inviting the leaders of these states to immediately stop hostilities at the front and sit down at the negotiating table, but this call was completely ignored by the Entente countries. November 9, 1917 to the commander-in-chief N.N. Dukhonin was instructed to immediately turn to the command of the Fourth Bloc countries with a proposal to end hostilities and start peace negotiations with them. General N.N. Dukhonin refused to comply with this order, for which he was immediately declared an "enemy of the people" and removed from his post, which was taken by Ensign N.V. Krylenko. A little later, upon the arrival of N.V. Krylenko to Mogilev, General N.N. Dukhonin was first arrested and then killed at the staff car by drunken sailors, and the new Commander-in-Chief immediately followed the instructions of the Central Committee on this issue.

On November 14, 1917, representatives of the German and Austro-Hungarian military leadership informed the Soviet side of their agreement to stop hostilities on the Eastern Front and begin the process of peace negotiations. On November 20, 1917, the first round of negotiations between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc began in Brest-Litovsk, at which the leadership of the Soviet delegation represented by A.A. Ioffe (chairman of the mission), L.B. Kameneva, G.Ya. Sokolnikov and L.M. Karakhan immediately announced a declaration of principles, in which they again proposed to conclude a democratic peace treaty without annexations and indemnities. Having received no response to their proposal, the Soviet side refused to conclude a formal truce and took a week-long time-out.

On November 27, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR approved the "Outline of the peace talks program", compiled by V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin and L.B. Kamenev, in which the idea of ​​concluding a general democratic peace was reaffirmed, and three days later the negotiation process resumed in Brest-Litovsk. The result of new negotiations was the signing on December 2, 1917 of an armistice agreement for a period of one month, until January 1, 1918.

On December 9, 1917, a new round of negotiations began, in which the head of the Soviet delegation, A.A. Ioffe announced the declaration "On the principles of universal democratic peace", consisting of six main points. In this declaration, based on the main provisions of the Peace Decree and the Outline of the Peace Negotiation Program, the main components of a democratic peace were once again concretized: "refusal of annexations and indemnities" and "complete self-determination of peoples".

On December 12, 1917, the Austrian Foreign Minister O. Chernin announced a response note to the Soviet side, which stated that the countries of the Quadruple Bloc agreed to immediately conclude a peace treaty with all Entente countries without annexations and indemnities. But for the Soviet delegation, this turn of events was so unexpected that its head, A.A. Ioffe suggested a ten-day break. The opposing side rejected this proposal, and three days later the head of the German delegation, Richard von Kuhlmann, who, by the way, while holding the post of State Secretary (Minister) of Foreign Affairs, was personally involved in the financial support of the Bolshevik Pravda, directly laid claim to the possession of all of Poland, Lithuania , Courland, part of Estonia and Livonia, whose peoples "they themselves expressed a desire to come under the protection of Germany." Naturally, the Soviet delegation categorically refused to discuss this proposal, and a break was announced in the work of the peace conference.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky once again tried to give the peace talks a general character and sent a second note to the governments of the Entente countries to sit down at the negotiating table, but he did not receive an answer to his message. In this situation, fearing that the negotiations in Brest would take on an openly separate character, at the suggestion of V.I. Lenin, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided to move the peace talks to the capital of neutral Sweden, the city of Stockholm. The Austro-German side rejected this trick of the Soviet government, and Brest-Litovsk remained the place to continue negotiations. At the same time, representatives of the countries of the Quadruple Alliance, referring to the fact that the Entente countries remained deaf to the proposal to conclude a "general democratic peace", abandoned their own declaration on December 12, which seriously aggravated the negotiation process itself.

On December 27, 1917, the second round of the peace conference in Brest-Litovsk began, at which the Soviet delegation was already headed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L.D. Trotsky. A new round of negotiations, at the suggestion of the oracle of the revolution, began with an empty theoretical dispute about the state and the right of nations to self-determination. This political chatter, which had rather bothered the opposing side, was soon stopped, and on January 5, 1918, the delegation of the countries of the Quadruple Union presented new conditions to the Soviet side in an ultimatum separate peace- rejection from Russia not only of the entire Baltic region and Poland, but also of a significant part of Belarus.

On the same day, at the suggestion of the head of the Soviet delegation, a break was announced in the negotiations. L.D. Trotsky, having received a letter from V.I. Lenin and I.V. Stalin, was forced to urgently leave for Petrograd, where he had to give his explanations about his new position regarding the further conduct of negotiations, which he outlined in a letter addressed to V.I. Lenin on January 2, 1918. The essence of the new position of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was extremely simple: “We stop the war, we demobilize the army, but we don’t sign peace.” In Soviet historical science, the position of L.D. Trotsky has always been interpreted in derogatory tones and expressions as the position of a "political prostitute" and a traitor to the interests of the working class and the working peasantry. In reality, this position, which was initially supported by V.I. Lenin, was absolutely logical and extremely pragmatic:

1) Since the Russian army cannot, and most importantly, does not want to fight, the old imperial army disband completely, and cease hostilities at the front.

2) Since the opposing side is categorically in favor of a separate peace treaty, which threatens the Bolsheviks with a loss of reputation in the eyes of the world proletariat, a separate treaty with the enemy should by no means be concluded.

3) It is necessary to drag out the negotiation process as long as possible, in the hope that in Germany and other European powers the fire of the world proletarian revolution will flare up in the near future, which will put everything in its place.

4) Refusal to sign a separate treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Alliance will not formally give the Entente countries a reason to start military intervention against Soviet Russia, which has violated its allied duty.

5) Finally, the refusal to sign a peace treaty will significantly smooth out the contradictions that have already arisen both within the ruling Bolshevik Party and in relations between the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs.

By mid-January 1918, the latter circumstance began to acquire paramount importance. At this time, the “left communists” headed by N.I. Bukharin, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, M.S. Uritsky, K.B. Radek and A.M. Kollontai. This rather noisy and influential faction of the Bolsheviks, which was supported by a number of leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (B.D. Kamkov, P.P. Proshyan), categorically opposed any agreements with the enemy and declared that only a “revolutionary war” with the German imperialism will save the Bolsheviks from the universal disgrace of the accomplices of world capital and create the necessary conditions to kindle the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Moreover, at this time B.D. Kamkov and P.P. Proshyan turned to K.B. Radek, N.I. Bukharin and G.L. Pyatakov with a proposal to arrest the entire Council of People's Commissars headed by V.I. Lenin and form a new government consisting of Left Social Revolutionaries and Left Communists, which could be headed by Georgy Leonidovich Pyatakov, but this proposal was rejected by them.

In the meantime, another principled approach to solving this problem was outlined in the party leadership, which was expressed by V.I. Lenin. The essence of his new position, which he reached at the end of December 1917, was also extremely simple: to conclude a separate peace with Germany and its allies at any cost.

In historical science, the question of the motives that prompted the leader of the revolution to such a political conclusion, which ran counter to all the postulates of orthodox Marxism, has long been discussed.

Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev, A. Bovin) claimed that V.I. Lenin came to this conviction under the pressure of harsh objective circumstances, namely complete decomposition the old Russian army and uncertainty about the timing of the proletarian revolution in Europe, primarily in Germany itself.

Their opponents, mainly from the liberal camp (D. Volkogonov, Yu. Felshtinsky, O. Budnitsky), are sure that, while advocating extremely harshly for the conclusion of a separate peace with Germany, V.I. Lenin only fulfilled his obligations to his German sponsors, who generously forked out for the October Revolution.

On January 8, 1918, after discussing the new Leninist theses at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee, an open vote was held, which clearly showed the alignment of forces in the top party leadership: the position of N.I. Bukharin was supported by 32 participants in this meeting, for L.D. Trotsky was voted by 16 participants, and the position of V.I. Lenin was supported by only 15 members of the Central Committee. On January 11, 1918, the discussion of this issue was submitted to the Plenum of the Central Committee, where the position of L.D. was supported by a small majority. Trotsky. This situation forced V.I. Lenin to make partial adjustments to his previous position: no longer insisting on the immediate conclusion of peace, he proposed to delay the process of negotiations with the Germans in every possible way. The next day, the Trotskyist slogan "no war, no peace" was approved by a majority vote at a joint meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) and the PLSR, which was immediately formalized as a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR. Thus, all supporters of peace in both ruling parties, in particular members of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) V.I. Lenin, G.E. Zinoviev, I.V. Stalin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.T. Smilga, A.F. Sergeev, M.K. Muranov and E.D. Stasov, and members of the Central Committee of the PLSR M.A. Spiridonova, A.L. Kolegaev, V.E. Trutovsky, B.F. Malkin and A.A. Bidenko again remained in the minority. On January 14, 1918, the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets approved a resolution reflecting the position of L.D. Trotsky, and on the same day the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs left for Brest-Litovsk, where on January 17 the third round of peace negotiations began.

Meanwhile, in Brest itself, negotiations were in full swing between Austro-German representatives and the leadership of the Ukrainian People's Rada (N.A. Lyublinsky), whose government the Bolsheviks recognized back in December 1917. On January 27, 1918, immediately after the signing of a separate treaty with the government of the Ukrainian People's We are glad that the delegation of the Quadruple Alliance in an ultimatum demanded that the Soviet side immediately respond to its terms of the peace treaty.

The next day, L.D. Trotsky, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, announced a declaration in which:

1) it was announced the termination of the state of war between Russia and the countries of the Quadruple Bloc - Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, as well as the complete demobilization of the old Russian army;

In Soviet historiography (A. Chubaryan, K. Gusev), this ultimatum of the head of the Soviet delegation was always regarded as another act of vile betrayal on the part of the “Jewish Trotsky”, who violated the oral agreement with V.I. Lenin that after the new "German ultimatum we sign a peace treaty."

Modern Russian historians, including outspoken apologists L.D. Trotsky (A. Pantsov), they say that the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs acted in strict accordance with the decision of the Central Committee of both ruling parties and the resolution of the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and their oral agreement with V.I. Lenin clearly contradicted them.

February 14, 1918 declaration by L.D. Trotsky received official support at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and its chairman Ya.M. Sverdlov, and a day later the German command in the person of Leopold of Bavaria and Max Hoffmann announced the end of the truce and the resumption of hostilities along the entire front from noon on February 18. In this situation, on the evening of February 17, 1918, an emergency meeting of the Central Committee was convened, at which six of the eleven members of the highest party Areopagus, namely L.D. Trotsky, N.I. Bukharin, M.S. Uritsky, G.I. Lomov, N.N. Krestinsky, A.A. Ioffe, spoke out against the resumption of the negotiation process in Brest.

The Germans launched an offensive at the front and by the end of February 19 occupied Polotsk and Dvinsk. In this critical situation, at a new meeting of the Central Committee, with seven votes in favor, it was decided to immediately resume the peace process. In this situation, L.D. Trotsky announced his resignation from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and the leader of the left communists N.I. Bukharin - about his withdrawal from the Central Committee and the editorial board of Pravda.

On February 23, 1918, the Soviet government was presented with new conditions for a separate peace treaty and a very strict framework for signing and ratifying it. In particular, the German side demanded that all of Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Estonia and part of Belarus be torn away from Russia, as well as the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Finland and Ukraine, and the signing of a similar peace treaty with the government of the Central Rada.

On the same day, a new meeting of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b) was convened, at which the votes on the German ultimatum were distributed as follows: seven members of the Central Committee voted “for” its adoption - V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, G.E. Zinoviev, Ya.M. Sverdlov, G.Ya. Sokolnikov, I.T. Smilga and E.D. Stasova, "against" - four members of the highest party Areopagus - N.I. Bukharin, A.S. Bubnov, G.I. Lomov and M.S. Uritsky, and "abstained" - also four members of the Central Committee - L.D. Trotsky, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, A.A. Ioffe and N.N. Krestinsky. Thus, at the most critical moment, when the issue of retaining one's own power was being decided, the majority of the members of the Central Committee "trembled" and voted for the conclusion of an "obscene" peace with the Germans.

On February 24, at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, after an extremely tense discussion, the Bolshevik resolution on the adoption of new terms of the peace treaty was approved by a small majority. And late in the evening of the same day, a new Soviet delegation consisting of G.Ya. left for Brest-Litovsk to sign a peace treaty with the countries of the Quadruple Bloc. Sokolnikova, L.M. Karakhan, G.V. Chicherin and G.I. Petrovsky.

On March 3, 1918, the leaders of both delegations signed Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, under the terms of which:

A vast territory of more than 1 million square meters was torn away from Soviet Russia. kilometers, on which more than 56 million people lived - the entire territory of Poland, the Baltic States, Ukraine, part of Belarus and Turkish Armenia;

Soviet Russia had to pay the countries of the Quadruple Alliance a huge military indemnity in the amount of six billion gold marks and agree to the complete transfer of all industrial enterprises and mines, where before the war 90% of all coal was mined and more than 70% of iron and steel were smelted.

According to V.I. Lenin, in such humiliating and "obscene" conditions of the Brest peace treaty, which the Soviet government was forced to sign, were to blame, first of all, "our unfortunate leftists Bukharin, Lomov, Uritsky and Co." Moreover, a number of Soviet and Russian historians (Yu. Emelyanov) argue that not a single theoretical or political mistake of N.I. Bukharin did not have such catastrophic consequences for our country and tens of millions of its citizens.

On March 8, 1918, at the emergency VII Congress of the RCP (b), the terms of the Brest Peace Treaty after a sharp controversy between V.I. Lenin and N.I. Bukharin were adopted by a large majority, since the majority of his delegates agreed with Lenin's argument that the international world revolution was for the time being just a beautiful fairy tale and nothing more. On March 15, 1918, after no less heated and heated discussion at the IV Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was ratified by roll call and entered into force.

In historical science, there are still diametrically opposed assessments of the Brest peace treaty, which largely depend on the political and ideological views of their authors. In particular, V.I. Lenin, who had no sympathy for the patriarchal thousand-year-old Russia, directly called Brest Treaty "Tilsit" and "obscene" peace, but vital to the salvation of the power of the Bolsheviks. The same assessments were shared by Soviet historians (A. Chubaryan, A. Bovin, Yu. Emelyanov), who were forced to talk about the brilliant insight and political wisdom of the leader, who foresaw the imminent military defeat of Germany and the annulment of this treaty. In addition, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was traditionally regarded as the first victory of the young Soviet diplomacy, which laid the foundations for the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR.

In modern science, the assessments of the Brest Treaty have changed significantly.

Historians of the liberal persuasion (A. Pantsov, Yu. Felshtinsky) believe that this agreement was not a victory, but the first major defeat of the Bolshevik course to prepare for the world proletarian revolution. At the same time, this peace became a kind of maneuver in the field of tactics and a short-term retreat of the Bolsheviks on the tortuous and difficult path of struggle for the victory of the world socialist revolution.

Historians of a patriotic persuasion (N. Narochnitskaya) are convinced that for V. Lenin and other leaders of Bolshevism, the Russian proletarian revolution was a kind of "bunch of brushwood" capable of igniting the fire of the world proletarian revolution. Therefore, the Brest Treaty was a direct betrayal of the national interests of Russia, which marked the beginning of its collapse and the most difficult Civil War.

2. "Left SR rebellion" and its political consequences

After the ratification of the Brest peace treaty, the "left communists" did not give up hope for its denunciation. In particular, in May 1918, at the Moscow Conference of the RCP(b), N.I. Bukharin, N.V. Osinsky and D.B. Ryazanov (Goldenbach) again called for the denunciation of the Brest Treaty, but the majority of the delegates of this party forum did not support their proposal.

Another attempt to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was the "Left SR rebellion", which took place in Moscow on July 6-7, 1918. The events associated with this rebellion were as follows: The Cheka, under a plausible pretext, entered the German embassy and, having killed the German ambassador Count V. Mirbach, hid in the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which was headed by their fellow party member Dmitry Popov.

After the accomplishment of this terrorist act, V.I. Lenin and Ya.M. Sverdlov went to the German embassy, ​​and the chairman of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest Ya. G. Blyumkin and N.A. Andreeva. Upon arrival at the place of F.E. Dzerzhinsky was taken under arrest, and the headquarters of the Cheka troops, on the orders of D.I. Popov was turned into an impregnable fortress, where more than 600 well-armed Chekists dug in.

Upon learning of the arrest of F.E. Dzerzhinsky, V.I. Lenin instructed to arrest the entire faction of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries who took part in the work of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and to take their leader Maria Spiridonova as a hostage in exchange for saving the life of F.E. Dzerzhinsky. At the same time, the commander of the division of the Latvian riflemen I.I. Vatsetis was ordered to storm the mansion of the Cheka troops and suppress the "Left SR rebellion". On the night of July 7, 1918, a division of Latvian riflemen, with the support of field artillery, launched an assault on the headquarters of the Cheka troops, which ended in the complete defeat of the rebels and the release of F.E. Dzerzhinsky.

The trial of the rebels was quick and just: several hundred people, including Ya.G. Blyumkin and N.A. Andreev, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and the immediate inspirer and leader of this rebellion, Deputy Chairman of the Cheka V.A. Aleksandrovich was shot. The same result ended with the new “Left SR rebellion”, raised in Simbirsk by the commander of the Eastern Front, the Left SR M.A. Muravyov, who was shot dead on July 10, 1918 upon arrival for negotiations in the building of the provincial executive committee.

In Soviet and Russian historical science (K. Gusev, A. Velidov, A. Kiselev), it was traditionally asserted that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk were deliberately organized by the leadership of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party (M.A. Spiridonova, P.P. Proshyan), who not only wanted to denounce the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, but also, having provoked a government crisis, to remove from power the Bolshevik Party, which, planting committees, began to pursue a disastrous economic course in the countryside.

In foreign historiography (Yu. Felshtinsky), there is a rather exotic version, which says that the so-called “Left SR rebellion” was organized by “left communists”, in particular, the head of the Cheka, F.E. Dzerzhinsky, who also sought to denounce the "obscene" Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and kindle the fire of the world proletarian revolution.

In our opinion, there are much more white spots and unsolved mysteries in the history of this rebellion than it seems at first glance, since researchers have not been able to properly answer even two completely obvious questions:

1) why exactly the chairman of the Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky personally went to the headquarters of the Cheka troops to arrest the killers of the German ambassador;

2) if the decision to kill the German ambassador was sanctioned by the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party, then why is its entire faction, including M.A. Spiridonov, calmly waited for her isolation and arrest on the sidelines of the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

Speaking essentially, it should be recognized that the July events in Moscow and Simbirsk drew a line under the period of development of Soviet statehood on a two-party basis and became the starting point for the formation of a one-party Bolshevik system in the country. During this period, the activities of all Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik and anarchist groups and parties, the existence of which still created the illusion of proletarian-peasant democracy in the country, were banned.

The Brest Treaty itself was denounced by the Soviet government on November 13, 1918, that is, exactly one day after the surrender of Germany and its military allies to the Entente countries, which put a long-awaited end to the First World War.

The direct result of the Brest Peace and the suppression of the "Left SR rebellion" was the adoption of the first Constitution of the RSFSR. According to most authors (O. Chistyakov, S. Leonov, I. Isaev), for the first time the issue of creating the first Soviet Constitution was discussed at a meeting of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on March 30, 1918. On April 1, 1918, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee formed a constitutional commission, in which included representatives of his three party factions (Bolsheviks, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries) and representatives of the six leading people's commissariats - for military and naval affairs, for nationalities, internal affairs, justice, finance and the Supreme Economic Council. Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya.M. Sverdlov.

During the work on the draft Constitution, which lasted more than three months, a number of fundamental disagreements arose on the following issues:

1) the federal structure of the state;

2) the system of local Soviet authorities;

3) the social and economic foundations of Soviet power, etc.

In particular, representatives of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries (V.A. Algasov, A.A. Schreider) and Maximalist Socialist-Revolutionaries (A.I. Berdnikov) very persistently suggested:

1) put the administrative-territorial principle at the basis of the Soviet federation state structure with the provision of the broadest possible rights to all subjects of the federation to manage their own territories;

2) liquidate the grassroots links of the Soviet state system and replace them with traditional rural gatherings, which, having lost their political functions, turned into municipal authorities;

3) carry out total socialization of property and tighten the principles of universal labor service, etc.

During a heated and lengthy debate, in which many prominent Bolsheviks took part, including V.I. Lenin, Ya.M. Sverdlov, I.V. Stalin, N.I. Bukharin, L.M. Reisner, M.F. Latsis and M.N. Pokrovsky, these proposals were rejected. The final draft of the Soviet Constitution was approved by a special commission of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), headed by V.I. Lenin.

On July 4, 1918, this project was submitted for consideration by the V All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and already on July 10, the congress delegates approved the first Constitution of the RSFSR and elected a new composition of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, consisting entirely of Bolsheviks.

The main provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic were enshrined in six separate sections:

2) general provisions the Constitution of the RSFSR;

3) the construction of Soviet power;

4) active and passive suffrage;

5) budget law;

6) about the emblem and flag of the RSFSR.

The Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People, which was fully included in the Constitution of the RSFSR, determined the political and social basis of the new Soviet statehood - the power of the Soviets of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies and "the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the poorest peasantry in order to completely suppress the bourgeoisie, abolish the exploitation of man by man and establish socialism in the country."

The state structure of the RSFSR was based on the principles of a national federation, the subjects of which were declared national republics, as well as various regional unions, consisting of several national regions. The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', Peasants' and Cossacks' Deputies became the supreme body of state power in the country, the exclusive competence of which included all issues of state building: approval and amendment of the Constitution of the RSFSR; declaration of war and conclusion of peace; ratification of peace treaties, general leadership of foreign and internal politics states; establishment of national taxes, duties and fees; the basics of the organization of the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, the judiciary and legal proceedings; federal law, etc.

For everyday and operational work, the congress elected from among its members the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK RSFSR), which formed the Council of People's Commissars (SNK RSFSR), which consisted of people's commissars who headed the sectoral people's commissariats (People's Commissariats). And the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and the Council of People's Commissars equally had the right to issue legislative acts, which was a direct consequence of the complete denial by the Bolsheviks of the well-known bourgeois principle of separation of powers. Regional, provincial, district and volost congresses of Soviets, as well as city and rural Soviets, which formed their own executive committees (executive committees), became local government bodies.

It should be emphasized that the well-known principle of “democratic centralism” was put at the basis of the organization of Soviet power at all levels, according to which the lower bodies of Soviet power were strictly subordinated to the higher ones, which were charged with the obligation to implement all decisions of the higher Soviets that did not violate their competence.

The Constitution of the RSFSR legislated not only a new type of Soviet statehood, but also a new type of Soviet democracy, since it openly proclaimed the class principle of democratic rights and freedoms. In particular, all "socially alien class elements" were deprived of the right to vote, and the representation from the social groups of working people who were endowed with the right to vote was far from equal. For example, in elections to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, city Soviets had a fivefold advantage over provincial Congresses of Soviets, etc.

In addition, the Soviet electoral system retained the principle of indirect elections that existed in Tsarist Russia. Only elections to grassroots city and rural Soviets were direct, and deputies of all subsequent levels were elected at volost, district, provincial and regional congresses of Soviets.

In the First World War, which began in the summer of 1914, Russia took the side of the Entente and its allies - the United States, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, Japan and Romania. This coalition was opposed by the Central Powers - a military-political bloc that included Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Bulgarian kingdom and the Ottoman Empire.

The protracted war exhausted the economy of the Russian Empire. At the beginning of 1917, rumors about an impending famine spread around the capital, bread cards appeared. And on February 21, robberies of bakeries began. Local pogroms quickly developed into anti-war actions under the slogans "Down with the war!", "Down with the autocracy!", "Bread!". By February 25, at least 300,000 people took part in the rallies.

The data on colossal losses destabilized society even more: according to various estimates, from 775 thousand to 1 million 300 thousand Russian soldiers died in the First World War.

In the same February days In 1917, a rebellion began in the troops. By the spring, the orders of the officers were not actually carried out, and the May Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier, which equalized the rights of soldiers and civilians, further undermined discipline. The failure of the summer Riga operation, as a result of which Russia lost Riga and 18 thousand people killed and captured, led to the fact that the army finally lost its morale.

The Bolsheviks also played their part in this, considering the army as a threat to their power. They skillfully fueled pacifist sentiments in military circles.

And in the rear it became a catalyst for two revolutions - February and October. The Bolsheviks got an already morally broken army, which was not able to fight.

• Line for bread. Petrograd, 1917
• RIA News

Meanwhile, the First World War continued, and Germany had a real opportunity to take Petrograd. Then the Bolsheviks decided on a truce.

“The conclusion of the Brest Peace was an inevitable, forced measure. The Bolsheviks themselves, fearing the suppression of their uprising, decomposed the tsarist army and understood that it was not capable of full-fledged combat operations, ”said Valery Korovin, director of the Center for Geopolitical Expertise, in an interview with RT.

Peace Decree

One month after October revolution On November 8, 1917, the new government adopted the Decree on Peace, the main thesis of which was an immediate truce without annexations and indemnities. However, the proposal to start negotiations of the powers of the "friendly agreement" was ignored, and the Council of People's Commissars was forced to act independently.

Lenin sent a telegram to the units of the Russian army that were at the front at that moment.

“Let the regiments standing in positions immediately choose authorized persons to formally enter into negotiations on a truce with the enemy,” it said.

On December 22, 1917, Soviet Russia began negotiations with the Central Powers. However, the formula "without annexations and indemnities" did not suit Germany and Austria-Hungary. They suggested that Russia "take note of the statements expressing the will of the peoples inhabiting Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estland and Livonia, about their desire for complete state independence and for separation from the Russian Federation."

Of course, the Soviet side could not fulfill such requirements. It was decided in Petrograd that time had to be gained in order to reorganize the army and prepare for the defense of the capital. For this, Trotsky leaves for Brest-Litovsk.

The mission of the "puller"

“In order to drag out the negotiations, you need a “delayer,” as Lenin put it,” Trotsky would later write, calling his participation in the negotiations “visits to the torture chamber.”

At the same time, Trotsky conducted "subversive" propaganda activities among the workers and peasants of Germany and Austria-Hungary with an eye on an imminent uprising.

The negotiations were extremely difficult. On January 4, 1918, they were joined by a delegation from the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR), which did not recognize Soviet power. In Brest-Litovsk, the UNR acted as a third party, putting forward claims to part of the Polish and Austro-Hungarian territories.

Meanwhile, the economic turmoil of the war had also reached the Central Powers. Food cards for the population appeared in Germany and Austria-Hungary, strikes began demanding peace.

On January 18, 1918, the Central Powers presented their terms for an armistice. According to them, Germany and Austria-Hungary received Poland, Lithuania, some territories of Belarus, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, the Moonsund Islands, and the Gulf of Riga. The delegation of Soviet Russia, for which the demands of the powers were extremely unfavorable, took a break in the negotiations.

The Russian delegation could not make an informed decision also because serious disagreements arose in the country's leadership.

Thus, Bukharin called for an end to negotiations and a "revolutionary war" against the Western imperialists, believing that even Soviet power itself could be sacrificed for the "interests of the international revolution." Trotsky adhered to the line "no war, no peace": "We do not sign peace, we stop the war, and we demobilize the army."

• Leon Trotsky (in the center) as part of the Russian delegation arrives for negotiations in Brest-Litovsk, 1918
• globallookpress.com
• Berliner Verlag / Archive

Lenin, in turn, wanted peace at all costs and insisted that German demands should be accepted.

"For revolutionary war we need an army, but we don’t have an army ... Undoubtedly, the peace that we are forced to conclude now is an obscene peace, but if a war starts, our government will be swept away and peace will be made by another government, ”he said.

As a result, they decided to drag out the negotiations even more. Trotsky again went to Brest-Litovsk with instructions from Lenin to sign a peace treaty on Germany's terms if she presented an ultimatum.

Russian "surrender"

During the days of the negotiations, a Bolshevik uprising took place in Kyiv. Soviet power was proclaimed in Left-Bank Ukraine, and Trotsky returned to Brest-Litovsk at the end of January 1918 with representatives of Soviet Ukraine. At the same time, the Central Powers declared that they recognized the sovereignty of the UNR. Then Trotsky announced that, in turn, he did not recognize separate agreements between the UNR and the “partners”.

Despite this, on February 9, the delegations of Germany and Austria-Hungary, with an eye to the difficult economic situation in their countries, signed a peace treaty with the Ukrainian people's republic. According to the document, in exchange for military assistance against Soviet Russia, the UNR was supposed to supply the "defenders" with food, as well as hemp, manganese ore and a number of other goods.

Having learned about the agreement with the UNR, German Emperor Wilhelm II ordered the German delegation to present an ultimatum to Soviet Russia demanding to abandon the Baltic regions to the Narva-Pskov-Dvinsk line. The formal reason for the toughening of the rhetoric was Trotsky's allegedly intercepted appeal to the German military with a call to "kill the emperor and the generals and fraternize with the Soviet troops."

Contrary to Lenin's decision, Trotsky refused to sign peace on German terms and left the negotiations.

As a result, on February 13, Germany resumed hostilities, rapidly moving northward. Minsk, Kyiv, Gomel, Chernigov, Mogilev and Zhitomir were taken.

• Demonstrators burn the symbols of the old system on the Champ de Mars, 1918
• RIA News

Lenin, given the low discipline and difficult psychological situation in the Russian army, approved of mass fraternization with the enemy and spontaneous truces.

“Desertion is progressively growing, entire regiments and artillery go to the rear, exposing the front for significant stretches, the Germans are walking in crowds along the abandoned position. Constant visits by enemy soldiers to our positions, especially artillery ones, and the destruction of our fortifications by them, undoubtedly, are of an organized nature, ”the note of the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Mikhail Bonch-Bruyevich, said in a note sent to the Council of People's Commissars.

As a result, on March 3, 1918, the delegation of Soviet Russia signed a peace treaty. According to the document, Russia made a number of serious territorial concessions. Baltic Fleet bases in Finland and the Baltic.

Russia lost the Vistula provinces, in which the predominantly Belarusian population lived, the Estonian, Courland and Livonian provinces, as well as the Grand Duchy of Finland.

In part, these regions became protectorates of Germany or were part of it. Russia also lost territories in the Caucasus - Kars and Batumi regions. In addition, Ukraine was rejected: the Soviet government was obliged to recognize the independence of the UNR and stop the war with it.

Also, Soviet Russia had to pay reparations in the amount of 6 billion marks. In addition, Germany demanded compensation for 500 million gold rubles of losses that it allegedly suffered as a result of the Russian revolution.

“The fall of Petrograd was, in general, a matter of, if not a few days, then a few weeks. And under these conditions, guessing whether it was possible or impossible to sign this peace does not make any sense. If we hadn’t signed it, we would have received an offensive by one of the most powerful armies in Europe on untrained, unarmed workers, ”says Vladimir Kornilov, director of the Center for Eurasian Studies.

Bolshevik plan

Estimates of the consequences of the Brest peace treaty by historians differ.

“We have ceased to be actors in European politics. However, there were no catastrophic consequences. In the future, all the territories lost as a result of the Brest Peace were returned first by Lenin, then by Stalin, ”Korovin emphasized.

Kornilov adheres to a similar point of view. The expert draws attention to the fact that the political forces, which considered the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk a betrayal, subsequently collaborated with the enemy themselves.

“Lenin, who was accused of betrayal, then proved that he was right by returning the territories. At the same time, the Right Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, who shouted the loudest, offered no resistance, calmly cooperated with the German occupation forces in southern Russia. And the Bolsheviks organized the return of these territories and returned in the end, ”said Kornilov.

At the same time, some analysts believe that in Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks acted solely for the sake of their own interests.

“They saved their power and deliberately paid for it with territories,” Rostislav Ishchenko, president of the Center for System Analysis and Forecasting, said in an interview with RT.

• Vladimir Lenin, 1918
• globallookpress.com

According to the American historian Richard Pipes, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk helped Lenin gain additional authority.

"Sharply going to humiliating world who gave him the necessary time to win and then collapsed under his own weight, Lenin earned the broad confidence of the Bolsheviks. When, on November 13, 1918, they tore up the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, following which Germany capitulated to the Western Allies, Lenin's authority in the Bolshevik movement was raised to unprecedented heights. Nothing better served his reputation for not committing political mistakes”, writes Pipes in his study “The Bolsheviks in the Struggle for Power”.

“Largely thanks to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, or rather, the German occupation, the future northern and eastern borders of Ukraine were formed,” says Kornilov.

In addition, it was the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk that became one of the reasons for the appearance in the Soviet, and then in the Russian Constitution of "time bombs" - national republics.

“The one-time loss of large territories has led to the facilitation and acceleration of the process of self-determination of the population of some of them as sovereign political nations. Subsequently, during the formation of the USSR, this influenced Lenin's choice of this particular model - the national-administrative division into the so-called republics with sovereignty and the right to secede from the USSR already inscribed in their very first constitution, ”Korovin noted.

At the same time, the events of 1918 largely influenced the idea of ​​the Bolsheviks about the role of the state.

“The loss of large territories forced the Bolsheviks as a whole to rethink their attitude towards the state. If until some point the state was not a value in the light of the coming world revolution, then the one-time loss of a large space sobered even the most rabid, forcing them to appreciate the territories from which the state is made up, with their resources, population and industrial potential, ”concluded Korovin .

The Brest peace is one of the most humiliating episodes in the history of Russia. It became a resounding diplomatic failure of the Bolsheviks and was accompanied by an acute political crisis within the country.

Peace Decree

The "Peace Decree" was adopted on October 26, 1917 - the day after the armed coup - and spoke of the need to conclude a just democratic peace without annexations and indemnities between all warring peoples. He served legal basis to conclude a separate agreement with Germany and other Central Powers.

Publicly, Lenin spoke about the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war, he considered the revolution in Russia only the initial stage of the world socialist revolution. In fact, there were other reasons as well. The warring peoples did not act according to Ilyich's plans - they did not want to turn bayonets against the governments, and the allied governments ignored the peace proposal of the Bolsheviks. Only the countries of the enemy bloc that were losing the war went for rapprochement.

Terms

Germany declared that it was ready to accept the condition of peace without annexations and indemnities, but only if this peace was signed by all the belligerent countries. But none of the Entente countries joined the peace negotiations, so Germany abandoned the Bolshevik formula, and their hopes for a just peace were finally buried. The talk in the second round of negotiations was exclusively about a separate peace, the terms of which were dictated by Germany.

Betrayal and necessity

Not all Bolsheviks were willing to sign a separate peace. The left was categorically opposed to any agreements with imperialism. They defended the idea of ​​exporting the revolution, believing that without socialism in Europe, Russian socialism is doomed to perish (and the subsequent transformations of the Bolshevik regime proved them right). The leaders of the left Bolsheviks were Bukharin, Uritsky, Radek, Dzerzhinsky and others. They called for a guerrilla war against German imperialism, and in the future they hoped to conduct regular military operations with the forces of the Red Army being created.

For the immediate conclusion of a separate peace was, above all, Lenin. He was afraid of the German offensive and the complete loss of his own power, which, even after the coup, was largely based on German money. It is unlikely that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was directly bought by Berlin. The main factor was precisely the fear of losing power. Considering that a year after the conclusion of peace with Germany, Lenin was ready even for the division of Russia in exchange for international recognition, then the terms of the Brest Peace would seem not so humiliating.

Trotsky occupied an intermediate position in the inner-party struggle. He defended the thesis "No peace, no war." That is, he proposed to stop hostilities, but not to sign any agreements with Germany. As a result of the struggle within the party, it was decided to drag out the negotiations in every possible way, waiting for a revolution in Germany, but if the Germans present an ultimatum, then agree to all conditions. However, Trotsky, who led the Soviet delegation in the second round of negotiations, refused to accept the German ultimatum. Negotiations broke down and Germany continued to advance. When the peace was signed, the Germans were 170 km from Petrograd.

Annexations and indemnities

Peace conditions were very difficult for Russia. She lost Ukraine and Polish lands, renounced her claims to Finland, gave up the Batumi and Kars regions, had to demobilize all her troops, abandon Black Sea Fleet and pay huge indemnities. The country was losing almost 800 thousand square meters. km and 56 million people. In Russia, the Germans received the exclusive right to freely engage in entrepreneurship. In addition, the Bolsheviks pledged to pay the royal debts of Germany and its allies.

At the same time, the Germans did not comply with their own obligations. After signing the treaty, they continued the occupation of Ukraine, overthrew the Soviet government on the Don and helped the White movement in every possible way.

Rise of the Left

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk almost led to a split in the Bolshevik Party and the loss of power by the Bolsheviks. Lenin hardly dragged the final decision on peace through a vote in the Central Committee, threatening to resign. The split of the party did not happen only thanks to Trotsky, who agreed to abstain from the vote, ensuring the victory of Lenin. But this did not help to avoid a political crisis.