Steppe ubermensch on a tireless Mongolian horse (Mongolia, 1911)

The historiography about the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars (or Tatar-Mongols, or Tatars and Mongols, and so on, as you like) into Rus' goes back over 300 years. This invasion has become a generally accepted fact since the end of the 17th century, when one of the founders of Russian Orthodoxy, the German Innocent Gisel, wrote the first textbook on the history of Russia - “Synopsis”. According to this book, the Russians hammered home history for the next 150 years. However, so far no historian has taken it upon himself to make a “road map” of Batu Khan’s campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 in North-Eastern Rus'.

A little background

IN late XII century, a new leader appeared among the Mongol tribes - Temujin, who managed to unite most of them around himself. In 1206, he was proclaimed at the kurultai (analogous to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR) as the all-Mongolian khan under the nickname Genghis Khan, who created the notorious “state of nomads.” Without wasting a minute, the Mongols began to conquer the surrounding territories. By 1223, when the Mongol detachment of commanders Jebe and Subudai clashed with the Russian-Polovtsian army on the Kalka River, the zealous nomads managed to conquer territories from Manchuria in the east to Iran, the southern Caucasus and modern western Kazakhstan, defeating the state of Khorezmshah and capturing part of northern China along the way.

In 1227, Genghis Khan died, but his heirs continued his conquests. By 1232, the Mongols reached the middle Volga, where they waged war with the nomadic Cumans and their allies - the Volga Bulgars (ancestors of the modern Volga Tatars). In 1235 (according to other sources - in 1236), a decision was made at the kurultai on a global campaign against the Kipchaks, Bulgars and Russians, as well as further to the West. The grandson of Genghis Khan, Khan Batu (Batu), had to lead this campaign. Here we need to make a digression. In 1236-1237, the Mongols, who by that time were fighting in vast areas from modern Ossetia (against the Alans) to the modern Volga republics, captured Tatarstan (Volga Bulgaria) and in the fall of 1237 began concentrating for a campaign against the Russian principalities.

Empire on a planetary scale

In general, why the nomads from the banks of Kerulen and Onon needed to conquer Ryazan or Hungary is not really known. All attempts by historians to laboriously justify such agility of the Mongols look rather pale. Regarding Western campaign Mongols (1235-1243), they came up with the story that the attack on the Russian principalities was a measure to secure their flank and destroy potential allies of their main enemies - the Cumans (part of the Cumans went to Hungary, but the bulk of them became the ancestors of modern Kazakhs). True, neither the Ryazan principality, nor the Vladimir-Suzdal, nor the so-called. The “Novgorod Republic” was never allies of either the Cumans or the Volga Bulgars (you can read an interesting study on this topic).

Also, almost all historiography about the Mongols does not really say anything about the principles of forming their armies, the principles of managing them, and so on. At the same time, it was believed that the Mongols formed their tumens (field operational units), including from conquered peoples, the soldier was not paid anything for his service, and for any offense they were threatened with the death penalty.

Scientists tried to explain the successes of the nomads this way and that, but each time it turned out quite funny. Although, ultimately, the level of organization of the Mongol army - from intelligence to communications - could be envied by the armies of the most developed states of the 20th century (however, after the end of the era of wonderful campaigns, the Mongols - already 30 years after the death of Genghis Khan - instantly lost all their skills). For example, it is believed that the head of Mongolian intelligence, commander Subudai, maintained relations with the Pope, the German-Roman emperor, Venice, and so on.

Moreover, the Mongols, naturally, during their military campaigns acted without any radio communications, railways, road transport and so on. IN Soviet time historians interspersed the traditional by that time fantasy about steppe ubermenches who did not know fatigue, hunger, fear, etc., with classical ritual in the field of the class-formational approach:

With a general recruitment into the army, each ten tents had to field from one to three warriors, depending on the need, and provide them with food. Weapons in Peaceful time stored in special warehouses. It was the property of the state and was issued to soldiers when they went on a campaign. Upon returning from the campaign, each warrior was obliged to surrender his weapons. The soldiers did not receive a salary, but they themselves paid the tax with horses or other livestock (one head per hundred heads). In war, each warrior had an equal right to use the spoils, a certain part of which was obliged to hand over to the khan. In the periods between campaigns, the army was sent to public works. One day a week was reserved for serving the khan.

The organization of the army was based on the decimal system. The army was divided into tens, hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands (tumyns or darkness), headed by foremen, centurions and thousands. The commanders had separate tents and a reserve of horses and weapons.

The main branch of the army was cavalry, which was divided into heavy and light. The heavy cavalry fought with the main forces of the enemy. The light cavalry carried out guard duty and conducted reconnaissance. She started a battle, disrupting the enemy ranks with arrows. The Mongols were excellent archers from horseback. Light cavalry pursued the enemy. The cavalry had a large number of factory (spare) horses, which allowed the Mongols to move very quickly over long distances. A feature of the Mongol army was the complete absence of a wheeled train. Only the tents of the khan and especially noble persons were transported on carts...

Each warrior had a file for sharpening arrows, an awl, a needle, thread and a sieve for sifting flour or straining muddy water. The rider had a small tent, two tursuks (leather bags): one for water, the other for kruta (dried sour cheese). If food supplies ran low, the Mongols bled their horses and drank it. In this way they could be content for up to 10 days.

In general, the term “Mongol-Tatars” (or Tatar-Mongols) itself is very bad. It sounds something like Croatian-Indians or Finno-Negros, if we talk about its meaning. The fact is that Russians and Poles, who encountered nomads in the 15th-17th centuries, called them the same - Tatars. Subsequently, the Russians often transferred this to other peoples who had nothing to do with the nomadic Turks in the Black Sea steppes. Europeans also made their contribution to this mess, who for a long time considered Russia (then Muscovy) Tatarstan (more precisely, Tartaria), which led to very bizarre constructions.

The French view of Russia in the mid-18th century

One way or another, society learned that the “Tatars” who attacked Rus' and Europe were also Mongols only at the beginning of the 19th century, when Christian Kruse published “Atlas and tables for reviewing the history of all European lands and states from their first population to our times." Then Russian historians happily picked up the idiotic term.

Particular attention should also be paid to the issue of the number of conquerors. Naturally, no documentary data on the size of the Mongol army has reached us, and the most ancient source that enjoys unquestioning trust among historians is historical work a team of authors under the leadership of the official of the Iranian state of the Hulaguids, Rashid ad-Din, “List of Chronicles”. It is believed that it was written in early XIV century in Persian, however, it surfaced only at the beginning of the 19th century, the first partial edition in French published in 1836. Until the middle of the 20th century, this source was not completely translated and published.

According to Rashid ad-Din, by 1227 (the year of Genghis Khan's death), the total army of the Mongol Empire was 129 thousand people. If you believe Plano Carpini, then 10 years later the army of phenomenal nomads consisted of 150 thousand Mongols themselves and another 450 thousand people recruited in a “voluntary-forced” manner from subject peoples. Pre-revolutionary Russian historians estimated the size of Batu's army, concentrated in the fall of 1237 near the borders of the Ryazan principality, from 300 to 600 thousand people. At the same time, it was taken for granted that each nomad had 2-3 horses.

By the standards of the Middle Ages, such armies look completely monstrous and implausible, we must admit. However, reproaching pundits for fantasizing is too cruel for them. It is unlikely that any of them could even imagine even a couple of tens of thousands of mounted warriors with 50-60 thousand horses, not to mention the obvious problems with managing such a mass of people and providing them with food. Since history is an inexact science, and indeed not a science at all, everyone can evaluate the range of fantasy researchers. We will use the now classic estimate of the size of Batu’s army at 130-140 thousand people, which was proposed by the Soviet scientist V.V. Kargalov. His assessment (like all the others, completely sucked from thin air, to be very serious) in historiography, however, is prevalent. In particular, it is shared by the largest modern Russian researcher of the history of the Mongol Empire, R.P. Khrapachevsky.

From Ryazan to Vladimir

In the autumn of 1237, Mongol troops, who had fought throughout the spring and summer across vast areas from the North Caucasus, Lower Don and to the middle Volga region, converged general collection- Onuza River. It is believed that we're talking about O modern river Prices in the modern Tambov region. Probably, some detachments of Mongols also gathered in the upper reaches of the Voronezh and Don rivers. There is no exact date for the start of the Mongols’ offensive against the Ryazan principality, but it can be assumed that it took place in any case no later than December 1, 1237. That is, steppe nomads with a herd of almost half a million horses, they decided to go on a hike in winter. This is important for our reconstruction. If so, then they probably had to be sure that in the forests of the Volga-Osk interfluve, still rather weakly colonized by the Russians by that time, they would have enough food for horses and people.

Along the valleys of the Lesnoy and Polny Voronezh rivers, as well as the tributaries of the Pronya River, the Mongol army, moving in one or several columns, passes through the forested watershed of the Oka and Don. The embassy of the Ryazan prince Fyodor Yuryevich arrives to them, which turned out to be ineffective (the prince is killed), and somewhere in the same region the Mongols meet the Ryazan army in a field. In a fierce battle, they destroy it, and then move upstream of the Pronya, plundering and destroying small Ryazan cities - Izheslavets, Belgorod, Pronsk, and burning Mordovian and Russian villages.

Here we need to make a small clarification: we do not have accurate data on the number of people in the then North-Eastern Rus', but if we follow the reconstruction of modern scientists and archaeologists (V.P. Darkevich, M.N. Tikhomirov, A.V. Kuza), then it was not large and, in addition, it was characterized by low population density. Eg, The largest city Ryazan land - Ryazan, maximum 6-8 thousand people, another 10-14 thousand people could live in the agricultural district of the city (within a radius of 20-30 kilometers). The remaining cities had a population of several hundred people, at best, like Murom - up to a couple of thousand. Based on this, it is unlikely that the total population of the Ryazan principality could exceed 200-250 thousand people.

Of course, for the conquest of such a “proto-state” 120-140 thousand soldiers were more than an excessive number, but we will stick to the classical version.

On December 16, the Mongols, after a march of 350-400 kilometers (that is, the pace of the average daily march here is up to 18-20 kilometers), go to Ryazan and begin its siege - they build a wooden fence around the city, build stone-throwing machines, with the help of which they lead shelling of the city. In general, historians admit that the Mongols achieved incredible - by the standards of that time - success in siege warfare. For example, historian R.P. Khrapachevsky seriously believes that the Mongols were able to build any stone-throwing machines on the spot from available wood in literally a day or two:

There was everything necessary to assemble stone throwers - the united army of the Mongols had enough specialists from China and Tangut..., and Russian forests abundantly supplied the Mongols with wood for assembling siege weapons.

Finally, on December 21, Ryazan fell after a fierce assault. True, an inconvenient question arises: we know that the total length of the city’s defensive fortifications was less than 4 kilometers. Most of the Ryazan soldiers died in the border battle, so it is unlikely that there were many soldiers in the city. Why did a gigantic Mongol army of 140 thousand soldiers sit for 6 whole days under its walls if the balance of forces was at least 100-150:1?

We also do not have any clear evidence of what the climatic conditions were in December 1238, but since the Mongols chose the ice of rivers as a method of transportation (there was no other way to pass through wooded areas, the first permanent roads in North-Eastern Rus' are documented only in the 14th century). century, all Russian researchers agree with this version), we can assume that it was already a normal winter with frosts, possibly snow.

An important question is also what the Mongolian horses ate during this campaign. From the works of historians and modern research steppe horses, it is clear that we were talking about very unpretentious, small - height at the withers up to 110-120 centimeters, conics. Their main diet is hay and grass (they did not eat grain). In their natural habitat, they are unpretentious and quite hardy, and in winter, during tebenevka, they are able to tear up snow in the steppe and eat last year’s grass.

Based on this, historians unanimously believe that thanks to these properties, the question of feeding the horses during the campaign in the winter of 1237-1238 against Rus' did not arise. Meanwhile, it is not difficult to notice that the conditions in this region (the thickness of the snow cover, the area of ​​grass stands, as well as the general quality of phytocenoses) differ from, say, Khalkha or Turkestan. In addition, the winter training of steppe horses consists of the following: a herd of horses slowly, walking a few hundred meters a day, moves across the steppe, looking for withered grass under the snow. Animals thus save their energy costs. However, during the campaign against Rus', these horses had to walk 10-20-30 or even more kilometers a day in the cold (see below), carrying luggage or a warrior. Were horses able to replenish their energy expenditure under such conditions? More interest Ask: if Mongolian horses dug through snow and found grass under it, then what should be the area of ​​their daily feeding grounds?

After the capture of Ryazan, the Mongols began to advance towards the Kolomna fortress, which was a kind of “gate” to the Vladimir-Suzdal land. Having walked 130 kilometers from Ryazan to Kolomna, according to Rashid ad-Din and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the Mongols were “stuck” at this fortress until January 5 or even 10, 1238 - that is, at least for almost 15-20 days. On the other hand, a strong Vladimir army is moving towards Kolomna, which Grand Duke Yuri Vsevolodovich probably equipped immediately after receiving news of the fall of Ryazan (he and the Chernigov prince refused to help Ryazan). The Mongols send an embassy to him with an offer to become their tributary, but the negotiations also turn out to be fruitless (according to the Laurentian Chronicle, the prince still agrees to pay tribute, but still sends troops to Kolomna. It is difficult to explain the logic of such an act).

According to V.V. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, the battle of Kolomna began no later than January 9 and lasted for 5 whole days (according to Rashid ad-Din). Here another logical question immediately arises - historians are sure that the military forces of the Russian principalities as a whole were modest and corresponded to the reconstructions of that era, when an army of 1-2 thousand people was standard, and 4-5 thousand or more people seemed like a huge army. It is unlikely that the Vladimir prince Yuri Vsevolodovich could have collected more (if we make a digression: the total population of the Vladimir land, according to various estimates, varied between 400-800 thousand people, but they were all scattered over a vast territory, and the population of the capital city of the earth - Vladimir, even according to the most daring reconstructions, it did not exceed 15-25 thousand people). However, near Kolomna the Mongols were pinned down for several days, and the intensity of the battle is shown by the fact of the death of Genghisid Kulkan, the son of Genghis Khan. With whom did the gigantic army of 140 thousand nomads fight so fiercely? With several thousand Vladimir soldiers?

After the victory at Kolomna in either a three- or five-day battle, the Mongols are vigorously moving along the ice of the Moscow River towards the future Russian capital. They cover a distance of 100 kilometers in literally 3-4 days (the pace of an average daily march is 25-30 kilometers): according to R.P. Khrapachevsky, the nomads began the siege of Moscow on January 15 (according to N.M. Karamzin - January 20). The nimble Mongols took the Muscovites by surprise - they did not even know about the results of the battle of Kolomna, and after a five-day siege, Moscow shared the fate of Ryazan: the city was burned, all its inhabitants were exterminated or taken prisoner.

Again, Moscow at that time, if we take archaeological data as the basis for our reasoning, was an absolutely tiny town. Thus, the first fortifications, built back in 1156, had a length of less than 1 kilometer, and the area of ​​the fortress itself did not exceed 3 hectares. By 1237, it is believed that the area of ​​the fortifications had already reached 10-12 hectares (that is, approximately half the territory of the current Kremlin). The city had its own suburb - it was located on the territory of modern Red Square. The total population of such a city hardly exceeded 1000 people. What a huge army of Mongols, possessing supposedly unique siege technologies, did for five whole days in front of this insignificant fortress, one can only guess.

It is also worth noting here that all historians recognize the fact of the movement of the Mongol-Tatars without a convoy. They say that the unpretentious nomads did not need it. Then it remains not entirely clear how and on what the Mongols moved their stone-throwing machines, shells for them, forges (for repairing weapons, replenishing lost arrowheads, etc.), and how they drove away prisoners. Because all the time archaeological excavations Not a single burial of “Mongol-Tatars” was found on the territory of North-Eastern Rus'; some historians even agreed on the version that the nomads took their dead back to the steppes (V.P. Darkevich, V.V. Kargalov). Of course, it’s not even worth raising the question of the fate of the wounded or sick in this light (otherwise our historians will come up with the fact that they were eaten, a joke) ...

However, after spending about a week in the vicinity of Moscow and plundering its agricultural contado (the main agricultural crop in this region was rye and partly oats, but steppe horses accepted grain very poorly), the Mongols moved along the ice of the Klyazma River (crossing the forest watershed between this river and Moscow River) to Vladimir. Having covered over 140 kilometers in 7 days (the pace of an average daily march is about 20 kilometers), on February 2, 1238, the nomads began the siege of the capital of the Vladimir land. By the way, it is at this crossing Mongol army 120-140 thousand people are “caught” by a tiny detachment of the Ryazan boyar Evpatiy Kolovrat of either 700 or 1700 people, against whom the Mongols - out of powerlessness - are forced to use stone-throwing machines in order to defeat him (it is worth considering that the legend about Kolovrat was It was recorded, according to historians, only in the 15th century, so... it is difficult to consider it completely documentary).

Let’s ask an academic question: what is an army of 120-140 thousand people with almost 400 thousand horses (and it’s not clear if there is a convoy?) moving on the ice of some Oka or Moscow river? The simplest calculations show that even moving with a front of 2 kilometers (in reality, the width of these rivers is significantly less), such an army under the most ideal conditions (everyone moves at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance of 10 meters) stretches for at least 20 kilometers. If we take into account that the width of the Oka is only 150-200 meters, then the giant army of Batu stretches for almost... 200 kilometers! Again, if everyone walks at the same speed, maintaining a minimum distance. And on the ice of the Moscow or Klyazma rivers, the width of which varies from 50 to 100 meters at best? For 400-800 kilometers?

It is interesting that none of the Russian scientists over the past 200 years have even asked such a question, seriously believing that giant cavalry armies literally fly through the air.

In general, at the first stage of Batu Khan’s invasion of North-Eastern Rus' - from December 1, 1237 to February 2, 1238, a conventional Mongolian horse covered about 750 kilometers, which gives an average daily rate of movement of 12 kilometers. But if we exclude from the calculations at least 15 days of standing in the Oka floodplain (after the capture of Ryazan on December 21 and the battle of Kolomna), as well as a week of rest and looting near Moscow, the pace of the average daily march of the Mongol cavalry will seriously improve - up to 17 kilometers per day.

It cannot be said that these are some kind of record paces of march (the Russian army during the war with Napoleon, for example, made 30-40-kilometer daily marches), the interesting thing here is that all this happened in the dead of winter, and such paces were maintained for quite a long time.

From Vladimir to Kozelsk

On the fronts of the Great Patriotic War XIII century

Prince Yuri Vsevolodovich of Vladimir, having learned about the approach of the Mongols, left Vladimir, leaving with a small squad for the Trans-Volga region - there, among the windbreaks on the Sit River, he set up a camp and awaited the arrival of reinforcements from his brothers - Yaroslav (father of Alexander Nevsky) and Svyatoslav Vsevolodovich. There were very few warriors left in the city, led by Yuri's sons - Vsevolod and Mstislav. Despite this, the Mongols spent 5 days with the city, shelling it with stone throwers, taking it only after the assault on February 7th. But before this, a small detachment of nomads led by Subudai managed to burn Suzdal.

After the capture of Vladimir, the Mongol army is divided into three parts. The first and largest unit under the command of Batu goes from Vladimir to the northwest through the impassable forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed. The first march is from Vladimir to Yuryev-Polsky (about 60-65 kilometers). Then the army is divided - part goes exactly northwest to Pereyaslavl-Zalessky (about 60 kilometers), and after a five-day siege this city fell. What was Pereyaslavl like then? It was a relatively small city, slightly larger than Moscow, although it had defensive fortifications up to 2.5 kilometers long. But its population also hardly exceeded 1-2 thousand people.

Then the Mongols go to Ksnyatin (about another 100 kilometers), to Kashin (30 kilometers), then turn west and move along the ice of the Volga to Tver (from Ksnyatin in a straight line it’s a little more than 110 kilometers, but they go along the Volga, there it’s all 250- 300 kilometers).

The second part goes through the dense forests of the Volga, Oka and Klyazma watershed from Yuryev-Polsky to Dmitrov (about 170 kilometers in a straight line), then after its capture - to Volok-Lamsky (130-140 kilometers), from there to Tver (about 120 kilometers) , after the capture of Tver - to Torzhok (together with the detachments of the first part) - in a straight line it is about 60 kilometers, but, apparently, they walked along the river, so it will be at least 100 kilometers. The Mongols reached Torzhok on February 21 - 14 days after leaving Vladimir.

Thus, the first part of the Batu detachment travels at least 500-550 kilometers in 15 days through dense forests and along the Volga. True, from here you need to throw out several days of siege of cities and it turns out about 10 days of march. For each of which, nomads pass through forests 50-55 kilometers a day! The second part of his detachment covers a total distance of less than 600 kilometers, which gives an average daily march pace of up to 40 kilometers. Taking into account a couple of days for sieges of cities - up to 50 kilometers per day.

Near Torzhok, a rather modest city by the standards of that time, the Mongols were stuck for at least 12 days and took it only on March 5 (V.V. Kargalov). After the capture of Torzhok, one of the Mongol detachments advanced towards Novgorod another 150 kilometers, but then turned back.

The second detachment of the Mongol army under the command of Kadan and Buri left Vladimir to the east, moving along the ice of the Klyazma River. Having walked 120 kilometers to Starodub, the Mongols burned this city, and then “cut off” the forested watershed between the lower Oka and middle Volga, reaching Gorodets (this is about another 170-180 kilometers, if the crow flies). Further, the Mongolian troops along the ice of the Volga reached Kostoroma (this is another 350-400 kilometers), separate units even reached Galich Mersky. From Kostroma, the Mongols of Buri and Kadan went to join the third detachment under the command of Burundai to the west - to Uglich. Most likely, the nomads moved on the ice of the rivers (in any case, let us remind you once again, this is the custom in Russian historiography), which gives about another 300-330 kilometers of travel.

In early March, Kadan and Buri were already near Uglich, having covered a little over three weeks to 1000-1100 kilometers. The average daily pace of the march was about 45-50 kilometers for the nomads, which is close to the performance of the Batu detachment.

The third detachment of Mongols under the command of Burundai turned out to be the “slowest” - after the capture of Vladimir, he set out for Rostov (170 kilometers in a straight line), then covered another 100 kilometers to Uglich. Part of Burundai's forces made a forced march to Yaroslavl (about 70 kilometers) from Uglich. At the beginning of March, Burundai unmistakably found the camp of Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Trans-Volga forests, whom he defeated in the battle on the Sit River on March 4. The transition from Uglich to the City and back is about 130 kilometers. In total, Burundai's troops covered about 470 kilometers in 25 days - this gives us only 19 kilometers of the average daily march.

In general, the conditional average Mongolian horse clocked up “on the speedometer” from December 1, 1237 to March 4, 1238 (94 days) from 1200 (the minimum estimate, suitable only for a small part of the Mongol army) to 1800 kilometers. The conditional daily journey ranges from 12-13 to 20 kilometers. In reality, if we throw out standing in the floodplain of the Oka River (about 15 days), 5 days of the assault on Moscow and 7 days of rest after its capture, the five-day siege of Vladimir, as well as another 6-7 days for the sieges of Russian cities in the second half of February, it turns out that Mongolian horses covered an average of 25-30 kilometers for each of their 55 days of movement. These are excellent results for horses, taking into account the fact that all this happened in the cold, in the middle of forests and snowdrifts, with a clear lack of feed (it is unlikely that the Mongols could requisition a lot of feed from the peasants for their horses, especially since the steppe horses did not eat practically grain) and hard work.

After the capture of Torzhok, the main part of the Mongol army concentrated on the upper Volga in the Tver region. They then moved in the first half of March 1238 on a broad front south into the steppe. The left wing, under the command of Kadan and Buri, passed through the forests of the Klyazma and Volga watershed, then went to the upper reaches of the Moscow River and descended along it to the Oka. In a straight line it is about 400 kilometers, taking into account the average pace of movement of fast-moving nomads - this is about 15-20 days of travel for them. So, apparently, already in the first half of April this part of the Mongol army entered the steppe. We have no information about how the melting of snow and ice on the rivers affected the movement of this detachment (the Ipatiev Chronicle only reports that the steppe inhabitants moved very quickly). There is also no information about what this detachment did the next month after entering the steppe; it is only known that in May Kadan and Buri came to the rescue of Batu, who by that time was stuck near Kozelsk.

Small Mongol detachments, probably, as V.V. believes. Kargalov and R.P. Khrapachevsky, remained on the middle Volga, plundering and burning Russian settlements. How they came out into the steppe in the spring of 1238 is not known.

Most of the Mongol army under the command of Batu and Burundai, instead of taking the shortest route to the steppe, which the detachments of Kadan and Buri took, chose a very intricate route:

More is known about Batu’s route - from Torzhok he moved along the Volga and Vazuza (a tributary of the Volga) to the interfluve of the Dnieper, and from there through the Smolensk lands to the Chernigov city of Vshchizh, lying on the banks of the Desna, writes Khrapachevsky. Having made a detour along the upper reaches of the Volga to the west and northwest, the Mongols turned south and, crossing watersheds, went to the steppes. Probably some detachments were marching in the center, through Volok-Lamsky (through the forests). Approximately, the left edge of Batu covered about 700-800 kilometers during this time, other detachments a little less. By April 1, the Mongols reached Serensk, and Kozelsk (the chronicle Kozeleska, to be precise) - April 3-4 (according to other information - already March 25). On average, this gives us about 35-40 more kilometers of daily march (and the Mongols no longer walk on the ice of rivers, but through dense forests on watersheds).

Near Kozelsk, where ice drift on Zhizdra and snow melting in its floodplain could already begin, Batu was stuck for almost 2 months (more precisely, for 7 weeks - 49 days - until May 23-25, maybe later, if we count from April 3, and according to Rashid ad-Din - generally for 8 weeks). Why the Mongols necessarily needed to besiege an insignificant, even by medieval Russian standards, town that had no strategic significance is not entirely clear. For example, the neighboring towns of Krom, Spat, Mtsensk, Domagoshch, Devyagorsk, Dedoslavl, Kursk were not even touched by the nomads.

Historians are still arguing on this topic; no sane argument has been given. The funniest version was proposed by the folk historian of the “Eurasian persuasion” L.N. Gumilyov, who suggested that the Mongols were taking revenge on their grandson Prince of Chernigov Mstislav, who ruled in Kozelsk, for the murder of ambassadors on the Kalka River in 1223. It’s funny that the Smolensk prince Mstislav the Old was also involved in the murder of the ambassadors. But the Mongols did not touch Smolensk...

Logically, Batu had to quickly leave for the steppes, since the spring thaw and lack of food threatened him with the complete loss of, at a minimum, “transport” - that is, horses.

None of the historians was puzzled by the question of what the horses and the Mongols themselves ate while besieging Kozelsk for almost two months (using standard stone-throwing machines). Finally, it is simply difficult to believe that a town with a population of several hundred, even a couple of thousand people, a huge army of the Mongols, numbering tens of thousands of soldiers, and supposedly having unique siege technologies and equipment, could not take 7 weeks...

As a result, near Kozelsk, the Mongols allegedly lost up to 4,000 people, and only the arrival of the troops of Buri and Kadan in May 1238 from the steppes saved the situation - the town was finally taken and destroyed. For the sake of humor it is worth saying that ex-president Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, in honor of the services of the population of Kozelsk to Russia, awarded the settlement the title of "City military glory"The humor was that archaeologists, after almost 15 years of searching, were unable to find unambiguous evidence of the existence of Kozelsk destroyed by Batu. You can talk about what passions were boiling about this in the scientific and bureaucratic community of Kozelsk.

If we summarize the estimated data in a first and very rough approximation, it turns out that from December 1, 1237 to April 3, 1238 (the beginning of the siege of Kozelsk), a conventional Mongol horse traveled on average from 1,700 to 2,800 kilometers. In terms of 120 days, this gives an average daily journey ranging from 15 to 23-odd kilometers. Since periods of time are known when the Mongols did not move (sieges, etc., and this is about 45 days in total), the scope of their average daily actual march spreads from 23 to 38 kilometers per day.

Simply put, this means more than intense stress on the horses. The question of how many of them survived after such transitions in rather harsh climatic conditions and an obvious lack of food is not even discussed by Russian historians. As well as the question of the Mongolian losses themselves.

For example, R.P. Khrapachevsky generally believes that during the entire Western campaign of the Mongols in 1235-1242, their losses amounted to only about 15% of their original number, while historian V.B. Koshcheev counted up to 50 thousand sanitary losses during the campaign in North-Eastern Rus' alone. However, all these losses - both in people and horses, the brilliant Mongols quickly made up for at the expense of... the conquered peoples themselves. Therefore, already in the summer of 1238, the armies of Batu continued the war in the steppes against the Kipchaks, and in Europe in 1241, I don’t understand what kind of army invaded - so, Thomas of Splitsky reports that it had great amount... Russians, Kipchaks, Bulgars, Mordovians, etc. peoples It is not really clear how many of them there were “Mongols” themselves.

XIV. MONGOL-TATARS. – GOLDEN HORDE

(continuation)

The rise of the Mongol-Tatar Empire. – Batu’s campaign against Eastern Europe. – Military structure of the Tatars. - Invasion of Ryazan land. – Ruin Suzdal land and the capital city. – Defeat and death of Yuri II. – Reverse movement to the steppe and the ruin of Southern Rus'. - Fall of Kyiv. – Trip to Poland and Hungary.

For the invasion of the Tatars in Northern Rus', the Lavrentievsky (Suzdal) and Novgorod chronicles are used, and for the invasion of Southern Russia - the Ipatievsky (Volynsky). The latter is told in a very incomplete manner; so we have the most scant news about the actions of the Tatars in the Kyiv, Volyn and Galician lands. We find some details in later vaults, Voskresensky, Tverskoy and Nikonovsky. In addition, there was a special legend about Batu’s invasion of Ryazan land; but published in Vremennik Ob. I. and Dr. No. 15. (About him, in general about the devastation of the Ryazan land, see my “History of the Ryazan Principality,” Chapter IV.) Rashid Eddin’s news about Batu’s campaigns was translated by Berezin and supplemented with notes (Journal of M.N. Pr. 1855. No. 5 ). G. Berezin also developed the idea of ​​the Tatar method of operating by raid.

For the Tatar invasion of Poland and Hungary, see the Polish-Latin chronicles of Bogufal and Dlugosz. Ropel Geschichte Polens. I. Th. Palatsky D jiny narodu c "eskeho I. His Einfal der Mongolen. Prag. 1842. Mailata Ceschichte der Magyaren. I. Hammer-Purgstal Geschichte der Goldenen Horde. Wolf in his Geschichte der Mongolen oder Tataren, by the way (chap. VI) , exposes critical review stories of the named historians about the Mongol invasion; in particular, he tries to refute Palacki’s presentation in relation to the modus operandi of the Czech king Wenzel, as well as in relation to the well-known legend about the victory of Jaroslav Sternberk over the Tatars at Olomouc.

Mongol-Tatar Empire after Genghis Khan

Meanwhile, a menacing cloud moved in from the east, from Asia. Genghis Khan assigned the Kipchak and the entire side to the north and west of the Aral-Caspian to his eldest son Jochi, who was to complete the conquest of this side begun by Jebe and Subudai. But the attention of the Mongols was still diverted by the stubborn struggle in eastern Asia with two strong kingdoms: the Niuchi empire and the neighboring Tangut power. These wars delayed the defeat of Eastern Europe for more than ten years. Moreover, Jochi died; and he was soon followed by Temujin [Genghis Khan] himself (1227), having managed to personally destroy the Tangut kingdom before his death. Three sons survived after him: Jagatai, Ogodai and Tului. He appointed Ogodai as his successor, or supreme khan, as the most intelligent among the brothers; Jagatai was given Bukharia and eastern Turkestan, Tula - Iran and Persia; and Kipchak was to come into the possession of the sons of Jochi. Temujin bequeathed to his descendants to continue the conquests and even drew for them overall plan actions. The Great Kurultai, assembled in his homeland, that is, on the banks of Kerulen, confirmed his orders. Ogodai, who was in charge of the Chinese war, tirelessly continued this war until he completely destroyed the Niuchi empire and established his rule there (1234). Only then did he pay attention to other countries and, by the way, began to cook great march to Eastern Europe.

During this time, the Tatar temniks, who commanded the Caspian countries, did not remain inactive; and tried to keep the nomads subdued by Jebe Subudai in subjection. In 1228, according to the Russian chronicle, “from below” (from the Volga) the Saksins (a tribe unknown to us) and Polovtsi, pressed by the Tatars, ran into the borders of the Bulgarians; The Bulgarian guard detachments they had defeated also came running from the country of Priyaitskaya. Around the same time, in all likelihood, the Bashkirs, fellow tribesmen of the Ugrians, were conquered. Three years later, the Tatars undertook a reconnaissance campaign deep into Kama Bulgaria and spent the winter there somewhere short of the Great City. The Polovtsians, for their part, apparently took advantage of the circumstances to defend their independence with weapons. At least their main khan Kotyan later, when he sought refuge in Ugria, told the Ugric king that he had defeated the Tatars twice.

Beginning of Batu's invasion

Having put an end to the Niuchi Empire, Ogodai moved the main forces of the Mongol-Tatars to conquer Southern China, Northern India and the rest of Iran; and for the conquest of Eastern Europe he allocated 300,000, the leadership of which he entrusted to his young nephew Batu, the son of Dzhuchiev, who had already distinguished himself in the Asian wars. His uncle appointed the famous Subudai-Bagadur as his leader, who, after the Kalka victory, together with Ogodai, completed the conquest Northern China. The Great Khan gave Batu and other proven commanders, including Burundai. Many young Genghisids also took part in this campaign, by the way, the son of Ogodai Gayuk and the son of Tului Mengu, the future successors of the Great Khan. From the upper reaches of the Irtysh, the horde moved westward, along the nomadic camps of various Turkish hordes, gradually annexing significant parts of them; so that at least half a million warriors crossed the Yaik River. One of the Muslim historians, speaking about this campaign, adds: “The earth groaned from the multitude of warriors; the troops went mad from the sheer numbers wild animals and night birds." This was no longer the selected cavalry that launched the first raid and fought on Kalka; now a huge horde with its families, wagons and herds was moving slowly. It constantly migrated, stopping where it found sufficient pastures for its horses and other livestock Having entered the Volga steppes, Batu himself continued to move to the lands of the Mordovians and Polovtsians, and to the north he separated part of the troops with Subudai-Bagadur for the conquest of Kama Bulgaria, which the latter accomplished in the fall of 1236. This conquest, according to Tatar custom, was accompanied by a terrible devastation of the land and beating the inhabitants; by the way, the Great City was taken and set on fire.

Khan Batu. Chinese drawing from the 14th century

By all indications, Batu’s movement was carried out according to a premeditated method of action, based on preliminary intelligence about those lands and peoples that it was decided to conquer. At least this can be said about the winter campaign in Northern Rus'. Obviously, the Tatar military leaders already had accurate information about what time of year is most favorable for military operations in this wooded area, replete with rivers and swamps; among them, the movement of the Tatar cavalry would be very difficult at any other time, with the exception of winter, when all the waters are covered with ice, strong enough to endure horse hordes.

Military organization of the Mongol-Tatars

Only the invention of European firearms and the establishment of large standing armies brought about a revolution in the attitude of sedentary and agricultural peoples to nomadic and pastoral peoples. Before this invention, the advantage in the fight was often on the side of the latter; which is very natural. Nomadic hordes are almost always on the move; their parts always more or less stick together and act as a dense mass. Nomads have no differences in occupations and habits; they are all warriors. If the will of an energetic khan or circumstances united a large number of hordes into one mass and directed them towards sedentary neighbors, then it was difficult for the latter to successfully resist the destructive impulse, especially where the nature was flat. The agricultural people, scattered throughout their country, accustomed to peaceful occupations, could not soon gather into a large militia; and even this militia, if it managed to set out on time, was far inferior to its opponents in speed of movement, in the habit of wielding weapons, in the ability to act in harmony and onslaught, in military experience and resourcefulness, as well as in a warlike spirit.

All such qualities in high degree owned by the Mongol-Tatars when they came to Europe. Temujin [Genghis Khan] gave them the main weapon of conquest: unity of power and will. While nomadic peoples are divided into special hordes, or clans, the power of their khans, of course, has the patriarchal character of the ancestor and is far from unlimited. But when, by force of arms, one person subjugates entire tribes and peoples, then, naturally, he rises to a height unattainable for a mere mortal. Old customs still live among these people and seem to limit the power of the Supreme Khan; The guardians of such customs among the Mongols are kurultai and noble influential families; but in the hands of the clever, energetic khan many resources have already been concentrated to become a limitless despot. Having imparted unity to the nomadic hordes, Temujin further strengthened their power by introducing a uniform and well-adapted military organization. The troops deployed by these hordes were organized on the basis of strictly decimal division. The tens united into hundreds, the latter into thousands, with tens, hundreds and thousands at the head. Ten thousand made up the largest department called “fogs” and were under the command of the temnik. Place of the former more or less open relationship Strict military discipline came to the leaders. Disobedience or premature removal from the battlefield was punishable by death. In case of indignation, not only the participants were executed, but their entire family was condemned to extermination. The so-called Yasa (a kind of code of laws) published by Temuchin, although it was based on old Mongol customs, significantly increased their severity in relation to various actions and was truly draconian or bloody in nature.

The continuous and long series of wars started by Temujin developed among the Mongols strategic and tactical techniques that were remarkable for that time, i.e. general art of war. Where terrain and circumstances did not interfere, the Mongols operated in enemy soil by round-up, in which they are especially accustomed; since in this way the Khan usually hunted wild animals. The hordes were divided into parts, marched in encirclement and then approached the pre-designated main point, devastating the country with fire and sword, taking prisoners and all kinds of booty. Thanks to their steppe, short, but strong horses, the Mongols were able to make unusually fast and long marches without rest, without stopping. Their horses were hardened and accustomed to endure hunger and thirst just like their riders. Moreover, the latter usually had several spare horses with them on campaigns, which they transferred to as needed. Their enemies were often amazed by the appearance of barbarians at a time when they considered them to be still far away from them. Thanks to such cavalry, the Mongols' reconnaissance unit was at a remarkable stage of development. Any movement of the main forces was preceded by small detachments, scattered in front and on the sides, as if in a fan; Observation detachments also followed behind; so that the main forces were secured against any chance or surprise.

Regarding weapons, although the Mongols had spears and curved sabers, they were predominantly riflemen (some sources, for example, Armenian chroniclers, call them “the people of riflemen”); They used bows with such strength and skill that their long arrows, tipped with an iron tip, pierced hard shells. Usually the Mongols first tried to weaken and frustrate the enemy with a cloud of arrows, and then rushed at him hand-to-hand. If at the same time they met a courageous resistance, they turned to feigned flight; As soon as the enemy began to pursue them and thereby upset their battle formation, they deftly turned their horses and again made a united attack from all sides, if possible. They were covered with shields woven from reeds and covered with leather, helmets and armor, also made of thick leather, some even covered with iron scales. In addition, wars with more educated and rich peoples brought them a considerable amount of iron chain mail, helmets and all kinds of weapons, which their commanders and noble people wore. The tails of horses and wild buffalos fluttered on the banners of their leaders. The commanders usually did not enter the battle themselves and did not risk their lives (which could cause confusion), but controlled the battle, being somewhere on a hill, surrounded by their neighbors, servants and wives, of course, all on horseback.

The nomadic cavalry, having a decisive advantage over sedentary peoples in the open field, however, encountered an important obstacle in the form of well-fortified cities. But the Mongols were already accustomed to dealing with this obstacle, having learned the art of taking cities in the Chinese and Khovarezm empires. They also started up battering machines. They usually surrounded a besieged city with a rampart; and where the forest was at hand, they fenced it off with a tine, thus stopping the very possibility of communication between the city and the surrounding area. Then they set up battering machines, from which they threw large stones and logs, and sometimes incendiary substances; in this way they caused fire and destruction in the city; They showered the defenders with a cloud of arrows or put up ladders and climbed onto the walls. In order to tire out the garrison, they carried out attacks continuously day and night, for which fresh detachments constantly alternated with each other. If the barbarians learned to take large Asian cities, fortified with stone and clay walls, the easier they could destroy or burn the wooden walls of Russian cities. Crossing large rivers did not make it particularly difficult for the Mongols. For this purpose they used large leather bags; they were stuffed tightly with clothes and other light things, tied tightly and tied to the tail of the horses, and thus transported. One Persian historian of the 13th century, describing the Mongols, says: “They had the courage of a lion, the patience of a dog, the foresight of a crane, the cunning of a fox, the farsightedness of a crow, the rapacity of a wolf, the battle heat of a rooster, the care of a hen for its neighbors, the sensitivity of a cat and the violence of a boar when attacked.” .

Rus' before the Mongol-Tatar invasion

What could ancient, fragmented Rus' oppose to this enormous concentrated force?

The fight against nomads of Turkish-Tatar origin was already a familiar thing for her. After the first onslaughts of both the Pechenegs and the Polovtsians, fragmented Rus' then gradually became accustomed to these enemies and gained the upper hand over them. However, she did not have time to throw them back to Asia or to subjugate them and return to their former borders; although these nomads were also fragmented and also did not submit to one power, one will. What a disparity in strength there was with the menacing Mongol-Tatar cloud now approaching!

In military courage and combat courage, the Russian squads, of course, were not inferior to the Mongol-Tatars; and they were undoubtedly superior in bodily strength. Moreover, Rus' was undoubtedly better armed; its complete armament of that time was not much different from the armament of the German and Western European armaments in general. Among her neighbors she was even famous for her fighting. Thus, regarding Daniil Romanovich’s campaign to help Konrad of Mazovia against Vladislav the Old in 1229, the Volyn chronicler notes that Konrad “loved Russian battle” and relied on Russian help more than on his Poles. But the princely squads that made up the military class of Ancient Rus' were too few in number to repel the new enemies now pressing from the east; and the common people, if necessary, were recruited into the militia directly from the plow or from their crafts, and although they were distinguished by the stamina common to the entire Russian tribe, they did not have much skill in wielding weapons or making friendly, quick movements. One can, of course, blame our old princes for not understanding all the dangers and all the disasters that were then threatening from new enemies, and not joining their forces for a united rebuff. But, on the other hand, we must not forget that where there was a long period of all kinds of disunity, rivalry and the development of regional isolation, no human will, no genius could achieve rapid unification and concentration. popular forces. Such a benefit can only be achieved through the long and constant efforts of entire generations under circumstances that awaken in the people the consciousness of their national unity and the desire for their concentration. Ancient Rus' did what was in its means and methods. Every land, almost every significant city bravely met the barbarians and desperately defended themselves, hardly having any hope of winning. It couldn't be otherwise. The great historical people are not inferior external enemy without courageous resistance, even under the most unfavorable circumstances.

Invasion of the Mongol-Tatars into the Ryazan Principality

At the beginning of the winter of 1237, the Tatars passed through the Mordovian forests and camped on the banks of some river Onuza. From here Batu sent to the Ryazan princes, according to the chronicle, a “sorceress wife” (probably a shaman) and with her two husbands, who demanded from the princes part of their estate in people and horses.

The eldest prince, Yuri Igorevich, hastened to convene his relatives, the appanage princes of Ryazan, Pron and Murom, to the Diet. In the first impulse of courage, the princes decided to defend themselves, and gave a noble answer to the ambassadors: “When we do not survive, then everything will be yours.” From Ryazan, Tatar ambassadors went to Vladimir with the same demands. Seeing that the Ryazan forces were too insignificant to fight the Mongols, Yuri Igorevich ordered this: he sent one of his nephews to the Grand Duke of Vladimir with a request to unite against common enemies; and sent another with the same request to Chernigov. Then the united Ryazan militia moved to the shores of Voronezh to meet the enemy; but avoided battle while waiting for help. Yuri tried to resort to negotiations and sent his only son Theodore at the head of a ceremonial embassy to Batu with gifts and a plea not to fight the Ryazan land. All these orders were unsuccessful. Theodore died in the Tatar camp: according to legend, he refused Batu’s demand to bring him his beautiful wife Eupraxia and was killed on his orders. Help didn't come from anywhere. The princes of Chernigovo-Seversky refused to come on the grounds that the Ryazan princes were not on Kalka when they were also asked for help; probably the Chernigov residents thought that the thunderstorm would not reach them or was still very far from them. And the slow Yuri Vsevolodovich Vladimirsky hesitated and was just as late with his help, as in the Kalka massacre. Seeing the impossibility of fighting the Tatars in an open field, the Ryazan princes hastened to retreat and took refuge with their squads behind the fortifications of the cities.

Following them, hordes of barbarians poured into the Ryazan land, and, according to their custom, engulfing it in a wide raid, began to burn, destroy, rob, beat, captivate, and commit desecration of women. There is no need to describe all the horrors of ruin. Suffice it to say that many villages and cities were completely wiped off the face of the earth; some of their famous names are no longer found in history after that. By the way, a century and a half later, travelers sailing along the upper reaches of the Don saw only ruins and deserted places on its hilly banks where once flourishing cities and villages stood. The devastation of the Ryazan land was carried out with particular ferocity and mercilessness also because it was in this regard the first Russian region: the barbarians came to it, full of wild, unbridled energy, not yet satiated with Russian blood, not tired of destruction, not reduced in number after countless battles. On December 16, the Tatars surrounded the capital city of Ryazan and surrounded it with a tyn. The squad and citizens, encouraged by the prince, repelled the attacks for five days. They stood on the walls, without changing their positions and without letting go of their weapons; Finally they began to grow exhausted, while the enemy constantly acted with fresh forces. On the sixth day the Tatars made a general attack; They threw fire on the roofs, smashed the walls with logs from their battering guns and finally broke into the city. The usual beating of residents followed. Among those killed was Yuri Igorevich. His wife and her relatives sought salvation in vain in the cathedral church of Boris and Gleb. What could not be plundered became a victim of the flames. Ryazan legends decorate the stories about these disasters with some poetic details. So, Princess Eupraxia, hearing about the death of her husband Feodor Yuryevich, threw herself from the high tower together with her little son to the ground and killed herself to death. And one of the Ryazan boyars named Evpatiy Kolovrat was on Chernigov land when the news of the Tatar pogrom came to him. He hurries to his fatherland, sees ashes hometown and is inflamed with a thirst for revenge. Having gathered 1,700 warriors, Evpatiy attacks the rear detachments of the Tatars, overthrows their hero Tavrul and finally, suppressed by the crowd, perishes with all his comrades. Batu and his soldiers are surprised at the extraordinary courage of the Ryazan knight. ( Similar stories, of course, the people consoled themselves in past disasters and defeats.) But next to examples of valor and love for the homeland among the Ryazan boyars, there were examples of betrayal and cowardice. The same legends point to a boyar who betrayed his homeland and handed himself over to his enemies. In each country, Tatar military leaders knew how to first of all find traitors; especially those were among the people captured, frightened by threats or seduced by caresses. From noble and ignorant traitors, the Tatars learned everything they needed about the state of the land, its weaknesses, the properties of the rulers, etc. These traitors also served as the best guides for the barbarians when moving into countries hitherto unknown to them.

Tatar invasion of Suzdal land

Capture of Vladimir by the Mongol-Tatars. Russian chronicle miniature

From the Ryazan land the barbarians moved to Suzdal, again in the same murderous order, sweeping this land in a raid. Their main forces went the usual Suzdal-Ryazan route to Kolomna and Moscow. Just then they were met by the Suzdal army, going to the aid of the Ryazan people, under the command of the young prince Vsevolod Yuryevich and the old governor Eremey Glebovich. Near Kolomna, the grand ducal army was completely defeated; Vsevolod escaped with the remnants of the Vladimir squad; and Eremey Glebovich fell in battle. Kolomna was taken and destroyed. Then the barbarians burned Moscow, the first Suzdal city on this side. Another son of the Grand Duke, Vladimir, and the governor Philip Nyanka were in charge here. The latter also fell in battle, and the young prince was captured. With how quickly the barbarians acted during their invasion, with the same slowness military gatherings took place in Northern Rus' at that time. With modern weapons, Yuri Vsevolodovich could put all the forces of Suzdal and Novgorod in the field in conjunction with the Murom-Ryazan forces. There would be enough time for these preparations. For more than a year, fugitives from Kama Bulgaria found refuge with him, bringing news of the devastation of their land and the movement of the terrible Tatar hordes. But instead of modern preparations, we see that the barbarians were already moving towards the capital itself, when Yuri, having lost the best part of the army, defeated piecemeal, went further north to gather the zemstvo army and call for help from his brothers. In the capital, the Grand Duke left his sons, Vsevolod and Mstislav, with the governor Peter Oslyadyukovich; and he drove off with a small squad. On the way, he annexed three nephews of the Konstantinovichs, appanage princes of Rostov, with their militia. With the army that he managed to gather, Yuri settled down beyond the Volga almost on the border of his possessions, on the banks of the City, the right tributary of the Mologa, where he began to wait for the brothers, Svyatoslav Yuryevsky and Yaroslav Pereyaslavsky. The first one actually managed to come to him; but the second one did not appear; Yes, he could hardly have appeared on time: we know that at that time he occupied the great Kiev table.

At the beginning of February, the main Tatar army surrounded the capital Vladimir. A crowd of barbarians approached the Golden Gate; the citizens greeted them with arrows. "Do not shoot!" - the Tatars shouted. Several horsemen rode up to the very gate with the prisoner and asked: “Do you recognize your prince Vladimir?” Vsevolod and Mstislav, standing on the Golden Gate, together with those around them, immediately recognized their brother, captured in Moscow, and were struck with grief at the sight of his pale, sad face. They were eager to free him, and only the old governor Pyotr Oslyadyukovich kept them from a useless desperate sortie. Having located their main camp opposite the Golden Gate, the barbarians cut down trees in the neighboring groves and surrounded the entire city with a fence; then they installed their “vices”, or battering machines, and began to destroy the fortifications. The princes, princesses and some boyars, no longer hoping for salvation, accepted monastic vows from Bishop Mitrofan and prepared for death. On February 8, the day of the martyr Theodore Stratilates, the Tatars made a decisive attack. Following a sign, or brushwood thrown into the ditch, they climbed onto the city rampart at the Golden Gate and entered the new, or outer, city. At the same time, from the side of Lybid they broke into it through the Copper and Irininsky gates, and from Klyazma - through the Volzhsky. The outer city was taken and set on fire. Princes Vsevolod and Mstislav with their retinue retired to the Pecherny city, i.e. to the Kremlin. And Bishop Mitrofan with the Grand Duchess, her daughters, daughters-in-law, grandchildren and many noblewomen locked themselves in the cathedral church of the Mother of God in the tents, or choirs. When the remnants of the squad with both princes died and the Kremlin was taken, the Tatars broke down the doors of the cathedral church, plundered it, took away expensive vessels, crosses, vestments on icons, frames on books; then they dragged the forest into the church and around the church, and lit it. The bishop and the entire princely family, hiding in the choir, died in smoke and flames. Other churches and monasteries in Vladimir were also plundered and partly burned; many residents were beaten.

Already during the siege of Vladimir, the Tatars took and burned Suzdal. Then their detachments scattered throughout the Suzdal land. Some went north, took Yaroslavl and captured the Volga region all the way to Galich Mersky; others plundered Yuryev, Dmitrov, Pereyaslavl, Rostov, Volokolamsk, Tver; During February, up to 14 cities were taken, in addition to many “settlements and graveyards.”

Battle of the City River

Meanwhile, Georgy [Yuri] Vsevolodovich still stood on the City and waited for his brother Yaroslav. Then terrible news came to him about the destruction of the capital and the death of the princely family, about the capture of other cities and the approach of Tatar hordes. He sent a detachment of three thousand for reconnaissance. But the scouts soon came running back with the news that the Tatars were already bypassing the Russian army. As soon as the Grand Duke, his brothers Ivan and Svyatoslav and his nephews mounted their horses and began to organize regiments, the Tatars, led by Burundai, attacked Rus' from different sides, on March 4, 1238. The battle was brutal; but the majority of the Russian army, recruited from farmers and artisans unaccustomed to battle, soon mixed up and fled. Here Georgy Vsevolodovich himself fell; his brothers fled, his nephews also, with the exception of the eldest, Vasilko Konstantinovich of Rostov. He was captured. The Tatar military leaders persuaded him to accept their customs and fight the Russian land together with them. The prince firmly refused to be a traitor. The Tatars killed him and threw him into some Sherensky forest, near which they temporarily camped. The northern chronicler showers Vasilko with praise on this occasion; says that he was handsome in face, intelligent, courageous and very kind-hearted (“he is light at heart”). “Whoever served him, ate his bread and drank his cup, could no longer be in the service of another prince,” the chronicler adds. Bishop Kirill of Rostov, who escaped during the invasion of the remote city of his diocese, Belozersk, returned and found the body of the Grand Duke, deprived of his head; then he took Vasilko’s body, brought it to Rostov and laid it in the cathedral church of the Mother of God. Subsequently, they also found the head of George and placed him in his coffin.

Batu's movement to Novgorod

While one part of the Tatars was moving to Sit against the Grand Duke, the other reached the Novgorod suburb of Torzhok and besieged it. The citizens, led by their mayor Ivank, courageously defended themselves; For two whole weeks the barbarians shook the walls with their guns and made constant attacks. The novotors waited in vain for help from Novgorod; at last they were exhausted; On March 5, the Tatars took the city and terribly devastated it. From here their hordes moved further and went to Veliky Novgorod along the famous Seliger route, devastating the country right and left. They had already reached the “Ignach-cross” (Kresttsy?) and were only a hundred miles from Novgorod, when they suddenly turned south. This sudden retreat, however, was very natural under the circumstances of that time. Having grown up on the high planes and mountain plains of Central Asia, characterized by a harsh climate and variable weather, the Mongol-Tatars were accustomed to cold and snow and could quite easily endure the Northern Russian winter. But also accustomed to a dry climate, they were afraid of dampness and soon fell ill from it; their horses, for all their hardiness, after the dry steppes of Asia, also had difficulty withstanding swampy countries and wet food. Spring was approaching in Northern Russia with all its predecessors, i.e. melting snow and overflowing rivers and swamps. Along with disease and horse death, a terrible thaw threatened; the hordes caught by it could find themselves in a very difficult situation; the beginning of the thaw could clearly show them what awaited them. Perhaps they also found out about the preparations of the Novgorodians for a desperate defense; the siege could be delayed for several more weeks. There is, in addition, an opinion, not without probability, that there was a raid here, and Batu recently found it inconvenient to make a new one.

Temporary retreat of the Mongol-Tatars to the Polovtsian steppe

During the return movement to the steppe, the Tatars devastated eastern part Smolensk land and Vyatichi region. Of the cities they devastated at the same time, the chronicles mention only one Kozelsk, due to its heroic defense. The appanage prince here was one of the Chernigov Olgovichs, young Vasily. His warriors, together with the citizens, decided to defend themselves until last person and did not give in to any flattering persuasion of the barbarians.

Batu, according to the chronicle, stood near this city for seven weeks and lost many killed. Finally, the Tatars smashed the wall with their cars and burst into the city; Even here the citizens continued to desperately defend themselves and cut themselves with knives until they were all beaten, and their young prince seemed to have drowned in blood. For such defense, the Tatars, as usual, nicknamed Kozelsk “the evil city.” Then Batu completed the enslavement of the Polovtsian hordes. Their main khan, Kotyan, with part of the people, retired to Hungary, and there he received land for settlement from King Bela IV, under the condition of the baptism of the Polovtsians. Those who remained in the steppes had to unconditionally submit to the Mongols and increase their hordes. From the Polovtsian steppes, Batu sent out detachments, on the one hand, to conquer the Azov and Caucasian countries, and on the other, to enslave Chernigov-Northern Rus'. By the way, the Tatars took Southern Pereyaslavl, plundered and destroyed the cathedral church of Michael there and killed Bishop Simeon. Then they went to Chernigov. Mstislav Glebovich Rylsky, Mikhail Vsevolodovich’s cousin, came to the aid of the latter and courageously defended the city. The Tatars placed throwing weapons from the walls at a distance of one and a half arrow flights and threw such stones that four people could hardly lift them. Chernigov was taken, plundered and burned. Bishop Porfiry, who was captured, was left alive and released. In the winter of the following 1239, Batu sent troops north to complete the conquest of the Mordovian land. From here they went to the Murom region and burned Murom. Then they fought again on the Volga and Klyazma; on the first they took Gorodets Radilov, and on the second - the city of Gorokhovets, which, as you know, was the possession of the Assumption Cathedral of Vladimir. This new invasion caused a terrible commotion throughout the entire Suzdal land. The residents who survived the previous pogrom abandoned their homes and ran wherever they could; mostly fled to the forests.

Mongol-Tatar invasion of Southern Rus'

Having finished with the strongest part of Rus', i.e. with the great reign of Vladimir, having rested in the steppe and fattened their horses, the Tatars now turned to Southwestern, Trans-Dnieper Rus', and from here they decided to go further to Hungary and Poland.

Already during the devastation of Pereyaslavl Russky and Chernigov, one of the Tatar detachments, led by Batu’s cousin, Mengu Khan, approached Kyiv to scout out its position and means of defense. Stopping on the left side of the Dnieper, in the town of Pesochny, Mengu, according to the legend of our chronicle, admired the beauty and grandeur of the ancient Russian capital, which picturesquely rose on the coastal hills, shining with white walls and gilded domes of its temples. The Mongol prince tried to persuade the citizens to surrender; but they did not want to hear about her and even killed the messengers. At that time, Kiev was owned by Mikhail Vsevolodovich Chernigovsky. Although Menggu left; but there was no doubt that he would return with greater forces. Mikhail did not consider it convenient for himself to wait for the Tatar thunderstorm, he cowardly left Kyiv and retired to Ugria. Soon afterwards the capital city passed into the hands of Daniil Romanovich of Volyn and Galitsky. However, this famous prince, with all his courage and the vastness of his possessions, did not appear for the personal defense of Kyiv from the barbarians, but entrusted it to the thousandth Demetrius.

In the winter of 1240, a countless Tatar force crossed the Dnieper, surrounded Kyiv and fenced it off with a fence. Batu himself was there with his brothers, relatives and cousins, as well as his best commanders Subudai-Bagadur and Burundai. The Russian chronicler clearly depicts the enormity of the Tatar hordes, saying that the inhabitants of the city could not hear each other due to the creaking of their carts, the roar of camels and the neighing of horses. The Tatars directed their main attacks on that part that had the least strong position, i.e. to the western side, from which some wilds and almost flat fields adjoined the city. The battering guns, especially concentrated against the Lyadsky Gate, beat the wall day and night until they made a breach. The most persistent slaughter took place, “spear breaking and shields clumping together”; clouds of arrows darkened the light. The enemies finally broke into the city. The people of Kiev, with a heroic, albeit hopeless defense, supported the ancient glory of the first throne of the Russian city. They gathered around the Tithe Church of the Virgin Mary and then at night hastily fenced themselves off with fortifications. The next day this last stronghold also fell. Many citizens with families and property sought salvation in the choirs of the temple; the choirs could not withstand the weight and collapsed. This capture of Kyiv took place on December 6, on St. Nicholas’ day. The desperate defense embittered the barbarians; sword and fire spared nothing; the inhabitants were mostly beaten, and the majestic city was reduced to one huge heap of ruins. Tysyatsky Dimitri, captured wounded, Batu, however, left alive “for the sake of his courage.”

Having devastated the Kyiv land, the Tatars moved to Volyn and Galicia, took and destroyed many cities, including the capital Vladimir and Galich. Only some places, well fortified by nature and people, they could not take in battle, for example, Kolodyazhen and Kremenets; but they still took possession of the first, persuading the inhabitants to surrender with flattering promises; and then they were treacherously beaten. During this invasion, part of the population of Southern Rus' fled to distant countries; many took refuge in caves, forests and wilds.

Among the owners of South-Western Rus' there were those who, at the very appearance of the Tatars, submitted to them in order to save their inheritance from ruin. This is what the Bolokhovskys did. It is curious that Batu spared their land on the condition that its inhabitants sow wheat and millet for the Tatar army. It is also remarkable that Southern Rus', compared to Northern Russia, offered much weaker resistance to the barbarians. In the north, the senior princes, Ryazan and Vladimir, having gathered the forces of their land, bravely entered into an unequal struggle with the Tatars and died with weapons in their hands. And in the south, where the princes have long been famous for their military prowess, we see a different course of action. The senior princes, Mikhail Vsevolodovich, Daniil and Vasilko Romanovich, with the approach of the Tatars, left their lands to seek refuge either in Ugria or in Poland. It’s as if the princes of Southern Rus' had enough determination for a general resistance only during the first invasion of the Tatars, and the Kalka massacre brought such fear into them that its participants, then young princes, and now older ones, are afraid of another meeting with wild barbarians; they leave their cities to defend themselves alone and perish in an overwhelming struggle. It is also remarkable that these senior southern Russian princes continue their feuds and scores for the volosts at the very time when the barbarians are already advancing on their ancestral lands.

Campaign of the Tatars to Poland

After Southwestern Rus', it was the turn of the neighboring Western countries, Poland and Ugria [Hungary]. Already during his stay in Volyn and Galicia, Batu, as usual, sent detachments to Poland and the Carpathians, wanting to scout out the routes and position of those countries. According to the legend of our chronicle, the aforementioned governor Dimitri, in order to save South-Western Rus' from complete devastation, tried to speed up the further campaign of the Tatars and told Batu: “Don’t hesitate long in this land; it’s time for you to go to the Ugrians; and if you hesitate, then there They will have time to gather strength and will not let you into their lands." Even without this, the Tatar leaders had the custom of not only obtaining all the necessary information before a campaign, but also with quick, cunningly planned movements to prevent any concentration of large forces.

The same Dimitri and other southern Russian boyars could tell Batu a lot about the political state of their western neighbors, whom they often visited together with their princes, who were often related to both the Polish and Ugric sovereigns. And this state was likened to fragmented Rus' and was very favorable for the successful invasion of the barbarians. In Italy and Germany at that time, the struggle between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines was in full swing. The famous grandson of Barbarossa, Frederick II, sat on the throne of the Holy Roman Empire. The aforementioned struggle completely distracted his attention, and in the very era of the Tatar invasion, he was diligently engaged in military operations in Italy against the supporters of Pope Gregory IX. Poland, being divided into appanage principalities, just like Rus', could not act unanimously and present serious resistance to the advancing horde. IN this era we see here the two eldest and most powerful princes, namely, Konrad of Mazovia and Henry the Pious, ruler of Lower Silesia. They were on hostile terms with each other; moreover, Conrad, already known for his short-sighted policy (especially calling on the Germans to defend their land from the Prussians), was least capable of a friendly, energetic course of action. Henry the Pious was related to the Czech king Wenceslaus I and the Ugric Bela IV. In view of the threatening danger, he invited the Czech king to meet the enemies with joint forces; but did not receive timely help from him. In the same way, Daniil Romanovich had long been convincing the Ugric king to unite with Russia to repel the barbarians, and also to no avail. The Kingdom of Hungary at that time was one of the strongest and richest states in all of Europe; his possessions extended from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea. The conquest of such a kingdom should have especially attracted the Tatar leaders. They say that Batu, while still in Russia, sent envoys to the Ugric king demanding tribute and submission and reproaches for accepting the Kotyanov Polovtsians, whom the Tatars considered their runaway slaves. But the arrogant Magyars either did not believe in the invasion of their land, or considered themselves strong enough to repel this invasion. With his own sluggish, inactive character, Bela IV was distracted by various disorders of his state, especially feuds with rebellious magnates. These latter, by the way, were dissatisfied with the installation of the Polovtsians, who carried out robberies and violence, and did not even think of leaving their steppe habits.

At the end of 1240 and the beginning of 1241, the Tatar hordes left Southwestern Rus' and moved on. The campaign was maturely thought out and organized. Batu himself led the main forces through the Carpathian passes directly to Hungary, which was now his immediate goal. Special armies were sent in advance on both sides to engulf Ugria in a huge avalanche and cut off all help from its neighbors. By left hand In order to get around it from the south, the son of Ogodai Kadan and the governor Subudai-Bagadur took different roads through Sedmigradia and Wallachia. And on the right hand moved another cousin of Batu, Baydar, the son of Jagatai. He headed along Lesser Poland and Silesia and began to burn their cities and villages. In vain, some Polish princes and commanders tried to resist in the open field; they suffered defeats in unequal battles; and most of them died the death of the brave. Among the devastated cities were Sudomir, Krakow and Breslau. At the same time, individual Tatar detachments spread their devastation far into the depths of Mazovia and Greater Poland. Henry the Pious managed to prepare a significant army; received the help of Teutonic, or Prussian, knights and waited for the Tatars near the city of Liegnitz. Baidarkhan gathered his scattered troops and attacked this army. The battle was very stubborn; unable to break the Polish and German knights, the Tatars, according to the chroniclers, resorted to cunning and confused the enemies with a deft cry fired through their ranks: “Run, run!” The Christians were defeated, and Henry himself died a heroic death. From Silesia, Baydar went through Moravia to Hungary to connect with Batu. Moravia was then part of the Czech kingdom, and Wenceslaus entrusted its defense to the courageous governor Yaroslav from Sternberk. Ruining everything in their path, the Tatars, among other things, besieged the city of Olomouc, where Yaroslav himself locked himself up; but here they failed; the governor even managed to make a lucky sortie and inflict some damage on the barbarians. But this failure could not have a significant impact on the general course of events.

Mongol-Tatar invasion of Hungary

Meanwhile, the main Tatar forces were moving through the Carpathians. The detachments sent forward with axes partly chopped up, partly burned out those forest axes with which Bela IV ordered to block the passages; their small military coverings were scattered. Having crossed the Carpathians, Tatar horde surged onto the plains of Hungary and began to brutally devastate them; and the Ugric king was still sitting at the Diet in Buda, where he consulted with his obstinate nobles about defense measures. Having dissolved the Diet, he now only began to gather an army, with which he locked himself in Pest, adjacent to Buda. After a futile siege of this city, Batu retreated. Bela followed him with an army, the number of which had grown to 100,000 people. In addition to some magnates and bishops, his younger brother Coloman, the ruler of Slavonia and Croatia (the same one who in his youth reigned in Galich, from where he was expelled by Mstislav the Udal), also came to his aid. This army carelessly settled down on the banks of the Shayo River, and here it was unexpectedly surrounded by the hordes of Batu. The Magyars succumbed to panic and crowded in disorder in their cramped camp, not daring to join the battle. Only a few brave leaders, including Koloman, left the camp with their troops and, after a desperate battle, managed to break through. The rest of the army was destroyed; the king was among those who managed to escape. After that, the Tatars raged unhindered in Eastern Hungary for the whole summer of 1241; and with the onset of winter they crossed to the other side of the Danube and devastated its western part. At the same time, special Tatar detachments also actively pursued the Ugric king Bela, as before the Sultan of Khorezm Mohammed. Fleeing from them from one region to another, Bela reached the extreme limits of the Ugric possessions, i.e. to the shores of the Adriatic Sea and, like Mohammed, also escaped from his pursuers to one of the islands closest to the shore, where he remained until the storm passed. For more than a year, the Tatars stayed in the Hungarian kingdom, devastating it far and wide, beating the inhabitants, turning them into slavery.

Finally, in July 1242, Batu gathered his scattered troops, burdened with countless booty, and, leaving Hungary, headed back through the Danube valley through Bulgaria and Wallachia to the southern Russian steppes. The main reason for the return campaign was the news of the death of Ogodai and the accession of his son Gayuk to the supreme khan throne. This latter had left Batu’s hordes earlier and was not on friendly terms with him at all. It was necessary to provide for his family in those countries that fell to Jochi’s share in the division of Genghis Khan. But besides the too great distance from their steppes and the threatening disagreements between the Genghisids, there were, of course, other reasons that prompted the Tatars to return to the east without consolidating the subordination of Poland and Ugria. For all their successes, the Tatar military leaders realized that further stay in Hungary or movement to the west was unsafe. Although Emperor Frederick II was still keen on the fight against the papacy in Italy, a crusade against the Tatars was preached everywhere in Germany; The German princes made military preparations everywhere and actively fortified their cities and castles. These stone fortifications were no longer as easy to take as the wooden cities of Eastern Europe. The iron-clad, military-experienced Western European knighthood also did not promise an easy victory. Already during their stay in Hungary, the Tatars more than once suffered various setbacks and, in order to defeat their enemies, often had to resort to their military tricks, such as: a false retreat from a besieged city or a feigned flight in an open battle, false treaties and promises, even forged letters, addressed to the residents as if on behalf of the Ugric king, etc. During the siege of cities and castles in Ugria, the Tatars were very sparing own strength; and more they took advantage of the crowds of captured Russians, Polovtsians and the Hungarians themselves, who, under the threat of beating, were sent to fill up ditches, make tunnels, and go on an attack. Finally, the most neighboring countries, with the exception of the Middle Danube Plain, due to the mountainous, rugged nature of their surface, already provided little convenience for the steppe cavalry.

INVASION OF THE MONGOL-TATARS ON Rus', 1237-1240.

In 1237, the 75,000-strong army of Khan Batu invaded Russian borders. Hordes of Mongol-Tatars, a well-armed army of the Khan's empire, the largest in medieval history, came to conquer Rus': to wipe out rebellious Russian cities and villages from the face of the earth, impose tribute on the population and establish the power of their governors - the Baskaks - throughout the entire Russian land.

The Mongol-Tatars’ attack on Rus' was sudden, but not only this determined the success of the invasion. For a number of objective reasons, power was on the side of the conquerors, the fate of Rus' was predetermined, as was the success of the Mongol-Tatar invasion.

By the beginning of the 13th century, Rus' was a country torn into small principalities, without a single ruler or army. Behind the Mongol-Tatars, on the contrary, stood a strong and united power, approaching the peak of its power. Only a century and a half later, in 1380, in different political and economic conditions, Rus' was able to field a strong army against the Golden Horde led by a single commander - the Grand Duke of Moscow Dmitry Ivanovich and move from a shameful and unsuccessful defense to active military action and achieve a devastating victory on the Kulikovo field.

Not about any unity of the Russian land in 1237-1240. there was no question, the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars showed the weakness of Rus', the invasion of the enemy and the power of the Golden Horde established for two and a half centuries, the Golden Horde yoke became retribution for internecine enmity and trampling of all-Russian interests on the part of Russian princes, too keen on satisfying their political ambitions.

The Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus' was swift and merciless. In December 1237, Batu’s army burned Ryazan, and on January 1, 1238, Kolomna fell under enemy pressure. During January - May 1238, the Mongol-Tatar invasion incinerated the Vladimir, Pereyaslav, Yuryev, Rostov, Yaroslavl, Uglitsky and Kozel principalities. In 1239 it was destroyed by Murom, a year later the inhabitants of the cities and villages of the Chernigov principality faced the misfortune of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, and in September - December 1240 the ancient capital city of Rus' - Kyiv - was conquered.

After the defeat of North-Eastern and Southern Rus', the countries of Eastern Europe were subjected to the Mongol-Tatar invasion: Batu’s army won a number of major victories in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, but, having lost significant forces on Russian soil, returned to the Volga region, which became the epicenter of the powerful Golden Horde.

With the invasion of the Mongol-Tatars into Rus', the Golden Horde period of Russian history began: the era of the rule of Eastern despotism, oppression and ruin of the Russian people, the period of decline of the Russian economy and culture.

The beginning of the Mongol conquests of the Russian principalities

In the 13th century the peoples of Rus' had to endure a difficult struggle with Tatar-Mongol conquerors, who ruled the Russian lands until the 15th century. (last century in a milder form). Directly or indirectly, the Mongol invasion contributed to the collapse of political institutions Kyiv period and the rise of absolutism.

In the 12th century. There was no centralized state in Mongolia; the unification of the tribes was achieved at the end of the 12th century. Temuchin, the leader of one of the clans. On general meeting(“kurultai”) representatives of all clans in 1206 he was proclaimed great khan with the name Genghis(“limitless power”).

Once the empire was created, it began its expansion. The organization of the Mongol army was based on the decimal principle - 10, 100, 1000, etc. Was created imperial guard, which controlled the entire army. Before the advent of firearms Mongol cavalry prevailed in the steppe wars. She was better organized and trained than any army of nomads of the past. The reason for the success was not only the perfection of the military organization of the Mongols, but also the unpreparedness of their rivals.

IN early XIII c., having conquered part of Siberia, the Mongols began to conquer China in 1215. They managed to capture its entire northern part. From China, the Mongols brought the latest military equipment and specialists for that time. In addition, they received a cadre of competent and experienced officials from among the Chinese. In 1219, Genghis Khan's troops invaded Central Asia. After Central Asia was Northern Iran captured, after which Genghis Khan’s troops made a predatory campaign in Transcaucasia. From the south they came to the Polovtsian steppes and defeated the Polovtsians.

The Polovtsians' request to help them against a dangerous enemy was accepted by the Russian princes. The battle between the Russian-Polovtsian and Mongol troops took place on May 31, 1223 on the Kalka River in the Azov region. Not all Russian princes who promised to participate in the battle sent their troops. The battle ended in the defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian troops, many princes and warriors died.

In 1227 Genghis Khan died. Ögedei, his third son, was elected Great Khan. In 1235, the Kurultai met in the Mongol capital Kara-korum, where it was decided to begin the conquest of the western lands. This intention posed a terrible threat to Russian lands. At the head of the new campaign was Ogedei's nephew, Batu (Batu).

In 1236, Batu's troops began a campaign against the Russian lands. Having defeated Volga Bulgaria, they set out to conquer the Ryazan principality. The Ryazan princes, their squads and townspeople had to fight the invaders alone. The city was burned and plundered. After the capture of Ryazan, Mongol troops moved to Kolomna. In the battle near Kolomna, many Russian soldiers died, and the battle itself ended in defeat for them. On February 3, 1238, the Mongols approached Vladimir. Having besieged the city, the invaders sent a detachment to Suzdal, which took it and burned it. The Mongols stopped only in front of Novgorod, turning south due to muddy roads.

In 1240, the Mongol offensive resumed. Chernigov and Kyiv were captured and destroyed. From here the Mongol troops moved to Galicia-Volyn Rus'. Having captured Vladimir-Volynsky, Galich in 1241 Batu invaded Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Moravia, and then in 1242 reached Croatia and Dalmatia. However, Mongol troops entered Western Europe significantly weakened by the powerful resistance they encountered in Rus'. This largely explains the fact that if the Mongols managed to establish their yoke in Rus', Western Europe only experienced an invasion and then on a smaller scale. This is the historical role of the heroic resistance of the Russian people to the Mongol invasion.

The result of Batu's grandiose campaign was the conquest of a vast territory - the southern Russian steppes and forests of Northern Rus', the Lower Danube region (Bulgaria and Moldova). The Mongol Empire now included the entire Eurasian continent from the Pacific Ocean to the Balkans.

After Ogedei's death in 1241, the majority supported the candidacy of Ogedei's son Hayuk. Batu became the head of the strongest regional khanate. He founded his capital at Sarai (north of Astrakhan). His power extended to Kazakhstan, Khorezm, Western Siberia, Volga, North Caucasus, Rus'. Gradually the western part of this ulus became known as Golden Horde.

The first armed clash between the Russian squad and the Mongol-Tatar army occurred 14 years before Batu’s invasion. In 1223, the Mongol-Tatar army under the command of Subudai-Baghatur went on a campaign against the Polovtsians in close proximity to Russian lands. At the request of the Polovtsians, some Russian princes provided military assistance to the Polovtsians.

On May 31, 1223, a battle took place between Russian-Polovtsian troops and Mongol-Tatars on the Kalka River near the Sea of ​​Azov. As a result of this battle, the Russian-Polovtsian militia suffered a crushing defeat from the Mongol-Tatars. The Russian-Polovtsian army suffered heavy losses. Six Russian princes died, including Mstislav Udaloy, the Polovtsian Khan Kotyan and more than 10 thousand militiamen.

The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian-Polish army were:

The reluctance of the Russian princes to act as a united front against the Mongol-Tatars (most Russian princes refused to respond to the request of their neighbors and send troops);

Underestimation of the Mongol-Tatars ( Russian militia poorly armed and not properly prepared for battle);

Inconsistency of actions during the battle (Russian troops were not a single army, but scattered squads of different princes acting in their own way; some squads withdrew from the battle and watched from the sidelines).

Having won a victory on Kalka, the army of Subudai-Baghatur did not build on its success and went to the steppes.

4. After 13 years, in 1236, the Mongol-Tatar army led by Khan Batu (Batu Khan), the grandson of Genghis Khan and the son of Jochi, invaded the Volga steppes and Volga Bulgaria (the territory of modern Tataria). Having won a victory over the Cumans and Volga Bulgars, the Mongol-Tatars decided to invade Rus'.

The conquest of Russian lands was carried out during two campaigns:

The campaign of 1237 - 1238, as a result of which the Ryazan and Vladimir-Suzdal principalities - northeast Rus' - were conquered;

The campaign of 1239 - 1240, as a result of which the Chernigov and Kiev principalities and other principalities of southern Rus' were conquered. The Russian principalities offered heroic resistance. Among the most important battles of the war with the Mongol-Tatars are:

Defense of Ryazan (1237) - the very first large city to be attacked by the Mongol-Tatars - almost all residents participated and died during the defense of the city;

Defense of Vladimir (1238);

Defense of Kozelsk (1238) - the Mongol-Tatars stormed Kozelsk for 7 weeks, for which they nicknamed it the “evil city”;

Battle of the City River (1238) - the heroic resistance of the Russian militia prevented the further advance of the Mongol-Tatars to the north - to Novgorod;

The defense of Kyiv - the city fought for about a month.

December 6, 1240 Kyiv fell. This event is considered the final defeat of the Russian principalities in the fight against the Mongol-Tatars.

The main reasons for the defeat of the Russian principalities in the war against the Mongol-Tatars are considered to be:

Feudal fragmentation;

Lack of a single centralized state and a unified army;

Enmity between princes;

The transition of individual princes to the side of the Mongols;

The technical backwardness of the Russian squads and the military and organizational superiority of the Mongol-Tatars.

Consequences of the Mongol-Tatars invasion for the Old Russian state.

The invasion of nomads was accompanied by massive destruction of Russian cities, the inhabitants were mercilessly destroyed or taken prisoner. This led to a noticeable decline in Russian cities - the population decreased, the lives of city residents became poorer, and many crafts were lost.

The Mongol-Tatar invasion dealt a heavy blow to the basis of urban culture - handicraft production, since the destruction of cities was accompanied by mass removals of artisans to Mongolia and the Golden Horde. Together with the craft population, Russian cities lost centuries of production experience: the craftsmen took their professional secrets with them. The quality of construction subsequently also dropped significantly. The conquerors inflicted no less heavy damage on the Russian countryside and rural monasteries of Rus'. The peasants were robbed by everyone: Horde officials, numerous Khan's ambassadors, and simply regional gangs. The damage caused by the Mongol-Tatars to the peasant economy was terrible. Dwellings and outbuildings were destroyed in the war. Draft cattle were captured and driven to the Horde. Horde robbers often raked out the entire harvest from barns. Russian peasant prisoners were an important export item from the Golden Horde to the East. Ruin, constant threat, shameful slavery - this is what the conquerors brought to the Russian village. The damage caused to the national economy of Rus' by the Mongolo-Tatar conquerors was not limited to devastating looting during raids. After the establishment of the yoke, huge values ​​left the country in the form of “ani” and “requests”. The constant leakage of silver and other metals had dire consequences for the economy. There was not enough silver for trade; there was even a “silver famine.” The Mongol-Tatar conquest led to a significant deterioration in the international position of the Russian principalities. Ancient trade and cultural ties with neighboring states were forcibly severed. For example, Lithuanian feudal lords used the weakening of Rus' for predatory raids. The German feudal lords also intensified the attack on the Russian lands. Russia lost the way to the Baltic Sea. In addition, the ancient ties of the Russian principalities with Byzantium were broken, and trade fell into decline. The invasion dealt a strong destructive blow to the culture of the Russian principalities. Numerous monuments, icon paintings and architecture were destroyed in the fire of the Mongol-Tatar invasions. And also there was a decline in Russian chronicle writing, which reached its dawn at the beginning of Batu’s invasion.

The Mongol-Tatar conquest artificially delayed the spread of commodity-money relations and “mothballed” the natural economy. While the Western European states, which were not attacked, gradually moved from feudalism to capitalism, Rus', torn apart by the conquerors, retained the feudal economy. It is difficult to even imagine how dearly the campaigns of the Mongol khans would have cost humanity and how many more misfortunes, murders and destruction they could have caused if the heroic resistance of the Russian people and other peoples of our country, having exhausted and weakened the enemy, had not stopped the invasion on the borders of Central Europe.

The positive thing was that the entire Russian clergy and church people were spared from paying the heavy Tatar tribute. It should be noted that the Tatars are completely tolerant of all religions, and the Russian Orthodox Church Not only did she not tolerate any oppression from the khans, but, on the contrary, the Russian metropolitans received from the khans special letters (“yarlyki”), which ensured the rights and privileges of the clergy and the inviolability of church property. The Church became the force that preserved and nurtured not only the religious, but also the national unity of the Russian “peasantry.”

Finally, Tatar rule separated Eastern Rus' from Western Europe for a long time, and after the formation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the eastern branch of the Russian people found itself separated for several centuries from its western branch, which created a wall of mutual alienation between them. Under the rule of the Tatars Eastern Rus' itself turned into “Tataria” in the minds of ignorant Europeans...

What are the consequences of the Mongol-Tatar invasion, the yoke?

Firstly, this is the backwardness of Rus' from European countries. Europe continued to develop, while Rus' had to restore everything destroyed by the Mongols.

The second is the decline of the economy. A lot of people were lost. Many crafts disappeared (the Mongols took artisans into slavery). Farmers also moved to more northern regions of the country, safer from the Mongols. All this delayed economic development.

Third, the slowness of cultural development of Russian lands. For some time after the invasion, no churches were built at all in Rus'.

Fourth – cessation of contacts, including trade, with the countries of Western Europe. Now the foreign policy of Rus' was focused on the Golden Horde. The Horde appointed princes, collected tribute from the Russian people, and carried out punitive campaigns when the principalities disobeyed.

The fifth consequence is very controversial. Some scientists say that the invasion and the yoke preserved political fragmentation in Rus', others argue that the yoke gave impetus to the unification of Russians.

If you remove all the lies from history, this does not mean at all that only the truth will remain - as a result, there may be nothing left at all.

Stanislav Jerzy Lec

The Tatar-Mongol invasion began in 1237 with the invasion of Batu's cavalry into the Ryazan lands, and ended in 1242. The result of these events was a two-century yoke. This is what the textbooks say, but in reality the relationship between the Horde and Russia was much more complicated. In particular, he talks about this famous historian Gumilev. In this material we will briefly consider the issues of the invasion of the Mongol-Tatar army from the point of view of the generally accepted interpretation, and also consider controversial issues this interpretation. Our task is not to offer fantasy on the topic of medieval society for the thousandth time, but to provide our readers with facts. And conclusions are everyone’s business.

Beginning of the invasion and background

For the first time, the troops of Rus' and the Horde met on May 31, 1223 in the battle of Kalka. The Russian troops were led by the Kiev prince Mstislav, and they were opposed by Subedey and Jube. The Russian army was not only defeated, it was actually destroyed. There are many reasons for this, but all of them are discussed in the article about the Battle of Kalka. Returning to the first invasion, it occurred in two stages:

• 1237-1238 - campaign against the eastern and northern lands of Rus'.
• 1239-1242 - a campaign against the southern lands, which led to the establishment of the yoke.

Invasion of 1237-1238

In 1236, the Mongols began another campaign against the Cumans. On this campaign they achieved great success and in the second half of 1237 they approached the borders of the Ryazan principality. The Asian cavalry was commanded by Khan Batu (Batu Khan), the grandson of Genghis Khan. He had 150 thousand people under his command. Subedey, who was familiar with the Russians from previous clashes, took part in the campaign with him.

Map of the Tatar-Mongol invasion

The invasion took place in the early winter of 1237. Can't install here the exact date, because it is unknown. Moreover, some historians say that the invasion took place not in winter, but in late autumn of the same year. With tremendous speed, the Mongol cavalry moved across the country, conquering one city after another:

• Ryazan fell at the end of December 1237. The siege lasted 6 days.
• Moscow - fell in January 1238. The siege lasted 4 days. This event was preceded by the battle of Kolomna, where Yuri Vsevolodovich and his army tried to stop the enemy, but was defeated.
• Vladimir - fell in February 1238. The siege lasted 8 days.

After the capture of Vladimir, virtually all the eastern and northern lands fell into the hands of Batu. He conquered one city after another (Tver, Yuryev, Suzdal, Pereslavl, Dmitrov). At the beginning of March, Torzhok fell, thereby opening the way for the Mongol army to the north, to Novgorod. But Batu made a different maneuver and instead of marching on Novgorod, he deployed his troops and went to storm Kozelsk. The siege lasted for 7 weeks, ending only when the Mongols resorted to cunning. They announced that they would accept the surrender of the Kozelsk garrison and release everyone alive. People believed and opened the gates of the fortress. Batu did not keep his word and gave the order to kill everyone. Thus ended the first campaign and the first invasion of the Tatar-Mongol army into Rus'.

Invasion of 1239-1242

After a break of one and a half years, in 1239 a new invasion of Rus' by the troops of Batu Khan began. This year based events took place in Pereyaslav and Chernigov. The sluggishness of Batu’s offensive is due to the fact that at that time he was actively fighting the Polovtsians, in particular in the Crimea.

Autumn 1240 Batu led his army to the walls of Kyiv. The ancient capital of Rus' could not resist for long. The city fell on December 6, 1240. Historians note the particular brutality with which the invaders behaved. Kyiv was almost completely destroyed. There is nothing left of the city. The Kyiv that we know today no longer has anything in common with the ancient capital (except for its geographical location). After these events, the army of invaders split:

• Some went to Vladimir-Volynsky.
• Some went to Galich.

Having captured these cities, the Mongols went on a European campaign, but it interests us little.

Consequences of the Tatar-Mongol invasion of Rus'

Historians describe the consequences of the invasion of the Asian army into Rus' unambiguously:

• The country was cut up and became completely dependent on the Golden Horde.
• Rus' began to annually pay tribute to the victors (money and people).
• The country has fallen into a stupor in terms of progress and development due to the unbearable yoke.

This list can be continued, but, in general, it all comes down to the fact that all the problems that existed in Rus' at that time were attributed to the yoke.

This is exactly what the Tatar-Mongol invasion seems to be, in short, from the point of view of official history and what we are told in textbooks. In contrast, we will consider Gumilyov’s arguments, and also ask a number of simple but very important questions for understanding the current issues and the fact that with the yoke, as with the Rus-Horde relations, everything is much more complex than is commonly said.

For example, it is absolutely incomprehensible and inexplicable how a nomadic people, who several decades ago lived in a tribal system, created a huge empire and conquered half the world. After all, when considering the invasion of Rus', we are considering only the tip of the iceberg. The Empire of the Golden Horde was much larger: from the Pacific Ocean to the Adriatic, from Vladimir to Burma. Giant countries were conquered: Rus', China, India... Neither before nor after has anyone been able to create a military machine that could conquer so many countries. But the Mongols were able...

To understand how difficult it was (if not to say impossible), let's look at the situation with China (so as not to be accused of looking for a conspiracy around Rus'). The population of China at the time of Genghis Khan was approximately 50 million people. No one conducted a census of the Mongols, but, for example, today this nation has 2 million people. If we take into account that the number of all peoples of the Middle Ages is increasing to the present day, then the Mongols were less than 2 million people (including women, old people and children). How were they able to conquer China with 50 million inhabitants? And then also India and Russia...

The strangeness of the geography of Batu’s movement

Let's return to the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Rus'. What were the goals of this trip? Historians talk about the desire to plunder the country and subjugate it. It also states that all these goals have been achieved. But this is not entirely true, because in ancient Rus' there were 3 richest cities:

• Kyiv is one of the largest cities in Europe and the ancient capital of Rus'. The city was conquered by the Mongols and destroyed.
• Novgorod is the largest trading city and the richest in the country (hence its special status). Didn't suffer from the invasion at all.
• Smolensk is also a trading city and was considered equal in wealth to Kyiv. The city also did not see the Mongol-Tatar army.

So it turns out that 2 of the 3 largest cities were not affected by the invasion at all. Moreover, if we consider plunder as a key aspect of Batu’s invasion of Rus', then the logic cannot be traced at all. Judge for yourself, Batu takes Torzhok (he spends 2 weeks on the assault). This is the poorest city, whose task is to protect Novgorod. But after this, the Mongols do not go to the North, which would be logical, but turn to the south. Why was it necessary to spend 2 weeks on Torzhok, which no one needs, in order to simply turn to the South? Historians give two explanations, logical at first glance:

• Near Torzhok, Batu lost many soldiers and was afraid to go to Novgorod. This explanation could well be considered logical if not for one “but”. Since Batu lost a lot of his army, then he needs to leave Rus' to replenish the army or take a break. But instead, the khan rushes to storm Kozelsk. There, by the way, the losses were huge and as a result the Mongols hastily left Rus'. But why they didn’t go to Novgorod is unclear.
• The Tatar-Mongols were afraid of the spring flooding of the rivers (this happened in March). Even in modern conditions March in the north of Russia is not characterized by a mild climate and you can easily move around there. And if we talk about 1238, then that era is called by climatologists the Little Ice Age, when winters were much harsher than modern ones and in general the temperature was much lower (this is easy to check). That is, it turns out that in the era of global warming in March you can get to Novgorod, but in the era ice age everyone was afraid of river floods.

With Smolensk, the situation is also paradoxical and inexplicable. Having taken Torzhok, Batu sets off to storm Kozelsk. This is a simple fortress, a small and very poor city. The Mongols stormed it for 7 weeks and lost thousands of people killed. Why was this done? There was no benefit from the capture of Kozelsk - there was no money in the city, and there were no food warehouses either. Why such sacrifices? But just 24 hours of cavalry movement from Kozelsk is Smolensk, the richest city in Rus', but the Mongols don’t even think about moving towards it.

Surprisingly, all these logical questions are simply ignored by official historians. Standard excuses are given, like, who knows these savages, this is what they decided for themselves. But this explanation does not stand up to criticism.

Nomads never howl in winter

There is one more remarkable fact that official history simply ignores, because... it is impossible to explain. Both Tatar-Mongol invasions were committed to Rus' in winter (or started in late autumn). But these are nomads, and nomads begin to fight only in the spring in order to finish the battles before winter. After all, they travel on horses that need to be fed. Can you imagine how you can feed a Mongolian army of thousands in snowy Russia? Historians, of course, say that this is a trifle and that such issues should not even be considered, but the success of any operation directly depends on the support:

• Charles 12 was unable to provide support for his army - he lost Poltava and the Northern War.
• Napoleon was unable to organize supplies and left Russia with a half-starved army that was absolutely incapable of combat.
• Hitler, according to many historians, managed to establish support only by 60-70% - he lost the Second World War.

Now, understanding all this, let's look at what the Mongol army was like. It is noteworthy, but there is no definite figure for its quantitative composition. Historians give figures from 50 thousand to 400 thousand horsemen. For example, Karamzin talks about Batu’s 300 thousand army. Let's look at the provision of the army using this figure as an example. As you know, the Mongols always went on military campaigns with three horses: a riding horse (the rider moved on it), a pack horse (it carried the rider’s personal belongings and weapons) and a fighting horse (it went empty, so that it could go into battle fresh at any time). That is, 300 thousand people are 900 thousand horses. To this add the horses that transported ram guns (it is known for certain that the Mongols brought the guns assembled), horses that carried food for the army, carried additional weapons, etc. It turns out, according to the most conservative estimates, 1.1 million horses! Now imagine how to feed such a herd in a foreign country in a snowy winter (during the Little Ice Age)? There is no answer, because this cannot be done.

So how much army did Dad have?

It is noteworthy, but the closer to our time the study of the invasion of the Tatar-Mongol army occurs, the smaller the number is. For example, historian Vladimir Chivilikhin speaks of 30 thousand who moved separately, since they could not feed themselves in a single army. Some historians lower this figure even lower – to 15 thousand. And here we come across an insoluble contradiction:

• If there really were so many Mongols (200-400 thousand), then how could they feed themselves and their horses in the harsh Russian winter? The cities did not surrender to them peacefully in order to take food from them, most of the fortresses were burned.
• If there were really only 30-50 thousand Mongols, then how did they manage to conquer Rus'? After all, every principality fielded an army of about 50 thousand against Batu. If there really were so few Mongols and they acted independently, the remnants of the horde and Batu himself would have been buried near Vladimir. But in reality everything was different.

We invite the reader to look for conclusions and answers to these questions on their own. For our part, we did the most important thing - we pointed out facts that completely refute the official version of the Mongol-Tatar invasion. At the end of the article, I would like to note one more important fact that the whole world has recognized, including official history, but this fact is hushed up and is rarely published. The main document by which the yoke and invasion were studied for many years is the Laurentian Chronicle. But, as it turned out, the truth of this document raises big questions. Official story admitted that 3 pages of the chronicle (which speak of the beginning of the yoke and the beginning of the Mongol invasion of Rus') have been changed and are not original. I wonder how many more pages from Russian history have been changed in other chronicles, and what really happened? But it is almost impossible to answer this question...

Chronology

• 1123 Battle of the Russians and Cumans with the Mongols on the Kalka River
• 1237 - 1240 Conquest of Rus' by the Mongols
• 1240 The defeat of the Swedish knights on the Neva River by Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich (Battle of the Neva)
• 1242 The defeat of the crusaders on Lake Peipsi by Prince Alexander Yaroslavovich Nevsky (Battle of the Ice)
• 1380 Battle of Kulikovo

The beginning of the Mongol conquests of the Russian principalities

In the 13th century the peoples of Rus' had to endure a difficult struggle with Tatar-Mongol conquerors, who ruled the Russian lands until the 15th century. (last century in a milder form). Directly or indirectly, the Mongol invasion contributed to the fall of the political institutions of the Kyiv period and the rise of absolutism.

In the 12th century. There was no centralized state in Mongolia; the unification of the tribes was achieved at the end of the 12th century. Temuchin, the leader of one of the clans. At the general meeting (“kurultai”) of representatives of all clans in 1206 he was proclaimed great khan with the name Genghis(“limitless power”).

Once the empire was created, it began its expansion. The organization of the Mongol army was based on the decimal principle - 10, 100, 1000, etc. An imperial guard was created that controlled the entire army. Before the advent of firearms Mongol cavalry prevailed in the steppe wars. She was better organized and trained than any army of nomads of the past. The reason for the success was not only the perfection of the military organization of the Mongols, but also the unpreparedness of their rivals.

At the beginning of the 13th century, having conquered part of Siberia, the Mongols began to conquer China in 1215. They managed to capture its entire northern part. From China, the Mongols brought the latest military equipment and specialists for that time. In addition, they received a cadre of competent and experienced officials from among the Chinese. In 1219, Genghis Khan's troops invaded Central Asia. Following Central Asia there was Northern Iran captured, after which Genghis Khan’s troops made a predatory campaign in Transcaucasia. From the south they came to the Polovtsian steppes and defeated the Polovtsians.

The Polovtsians' request to help them against a dangerous enemy was accepted by the Russian princes. The battle between the Russian-Polovtsian and Mongol troops took place on May 31, 1223 on the Kalka River in the Azov region. Not all Russian princes who promised to participate in the battle sent their troops. The battle ended in the defeat of the Russian-Polovtsian troops, many princes and warriors died.

In 1227 Genghis Khan died. Ögedei, his third son, was elected Great Khan. In 1235, the Kurultai met in the Mongol capital Kara-korum, where it was decided to begin the conquest of the western lands. This intention posed a terrible threat to Russian lands. At the head of the new campaign was Ogedei’s nephew, Batu (Batu).

In 1236, Batu's troops began a campaign against the Russian lands. Having defeated Volga Bulgaria, they set out to conquer the Ryazan principality. The Ryazan princes, their squads and townspeople had to fight the invaders alone. The city was burned and plundered. After the capture of Ryazan, Mongol troops moved to Kolomna. In the battle near Kolomna, many Russian soldiers died, and the battle itself ended in defeat for them. On February 3, 1238, the Mongols approached Vladimir. Having besieged the city, the invaders sent a detachment to Suzdal, which took it and burned it. The Mongols stopped only in front of Novgorod, turning south due to muddy roads.

In 1240, the Mongol offensive resumed. Chernigov and Kyiv were captured and destroyed. From here the Mongol troops moved to Galicia-Volyn Rus'. Having captured Vladimir-Volynsky, Galich in 1241 Batu invaded Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Moravia, and then in 1242 reached Croatia and Dalmatia. However, Mongol troops entered Western Europe significantly weakened by the powerful resistance they encountered in Rus'. This largely explains the fact that if the Mongols managed to establish their yoke in Rus', Western Europe only experienced an invasion and then on a smaller scale. This is the historical role of the heroic resistance of the Russian people to the Mongol invasion.

The result of Batu’s grandiose campaign was the conquest of a vast territory - the southern Russian steppes and forests of Northern Rus', the Lower Danube region (Bulgaria and Moldova). The Mongol Empire now included the entire Eurasian continent from the Pacific Ocean to the Balkans.

After Ogedei's death in 1241, the majority supported the candidacy of Ogedei's son Hayuk. Batu became the head of the strongest regional khanate. He founded his capital at Sarai (north of Astrakhan). His power extended to Kazakhstan, Khorezm, Western Siberia, Volga, North Caucasus, Rus'. Gradually the western part of this ulus became known as Golden Horde.

The struggle of the Russian people against Western aggression

When the Mongols occupied Russian cities, the Swedes, threatening Novgorod, appeared at the mouth of the Neva. They were defeated in July 1240 by the young prince Alexander, who received the name Nevsky for his victory.

At the same time, the Roman Church made acquisitions in the Baltic Sea countries. Back in the 12th century, German knighthood began to seize lands belonging to the Slavs beyond the Oder and in the Baltic Pomerania. At the same time, an attack was carried out on the lands of the Baltic peoples. The Crusaders' invasion of the Baltic lands and North-Western Rus' was sanctioned by the Pope and German Emperor Frederick II. German, Danish, Norwegian knights and troops from other countries also took part in the crusade. northern countries Europe. The attack on Russian lands was part of the doctrine of “Drang nach Osten” (pressure to the east).

Baltic states in the 13th century.

Together with his squad, Alexander liberated Pskov, Izborsk and other captured cities with a sudden blow. Having received news that the main forces of the Order were coming towards him, Alexander Nevsky blocked the path of the knights, placing his troops on the ice of Lake Peipsi. The Russian prince showed himself to be an outstanding commander. The chronicler wrote about him: “We win everywhere, but we won’t win at all.” Alexander placed his troops under the cover of a steep bank on the ice of the lake, eliminating the possibility of enemy reconnaissance of his forces and depriving the enemy of freedom of maneuver. Considering the formation of the knights in a “pig” (in the form of a trapezoid with a sharp wedge in front, which was made up of heavily armed cavalry), Alexander Nevsky arranged his regiments in the form of a triangle, with the tip resting on the shore. Before the battle, some of the Russian soldiers were equipped with special hooks to pull knights off their horses.

On April 5, 1242, a battle took place on the ice of Lake Peipsi, which became known as the Battle of the Ice. The knight's wedge pierced the center of the Russian position and buried itself in the shore. The flank attacks of the Russian regiments decided the outcome of the battle: like pincers, they crushed the knightly “pig”. The knights, unable to withstand the blow, fled in panic. The Russians pursued the enemy, “flogged, rushing after him as if through the air,” the chronicler wrote. According to the Novgorod Chronicle, in the battle “400 Germans and 50 were captured”

Persistently resisting Western enemies, Alexander was extremely patient with regard to the eastern onslaught. Recognition of the Khan's sovereignty freed up his hands to repel the Teutonic Crusade.

Tatar-Mongol yoke

Persistently resisting Western enemies, Alexander was extremely patient with regard to the eastern onslaught. The Mongols did not interfere in the religious affairs of their subjects, while the Germans tried to impose their faith on the conquered peoples. They pursued an aggressive policy under the slogan “Whoever does not want to be baptized must die!” Recognition of the Khan's sovereignty freed up forces to repel the Teutonic Crusade. But it turned out that the “Mongol flood” is not easy to get rid of. RThe Russian lands, devastated by the Mongols, were forced to recognize vassal dependence on the Golden Horde.

During the first period of Mongol rule, the collection of taxes and the mobilization of Russians into the Mongol troops was carried out on the orders of the Great Khan. Both money and recruits were sent to the capital. Under Gauk, Russian princes went to Mongolia to receive a label to reign. Later, a trip to Sarai was enough.

The continuous struggle waged by the Russian people against the invaders forced the Mongol-Tatars to abandon the creation of their own administrative authorities in Rus'. Rus' retained its statehood. This was facilitated by the presence in Rus' of its own administration and church organization.

To control the Russian lands, the institution of Baskaq governors was created - leaders of military detachments of the Mongol-Tatars who monitored the activities of the Russian princes. Denunciation of the Baskaks to the Horde inevitably ended either with the prince being summoned to Sarai (often he was deprived of his label, or even his life), or with a punitive campaign in the rebellious land. Suffice it to say that only in the last quarter of the 13th century. 14 similar campaigns were organized in Russian lands.

In 1257, the Mongol-Tatars undertook a population census - “recording the number.” Besermen (Muslim merchants) were sent to the cities, who were in charge of collecting tribute. The size of the tribute (“output”) was very large, only the “tsar’s tribute”, i.e. the tribute in favor of the khan, which was first collected in kind and then in money, amounted to 1,300 kg of silver per year. The constant tribute was supplemented by “requests” - one-time exactions in favor of the khan. In addition, deductions from trade duties, taxes for “feeding” the khan’s officials, etc. went to the khan’s treasury. In total there were 14 types of tribute in favor of the Tatars.

The Horde yoke slowed down the economic development of Rus' for a long time and destroyed it Agriculture, undermined the culture. The Mongol invasion led to a decline in the role of cities in the political and economic life of Rus', urban construction stopped, and fine and applied arts fell into decay. A serious consequence of the yoke was the deepening disunity of Rus' and the isolation of its individual parts. The weakened country was unable to defend a number of western and southern regions, which were later captured by Lithuanian and Polish feudal lords. The trade relations between Rus' and the West were dealt a blow: only Novgorod, Pskov, Polotsk, Vitebsk and Smolensk retained trade relations with foreign countries.

The turning point came in 1380, when Mamai’s army of thousands was defeated on the Kulikovo Field.

Battle of Kulikovo 1380

Rus' began to strengthen, its dependence on the Horde weakened more and more. The final liberation occurred in 1480 under Emperor Ivan III. By this time the period had ended, the gathering of Russian lands around Moscow and.