Tricks in an argument. Techniques for conducting a dispute

A trick in an argument is called any technique with the help of which they want to make a dispute easier for themselves and make it more difficult for their opponent.

The practice of public disputes, since ancient times, has developed many such methods, varied in nature and essence.

Let's look at the most common situations encountered in a dispute. For example, the opponent presented an argument to which it is difficult to immediately find a worthy answer, so they try to unnoticed by the opponent “delay the objection.” For this purpose, questions are raised in connection with the argument given, as if to clarify it; they begin the answer from afar, with something not directly related to the given question; they begin to refute secondary arguments, and then, having gathered strength, smash the main arguments of the enemy, etc. It is recommended to use “Delaying an Objection” even if you are very confused, nervous, all your thoughts have suddenly “disappeared”, there is confusion in your head . In order not to show your opponent your condition, you can start talking about something extraneous, in a confident voice. Sometimes the enemy’s argument seems correct, but you should not rush to agree with it.

The following situation may also arise: in the process of discussing a controversial issue, one of the polemicists notices that he has made a mistake. If it is discovered, it will discredit the speaker's position. If the error goes unnoticed, the polemicist will become a conductor of incorrect thoughts and inaccurate information. The polemicist does not want to openly admit a mistake for various reasons and resorts to speech patterns that allow him to soften and correct the situation: “That’s not what I wanted to say”; “These words do not express my thoughts correctly”; “Let me clarify my position,” etc. All these techniques are considered permissible, they are perfectly acceptable in a public dispute. Their use does not interfere with finding out the truth and does not compromise the opponent.

However, it should be borne in mind that unscrupulous polemicists often resort to various kinds of dishonest means in disputes.

The rudest prohibitive tricks of S.I. Povarnin in the work “Dispute. On the Theory and Practice of Dispute” gives the wrong way out of a dispute, derailing a dispute, an argument “to the policeman”, “stick” arguments.

Exit from the dispute. One of the participants feels that the dispute is not in his favor, that he does not have sufficient arguments, and tries to “sneak out of the dispute,” “suppress the dispute,” “finish off the dispute.”

Breaking down the dispute. Sometimes the enemy is interested in derailing the dispute, since it is beyond his strength, or unprofitable for some reason. In such cases, they resort to crude “mechanical” tricks: they interrupt the opponent, do not allow him to speak, clearly show reluctance to listen to the opponent - they cover their ears, hum, whistle, laugh, stomp their feet, etc. Sometimes these actions are performed by listeners, wanting to support their like-minded person and harm his opponent. This technique is called “obstruction” (intentionally disrupting the dispute).

"The argument to the policeman." The opponent's thesis is declared dangerous for the state or society. The opponent is essentially “gagged”, the argument ends, and victory is on the side of the one who used the trick.

"Stick arguments." They present an argument that the opponent must accept for fear of something unpleasant, often dangerous, or to which he cannot answer for the same reason and must either remain silent or come up with some “workarounds.”

A variation of the “argument to the policeman” and “stick arguments” is considered a trick called "reading in hearts". Its essence lies in the fact that the opponent does not so much analyze the opponent’s words as refer to the motives that forced them to be expressed (“You speak out of pity for him”; “You are forced to speak so by the interests of this organization”; “You are pursuing personal interests” and so on.).

The grossest impermissible tricks include insinuation. Word insinuation(Latin) means “a slanderous fabrication intended to discredit someone; malicious fiction, slander." The essence of the technique is that the participant in the dispute, wanting to discredit his opponent, undermine confidence in him, and, consequently, in his arguments, uses irresponsible hints and statements, for example, “It’s clear what you were doing during this visit...” , “We’ll still figure out where you got the funds to build a new dacha,” “Yes, we already know how you spend your free time.”

A fairly large group of dishonest means consists of psychological tricks. They are diverse in essence, many are based on a good knowledge of the peculiarities of human psychology, the weaknesses of human nature. As a rule, these tricks contain elements of cunning and outright deception. They display a rude, disrespectful attitude towards their opponent.

Let's look at some of them.

Knocking the enemy off balance. For this purpose, rude antics, insults, clearly unfair, mocking accusations, etc. are used. If the enemy “boils”, the case is won. He lost his chance of success in the argument.

A bet on false shame. It is known that people often want to appear better than they really are and are afraid of “losing themselves” in the eyes of others.

It is this desire to look a little better that some experienced polemicists play on. For example, when presenting an unproven or even false conclusion, the opponent accompanies it with the phrases: “You, of course, know what science has long established”; “Do you really still not know?”; “It is a generally known fact” and so on, i.e. relies on false shame. If a person does not admit that he does not know this, he is “hooked” by the enemy and is forced to agree with his arguments.

"Greasing the argument." Another related ego-based trick is called buttering up an argument. A weak argument that can be easily rebutted is accompanied by a compliment to the opponent. For example: “You, as an intelligent person, will not deny”; “Everyone is well aware of your honesty and integrity, so you...”; “A person who is not sufficiently educated will not appreciate or understand the argument presented, but you...” Sometimes the enemy is subtly made to understand that he is personally treated with special respect, his intelligence is highly valued, and his merits are recognized.

Suggestion. In a public dispute, suggestion has a great influence on both opponents and listeners. Therefore, one should not succumb to such a common trick as a self-confident, peremptory, decisive tone. A person speaking with aplomb and an impressive voice puts psychological pressure on those present. Indeed, when the enemy behaves very confidently, without having any reason for it, we, even if we feel right, begin to doubt our position. And if we haven’t understood the problem enough, then we generally give in to him. In such a situation, internal composure, restraint, a businesslike tone, and the ability to move the conversation from general phrases to consideration of the substance of the matter are required.

In addition to the appropriate tone, there are many other various tricks designed to inspire and psychologically influence the participants in the dispute. This is ridicule, and the desire to cut off the enemy, to arouse distrust in his words, a sharply negative assessment of the opinions expressed, an offensive remark, etc.

Reference to age, education, position. Often in disputes, references to one’s age, education and position are used as arguments. Quite often we come across the following reasoning: “If you live to my age, then you will judge”; “First get your diploma, and then we’ll talk”; “If you take my place, then you will argue,” etc. However, it is known that a person who is older in age, has a higher education, and holds a certain position is not always right. Therefore, you should not immediately give up positions and retreat; it is necessary to demand that the opponent present more compelling and convincing arguments.

"Double-entry bookkeeping". This trick is based on people’s tendency to have dual assessments: one measure is for ourselves and for what is beneficial and pleasant to us, the other is for other people and for what we do not like. In a dispute, the same argument can be correct when it suits us, and erroneous if it does not suit us. When We we refute someone using this argument - it is true, and when us they refute it - it is false.

Quite common in disputes and logical tricks, so called sophistry, or intentional errors in evidence. It should be remembered that sophistry and error differ only in that sophistry is intentional, and error is not intentional. Therefore, as many logical errors as there are sophisms. Let us dwell on some tricks of a sophistical nature.

Taking the conversation aside. We often observe situations when participants in a discussion of a controversial issue find it difficult to find the necessary arguments. In order to avoid defeat, to make it less noticeable, they divert the conversation in every possible way, distracting the attention of their opponents with secondary questions and stories on abstract topics.

Translating the dispute into contradictions between words and deeds. You can get away from the subject of discussion, leave aside the thesis put forward, with the help of such a trick - transfer the dispute to the contradictions between word and deed, the views of the enemy and his actions, way of life. By showing the inconsistency of the thesis put forward with the actions of the opponent, they put the opponent in an awkward position, effectively reducing the dispute to nothing.

This trick affects not only the enemy, but also the witnesses to the dispute. Usually listeners do not have time to delve into the essence of the matter, and they do not want to do so. Even if there is no contradiction between the stated principle and the behavior, no one will understand anything, the trick achieves its goal. About similar type tricks S.I. Povarnin writes: “This is one of the types of “clamping the mouth” of the enemy and has nothing to do with an honest fight in a dispute for the truth. – As a method of denunciation, it may be required and is often necessary. But denunciation and an honest dispute for the truth, like the struggle of thought with thought, are two incompatible things.”

Translation of the question into the point of view of benefit or harm. This is one of the common tricks in public argument. Instead of proving the truth of this or that proposition, it is determined whether it is of benefit to us or not. And it is clear that when we feel that a given proposal is beneficial to us, although it has harmful consequences for others, we are more likely to agree with it. It is this weakness of human nature that unscrupulous debaters take advantage of. They begin to put pressure on the opponent, emphasizing the advantages of their position for the opponent. Such arguments are often called “pocket”, i.e. convenient, profitable. And sometimes they have a simply hypnotic effect.

Action time offset. Sometimes debaters use this trick: in the process of reasoning, they shift the time of action, replacing what is true for the past and present with what will happen in the future. The author of the feuilleton “Saving an Honorable Name” humorously spoke about how the director, Comrade Kirchev, used this trick, refuting the speech of his colleague Simeonov:

“Noticing with what gloomy determination he stood up, everyone realized that Simeonov had decided to criticize the director himself.

– I think it's enough to be silent – Simeonov said in a voice vibrating with excitement, and a grave silence fell in the hall. – Everyone knows that our director is a despot. He suppresses criticism! No one dares to object to him, knowing full well what will follow...

Simeonov continued in the same vein for another ten minutes. After him, Comrade Kirchev, our director, himself made a refutation.

– Comrades, – he began, – I listened with great attention to the speech of the previous speaker. He spoke quite interestingly, but with his accusations he embarrassed both himself and me. Think for yourself: if after all that has been said I don’t punish him, what will happen? But it turns out that I am not a malicious critic at all and that Simeonov publicly slandered me! This is what will happen, comrades! It turns out that Simeonov is a slanderer and a liar! The honest name of Comrade Simeonov, who so passionately criticized me, will be seriously tarnished. And this, in turn, can cast a shadow on our entire glorious team. Therefore, I believe that the honest name of Comrade Simeonov must be saved. And I think the best way to do this is by punishing him, for example, by transferring him to a lower-paid position and depriving him of a quarterly bonus...

The hall burst into applause."

It is obvious that director Kirchev is not concerned about saving Simeonov’s reputation, as he claims, but about dealing with him for his criticism. After all, Simeonov said what the director’s behavior had been like so far, and not what it would be, so a change in the director’s behavior could not refute Simeonov’s statements and discredit his name.

Polemicists often resort to the tricks associated with the unfair use of questions and answers. These include, for example, the so-called "The error of many questions." The opponent is immediately asked several different questions under the guise of one and demands an immediate answer. Yes or No. But the fact is that the sub-questions contained in a given question are directly opposite to each other, one of them requires an answer yes, ah another - No. The answerer, without noticing this, gives an answer to only one of the questions. The questioner takes advantage of this, arbitrarily applies the answer to another question and confuses the opponent. This trick was used back in the ancient world. Here is a typical question of this type. The student was asked: “Have you stopped beating your father? Yes or no?" If the respondent says “yes,” then it turns out that he beat his father; if he says “no,” then it turns out that he continues to beat his father. Obviously, such a question cannot be answered in a “yes” or “no” form. The student had to say something like this: “I can’t even think about beating my father, because there can be no greater shame for a son.”

In disputes there are often situations when polemicists, for various reasons, try avoid the questions asked. Sometimes they simply ignore the question, as they say, deaf ears, as if they don’t notice it.

Some polemicists begin sneer at questions his opponent: “You ask such “deep” questions”; “And do you consider your question serious?”; “What a frivolous question”; “You ask such a difficult question that I give in to it” and so on. The question itself is often given a negative assessment: “This is a naive question”; “This question sounds apolitical”; “This is dogmatism”; "It's an immature question." Phrases of this kind do not contribute to finding out the truth or constructively solving the problem. They have a psychological effect on the opponent, as they manifest a disrespectful attitude towards him. This allows the person uttering such phrases to avoid the questions posed and leave them unanswered.

The most common in the dispute is considered “answering a question with a question.” Not Wanting to answer the question posed or having difficulty finding an answer, the polemicist poses a counter question to his opponent’s question. If the enemy begins to respond, it means he has fallen for this trick.

Polemicists also resort to such a peculiar trick as "answer on credit." Having difficulty discussing a problem, they postpone the answer to “later,” citing the complexity of the issue.

These are some of the dishonest tactics you encounter in disputes. You can learn the rest of the tricks on your own by reading literature on the art of argument.

The need for knowledge of this kind of means is beyond doubt. Everyone who fights for his beliefs, seeks the right solutions, asserts the truth, must not only be armed himself, but also know well the methods of his opponent. The ability to recognize this or that trick, show for what purpose it is used, and give a worthy rebuff to the enemy is a necessary quality of a polemicist.

Researchers are developing special techniques for protecting against incorrect methods of arguing. For example, if an opponent moves the discussion of a controversial issue to another, no less important topic, it is recommended to first agree that the new topic certainly deserves attention, and then suggest returning to the previous one.

It is advisable to ignore minor attacks from the opponent, but in case of obvious insults it is necessary to temporarily interrupt the argument.

Useful guidelines for resolving difficult situations when making management decisions are contained in Otto Ernst’s book “The Floor is Given to You: Practical Recommendations for Conducting Business Conversations and Negotiations.” The author describes the partner's actions during an argument and possible reactions to these actions. We present this table in full.

Partner's actions during a dispute

Possible reaction to your partner’s actions during an argument

Rejection of the decision (“it still won’t work”)

Accusation of illusions (“pure theory”)

Unproductive questions (for example, about organizational details when discussing strategic issues)

Simplifying the problem (“it will run its course”)

Complicating the problem (extreme “yes, but” method – permanent position)

Making demands (in terms of number of workers, financial, material resources)

Routine (“we always did it this way, and everything worked out”)

Verbosity (“lots of water, few arguments”)

Avoidance of meaning (pompous words, complex, incomprehensible sentence structures)

One-sided approach (for example, excessive theorizing when there is a need to discuss practical aspects)

Generalization error (individual, general phenomenon)

Lack of criteria for evaluation (presumptuous judgments)

Arbitrariness of comparisons (quantity, quality)

activating the partner by asking questions:

what arguments can be given?

what other solution is possible?

what real goals (means, solutions) are possible?

How does this relate to the problem under discussion?

What contradictions and obstacles may arise in this case?

how can you solve the problem?

how to meet these requirements?

what is the difference in efficiency (new, old)?

what is the meaning of your statement?

requirement (direct) to speak clearly

What is the practical value of what was said?

direct questions: does this concern a particular case, phenomenon, opportunity?

Based on what criteria is the assessment made?

Isn't a differentiated approach needed here?

Thus, you need to be psychologically prepared for various kinds of attacks and tricks from your opponent. It is important to maintain restraint and composure. It should be remembered that dishonest methods are in one way or another connected with a deviation from the laws of correct thinking, with a violation of the basic rules that govern the dispute, with the desire to divert the conversation from the subject of discussion.

Test questions and assignments

1. Tell us about the history of the art of argument.

2. What types of disputes do you know?

3. Formulate the basic rules for conducting a dispute and characterize them.

4. What influences the behavior of polemicists?

5. How do opponents treat each other with respect?

6. What polemical techniques are used in a dispute? Give examples of their use.

7. What tricks do unscrupulous polemicists often resort to in disputes? What is the essence of these tricks?

8. Have you ever encountered dishonest tactics from your opponent? How did you behave in a similar situation?

It should be admitted that it is not often possible to observe an ideal form of argument in life. More often, there are disputes in which the participants do not understand (or do not want to understand) each other, do not listen to the argument, interrupt each other, “attack” the opponents’ arguments, or “attack” the opponents themselves. A more sophisticated form of hidden struggle in an argument is a ruse.

A trick in a dispute is any technique with the help of which the participants in a dispute want to make it easier for themselves or make it more difficult for their opponent. A person who masters tricks is able to win an argument faster and more “successfully.” A philosopher who openly proclaimed an attitude towards dishonest argumentation was A. Schopenhauer. In his work “Eristics, or the art of winning in disputes,” he gives advice on how to deceive or confuse your opponent in a dispute. True, he recommends using this kind of advice only in certain situations. Thus, he considers fidelity to the truth impracticable or useless in cases where the thesis of the argument clearly contradicts the already established opinion of the opponent.

Tricks may or may not be acceptable. They are acceptable if it is noticeable that the opponent is resorting to dishonest, impermissible methods of conducting a dispute. In this case, it is necessary to create a kind of trap into which the unscrupulous debater must fall. For example, a person who insists that “all people are dishonest, trying to grab a bigger piece for themselves” and does not listen to any arguments refuting this thesis, can be stopped in his persistence only by attributing this statement to his own person, a statement of this kind: “ If we assume that what you insist on is fair, then you are also a dishonest person, trying to grab a bigger piece for yourself.” Usually a moralizing person does not accept such assessments of himself.

Such a technique as delaying an objection is allowed.

They resort to it if an objection to a thesis or argument does not immediately come to mind. Usually a person finds clearer objections only after an argument (often called late in the mind); at the right moment there is only a “feeling” that he could respond to the attack, but his thoughts do not line up in a coherent logical chain. In such a situation, you can begin to ask questions in connection with the argument presented, imagining this as a simple clarification of the essence of what was said or information in general. It would be forgivable to delay the objection even if there is a need to more carefully consider the thesis or argument being put forward with their apparent correctness.

Are considered unacceptable the following types tricks: wrong way out of a dispute, disrupting a dispute, “argument to the policeman,” “stick” arguments.

Exit from a dispute occurs if one of the parties to the dispute is unable to support argumentative activity due to weakness own position in this dispute.

Disruption of a dispute is done by constantly interrupting the opponent, demonstrating reluctance to listen to him, etc. Unfortunately, such a trick is resorted to even during dialogue about socially significant problems at the highest level. In recent history, the reaction of deputies to the speech of Academician A.D. Sakharov at the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in June 1989 is notorious in this regard.

“Argument to the policeman” as a method of suppressing an opponent in a dispute is actively used in totalitarian societies. This usually happens in the following way: the thesis or argument proposed by the opponent is declared dangerous for society or the state. In any case, these tricks are aimed at ending a dispute that is unfavorable for one of the parties to the dialogue.

If the goal of the dispute is to “convince” the opponent at any cost, then they resort to the so-called “stick” arguments. This type of trick can be defined as a special form of intellectual and psychological violence. Its essence lies in the fact that the participant in the dispute makes an argument that the opponent must accept for fear of something unpleasant, dangerous, or to which he cannot answer correctly for the same reason and must either remain silent or come up with “workarounds.”

A variation of the above tricks is such a technique as “reading hearts x”. At the same time, the opponent is not interested in understanding what the enemy said, but is trying to determine the motives for which he says it or somehow acts. An example of this method of arguing is described by A.P. Chekhov in the story “Name Day”:

“Will you bother to explain to me what this means? I'm asking you!

I'm tired of it, Olga! Honestly, I’m tired, and now I don’t have time for this... Tomorrow we’ll fight.

No, I understand you perfectly! - Olga Mikhailovna continued. - You hate me! Yes Yes! You hate me because I'm richer than you! You will never forgive me for this and will always lie to me!... Now, I know, you are laughing at me... I am even sure that you married me only to have a qualification and these vile horses...

Pyotr Dmitrich dropped the newspaper and stood up. The unexpected insult stunned him. He smiled helplessly as a child, looked at his wife in confusion and, as if protecting himself from blows, stretched out his hands to her and said pleadingly:

Insinuation should also be included in the same category of tricks. If one of the participants in a dispute needs to undermine the credibility of his opponent, and therefore his arguments, he uses irresponsible hints for this purpose. In this case, they resort to remarks like: “No one knows what you did or said there...” or “Who can prove that you didn’t do that or say that?” and so on.

A person focused on winning an argument at any cost has a fairly large arsenal of psychological tricks, which include such as throwing the enemy “off balance”, relying on the slowness of thinking and gullibility of the enemy, distracting attention and leading to the wrong trail, relying on false shame , “greasing” the argument, suggestion, “double-entry bookkeeping.” In the first case, the opponent uses statements that infuriate the opponent, outrage him, for example, using rude antics, insults to the “personality,” bullying, etc. In the second, seeing that the opponent thinks slowly but thoroughly, he speaks very quickly , expresses thoughts unclearly, in a form that is difficult to understand, replaces one thought with another. Wanting to defeat an opponent who is clearly weak in some area of knowledge or generally weaker intellectually, they turn to him with the words: “You, of course, cannot but know that...”, “Everyone knows that ...”, “Only a stupid and uneducated person does not know that...”, etc. In such a situation, a person gets lost and begins to pretend that he, of course, knows... Then a strong opponent can say anything , the opponent has no choice but to agree with everything else.

One is inclined to “grease the argument” if the argument itself is unsubstantiated and the opponent can object to it. Then they express this argument in a vague, confusing form, accompanied by, for example, a compliment to the opponent: “Of course, this is an argument that you cannot bring in every dispute; an insufficiently educated person will not understand or appreciate it” or “You, as an intelligent person, do not you will deny that...”, etc.

One of the most powerful tricks in an argument is suggestion. Its role is especially great in oral argument. If a person has a loud, impressive voice, speaks calmly, clearly, confidently, with authority, has a representative appearance and manners, he has, among other things, equal conditions a huge advantage in the dispute. If a person is deeply convinced of what he is arguing about, and knows how to express this unshakable firmness with a convinced tone, manner of speaking and facial expression, he has greater inspiring power and also “acts” on the enemy, especially one who does not have this conviction. A persuasive tone and manner are often more persuasive than the most solid argument.

“Double-entry bookkeeping” is based on the duality of a person’s assessments of the world around him and himself (if something is beneficial to me, it’s good, if something is beneficial to someone else, it’s bad). In the field of argumentation, it looks like this: the same argument turns out to be true when it is beneficial for us, and erroneous when it is disadvantageous. A type of “double-entry bookkeeping” includes the conscious substitution of one definition for another in order to create a favorable and convenient assessment of the situation, actions taken. This case is described quite clearly by A.P. Chekhov: “My Vaska was my worker all his life; he didn’t have a baby, he’s hungry and sick. If I give him 15 kopecks now. per day, then by this I want to return him to his previous position as an employee, that is, I protect, first of all, my interests, and meanwhile these 15 kopecks. For some reason I call it help, benefit, good deed... There is no logic in our life, that's what! Logic! (Chekhov A.P. Wife).

Among the usual and widespread tricks are the so-called sophisms, or deliberate errors in proof. Sophistry and error differ not essentially, not logically, but only psychologically: error is not intentional, sophistry is intentional. Sophisms are possible as deviations from the objectives of the dispute in the field of argumentation, as well as so-called sophisms of inconsistency.

A deviation from the objectives of the dispute, a deviation from the thesis occurs if at the very beginning of the dispute or in the middle of it, the previous thesis is discarded and another one takes its place, or a dispute over the thesis is replaced by a dispute over evidence. In the latter case, the following happens: instead of refuting the thesis, the opponent breaks down the proof and, if he succeeds, announces that the opponent’s thesis has been refuted. In fact, one correct conclusion follows from this: the thesis has not been proven by the enemy. This same type of sophism includes the translation of a dispute into contradictions. It is necessary to point out that the opponent contradicts himself, but this is absolutely not important for proving the falsity of his thesis. Such indications, for example, are of great importance when criticizing any system of thoughts; often with their help it is possible to break or weaken the opponent’s evidence, but it is impossible to refute his thesis with one indication of the inconsistency of the opponent’s thinking. This should also include transferring the dispute to the contradictions between word and deed, between the views of the enemy and his actions, his life, etc. This is one of the ways of “clamping the mouth.” As a method of denunciation, it may be necessary, but denunciation and an honest dispute for the truth as a struggle of thought with thought are two incompatible things.

If not one argument, but several, is given as proof of a thesis, the sophist often resorts to an “incomplete refutation.” He tries to refute one or two of the weakest or easiest to refute, often leaving the most significant and only important without attention. At the same time, he pretends to refute all the evidence.

Frequent deviations from the objectives of the dispute include the substitution of a point of disagreement in a complex controversial thought, the so-called refutation without substance. It is especially typical for disputes in the press and occurs in the expectation that the reader might not have seen or remembered the original thesis. The sophist does not refute the essence of a complex controversial thought, but takes only unimportant details and refutes them, pretending to refute the thesis.

Control questions

What is called a trick in an argument?

Describe the entity acceptable tricks in a dispute, give examples of this kind of tricks.

What tricks are considered unacceptable when conducting a discussion or argument?

Define the essence of sophistry as a type of trick.

In the scientific literature on the rules of ideal argumentation, the code of the argumentator and the code of the opponent are formulated, with the goal of helping those participants in the dispute who strive not only for success in argumentation, but also for their statements to correspond to reality and be effective. Let us present these codes.

Argumentator Code

1. The argumentator strives to achieve or disseminate the truth, deepen the understanding of the subject.

The argumentator views himself and his opponent as people with equal rights to free knowledge.

Based on this:

P. 1. The argumentator has the goal of achieving acceptance by the opponent of the thesis in the modality in which the argumentator himself accepts it.

The argumentator cannot mislead his opponent by using obviously incorrect premises or deliberately incorrect methods of reasoning. Everything that is asserted by the argumentator is asserted in the modality in which he himself accepts it.

The argumentator takes into account the field of argumentation. It means that:

a) the arguer forms the argumentative structure in such a way that it is understandable to the opponent;

b) the argumentator forms an argumentative structure in such a way that the views and inclinations of the opponent, the information he has, and his intellectual capabilities allow him to accept it.

The argumentator avoids the use of argumentum ad hominem, and especially those cases where the opponent’s ability to make an objective and adequate judgment on the issue under consideration is called into question.

The argumentator’s commitment to the ethical-gnoseological attitude formulated in Part I supports his emotional balance in the event of failure of the argumentation and contributes to the preservation of self-criticism and the desire for improvement in the event of successful argumentation.

Opponent Code

1. The opponent recognizes himself as free in his internal assessment of the argumentation.

The opponent strives to achieve the truth, deepen the understanding of the subject, and spread the truth.

When assessing the argument internally and expressing it externally, the opponent adheres to general ethical standards.

Based on this:

P. 1. The opponent strives to give an adequate logical and epistemological assessment of the argumentative structure, as well as adequate pragmatic, ethical and emotional assessments.

In this case, the opponent carries out the type of assessment that

required or appropriate in the circumstances for a given argumentative construction.

The opponent does not mix different types of assessments, does not replace one type of assessment with another.

If conditions and ethical standards allow, the opponent gives an external assessment of the argument that coincides with the internal one. The opponent avoids giving an external assessment of the argumentation that contradicts the internal one.

Alekseev A.P. Argumentation. Cognition. Communication. M., 1991.

Andreev V.I. Conflictology: the art of dispute, negotiation, conflict resolution. Kazan, 1992.

Dialectics and dialogue. M., 1992.

Pavlova K. G. The art of argument: logical and psychological aspects. M., 1988.

Povarnin S. Dispute. On the theory and practice of dispute // Questions of philosophy. 1990. No. 3.

Schopenhauer A. Eristics, or the art of winning disputes. St. Petersburg, 1900.

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Introduction
1. Dispute. Types of dispute
2. Tricks in an argument
4. Measures against tricks
Conclusion
Bibliography

Introduction

The significance of a dispute in a person’s life is quite great, since it is an important element of interpersonal communication and interaction between people, as well as an integral stage in the procedure for making any decisions that affect their interests.

In our world, in order to achieve success you need to be able to prove your ideas to people and defend them, for this you often have to enter into an argument, and the ability to argue is an art, and mastery of the art of argument is a big plus for every person.

The purpose of this test work is an analysis of the problem of correct and incorrect conduct of disputes, the use of tricks in a dispute. Tasks - consideration various types dispute, rules for conducting a dispute, the existence of permissible and impermissible tricks in a dispute and ways to protect yourself from them.

trick dispute permissible impermissible

1. Dispute. Types of dispute

A dispute is understood as any clash of opinions in which each party defends its rightness by constructing evidence. The dispute begins with the fact that the point of view expressed by one of its participants is, at a minimum, called into question.

In order to consciously conduct a correct, focused dispute, you need to be able to “embrace the dispute,” that is, all the time keep in mind the general picture of a given dispute, giving an account of what position it is in, what has been done, what is being done and why at a given moment.

There are the following types of dispute:

Discussion (from Latin discussio - research, discussion) is a public dispute, the purpose of which is to compare different points of view in order to correctly find a solution to a controversial issue. The discussion is led by an experienced facilitator.

A debate is a pre-prepared oral argument on a given topic (scientific, moral and ethical, socially important). During the dispute, they compare various points vision under the guidance of a competent facilitator.

Polemics (from the Greek polemikos - militant, hostile) is a heated dispute, a struggle between fundamentally opposing points of view. The goal is to defeat the enemy and defend your own position. A presenter is not required.

Debate is the name given to disputes that arise during the discussion of reports. It is important to note that each speaker may speak only once in a debate.

Debates are like that speech genre dialogical speech, which is based on discussion of current issues. During the debate, various (including opposing) points of view are compared, making it possible to reveal the identified problem from different positions. Unlike debates, which are similar in scope to debates, their participants are not limited in how many times they can take the floor.

Disputes are classified by purpose, number of participants and form of conduct.

Based on the purpose, the following types of disputes are distinguished:

because of the truth: dispute for the sake of clarifying the truth is called the highest form of dispute, the most noble and beautiful. In addition to the undoubted benefits, such a dispute brings real pleasure to its participants. This is understandable: knowledge about the subject of the dispute is expanding, faith in one’s own intellectual capabilities is strengthening;

for persuasion: the goal of an argument may be to convince the opponent. There are two possible options here: the arguer sincerely convinces of what he is talking about; the arguer himself does not at all believe in the truth of what he defends. Such a disputant prefers an opponent who is weaker than himself and chooses only arguments that are convenient for himself;

for victory: the goal of a dispute is victory, and polemicists do not set as their goal to get closer to the truth or to convince the enemy. Their goal is to convince their opponent by any means. Main principle participants in such a dispute - “winners are not judged”, so those disputing resort to spectacular, but undignified methods of influencing the enemy;

for the sake of argument: often there is an argument for the sake of argument. For such debaters, it makes no difference what to argue about or with whom to argue. It is important for them to show off their eloquence;

Based on the number of participants there are:

dispute-monologue: a person argues with himself, the so-called “internal dispute”;

dispute-dialogue;

dispute-polylogue.

The form of the dispute can be oral or written. If an oral argument is conducted in front of an audience, important role psychological factors play a role. Reaction speed and wit are of great importance. Participants try not only to convince each other, but also to impress the audience. A written dispute is considered a more acceptable form of clarifying the truth, and therefore is of particular value. But if a written argument drags on for too long, readers tend to forget certain conclusions.

2. Tricks in an argument

In the process of argumentation and criticism, two types of errors can be made: intentional and unintentional.

Unintentional mistakes are made due to low culture of thinking, haste and some other reasons. They are called paralogisms (Greek - incorrect reasoning).

Deliberate errors are called sophisms, and persons who commit such errors are called sophists. The reasoning itself, which contains deliberate errors, is also called sophistry. Sophistry from Greek. - a cunning trick, an invention. A trick in a dispute is any technique with the help of which the participants in a dispute want to make it easier for themselves and difficult for their opponent.

The mistake of many questions - the opponent is asked several different questions under the guise of one and asked to answer “yes” or “no”. The way out of this situation is to give a detailed answer.

Answering a question with a question - not wanting to answer the question posed, the polemicist poses a counter question.

Answer on credit - experiencing difficulties in discussing a problem, debaters postpone the answer to “later”, citing its complexity.

Exit from a dispute occurs if one of the parties to the dispute realizes the weakness of his position.

Disruption of a dispute is done by constantly interrupting the opponent, demonstrating reluctance to listen to him.

The “argument to the policeman” is actively used in totalitarian societies. The thesis or argument is declared dangerous to society.

“Strike arguments” can be defined as a special form of intellectual violence. The disputant gives an argument that the opponent must accept for fear of something unpleasant or dangerous.

3. Permissible and impermissible tricks

There is no sufficiently strict definition of the concept of “trick in an argument”. This term usually refers to deliberately incorrect methods of conducting a dispute, peculiar trips, “sabotage”, attempts to fairly crudely manipulate a partner in order to maximally satisfy one’s own interests, belittle the opponent and cause him certain psychological damage. On the one hand, they help to defend their judgment, which the partner must accept as if freely, without feeling pressure on him, on the other hand, they allow him to equally freely lead the interlocutor, who is not experienced in logic and the rules of correct conduct of a dispute, to abandon his own position. Obviously, tricks are often used to make it much more difficult for an opponent to conduct a dispute.

The following can be considered permissible tricks in a dispute:

suspension of the dispute by one or both parties for valid reasons;

if the dispute escalates and the dispute reaches an unacceptable phase (violation), the dispute can be stopped by one (even the wrong) party to its benefit;

contacting an independent person or source with a request for clarification of inaccuracies.

The crudest tricks in a dispute are:

moving “aside” from the topic of the ongoing dispute with a transition to “personalities” - indications of: profession, nationality, position held, physical defects, psychological disorders;

shouting and obscene language, mutual insults, shouting and insults of third parties;

threats and hooligan behavior;

assault and fighting.

A fairly large group of dishonest means consists of psychological tricks (greasing an argument, relying on false shame), with the help of which some polemicists want to make the argument easier for themselves and make it more difficult for their opponent. They are diverse in essence, many are based on a good knowledge of the peculiarities of human psychology, the weaknesses of human nature. As a rule, these tricks contain elements of cunning and outright deception. They display a rude, disrespectful attitude towards their opponent. Such tricks in a dispute are considered unacceptable.

4. Measures against tricks

Often in a dispute it is convenient to use certain tactical methods, and sometimes even necessary. It is only important in the heat of an argument not to stoop to rude and unacceptable tricks, to control yourself and not try to hurt your opponent. If one of the parties feels that not entirely correct methods are being used towards it, you need to properly protect yourself. In order to resist tricks in an argument, you need to know them well enough and be able to recognize them in polemics.

When one side notes to itself that the other is using subterfuge tactics in a dispute, the most adequate reaction will be the following:

1. Identify the very fact of using a specific trick.

2. Directly bring this up for discussion and agree on what rules the opponents in the dispute will adhere to in order to resolve it constructively.

Discussing subterfuge tactics not only makes it less effective, but also makes the other party worry that the first party may interrupt the dialogue and complicate the relationship, and he himself risks “losing face.” Simply raising the issue that such tactics are unacceptable may be enough to stop the use of subterfuge. In discussing the “rules of the game” in a dispute, the following positions can be noted:

1. You should abandon the initial negative attitude towards the controversial situation, and not consider it for yourself only as a source of troubles or threats.

2. Separate people from problems. Don't allow yourself to attack someone for using tactics that you consider illegal and inappropriate.

3. Focus on mutually beneficial options.

4. Use the tactic "I would like to better understand your position. Let me tell you where I have difficulty understanding your reasoning."

5. It is necessary to allow the opponent in a dispute to “let off steam” from time to time. Emotions in a dispute are not always pleasant, but they should still be recognized as legitimate. If a person is able to free himself at least a little from the pressure of unexpressed feelings, he is likely to be able to think more calmly and this will allow him to focus more on finding a compromise.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I think it is important to note that the goal of a dispute should be to find the truth or reach a compromise, but not to win. In cases where this condition is not met, it is better to interrupt the dispute.

A conversation can be considered successful if the result is:

1) the partners received new information for themselves and were able to better understand the opponent’s position;

2) were able to at least partially remove or reduce tension in relations, eliminate manifestations of mutual hostility, mistrust, resentment, irritation;

3) came to an understanding;

4) were able to resolve the controversial situation itself, eliminate the conflict, and reach agreement.

You need to remain calm in an argument. Sometimes this is difficult, especially when the opponent wants to win the argument at any cost. Mastering polemical skills is a difficult task. Solving it requires hard work, patience and perseverance, some effort on oneself, as well as great desire.

Bibliography

1. Vinokur V.A. Tricks in an argument. - St. Petersburg: Speech 2005.

2. Povarin S.V. The art of argument. On the theory and practice of dispute. - M., 1996.

3. Melnikova S.V. Business rhetoric. - M., 1999.

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Tricks in an argument

Chapter 13. Permissive tricks

What is a trick? Delaying an objection. Shock. Development of weak points of the opponent’s argumentation. Tricks in response to “malicious denial” of arguments.

1. A trick in a dispute is any technique with the help of which one wants to make the argument easier for oneself or make the argument more difficult for the enemy. There are many such techniques, very diverse in nature. Some of them, which are used to facilitate the dispute for oneself, are permissible. Others are unaffordable and often downright dishonest. It is currently impossible to list all the tricks or at least accurately classify them. We believe, however, that it is necessary to describe some of the most important and most frequently encountered ones in order to help recognize them and take protective measures.

2. First, let's touch on some clearly permissible techniques. Such tricks include (most often in an oral argument) delaying an objection. Sometimes it happens that the enemy has given us an argument to which we cannot immediately find an objection. It just “doesn’t come to mind,” and that’s all. In such cases, they try to “delay the objection” as unnoticeably as possible for the opponent, for example, they raise questions in connection with the argument presented, as if to clarify it or for information in general, although neither one nor the other is needed; they begin the answer from afar, with something related to the given question, but also not directly related to it, etc., etc. At this very time, the thought works and often the desired objection appears, to which they now move on. You must be able to do this deftly and quietly. If the enemy notices what's going on, he will do his best to interfere with the trick.

3. This trick in its pure form is completely permissible and often necessary. The human mental mechanism is a very capricious mechanism. Sometimes suddenly the thought in a dispute refuses to work for a moment in the face of the most ordinary or even absurd objection. The person gets lost. This happens especially often with nervous or shy people, under the influence of the most unexpected reasons - for example, sometimes even under the influence of a suddenly flashing thought: “what if I don’t find the answer” (self-hypnosis). This phenomenon reaches its highest degree in the so-called “shock”. The person arguing suddenly loses all the baggage of thoughts on this issue. “My head is empty.” All knowledge, all income, all objections seemed to “fly out of my head.” (49:) The person is completely helpless. This “shock” occurs most often when a person is very worried or tired. In such cases, the only “salvation” is the trick we analyze. You must try not to give away your condition, not look confused, not lower or weaken your voice, speak firmly, and skillfully delay an objection until you recover. Otherwise, both the opponent and the listeners (for the most part judging the course of the dispute “by appearance”) will think that we are “broken,” no matter how absurd the reason for which this unpleasant story happened to us.

Often they resort to “delaying an objection” in cases where, although the opponent’s argument seems correct, the possibility cannot be ruled out that we are subject to some illusion or error in such an assessment. Caution dictates not to agree with him too easily; In such cases, they very often resort to other tricks that are no longer permissible, for example, they evade an objection to it and keep silent, “bypass” it; or they simply transfer the dispute to another topic, etc. etc.

4. It is also entirely permissible to use that technique (it’s hard to even call it a “trick”) when we, seeing that the enemy is embarrassed by some argument, or has become especially excited, or is trying to “escape” the answer, pay special attention to this argument and we begin to “press” on it. Whatever the dispute, you should always vigilantly monitor the weak points in the opponent’s argumentation and, having found such a point, “develop” it to the end, without “letting go” of the enemy until the entire weakness of this point is revealed and emphasized. “Releasing” the enemy in such cases is possible only when the enemy is obviously in shock or the like. or out of generosity, out of the well-known “chivalry in an argument”, if he got into a particularly ridiculous “problem”. Meanwhile, the ability to exploit enemy weaknesses is quite rare. Anyone interested in the art of argument often watches with pity as the arguer, due to his complete inability to navigate the argument or for other reasons, loses his advantage over his opponent.

5. Some tricks used to respond to the enemy’s dishonest tricks are also quite permissible. Sometimes you can't protect yourself without this. For example, in an argument you need to prove some important idea. But the enemy felt that if you prove it, you will also prove the thesis, and then his case is lost. To prevent you from proving this idea, he resorts to a dishonest trick: whatever argument you give in favor of it, he declares it unproven. You say: “all people are mortal,” he replies: this has not yet been proven. You will say: “Do you yourself exist or not?” He answers: maybe I exist, but maybe it’s an illusion.” What to do with such a person? With such a “malicious denial” of the arguments, the only option is to either give up the argument or, if this is inconvenient, resort to a trick. The most typical are two “defensive tricks”: a) it is necessary to “conduct” arguments in favor of the idea being proven so that the opponent does not notice that they are intended for this purpose. Then he will not “maliciously persist” and can accept them. When we have carried them all out, then all that remains is to connect them together - and the idea is proven. The enemy fell into a trap. In order to successfully carry out this trick, one often needs very great skill, the ability to “master an argument,” the ability to conduct it according to a well-known plan, which is rare in our time. Simply another trick. b) Noticing that the enemy maliciously (50:) denies each of our arguments in favor of the thought being proven, and we need to make some argument, we set a trap. We are silent about our argument, and instead we take a thought that contradicts it and pretend that we want to use it as an argument. If the enemy has “set up” to deny all our arguments, then he can, without thinking carefully, attack her and reject her. This is where the trap over him will slam shut. By rejecting the thought that contradicted our argument, he thereby accepted our argument that we wanted to carry out. For example, I need to make the argument “some people are vicious by nature,” but my opponent has clearly taken up malicious denial and will never miss any argument. Then I pretend that I want to put forward, as an argument, a contradictory thought: “after all, you will not deny,” I will say, “that by nature every person is good and blameless, and depravity is acquired from upbringing, from the environment, etc. ." If the enemy does not solve the trap, he will apply his tactics here too and declare that this is an obviously false idea. “Undoubtedly, there are people who are vicious by nature” - sometimes he will even provide evidence. This is exactly what we need. The argument has been carried out, the trap has slammed shut.

Chapter 14. The grossest impermissible tricks

Wrong way out of a dispute. Breaking down the dispute. Argument “to the policeman.” Stick arguments.

1. There are countless illegal tricks. There are very rough ones, and there are very subtle ones. The most crude tricks are of a “mechanical” nature. The wrong “way out of a dispute” often has this nature. Sometimes you have to “give up the argument” because, for example, the opponent gets personal, allows himself to use rude expressions, etc. This, of course, will be the right “way out of the dispute,” for serious reasons. But it also happens that a debater has a bad time in a dispute because the opponent is stronger than him, either in general or in this matter. He feels that the argument is beyond his strength, and tries in every possible way to “sneak out of the argument,” “suppress the argument,” “finish off the argument.” They are not shy about their means and often resort to the crudest mechanical tricks.

2. The crudest of them and the most “mechanical” is to not let the enemy speak. The arguer constantly interrupts the opponent, tries to talk him down, or simply demonstratively shows that he does not want to listen to him; covers his ears, hums, whistles, etc. etc. In a dispute in front of listeners, listeners sometimes play such a role, seeing that their like-minded person is having a bad time: there is a chorus (51:) of approval or disapproval, and roaring, and cackling, and stamping feet, and breaking tables and chairs, and a demonstrative exit from premises - all according to the cultured morals of the listeners. It is, of course, impossible to argue under such conditions. This is called (if successful) “breaking the dispute.”

If the arguer is impudent enough, he may, after “arguing” with you and not allowing you to say a word, declare: “you can’t argue with you because you don’t give a new answer to questions” or even: “because you don’t positively give opportunity to speak." Sometimes such a gentleman, when in trouble, will seize on the word “I don’t understand,” like the sophist Callicles in Plato’s dialogue “Gorgias.” Whatever Socrates tells him, the only answer is “I don’t understand.” “I don’t understand your cleverness, Socrates.” “I don’t know what you’re saying,” etc. etc. So Callicles would have gotten out of the argument if his teacher, Gorgias, had not ordered him to continue. “No, no, Callicles, answer for us too, so that the research can be completed” (GorgiaCh97 A.V.). Sometimes all this is done more subtly. You have made a strong but complex argument, against which the enemy cannot argue anything: he then says with irony: “I'm sorry, but I can’t argue with you anymore. Such arguments are beyond my understanding. They are too learned for me,” etc. and so on.

After this, there is no way to force another stubborn person to continue the argument: you can’t grab him by the leg to hold him back. Another can be kept “in an argument” by declaring that if he did not understand the argument, then the fault is in our inability to express it clearly, and not in his mind, etc.

Unfortunately, in a rougher or more subtle form, “suppressing the dispute” and “derailing the dispute” are not very rare. To illustrate this technique - and also to illustrate another “natural trick”, namely, a “chorus” of half-listeners and half-participants in the dispute, in every possible way praising the arguments of one side and maliciously condemning the arguments of the other side - I will give a witty example of a dispute from Moliere’s Critique of the School of Women.

Lysis (opponent of “Chevalier” Dorant). Finally, the title itself: “ dramatic work" comes from a Greek word that means "to act" and is given to show that the very essence of this work is action. In the comedy under discussion there is no action at all. It all consists of the stories of Agnes or Horace.

Marquise. Oh! Oh! Chevalier.

Klymene. What a witty remark! This is called looking into the essence of things.

Lysis. What could be less witty, or, better yet, so base, as other expressions of this comedy, at which everyone laughs - especially the word about the birth of children from the ear?

Klymene. Perfect.

Eliza. Oh!

Lysis. And the scene with the servant and maid in the house? Isn't it boringly long? Isn't she completely unbearable?

Marquis. It's right.

Klymene. Definitely correct.

Eliza. He is right.

Lysis. Isn't Arnolf giving his money to Horas too easily? And besides, he is the funny face in the play. Should he have been forced to perform the act of a noble man?

Marquis. Wonderful. This remark is also excellent.

Klymene. Amazing remark!

Eliza. Amazing!

Lysis. Arnolf's sermon and his maxims - aren't they funny? And don’t they even shock our sense of reverence for the sacraments?

Marquis. Absolutely right.

Klymene. Very well said.

Eliza. Nothing better could be said.

Lysis. And finally, this Monsieur Delyasouche appears to us as an intelligent man; in so many places in the play he seems so serious? Doesn’t he descend into something overly comic and overly exaggerated in the fifth act, when he expresses the ardor of his love to Agnes with strange rolling of his eyes, funny sighs, tears, at which everyone laughs.

Marquis. Parbleu! Wonderful.

Klymen. Fabulous!

Eliza. Vivat, M'sieur Lyzidas!

Lysis. I don't want to bore you, so I'm omitting thousands of other comments.

Marquis. Parbleu! Chevalier. You were treated well.

Dorant. Let's see.

Marquis. You found an opponent stronger than you, honestly.

Dorant. May be.

Marquis. Answer, answer, answer, answer!

Dorant. With pleasure. He…

Marquis. Answer, please.

Dorant. Let me answer. If…

Marquis. Parbleu! I don't believe you answered.

Dorant. Yes, if you talk all the time.

Klymene. Please, let's listen to his arguments.

Dorant. Firstly, it is not true that the entire play consists of only stories. There is a lot of action happening on stage. The stories themselves are actions, as required by the plot: they are innocently conveyed to the person concerned, thanks to this, he finds himself in an awkward position and, after each story, takes all possible measures to avoid the misfortune he fears.

Urania. And I find that the beauty of the “School for Women” plot lies precisely in these constant trusting stories. In my opinion, it’s quite funny that Arnolf, a smart man, is constantly informed about everything by a naive, simple-minded girl, his beloved, and a frivolous young man, his rival; Meanwhile, despite this, he cannot avoid what is happening to him.

Marquis. Nonsense, nonsense!

Klymene. Weak answer!

Eliza. Bad arguments.

Dorant. As for the “children from the ear,” the point is that Arnolf says them. The author inserted these words not because he himself wanted to say something witty, but simply as a thing that characterizes Arnolf. They depict his eccentricity all the more because Arnolf talks about this trivial stupidity said by Agnes as something surprisingly good; they give him unspeakable pleasure.

Marquis. Bad answer!

Klymene. Unsatisfactory answer.

Eliza. This is the same as not answering anything.

Dorant. And as for the money that Arnolf gives so easily, he has a letter from his best friend - sufficient security. Then it is not at all incompatible that a person is funny in one way and noble in another. As for the scene with the servants, which others found long and cold, it obviously has its own meaning. Arnolf suffers punishment everywhere (53:) through the very thing on which he built his precautions, as on an unshakable basis: Agnes’s innocent simplicity strikes him during the journey; the simplicity of the servants lingers for a long time at the door upon their return.

Marquis. Worthless arguments.

Klymene. These are all just empty excuses.

Eliza. Arguments that inspire pity.

Finally, the Marquis finally breaks down the argument. After one argument from Dorant, he declares:

Marquis. Honestly, Chevalier, you would do better if you shut up.

Dorant. So be it. But in the end, if we observe ourselves while we are in love...

Marquis. But I don't want to listen to you.

Dorant. Listen to me. Is it really in the heat of passion...

Marquis.(sings).

Marquis. How!

Marquis. La, la, la, la, lar, la, la, la, la, la, la.

Dorant. I don't know if it's possible...

Marquis. La, la, la, la, lar, la, la, la, la, la, la.

Urania. I think that…

Marquis. La, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la, la.

The dispute ends... When the desire is expressed that the dispute be recorded in the form of a small comedy, the Marquis declares to Dorant:

Marquis. Parbleu! You will play, Chevalier, an unfavorable role in this comedy.

3. Another but more “serious” mechanical trick to put an end to an unprofitable dispute is an “appeal” or “argument to the policeman.”

First, a person argues honor with honor, argues over whether the thesis is true or false. But the dispute is not playing out in his favor - and he turns to the powers that be, pointing out the danger of the thesis for the state or society, etc. And then some “power” comes and clamps down on our enemy, which is what we needed to prove. The dispute stopped and “victory” was theirs.

4. But the “call to the policeman” is intended only to end the dispute. Many are not content with this, but use similar means to “convince” the enemy, i.e. or rather, to force him, at least in words, to agree with us. Then such arguments are called “stick arguments.” Of course, even in our time “stick arguments” are still used in the literal sense of the word. Violence of all kinds very often “convinces” many and resolves (54:) disputes, at least for a while. But such stick arguments are not included in the scope of consideration by logic, even applied logic. Here, a stick argument is a rather ugly trick, which consists in presenting an argument that the opponent, according to the sophist, must accept for fear of something unpleasant, often dangerous, or which he cannot answer correctly for the same reason and must or remain silent, or come up with some “workarounds.” This is, in essence, robbery in a dispute. Even, perhaps, in one respect, even worse. The robber openly offers a dilemma: “trick or treat.” The sophist presents in a hidden way and with an innocent appearance the dilemma of “accept the argument or suffer trouble”; "don't mind or get hurt."

5. Such arguments abound at all times, among all peoples, under all regimes; in state, in public, in private life. During the Inquisition, for example, such disputes were possible: a freethinker declares that “the earth revolves around the sun”; the opponent objects: “Here it is written in the psalms: You have set the earth on solid foundations, it will not shake forever and ever.” “What do you think,” he asks pointedly, “can the Holy Scriptures be mistaken or not?” The freethinker remembers the Inquisition and stops objecting. For greater security, he usually even “makes sure”, even sometimes touchingly thanks “for teaching.” For a “strong” “argument with a stick”, like the Inquisition standing behind one’s back, is naturally irresistible and “convincing” for most weak mortals.

In our times, thank God, there is no Inquisition, but there are many other forms of argument with a stick. An example from recent life is a missionary’s interview with Old Believers. The Old Believer vehemently argues that the missionary and his church are heretics. The resourceful “missionary” poses the question: “That’s how it is! Does that mean our Sovereign Emperor is a heretic too? The familiar faces of the Alguazils flashed before the Old Believer (in imagination, and perhaps in reality), and he remembered “places not so distant.” “His heart was troubled and his strength deserted him” and “he became like a man who does not hear and does not have reproach in his mouth.” Bosses are sometimes very successful at convincing their subordinates. “People of other beliefs” are “not suitable” for him, and at the house of the persuaded man, Vasya and Vanya squeak and ask for food and drink. The arguments of the authorities are often incomparably stronger than Cicero’s eloquence.

Chapter 15. Complications and modifications of stick arguments

Reading in hearts. Positive and negative forms of it. Insinuations. “Slave” trick in the absence of freedom of speech.

1. Various modifications of “arguments to the policeman” and “stick arguments” are countless. At least in ancient logics of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries there are sometimes quite long lists of them, but not exhaustive of the material. From the lists and descriptions it is clear that all of them are found in our time. Only the leaves truly change, but the tree and its branches remain the same.

2. The most “favorite” modifications and complications include, first of all, many cases of “reading in the hearts.” This trick consists in the fact that the sophist does not so much analyze your words as the secret motives that made you express them. Sometimes even this is all he does. Enough! - Not in the form of a “stick argument”, this trick is found very often and is generally used to “clamp the mouth” of the enemy. For example, your interlocutor tells you in an argument: “You are saying this not because you yourself are convinced of it, but out of perseverance,” “just to argue.” “You yourself think the same thing, but you don’t want to admit your mistake.” "You speak out of envy of him." "Out of class interests." “How much did they give you to support this opinion?” “You say this out of party discipline,” etc., etc., etc. How to respond to such “reading in the hearts”? It silences many people, because it is usually impossible to refute such an accusation, just as it is impossible to prove it. Others know how to “cut off” such an opponent, for example, by deftly and sharply emphasizing the nature of his trick. But this trick acquires real formidable power in connection with the cudgel argument. For example, if we prove the harmfulness of some government event, the opponent writes: “the reason for such an attack on the event is clear: it is the desire to undermine the prestige of the authorities. The greater the devastation, the more desirable it is for such servants of the revolution (or counter-revolution),” etc. Or: “these words are a clear call for an armed uprising,” etc.

Of course, such accusations, if they are justified, may be in this case and fair, and the prosecutor does a very useful job by paying attention to known facts. Sometimes it's a civic duty. But you can’t call it a dispute; and this cannot be mixed into the dispute. A dispute is a struggle between two thoughts, (56:) and not between a thought and a club. It is against the admixture of such methods into the dispute that it is necessary to protest in every possible way. Not every verbal fight is an argument.

3. Sometimes “reading in hearts” takes another form: it looks for the reason why a person does not say something or does not write. Undoubtedly, he does not do this for such and such a reason (for example, “seditious”). For example, why didn’t he express “patriotic delight” when talking about such and such an event? Clearly he doesn't sympathize with him. Thus, for a skilled lover of “reading in hearts,” it is possible, if desired, to find some kind of “sedition,” etc., everywhere, both in some of the words of the enemy, and sometimes in his silence.

4. Insinuation should also be included in the same category of argumentative tricks. A person seeks to undermine listeners or readers’ trust in his opponent, and, consequently, in his arguments, and for this purpose he uses insidious irresponsible hints. Unfortunately, this trick is very popular, and even other very respectable figures do not disdain it. Here is a typical excerpt from an article by one undoubtedly conscientious author who fell victim to such a trick:

“My article on land management, dry, calm and businesslike, overflowing with digital calculations, deprived Mr. H. of his peace of mind. His answer is not a dispute on the merits, not a refutation of my arguments, but sheer political insinuation, an attempt to kill me through political defamation. In many variations, Mr. Kh. always repeats one thing: A. “is a lawyer for land management,” sings “praises for the land management department,” “tied his boat to the land management steamship,” and only “makes his voyage with an air of complete independence,” etc. ., etc.

“Everywhere, as you see, Mr. H. maintains a tone of insinuation. Nowhere does he dare to directly and honestly accuse me of having entered the service of the land management department and working as a “government pen.” No, Mr. H. is only insinuating: “he tied his boat to the land management steamer” and “willy-nilly he has to participate in all its evolutions; - even when the smoke of this steamer directly eats your eyes, when anyone else would hasten to get off to the side.” G.H. probably knows his readers well, thinking that these insinuations are enough for them. But I have the right to demand a direct answer from Mr. X., provide evidence of my dependence on the land management department. I affirm that my pen is no less independent than yours. But Mr. Kh., like all insinuators, is prudent and, of course, will slip away into some hole, declaring that he did not mean official, not factual, but some kind of ideological, moral dependence”...

5. Where crude arguments reign, where freedom of speech is constrained by violence, a special opposite, also rather ugly, trick is often developed. A person has nothing to say in response to a reasonable argument from an opponent; however, he pretends that he could say a lot in response, but... “Our enemy knows very well why we cannot object to him on these pages. Our fight is unequal. There is little honor in defeating a bound man,” etc. The reader's sympathy for the “victim” and indignation against the “scoundrel” who takes advantage of her defenselessness is almost undeniable. Many empty heads have used this technique, surrounding themselves with an undeserved halo of mind that is “not allowed to unfold.” Thus, any violence against freedom of speech corrupts people - both the oppressors and the oppressed.

6. “False rebuttal of an argument” is also quite common. The opponent's argument is crushing, or there is no answer to it. Then they rush to replace: (57:) “this is not relevant,” i.e. reject the argument. A trick known since ancient times. In Aristophanes’ comedy “Clouds” we read an argument with his son:

Fidia. Look at the roosters and other animals, how they fight with their fathers. But the difference between us and them is not only that they do not issue written laws.

Strepsiades. Hm! If you want to follow the example of roosters, why don’t you eat manure and sleep on a pole?

Fidia. This, my dear, is completely irrelevant, as Socrates would agree.

Chapter 16. Psychological tricks

Taking the enemy “off balance”. Relying on slow thinking and gullibility. Distracting attention and leading to the wrong trail.

1. Much more interesting are those tricks that can be called psychological. They are based on knowledge of some properties of the human soul, and some of our weaknesses.

The state of mind during an oral argument has a huge impact on the conduct of the dispute. When we are “on fire”, i.e. we are overcome by a light, pleasant excitement, in which thought, memory, and imagination work especially clearly and vividly, we argue better than usual. If we are very excited about something, embarrassed, confused, “hot,” if our attention is distracted by something, we argue and think worse than usual, or even completely poorly. (Of course, all other things being equal). This gives rise to a series of psychological tricks designed to unbalance us, weaken and frustrate the work of our thoughts.

2. There are many different techniques for this. The crudest and most common trick is to irritate the enemy and drive him crazy. To do this, they use rude antics, “personalities”, insults, mockery, mockery, clearly unfair, outrageous accusations, etc. If the enemy “boils”, the case is won. He lost many chances in the argument. Some skillfully try to “inflate” it to the desired degree. I saw a ploy: with injustice and ridicule, the sophist unbalanced his youthful opponent. He began to get angry. Then the sophist assumed an air of indescribable good nature and a patronizing tone: “Well, Jupiter! You’re angry, which means you’re wrong.” Well, what are you talking about, father! It's worth getting so excited! Calm down, calm down! What a (58:) hothead you are,” etc. So he brought the young man to white heat! His hands are shaking with excitement and indignation. He throws himself blindly into an argument, wherever he may find it. I stopped thinking completely and, of course, “failed.” But they also use various other methods to “keep things out of balance.” Another deliberately begins to mock your “holy of holies.” He doesn’t let himself get personal, no! But it can “inflate” a careless idealist to the extreme. If the dispute is very important, in front of listeners, responsible, then, they say, others even resort to the “artists’ trick.” Some artists, for example, singers, in order to “undercut” their opponent, before his performance tell him some extremely unpleasant news, upset him in some way or piss him off with an insult, etc., etc., in the calculation that after this he will not control himself and sing poorly. According to rumors, some debaters do not hesitate to do this from time to time before a responsible dispute. Personally, I have never observed this vile trick, but it is undoubtedly possible. You need to be on guard against it too.

3. If the enemy is an “untested” person, trusting, thinking slowly, although perhaps accurately, then some arrogant “magicians of thought” try to “stun” him in an oral argument, especially in front of listeners. They speak very quickly, often express thoughts in a form that is difficult to understand, and quickly replace one another. Then, “without allowing them to come to their senses,” they victoriously draw the conclusion that they desire and give up the argument: they are the winners. The most arrogant ones sometimes do not hesitate to bring up thoughts without any connection, sometimes absurd ones, and while a slow-thinking and honest opponent tries to grasp the connection between thoughts, without in any way suggesting that such impudence is possible, they already leave the battlefield with a triumphant look. This is done most often in front of listeners who understand absolutely nothing about the topic of the dispute, and judge success or failure by appearance. Here famous example such a trick from "The Vicar of Wakefield."

- “That's right, Frank! - cried the squire. ... Beautiful girl worth all the clergy intrigues in the world. What are all these tithes and charlatan inventions if not a deception, just a nasty deception! And I can prove this."

- “I would like to listen! - exclaimed the son Moses. I think I could answer you.”

“Very well, sir,” said the squire; who immediately guessed it and winked at the rest of the company so that we could get ready to have fun.

- “Great, if you want to discuss this topic calmly, I am ready to accept the argument. And above all, how do you prefer to discuss issues: analogically or dialogically?”

“Discuss wisely,” Moses exclaimed, happy that he could argue.

- “Again excellent. First of all, first of all, I hope you will not deny that what is, is. If you don't agree with this, I can't argue further."

- "Still would!" - Moses answered. “Of course, I agree with this and I myself will use this truth as best I can.”

- “I also hope you agree that the part is less than the whole?”

- “I also agree!” cried Moses. “This is both correct and reasonable.”

“I hope,” exclaimed the squire, “you will not deny that three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.”

“Nothing is more obvious,” Moses answered and looked around with his usual importance.

“Excellent,” exclaimed the squire, and began to speak very quickly: “Since these premises have been established, I assert that the concatenation of self-existence, acting in a mutual dual relationship, naturally leads to problematic dialogism, which to a certain extent proves (59:) that the essence of spirituality can be attributed to the second type of predicabilia.”

- “Wait, wait!” - Moses exclaimed. “I deny it. Do you really think that I can give in to such wrong teachings without protest?”

- "What?" - answered the squire, pretending to be furious: “you are not giving in? Answer me one simple and clear question: do you think Aristotle is right when he says that the relative is in relation?”

“Undoubtedly,” said Moses.

- “And if so,” exclaimed the squire, “then answer me directly: do you think that analytical development the first part of my enthymeme deficient secundum guoad or guoad minus and give me your reasons. Give me your reasons,” I say, “bring them directly, without subterfuge.”

- “I protest,” Moses exclaimed. “I did not properly grasp the essence of your argument. Reduce it to a simple sentence, then I think I can give you the answer.”

- “Oh, sir!” exclaimed the squire, “your humble servant. It turns out that I must provide you not only with arguments, but also with understanding! No sir. Here I protest, you are too difficult an opponent for me.”

At these words, Moses burst into laughter. He sat alone with a long face among laughing faces. He didn’t say another word during the conversation.”

Wekf. Priest Goldsmith. Chapter VII.

4. Many rough and subtle tricks are aimed at diverting the enemy’s attention from some idea that they want to carry out without criticism. The most typical subtle tricks look like this.

The thought that we want to convey in this way is either not expressed at all, but is only necessarily implied, or it is expressed, but perhaps briefly, in the most gray, everyday form. In front of her, they express such a thought, which inevitably, by its content or form, should attract the special attention of the enemy, for example, offend him with something, hit him, etc. If this is done successfully, then there is a very good chance that the trick will be successful against an ordinary enemy. He will “overlook” and let an unnoticed thought pass without criticism.

Often (especially in disputes without long “speeches”) the technique takes the form of a real “putting on the wrong trail.” Before the thought that they want to “carry through” without criticism, they put some thought that, by all considerations, should seem clearly doubtful or clearly erroneous to the enemy. At the same time, it is assumed that every opponent is looking for weak points in our argumentation and the majority pounces on the first weak point that comes across, without much attention skipping the subsequent thoughts closest to it, if they are not strikingly erroneous. Let's say, X needs to carry out without criticism an idea that is important for his goal, which the enemy can be very picky about if he notices its importance and incomplete evidence - the idea that the house about which we're talking about, old X decides to lead the enemy on the wrong trail. Knowing that an opponent defending, for example, some B. will certainly attack with indignation any accusation of B.’s dishonesty, X says: “Here the matter undoubtedly did not go without a trick on B.’s part. He acquired this old house not without the help deceit." If the opponent “pounces” on the accusation, he can skip the “old house” without criticism. Then, in the heat of battle, it remains to quietly repeat these words several times, hiding them in the shadows, until “the ear gets used to them” - and the thought is carried out.

This trick allows for a variety of modifications and, so to speak, “flavours”. Sometimes, for example, feeling that a false idea, under the wing of which they want to imperceptibly carry out an argument, may not in itself attract criticism from the enemy, they artificially try to show him that they themselves consider it the weak (60:) point of the argument. Here “talent” can manifest itself in all its strength. For example, a person, through tone, facial expression, and the play of pauses, reproduces the behavior of a person who has expressed a weak objection and is afraid for him; unsure of the strength of the argument, and trying to quickly carry it out unnoticed, escaping criticism. An insufficiently sophisticated opponent can quite easily fall for this bait, if the sophist does not “overact”, does not emphasize his “desire to escape” too unnaturally, etc. etc.

It is worth noting that in oratory speeches one of the most powerful means of distracting attention from thoughts and their logical connection is pathos, the expression of a strong emotional upsurge, as well as an excess of successful tropes, figures, etc. It has been verified by experience that usually the listener is the worst at learning and remembering the meaning of such sections of speech.

Chapter 17. Psychological tricks (Continued)

A bet on false shame. "Greasing" the argument. Suggestion. “Rubing” glasses on thoughts. Double-entry bookkeeping.

1. Very often the sophist takes advantage of the common human weakness of “appearing better than he really is” or “not losing himself” in the eyes of his opponent or listeners; most often - “false shame”. Seeing, for example, that the opponent is weak in science, the sophist makes an unsubstantiated or even false argument under the following sauce: “You, of course, know what science has now established,” etc. Or “it has long been established by science”; or "social fact"; or “don’t you still know about that?” etc. If the enemy is afraid to “drop himself” by admitting that he does not know this, he is in a trap, and the sophist giggles in his soul. Sometimes this trick is associated with using the authority of a person - a writer, scientist, etc. For example, in a dispute with a Marxist socialist, they use “the famous saying of Marx.” You can often bet eighty to twenty, and sometimes ninety-nine to one, that a given “Marxist” has never even leafed through Marx, much less studied him, and has never encountered the “famous saying” anywhere. However, he usually does not dare to say this. Rather, if you are also a socialist, he will pretend that he also knows this saying; more often than not, he will “swallow” the argument without objection.

2. In disputes “to win,” another modification of this trick, based on the same weakness, is very common. Everyone knows that in general one thing (61:) is often said and another is thought. Secret desires, beliefs, goals - may be one thing, words - completely different. But some people will never admit this and will not dare to refute the “words” so as not to “appear” to be insufficient a good man. Aristotle also notes this feature.

Some high moral principles and principles are on the lips of many, in the soul and in deeds of a few. For example, not many people put into practice the truth cited by the same Aristotle: “it is better to go broke while remaining honest than to get rich by lying.” But in words, rarely anyone will contradict her. On the contrary, sometimes a person has “unclean hands”

Each era has its own “truths,” which they recognize as necessary to agree with out of “false shame,” out of fear of being called “backward,” “uncultured,” “retrograde,” etc. etc. And the weaker a person is in spirit, the more cowardly he is in this regard.

The sophist benefits from both. Both false and correct shame. He boldly stands on the basis of social hypocrisy and the cowardice of the herd man and often acts “for sure.”

3. Quite often, another related trick is used, also based on a person’s pride: “grease the argument.” The argument itself is not conclusive, and the opponent can object to it. Then they express this argument in a vague, confusing form and accompany it, for example, with a compliment to the opponent: “of course, this is an argument that cannot be brought up in every dispute; a person who is not sufficiently educated will not appreciate or understand it,” etc.; or “you, as an intelligent person, will not deny that,” etc.; or “of course, it’s absolutely clear to you and me that”, etc. etc. Sometimes they don’t give compliments, but only subtly make it clear that your intelligence is treated with special respect... All this sometimes works amazingly in arguments for persuasion. Even in crude form, sometimes such a technique “softens” the enemy’s soul. The gates of the mind, “greased” with the oil of flattery, open surprisingly easily to accept arguments. What to do! All people; everyone is human. As for the sophist, he rubs his hands. That's why the pike is in the sea, so that the crucian carp doesn't doze off.

4. One of the strongest and most common tricks in an argument is suggestion. His role is especially enormous in oral argument. Whoever has a loud, impressive voice, speaks calmly, clearly, self-confidently, with authority, has a representative appearance and manners, has, other things being equal, a huge advantage in oral argument. In most cases, he involuntarily “impresses” the enemy as well. Whoever is deeply and firmly convinced of what he is arguing for, and knows how to express this unshakable firmness with a convinced tone, manner (62:) of speech and facial expression - he also has great inspiring power and also “acts” even on an opponent, especially one who who does not have this conviction. A persuasive tone and manner are often more persuasive than the most solid argument.

Perhaps you should go; But, really, wouldn’t it be better for you to stay? You would wait for us here, hunt, and we would go with God. And it would be nice!” - he said in such a convincing tone that at first it really seemed to me that it would be nice.

L. Tolstoy. Raid.

This “external persuasiveness” and its power are known to everyone from experience. This is the secret of the success of the preaching of many fanatics. It is used by skilled orators, and in an argument with many it is one of the most powerful tricks.

5. Suggestion is especially effective on listeners of an argument. We have already touched on the “psychology of the typical listener.” If the argument is more or less abstract or goes beyond what the listener “knows through and through”, “like the back of his hand,” the average listener does not delve into the arguments, does not pay enough attention to grasp the essence of what is being said, especially if the objection or the answer is long. When the listener already has a certain conviction on the issue being discussed, he usually does not even listen properly to “other people’s” opposing arguments. If he does not have a definite conviction, and the dispute does not affect interests very close to him, the listener is guided by more or less external signs in order to judge whose side is winning. And this kind of listener is the most suitable material for suggestion in a dispute.

“The old man shook his head so sternly and victoriously (having expressed his argument, S.P.) that the clerk (one of the listeners, S.P.) immediately decided that victory was on the merchant’s side and laughed loudly.” “The impressiveness of the merchant’s intonation obviously won over the listeners and the lady even felt depressed.” (Tolstoy L. Kreutzer Sonata, Ch. 11).

This is taken from life. It is worth looking closely at the controversy to feel the reality of the image. Whoever speaks in a weak, unsteady voice, hesitantly, under normal circumstances, loses in an argument in front of the audience, no matter whether this argument is for victory or for persuasion. According to William James, even in such an abstract field as philosophy, it is important not only what is said, but also how it is said. “No matter how pure and impeccable you may find this philosophical movement, there is no strong, radical temperament in it.” It has “neither activity nor enthusiasm.” "It lacks an aggressive, winning tone - and as a result it lacks authority." (Pragmatism, lecture 1).

6. In addition to the tone and manner of arguing, there are many other techniques designed for suggestion. Laughter, mockery of words, can act this way. This is often the effect of statements that such and such an opponent’s argument is an “obvious mistake” or “nonsense,” etc. etc. The latter kind of techniques are also used in a written dispute: “our enemy has agreed to such an absurdity as”, etc. What follows is the “absurdity” itself, which is not at all absurd. It has three exclamation points, but no attempt has been made to prove that this is absurdity. Or, on the contrary: “in highest degree the following words of such and such are witty and profound.” There is neither wit nor profundity in the “words” of such and such, but the author of the article needs them, and the latter knows that the reader often does not even have time to check his assessment, will not focus attention on checking, but will simply accept the words with the sauce that under (63:) as they were served to him. Maybe in an hour he will repeat them as witty and thoughtful.”

This also includes, on the psychological side, references to authorities. These references act on others like a battering ram breaking through the wall of mistrust. Sometimes they presuppose a fact or someone else’s argumentation, etc. “a few words” intended to preliminarily “properly highlight” this fact or argument. Here, too, “suggestion” often lurks, etc., etc. In general, all such tricks are in the nature of “rubbing in the glasses” through which the reader or listener must look at a well-known question.

Tricks of suggestion also include repeating the same argument several times, especially when used in oratory practice. Often the argument is presented in a different form each time, but in such a way that it is clear that the idea is the same. This acts as a mechanical “drilling into the head,” especially if the style is decorated with the colors of eloquence and pathos. “Whatever the people are told three times, the people believe,” says one of the German authors. This is indeed confirmed by experience.

7. Finally, it is necessary to note one of the most common mistakes and tricks - although already psychological - the so-called. (not entirely correct) double-entry bookkeeping. Almost all people are prone to more or less duality of assessments: one measure is for ourselves and for what is beneficial or pleasant to us, the other is for strangers, especially people who are unpleasant to us, and for what is harmful and not to our liking. In ethics this is expressed in the form of “Hottentot morality”; for example, if I rip off an extra hundred rubles from you, that’s good; if you're with me, that's bad. You have to shout: “Guard!” The party newspaper screams about injustices and cruelties committed by the other party; what is done by its party is always only necessary or commendable; the newspaper can even boast of the same or many times worse cruelties committed by its allies. Often Hottentot morality has such naive, unconscious forms that you don’t know whether to be indignant or laugh. For example, when a very good person scolds another for gossiping about him - and he himself immediately passes on new gossip about this to the other. Not out of revenge, no! He simply does not realize that this is gossip. Gossip - when others talk; and when we say the same thing, it is a “transmission through friendship” of an interesting fact from the lives of acquaintances.

8. When this tendency towards duality of assessment begins to operate in the field of evidence, then “double-entry bookkeeping” results. The same argument turns out to be true in one case, when it is beneficial for us, and erroneous when it is unprofitable. When we, for example, refute someone with the help of a given argument, it is the truth; when we are refuted by it, it is a lie. Naturally, the sophist cannot help but accept “double-entry bookkeeping” into his arsenal of tricks: it is too profitable “if used skillfully.” Another lawyer will refer, for example, to a well-known interpretation of such and such an article of the law as correct if it speaks in favor of his client. And he will prove its falsity if, on the contrary, his opponent is based on this interpretation. The same fact is accepted, beyond doubt, if it confirms our thesis; and immediately its dubiousness is suspected if, on the contrary, it is expressed by the enemy, etc.

Here is an example of this trick: one of the parties that entered the district dumas of the city of X. turned out to be the predominant party in most of these dumas. Having entered into a bloc with other parties related to it, it did not give a single seat in the government of a hostile party in these thoughts. - Members of the latter argued that they have a right demand known number"managerial" places: elections to the Duma were proportional, therefore, seats in the council should be distributed according to the same principle.

The dominant party rejected this argument as unsuitable, incorrect.

However, it happened that in some district councils it still turned out to be non-predominant. “Related” parties took advantage of this and, having formed a bloc among themselves, in turn did not give her a single seat in the government. Then she resorted to the same argument that her “enemies” resorted to in other thoughts. This is where he ended up suitable and correct. - Thus, “double-entry bookkeeping” triumphed.

In cases where evidence and dispute concern the area of ethical assessments, “double-entry bookkeeping” is only a formulation of “Hottentot morality” in the area of arguments and evidence. This is clear, of course, by itself.

Sometimes “double-entry bookkeeping” is not hidden at all, but appears with an open visor. This happens in cases where she openly relies on “her own convictions” in what is beneficial for her, and when this is not beneficial, on the beliefs of her opponent. Here's an example. In France, Catholics were reproached for logical inconsistency: they demand complete freedom of speech for themselves, while in general they themselves are bitter enemies of this freedom. One Catholic publicist responded something like this: “When we demand freedom for ourselves, we proceed from your principles. This is how you defend freedom of speech. Why don't you apply it to us? When we restrict freedom of speech, we proceed from our convictions. In this we are also quite right and logically consistent.” - Of course, this is often very profitable “accounting”! In a word, a special, increased love for logic is manifested here.

Double-entry bookkeeping is already quite clearly moving from the realm of “just tricks” to the realm of sophistry.

Chapter 18. Sophistry: deviation from the task of the dispute

The essence of sophisms. Deviation from the thesis and the objective of the argument. Replacing a dispute over a thesis with a dispute over evidence. Translation of the dispute into contradictions in the opponent’s argumentation. Contradiction between words and actions. Incomplete rebuttal. Substitution of point of disagreement.

1. Among the most common and favorite tricks are the so-called sophisms (in in a broad sense words) or intentional errors in evidence. We must constantly keep in mind that sophistry and error differ not essentially, not logically, but only psychologically; they differ only in that the error is not intentional, while sophistry is intentional. Therefore, as many (65:) types of errors as there are, there are as many types and sophisms. If, for example, during an argument, I unnoticeably deviated from the thesis, this would be a mistake. If, having noticed that such a retreat could be beneficial for me, I repeat it consciously, intentionally, in the hope that the enemy will not notice, this will be sophistry.

2. First of all, it is necessary to mention the sophistry of deliberate vagueness or confusion (of the thesis, arguments or the entire proof). Actually, this is a trick, which is, as it were, a transition from psychological tricks to the realm of sophistry in the true sense of the word. The prover speaks in such a way that you do not immediately understand, and sometimes it is even impossible to understand what exactly he wanted to say. Or, if you need to answer “yes” or “no,” he will answer in such a way that it is immediately (or not at all) clear what the answer is: “no” or “yes,” etc.

Of course, this trick is not always possible. Most often it is used in speeches, debates, etc. and where there is obviously no immediate demand to find out the meaning of what is said, it is often accompanied by some other trick aimed at making the listener pretend that he understands the words of the prover. Such tricks were discussed in the previous chapter. As an illustration, one cannot help but recall the charming speech of the “minister” by Al. Tolstoy (“Popov’s Dream”).

...No, gentlemen! Russia will have to

Connecting the past with the future,

Create, if I dare say it, a look

Which is called inherent.

All times; and standing on your granite,

The haves, so to speak, and the have-nots.

Open a spring of mutual labor.

I hope you understand, gentlemen?

Another illustration is the speech of a fashionable English preacher, from one English story, ( Stefan Remarque, Iz modern life. St. Petersburg. 1906).

Are you asking me if everything that the Gospel says happened? I’ll tell you this: it happened and at the same time it didn’t happen. For such simple people as the apostles, all this happened, but for you and me it did not happen.

I can’t even confidently say that all this didn’t happen. I would rather say that according to the impression received, according to the action produced, all this happened; but as a tangible, concrete fact, it did not happen. It all depends on how we understand the word “happened.” Suppose a man dying of hunger sees in front of him a shop with food supplies. You, well-fed people, do not need these food supplies. The hungry one looks at them with lust. He passes by food supplies, the smell of them rushes around him, he takes this smell with him, and it seems to him that he is satisfied with the food supplies he has seen. You pass by the same display case and don’t pay attention to everything on display. Your dinner took place in reality, it constitutes a fact of tangibility; the poor man's dinner took place in his imagination, in his imagination. Both you and he will be right if you say that you had lunch. It’s all so simple when we look at everything with simple eyes, not through the prism of narrow sophistical interpretations or dogmatic prejudices.

This passage, rich in sophistry, ends, therefore, with a rather spectacular insolence in accusing the enemy of sophistry. Not a bad illustration of the trick, which we will talk about below.

3. There are an infinite number of sophisms consisting of a deviation from the problem of the argument and a “deviation from the thesis”.

You can start a debate with this sophistry or error, immediately taking, for example, the wrong thesis; you can do this in the middle of an argument. You can completely discard the previous thesis, you can only more or less change it, etc., etc. But the logical essence will be the same - a deviation from the task of the dispute, a deviation from the thesis.

In the foreground, it is necessary to mention the frequent and very important replacement of a dispute over a thesis with a dispute over evidence. The sophist needs to prove that the thesis is false. Instead, he examines the evidence of the thesis provided by the opponent and limits himself to breaking them down, if possible. More often than not, however, the matter is not limited to this. If you managed to break down the opponent’s evidence, there is only one correct conclusion: “the thesis has not been proven by the opponent.” But the sophist pretends that the conclusion is different: that the thesis is refuted. This is one of the most common tricks and, thanks to the usual inability to distinguish between a dispute over a thesis and a dispute over a proof, and also thanks to the usual lack of clarity of thinking on the part of the opponent and the inability to grasp the dispute, it usually succeeds. Let's say someone began to defend the thesis: the human soul is immortal. The enemy demands evidence. The evidence is given, but such that it is easy to break it. The sophist breaks them down and pretends that he “proved the thesis wrong.” Most listeners of the argument get the same impression. At trial, the lawyer breaks down all the evidence presented by the prosecutor against the accused. Hence the direct conclusion: guilt has not been proven; but the lawyer sometimes makes a different conclusion: “the defendant is not guilty”; listeners most often conclude: “Acquitted, which means not guilty.”

4. This type of sophism includes the translation of a dispute into contradictions. Pointing out that the opponent is contradicting himself is often very important and necessary. But not to prove the falsity of his thesis. Such indications, for example, are of great importance when criticizing any system of thoughts. Often with their help you can break or weaken the opponent’s proof. But it is impossible to refute his thesis by merely pointing out the inconsistency of the enemy’s thinking. For example, X. just said that he is a completely unbelieving person, and then it turns out that he admits the existence of something “that our sages never dreamed of.” Does this fact of contradiction in any way prove the falsity of his thesis? Meanwhile, often a dispute, the task of which is to show the truth or falsity of a thesis, is translated into a contradiction in the opponent’s thinking. At the same time, having shown that there is a contradiction, they often pretend that the enemy is completely defeated and his thesis is false. A trick that often goes unpunished.

5. This also includes transferring the dispute to the contradiction between word and deed; between the enemy’s views and his misdeeds, life, etc. Sometimes this takes the form: “to the doctor, heal yourself.” This is one of the favorite and common forms of gagging. For example, let's say L.N. Tolstoy proves that virginity is better than marriage. They object to him: and after your preaching of chastity, you had a child. A pessimistic philosopher argues that suicide is permissible and, as it seems to him, has reasonable grounds. They answer him: why don’t you hang yourself? They prove to the soldier (67:) that he must go to the front and fight. He replies: “Then take your gun and go.”

It is clear that this kind of objection is sophistry if a person knows what he is saying. The truth will remain the truth, even if it were spoken by the most criminal lips in the world; and correct proof will remain correct proof, even if it was built by the father of lies himself. Therefore, if the question of the truth or falsity, the morality or immorality of any thought is considered on its merits, any appeals to the personality of the opponent are evasions from the task of the dispute. This is one of the types of “clamping the opponent’s mouth” and has nothing to do with an honest fight in a dispute for the truth. As a method of reproof, it may be required and is often necessary. But reproof and honest dispute for the truth, like the struggle of thought with thought, are two incompatible things.

However, this trick has an extremely strong effect both on the enemy (often clamping his mouth shut) and on the listeners. Even if there is no contradiction between our principle and behavior, sometimes it is difficult to prove it; subtle distinctions and long arguments are required, into which the listeners do not delve into and do not like. Meanwhile, the sophistic argument is simple and vitally clear. For example, the soldier’s answer: “Why don’t you go to the front if you stand for the war?” Simple and clear. Start arguing that everyone has their own duty that must be fulfilled and without this the state will collapse; that it is his duty, since he is called by law to defend the state, to fight. If the law calls me, I will go too, etc. Say all this, come up with even more compelling objections: a soldier, and some people more developed than him, often will not understand your reasoning, even if they do not want to “not understand.” Such concepts as “debt”, “state”, “law”, its origin and meaning, etc. for many they are too abstract, distant, vague, complex and lacking power. Meanwhile, his argument - a purely animal argument - is quite clear and demonstrative. “Nobody wants to die. If you are for war, take your gun and go.”

It is even worse if there is a real contradiction between the principle you defend and your actions. The enemy’s trick is obvious sophistry, transferring the dispute to another plane, deviating from the purpose of the dispute. But the listener does not understand such subtleties. It is only clear to him that our enemy is right on this new level of dispute. Hence the conclusion that we are wrong, which means we are broken, or that our thesis is unproven, even false. Meanwhile, such attacks do not in any way affect the truth of the thesis. “Pay attention not to the one who said, but to what is said,” the apostle rightly says. (Policy in the spirit of such sophisms against thoughts expressed, for example, by L.N. Tolstoy, was often downright impermissible).

6. When we present not one argument, but several, to prove a thesis, the sophist often resorts to an “incomplete refutation” ». He tries to refute one or two arguments, the weakest or the most effectively refutable, leaving the rest, often the most significant and the only important, without attention. At the same time, he pretends that he has refuted all the evidence and that the enemy is “broken along the entire front.” If the dispute over one or two arguments was long and fierce, then the listeners, and often the inept arguer, may not remember them. Thus, the trick is often successful. It is especially used (68:) in written disputes, where they “fight” each other on the pages of various books, newspapers, etc. There, the reader often cannot check whether all the arguments have been answered.

7. Frequent deviations from the task of the dispute include the substitution of a point of disagreement in a complex controversial thought, so-called. The refutation is not substantive. The sophist does not refute the very essence of a complex controversial thought. He takes some unimportant details of it and refutes them, but pretends that he refutes the thesis. This trick is also more common in written disputes, newspapers, magazines. These disputes are “for the reader”: the reader probably did not remember the thesis, and if he remembers it, he will not understand the trick.

For example, a message appeared in the newspaper that, say, the governor expelled Mr. Limonnikov, who lived peacefully in the city of B, without any legal reason. The governor refutes: “The message is not true. G. Limonnikov does not exist not only in the city of B., but generally in the province entrusted to me.” The governor is right. Limonnikov is not in the province. But the point is not in Limonnikov, but in whether someone at a given time was expelled from the province without legal reasons or was not expelled. The last name was indicated incorrectly, and the governor used this to refute the details of the message, leaving the essence of it unanswered. The reader will not understand and, in any case, indicating an error in detail undermines the completeness of confidence in the whole. Moreover, from the external formal side, the refutation is correct: the information about the fact is not entirely accurate.

Another example. The article says; “This pine tree, planted by Peter V. in 1709, still exists on Lakhta.” The sophist declares: “This is not true” and refutes this complex proposition. But he refutes not the essence in it, not what should be refuted, not the idea that “this pine tree still exists on Lakhta,” but the detail: “this pine tree was planted by Peter V . in 1709." Peter could not have been on Lakhta in 1709. Let us assume that this argument is correct. Then, of course, we can say that there is an error in the thesis (without saying that the error is in an unimportant detail). But that’s not the point.

It is clear that this type of sophism is a “substitution of a point of disagreement”; more precisely, by replacing an essential point of disagreement with an insignificant, unimportant one.

Chapter 19. Sophistry: deviations from the thesis

Sabotage. Changing thesis. Expanding and contracting it. Strengthening and softening. Introduction and exclusion of reservations and conditions. Implied Terms and Conditions. Homonyms. Synonyms. Transferring the dispute to the point of view of benefit or disadvantage.

1. During an argument, completely leaving aside the previous task of the argument, an unsuccessful thesis or argument and moving on to others is called “doing a diversion.” Sabotage is done in various ways. The crudest way is for the arguer to directly, “immediately” abandon an argument or thesis and grab onto another. This happens extremely often. In one meeting dispute, for example, a worker argued that it was not the workers who interfered with the “loan of freedom,” but the bourgeoisie. He soon saw, however, that his thesis was weak and that his opponent was beating him in an argument, and he made a “sabotage”: “in general, the capitalists started the war.” The enemy failed to take advantage of his position and succumbed to the trick and immediately began to prove that it was not the capitalists who started the war. The sabotage was a success. Often sabotage consists of “getting personal.” For example, a young idealist proves to a person of “experience” that such and such an act is cowardly and dishonest. He at first began to argue “rank and file,” but, seeing that his case was bad, he made a diversion: “You are still very young and inexperienced. Live, you will know life and you yourself will agree with me.” The young man began to prove that youth had nothing to do with it, that “he knows life.” The sabotage was a success. Or another case. They are arguing whether the minister was right in publishing such and such documents. One of the disputants sees that his case is bad and undertakes a diversion: “You are somehow biased towards this person. Just recently you also argued that the measure he took in such and such a case was quite appropriate. But it turned out that it was precisely this that led to the opposite results.” The enemy begins to prove that the measure turned out to be beneficial. The sabotage was a success. It also happens that for sabotage they deliberately look for and put forward some kind of paradox, or an opinion that the enemy will certainly not fail to attack. This is a kind of “bait for sabotage” - Sometimes sabotage is carried out very subtly and imperceptibly, with gradual transitions, etc.

2. If the dispute is not because of the thesis, but because of the evidence, then the diversion consists in the fact that the defender of the thesis stops proving his thesis, and begins to refute (70:) ours or demands that we prove our thesis. Here's an example. One young debater started an argument with an equally young girl, and she tried in every possible way to defend some difficult thesis; the dispute was over evidence. After much work, the young debater, seeing that her case was not moving forward, turned to her opponent with a claim. “Why am I still trying to prove my opinion, and you only criticize. It's easy to criticize. Can you prove your opinion? Why are you so convinced of him? The young debater, who knew little about the technique of arguing, was ashamed; How is it, really - she proves everything and works, and I only criticize! The sabotage was a success. He began to prove his thesis and “lost the attack.”

It is useful, in conclusion, to note that any diversion, if we “move away” from the previous thesis, turns a concentrated dispute into a formless one. When there is a diversion from argument or evidence, the dispute, of course, can remain focused.

3. One must distinguish from sabotage another type of sophism associated with a deviation from the thesis or argument - changing the thesis or argument. We do not give up on them, on the contrary, we pretend that we are holding on to them all the time, but in fact we have changed them. We already have a different thesis or argument, although similar to the previous one. This is often called substitution of a thesis or argument.

The different types of such substitution include, first of all, expansion or narrowing of the thesis (or argument). For example, at first the debater put forward the thesis: “all people are selfish,” but seeing that it cannot be proven and the opponent’s objections are strong, he begins to assert that the thesis was simply “people are selfish.” “You were free to understand him so broadly. There is no rule without exception. I didn’t mean all of them, of course, but the majority.” If, on the contrary, the opponent puts forward the thesis “people are selfish,” the sophist tries to interpret it in a more favorable sense for himself: in the sense that “all people are selfish,” since in this form the thesis is easier to refute. In general, the sophist usually tries, if the situation is bad, to narrow it down: then it is easier to defend it. He seeks to expand the opponent’s thesis, because then it is easier to refute it. He often resorts to various tricks to force the opponent himself to rashly expand his thesis. This is sometimes not difficult, causing a “spirit of contradiction” in a hot head.

More examples of another type of expansion and narrowing of the thesis. Thesis: “A. I am well acquainted with Russian literature.” The striker expands it: “Ah. a connoisseur of literature (in general),” the defender narrows it down: “A. I am well acquainted with modern Russian literature.”

4. Related to the expansion and narrowing of the thesis is its strengthening and softening. They lead to a “distortion” of the thesis and are, perhaps, even more common. The thesis was given, for example, as follows: “Our ministers are mediocre.” The enemy “distorts” it, strengthening it: “you claim that our ministers are idiots.” The defender of the thesis, if the situation is bad, tries to “soften” the thesis: “no, I said; that our ministers are not up to the level of their calling.” Or another example. Thesis: “the source of this money is very suspicious.” The opponent strengthens the thesis: “you claim that this money is stolen.” The defender, if he finds it necessary, softens the thesis: “I only said that the source of this money is unknown.” Strengthening the thesis is usually beneficial for the attacker and is often done in the highest degree (71:) unceremoniously and arrogantly. A softening of the thesis is usually done by its defender, as it helps the defense. And here they often don’t stand on ceremony.

5. One of the most common substitutions of the thesis (and argument) is that a thought that is given with a certain reservation, with known conditions under which it is true, is replaced by the same thought, but already expressed “in general”, without any conditions and reservations This trick is most often encountered in refutations and is most successful with mentally underdeveloped listeners. An underdeveloped mind tends to understand everything “simple”; he does not know how to notice “subtle differences” in thoughts, he directly does not like them, sometimes does not tolerate them and does not understand. They are too difficult for him. Therefore, subtle distinctions seem to such a person either “cunning,” “intricacies,” “sophisms,” or (if he is somewhat educated) “unnecessary scholasticism.” This partly explains the difficulty of arguing about complex issues, requiring accurate and fine analysis and distinctions, with an undeveloped opponent or, especially, with undeveloped listeners. But such issues include, for example, most political, state and public issues, etc. questions. On this basis, the sophist, all other things being equal, has a huge advantage. An honest debater will present a correct argument, with the necessary reservations, and expressed quite precisely. But an undeveloped listener usually does not grasp or remember these reservations and conditions, and does not at all appreciate their importance. Taking advantage of this, the sophist deliberately omits reservations and conditions in the argument or thesis of the opponent and refutes the thesis or argument as if the thought was expressed without them, but “in general.” Strengthening the thesis and oratorical techniques are often added here to help: “indignation,” etc., almost inseparable from the “meeting sophist” type. All this has a very strong effect on the undeveloped listener, and it takes a lot of composure, resourcefulness and wit to repel such an attack, if the audience sympathizes with the views of the sophist at all. Here is an example: H. states that “at present, with this level development of the majority of the people, the famous “four-tailed” system (direct, secret, universal, equal voting) when electing members of the State Duma is harmful to the state.” The opponent omits all these reservations and begins to prove the antithesis, which is direct, secret, etc. voting (in general) is useful for this reason and for this reason. Or I argue that “the death penalty is necessary under certain circumstances and conditions.” The opponent refutes me in front of the audience as if I argued that the death penalty is generally necessary and calls me “an ardent defender of the death penalty,” while throwing thunder of indignation and indignation at me. Undeveloped listeners who sympathize with the sophist also begin to be indignant - “which was what needed to be proven.” Often it takes a lot of composure, knowledge of the “listeners” and resourcefulness to repel such an attack.

The opposite trick is when something that was approved without reservation, without conditions, is then approved with reservation and condition. It is more common on the defending side. For example, at first a person argued that “one should not go to war” at all, under any circumstances. Pressed against the wall, he substitutes this statement; “Of course, I did not mean cases when the enemy attacks without any reason and ruins the country.” Then he can introduce some other clause.

6. These tricks - especially the last one - are greatly facilitated by the incompleteness and imprecision of ordinary speech. We very often express thoughts with only implied reservations. These reservations “go without saying” because, if you express them, speech becomes some kind of heap of reservations - unusually heavy and “indigestible.” An example would be the business language of contracts, etc. documents developed by legal, etc. practice in defense against “pocket business sophists.”

Thus, reservations are implied at every step, and this leads to the possibility of countless errors and sophisms. A. says: “arsenic is poison.” This implies the clause “if you take more than a known amount.” B. omits this clause and says: “The doctor prescribed arsenic for me, which means it is poisoning me.” In Shakespeare's "The Merchant of Venice", Shylock makes a condition with the merchant Antonio: if Antonio defaults on the bill, then he, Shylock, has the right to cut out "a pound of flesh from him, as close to his heart as possible." The deal was completed completely legally.” The bill is overdue and Shylock demands the agreed penalty. The wise judge (Portia) saves Antonio this way. “According to this receipt,” she says,

You have the right to take it.

There is only a pound of meat, there is exactly a pound of meat in it.

Written; but does not give the right.

She's no match for you.

So, take what you need -

A pound of meat, but when cutting out the meat,

If you are a drop of Christian blood.

If you spill, it will be your property and land.

The country will take the republic for itself.

This is the law of Venice.

Lawyers have debated over the past century whether Portia's decision was legally correct.

There were different opinions. But from a logical point of view, this solution is an undoubted sophistry. When someone talks about cutting a piece of meat from a living body, he inevitably means that blood will be shed; and whoever agrees to the cutting of such meat agrees to the self-evident inevitable condition of this cutting - the shedding of blood. So Portia deliberately changed the terms of the contract, taking advantage of the fact that it was expressed usually, without exhaustive accuracy and completeness.

7. There are literally countless other forms of substitution of thesis and arguments.

Let us briefly list their most common and important types.

The same word can mean different thoughts. Therefore, it is often easy, while keeping the same words of the thesis (or argument), to first give them one meaning, then another. One of the most common mistakes, one of the most common sophisms. We often don't even notice how many different meanings the same word has. Therefore, it is easy to “twist” us with the sophist, who distinguishes them all perfectly. Let's take the word "people". Rarely has anyone tried to understand its meanings, but there are many of them: a) people means the same as the little-used word “nationality.” (“Peoples of Europe”; “study of peoples”; “ethnic studies”); b) people - all citizens of the same state, united by their citizenship. Thus, they talk about the “Russian people” as opposed to the “Austrian people”, about the “English people”, etc. “The entire Russian people recognized the revolution,” etc.; (73:) c) people - the lower classes of the population, opposed to the intelligentsia, the “ruling classes,” etc. Hence the terms: “go to the people”, “populists”. “He came out of the people,” etc.; d) people - in general means a collection of people, without distinction of classes, nationality, etc., or rather, a group of people located in one place. “There are a lot of people on the street.”

At the order gate.

People were gathering.

Thickly... etc.

It goes without saying how easy it is to “play” with such a word in sophisms. - When a bunch of “people” - workers, peasants, etc. - gather in the streets and declare the “will of the people”, there is an unconscious substitution of thought; when a speaker, an experienced sophist and demagogue, says to this crowd: “you are the people, the people’s will must definitely be fulfilled,” then, replacing the meaning of the word, he often deliberately replaces the argument or thesis. And there are a lot of “multi-meaning words” like “people”.

8. Very often they use the properties of so-called synonyms, words and expressions that have different sounds, but denote different shades of the same concept. If these differences in shades are not significant for this issue, then synonyms can be used one instead of the other without any difference. If they are significant, then a more or less important change in the thesis results. The difference is especially important in this regard if it is accompanied by a difference in assessment, a shade of praise or blame. For example, it is far from all the same to say. "A. pious" and "A. hypocrite". “Jealousy of faith” and “fanaticism.” "Protest" and "outrage". “Leftist” by conviction and “revolutionary”, etc. If I expressed the thesis: “zeal in faith is the duty of every religious person,” and my opponent changed it: “here you claim that every religious person must be a fanatic,” then he distorted my thesis. He introduced into it a shade favorable to refutation. I included signs that make the thesis indefensible. Of course, to say that fanaticism is the duty of every Christian is absurd. Or, let's say, I argue, “priests should receive such and such benefits.” My opponent puts this thesis this way: “H. thinks that priests should have some kind of property.” The name “pop” in the mouth of an educated person has a certain disparaging connotation and, by introducing it into the thesis, the opponent thereby reduces the stability of the thesis. In general, this trick is probably the most commonly used. People resort to it as if instinctively, trying to designate a concept with a name that is most favorable for themselves and most unfavorable for the enemy. And the coarser the mind, the coarser and more primitive such sophisms come out.

9. “Translating the question into the point of view of benefit or harm” is of great importance. One must prove that a thought is true or false; prove that it is good for us or harmful. It is necessary to prove that the action is moral or immoral; prove that it is beneficial or unprofitable for us, etc. For example, one must prove that “God exists”; prove that faith in His existence brings comfort and happiness. It is necessary to prove that “the socialization of the means of production is feasible at the present time”; prove that it would be beneficial to listeners. Often there are no more convincing arguments for the average person than those conclusions that affect his vital interests. Even the simplest arguments are purely “pocket-sized” ( argumenta ad bursam), have a magical effect. One argument acting on the will, vividly and vividly depicting the benefit or disadvantage of something, is sometimes stronger than a hundred arguments acting on the mind. If we are dealing with ignorant, obscure listeners who do not know how to thoroughly delve into the issue and discuss it, then they have a clever argument “from benefit”, vividly and (74:) clearly depicting what immediate benefit or harm a person can receive from the event etc. etc., often has a completely hypnotic effect. They are “fascinated” by the anticipation of future benefits. They don't want to listen to arguments against it. From reasoning about the impracticability of this or that, about harmful consequences, which may come later, they brush it off like children. It goes without saying what fertile ground this is for sophists; how lushly all kinds of demagoguery grow on it. Every “fraudster of the word” knows this very well. Therefore, this trick is the favorite weapon of such scammers.

Here is an example of a simple “pocket argument” (with a touch of “stick”).

- Or, for example, Ireland! - Ivan Petrovich began with new animation, after a pause: - they write that the country is poor, there is nothing to eat, there are only potatoes, and they are often not suitable for food...

Well, sir, so what?

Ireland is a subject of England, and England is a rich country: there are no landowners like them anywhere. Why not now take at least half of their grain and livestock and give it there, to Ireland?

What is it, brother, that you preach: rebellion? - Neil Andreich suddenly said.

What a riot, Your Excellency... I'm just out of curiosity.

Well, if there is a famine in Vyatka or Perm, and they take half your bread for nothing, then go there?

How is this possible! We are a completely different matter...

Well, how will the men hear you? - Nil Andreevich pressed - huh? what then?

Well, God forbid! - said the landowner.

God forbid! - said Tatyana Markovna, etc.

Goncharov. Break.

This is an argument for the landowner's pocket; We have heard similar arguments about the men's pockets. These arguments are incredibly convincing for those for whom they are intended. It would not be out of place here to give a witty note about this trick from Schopenhauer. “Where this trick is applicable, the rest need not be used. Act not on the mind, with the help of arguments, but on the will, with the help of motives; then both the enemy and the listeners, if they have the same interests as him, will immediately agree with your opinion, even if it was borrowed from a madhouse. After all, a lot of will weighs, for the most part, heavier than a hundredweight of reasoning and conviction.” “When we are able to tangibly prove to the enemy that his opinion, if it acquired significance, would cause significant harm to his interests, he will just as hastily throw away this opinion, like a red-hot iron that he accidentally grabbed in his hand.”

Chapter 20. False arguments

Substitution of arguments. Multiplying arguments. Partial lie. Ridiculous arguments. Subjective arguments. The difference is in them. Their assessment. Lawyer's argument. Its “pig” form.

1. The sophisms of the arguments are even more numerous than the deliberate deviations from the thesis. We have already talked about the substitution of arguments during a dispute. Everything that is said “about the substitution of the thesis also applies to the substitution of arguments. They often resort to it when they see that the argument is weak or inconvenient for some reason. Relatively rare is the sophism “multiplying an argument,” when the same argument is repeated in different forms and words and passes for two or more different arguments. This trick is especially used in arguments in front of listeners, in long speeches, etc. Sometimes it is very difficult to figure out whether we have one thought expressed in different forms or several different thoughts; you need intense attention, and often good knowledge of the issue in question. All these are qualities that are rarely inherent in the ordinary listener, who does not even know how to consciously identify arguments. Here simplest example multiplying the argument. Thesis: “God exists.” Proof: “There is an immediate confidence in God in our spirit. We absolutely cannot get rid of the thought of God. We cannot think about the world, we cannot think about ourselves, without involuntarily connecting with this the thought of God. Through everything visible and finite, our thoughts rush to the highest, invisible, infinite, and their movement does not calm down until they reach their goal. We must necessarily think about God. The consciousness of God is as essential an element of our spirit as world consciousness and self-consciousness,” etc. etc. (Luthardt, Apology of a Christian, III reading). Let the reader decide for himself how many arguments are made in this entire passage. Bahn quotes in one book (Rhetoric etc.) the remark of an experienced author: “For a mass, one argument, presented in five different forms, acts exactly the same as five new ones.”

2. The most common errors of argument are false argument and arbitrary argument. When it comes to a deliberate error, about sophistry, a false argument takes on the character of a false argument. Suppose the sophist does not have true arguments at hand on which to rely. Then he takes some idea that is obviously false to him, new to the enemy or to the listeners, or not recognized by them until that time - for example, false fact, false generalization, (76:) false quotation, etc., and passes it off as true. At the same time, he often (and especially in disputes for persuasion) uses the gullibility of his opponent or listeners, his authority, suggestion, or all possible other tricks to force him to accept such an argument.

The success of such sophistry is greatly facilitated if the lie is partial, i.e. the kind that Satan talks about in Alexei Tolstoy (in Don Juan).

The lie has grown together with the truth and has become so attached to the truth,

That there is no way to scrape it off.

And not only is it impossible to scrape it off, but often it is impossible to immediately distinguish where the lie ends and where the truth begins. We have already had occasion to talk about this above (Chapter XI, 6). Such lies pass unnoticed, often hidden under the cloak of the truth that goes along with it. Similar cases in ordinary life- darkness of topics. For example, they put forward the argument: “these people were severely beaten.” Some truth: they were beaten. Share of lies - “cruelly” beaten. A pessimist states: “life is suffering.” The idea is false. But we feel that it is based on a partial truth: there is a lot of suffering in human life, etc.

3. It is interesting that, along with such partially true arguments, in oral disputes over victory, absurd arguments are often successfully used. Firstly, some absurdity is very difficult to refute in an oral argument, and even in front of ignorant listeners. Even more: just as there are “obvious”, unprovable truths, there are “obvious”, irrefutable absurdities. Secondly, an absurd argument often directly puzzles the opponent with its surprise; you won’t immediately find an answer to it. Others are completely at a loss: it is obviously absurd - but how can one prove this to the enemy, and even in front of these listeners! This requires long reasoning and prerequisites that he (and they) do not have and which he does not want to accept. For example, the enemy will say: “instead of truth, I recognize lies, instead of good, evil.” After all, there are such caricatures of superman in Russia. What can I say to him? - All that remains is, in the manner of Major Kovalev, to shake your head and say, spreading your hands a little: “I admit, after such arguments on your part, I can’t add anything”... And leave the dispute and the “winner.” Those who have wit can try to make fun of the sophist before leaving the argument. But arguing further is hardly useful.

The same role is played by ridiculous questions when informing. The late Sanskrit scholar Minaev describes a characteristic dispute in Ceylon between a Buddhist preacher and Christian missionaries, in which the latter were defeated. “Attacking his opponents, Gudananda reconstructed their entire teaching in his own way and put forward a whole series of wild questions, which, due to their absurdity, put the missionaries in difficulty” (Minaev. Essays on Ceylon and India). This technique is sometimes used here too.

4. A false argument must be distinguished from a subjective argument. A false argument, as has been said, seeks to introduce an idea that is obviously false for the sophist into the thinking of the interlocutor or listeners, to force them to accept it. A subjective argument can also be obviously false for us or, in any case, unproven. But we know that the interlocutor considers it true. It is not introduced by us into the thinking of the opponent or the listener, but is borrowed from this thinking. Thus, if we strive to prove some (77:) truly true thesis and use a false argument, then we introduce into the enemy’s thinking not only the truth (thesis), but also a new delusion, a new error (argument). If we prove the same thesis with the help of a subjective argument, then we will not introduce new misconceptions into the mind of the opponent or listener, but only a new truth.

This difference is recognized in practice as so significant that a false argument is considered an impermissible dishonest trick, and a subjective argument is constantly used, often at every step, as a permissible trick. For example, in a dispute for persuasion, if there is no “common ground,” not a single step can be taken without an objective argument. Arguing to win often resorts to this trick, especially for the listeners. Only highest form dispute - a dispute to explore the truth - never stoops to it.

Here is an example of it, in comparison with a false argument. A. wants to prove that religion is a relic of past superstition. As proof, he cites an argument that is new to his interlocutor: “After all, science has already proven that there is no God.” This argument is either erroneous or patently false. If it is deliberately false (i.e. A. knows that science has not proven and cannot yet prove anything like that) and yet A. introduces it in order to, with the help of the authority of science, convince the enemy of the non-existence of God - then this argument is false.

Let us now suppose that A. is arguing about the same thesis with another opponent, who, as he knows, has more than once expressed the conviction that “science has proven the non-existence of God.” If A. says: “after all, you admit that science has proven the non-existence of God” - this will be a subjective argument. A. bases his proof on the opponent’s belief, which he himself considers erroneous.

I repeat, such tricks come across extremely often. Without them, many disputes would be impossible, for example, arguments in front of listeners to convince them. They shorten the argument. They give an extra chance in the fight against the sophists. But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that they are not always permissible under all circumstances.

5. First of all, a big difference whether we openly rely on the enemy’s opinion or in a hidden way. In the first case, we say something like this: “after all, you think so and so. Let's not argue whether your idea is correct or not. But the truth of my thesis necessarily follows from it.” Or: “let’s take your point of view”... etc. Here we are not hiding from the enemy; that for us personally his argument has no meaning; to us it seems controversial or even erroneous. But the enemy obviously considers it to be true; therefore, we say, he is obliged to accept our thesis, which necessarily follows from this argument. In short, we want to force the opponent to accept our thesis by forcing it to be logically consistent.

By using a hidden subjective argument, we act differently: we remain completely silent about our attitude towards it, hoping that this silence will be accepted as a “sign of consent”; or even directly mislead the enemy by declaring that we also consider this argument valid. For example, we accompany it with introductory words: “there is no doubt that...” or “it is known that...”, etc.

6. The overtly subjective argument is entirely morally sound. It sometimes "may and must" be brought, says Whatley, to silence (78:) those who are not amenable to good arguments, or to convince those who, through weakness or prejudice, cannot recognize their strength." Whatley points out that Christ also used similar arguments in disputes with the Jews to silence them (Logic, 352-3). But to convince the enemy or listeners, such an argument cannot always be recommended. When presenting a thought, expressing, at the same time, doubt about its truth - especially when doubting it is also beneficial for the enemy, who does not want to be convinced - is a bad psychological calculation. Therefore, in practice, hidden subjective arguments are used extremely often. Usually the only restrictions introduced by conscience and tact are dictated by the principle: “the end justifies the means corresponding to it.” They try to ensure that the thesis is a judgment that is undoubtedly true for us, and the benefit from its acceptance significantly outweighs the harm from confirmation (that is, from strengthening with our agreement) an argument that is false from our point of view. You can gather as many examples of hidden subjective argument as you like from oratory speeches and oratorical duels. When a notorious atheist social revolutionary once addressed his peasant listeners with the argument that “the land is God’s,” given to everyone equally, etc., he used a “hidden subjective argument.” When the “right” in 1917 at a rally addressed his socialist opponent with the argument: “that’s what the congress of the r. and deputies, how can we go against this decision?” - he used a hidden subjective argument, etc., etc.

Hidden subjective arguments in the hands of an unceremonious and unscrupulous person turn into a terrible weapon of demagoguery and agitation of the crowd. They often receive the typical and ominous character of “arguments to the mob,” (ad plebem), based on their ignorance and dark prejudices. But even a completely decent person can hardly do without them to convince him of very good thoughts, if he often has to convince people.

7. Often the worst forms of subjective argument, sometimes even false argument, include some types of so-called “lawyer’s trick”, “lawyer’s argument” (Adwokatenbeweis). The essence of this trick is that the sophist “takes advantage of any imprudence of his opponent” (Kant), - his mistake or even a direct slip, slip, etc.

Suppose, for example, the opponent clearly misunderstands some law (in legal practice). The sophist sees this perfectly well, but he benefits from such an understanding. Therefore, he will beware of attacking the opponent’s argument from this side; on the contrary, he tries to leave the enemy in his error and base his proof on his mistake, which otherwise, perhaps, would not have gone well. This is, of course, the application of a subjective argument.

8. This trick takes on a completely “swinely”, sometimes basely “litigious” character when they use an obvious slip, typo, typo, despite even the direct statement of the enemy that this is a typo, etc., so here this trick takes on the character false argument for listeners or readers, etc. This trick is used for different purposes; sometimes they generally want to mislead their readers or listeners who are not able to verify the arguments; sometimes they want to at least for the first time weaken the impression of some statements, etc. (79:) the enemy, taking advantage of a slip or typo, etc., etc. Here is an example from newspaper practice. One newspaper made a sensational revelation about a political murder that was sensational at the time and named the killer. But, thanks to a typo, one letter in this surname was distorted. The editorial offices of other major newspapers were immediately informed about this by telephone. Unfortunately, one of the latter, (“New Time”), defending the party to which the killer belonged, the next day argued as if she knew nothing about the typo: she published an “indignant” letter from a person who had the surname printed by mistake; launched indignant articles against the “slander” against him, etc., etc. An approach that not everyone will decide to take.

Chapter 21. Arbitrary arguments

Demanding on arguments. Hidden arguments. Arbitrary names. Malicious nicknames and beautiful names. A game of two synonyms. Unsubstantiated assessment of the opponent's arguments. Refutation "on credit".

1. Undoubtedly, the most common mistake and the most common sophism is “arbitrary arguments.” It is worth carefully looking through the articles of any newspaper, the speech of any speaker, listening to the argument of any person - and we will almost invariably come across arbitrary, not at all obvious and unproven statements and denials on which people rely to support their opinions. Only in strictly scientific books from the field exact sciences These kinds of mistakes rarely happen.

Recognition or non-recognition of an argument as “arbitrary” depends, however, in practice, to a large extent on the degree of our demands on it. In one case we are more demanding, in another we are less demanding, and this is quite correct. Demanding arguments must, in practice, have degrees. Otherwise, we fall into the error of “excessive doubt” or “excessive precision,” which has its own special sophism. If we began to examine the reliability of every argument and under all circumstances with absolute accuracy, then an ordinary dispute would not be possible, practical activity would not be possible. It would remain to repeat the wisdom of the ancient skeptical philosophers, who considered it necessary to apply the standard of absolute certainty and therefore doubt everything. Here is an example of such doubt (as depicted by Moliere):

Marfury: What do you want, Monsieur Sganarelle?

Sganarelle: Mister Doctor, I would like to consult with you about one circumstance, and I came here specifically for that.

Marfury: First of all, Mr. Sganarelle, I ask you to change your manner of expression. Our philosophy requires that no completely decisive proposals be made, that everything be spoken of indefinitely, and that judgments be conditional and conjectural. And as a result of this, you should not say: I have come, but it seems to me that I have come.

Sganarelle: Seems?

Marfury: Yes.

Sganarelle: Damn it! It must appear if it really exists!

Marfury: It does not follow one from the other; it may seem to you without the fact actually existing.

Sganarelle: How! In your opinion, it is not certain that I came here?

Marfury: This is still a question - and we must doubt everything.

Sganarelle: How! I'm not here and you're not talking to me?

Marfury: It seems to me that you are here, and it seems that I am talking to you, but this is not certain.

"Forced marriage." Transl. F. Ustryalov.

Marfury's mistake is that he uses sophisticated chemical scales where he should weigh on ordinary bench scales. Eat known degree demands on the argument, established by the logical tact of a person. In science there is only one; in legal practice - another; in ordinary life - the third. And within these limits it depends mainly on the greater or lesser importance of the dispute for us. If someone argues with us over a ten-kopeck piece, we will have one level of demands on his arguments; if the dispute is over two hundred thousand - it’s completely different. If a dispute is very important to us, for example, a radical change in our worldview, in our life, in the assessment of our works depends on the outcome, then sometimes the exactingness goes beyond the reach of common sense:

Do you see?

Even though I see it, I don’t believe it.

The sophist very often takes advantage of this loophole in order to escape defeat in an argument. “Not proven!” "Arbitrary argument!" “Prove it!” "I do not believe!" These cheap statements, in skillful hands, turn into a very important means of retreat.

But just as being too demanding about arguments is a mistake or a trick, so too being too undemanding is also a mistake. What is needed is logical tact and experience in order to find the appropriate measure of exactingness in each given case.

2. Of all the types of sophisms of arbitrary argument, we must first of all single out “hidden arbitrary arguments.” The point of this trick is this. Usually, when reasoning, especially in disputes, not all the thoughts necessary to draw one or another conclusion are presented. Some of them are “omitted” and should be implied by themselves. For example, in the reasoning: “all people die, we will die too”, the thought (“premise” of the reasoning) “we are people” is omitted and is itself implied. You can skip another one instead of this one. “We are all human, which means we too will die.” Here the thought will be missed and necessarily implied: “all people die,” etc.

There are especially many such missed thoughts in oral arguments. We have, however, the right to skip only those premises that are obvious. The sophist does the opposite. “The sophist brings out what is not obvious, and is in fact the weakest side of the argument, trying at the same time to divert attention from the place where the error is located” (Whatley. Logics, 200). Let's look at the most characteristic appearance This error is the sophistry of an “arbitrary name” that hides the argument.

3. Huge role in sophistic practice, names are played with a missing premise that justifies them. After all, each name must also be justified. When I say: “this officer is a famous traveler,” the thought that goes without saying: “this man is an officer.” When I say, “manifestations of anarchy such as this act are unacceptable in the state,” then the thought itself is implied: “this act is a manifestation of anarchy.” In a word, each name implies a justificatory premise that gives the right to this name. This premise is also an argument, a hidden argument and very often arbitrary. Meanwhile, humanity, due to laziness of thought and for many other reasons, is especially inclined not to check this kind of hidden arguments , but take them on faith.

Meanwhile, the adoption of a name often decides the whole matter. After all, having accepted it, we thereby accepted that the object designated by it also has the corresponding properties.

Reasoning correctly, we should often first be convinced that an object has these properties, and then accept its name. In fact, we first accept its name, and, based on the name, we conclude that the object must have certain properties. It turns out to be a kind of “inverted proof”. The sophist takes advantage of this shortcoming of ordinary thinking, trying to force us to first take on faith the name of the object; and at the same time those properties of the object that he wants to convince us of will “pass” unnoticed.

4. In order for us to take the name on faith, he uses, in addition to our usual inclination to do this, various ordinary tricks, for example, suggestion. He speaks in a peremptory tone, uses the name as something self-evident, undoubtedly correct. Distracts attention from checking the hidden exculpatory premise, etc., etc. There are names that are especially suitable for such a trick: these are those that have a connotation of blame or praise; they are used as “malicious nicknames” or “ in beautiful words», « beautiful names" Of these, the most suitable are the currently fashionable “combat” nicknames and names. These words become for many people something of a fetish or a “bogeyman” for Ostrovsky’s Moscow merchant’s wife. Often these are in the full sense of “hypnotizing with l ova." They act on a person with little development, like a chalk line on a chicken. They say that if you bend a chicken's head to the floor and draw a straight line from its beak with chalk, the chicken will remain motionless in this position for some time, contemplating only this line. Likewise, a person hypnotized by a corresponding word loses the ability to judge whether this word is applied correctly or not. Especially if they strongly emphasize such a word and wax eloquent about it.

5. The game of “beautiful names” and “malicious nicknames” is found at every step, for example, in newspaper polemics of a certain (82:) type. G. X made some kind of statement in the meeting: the newspaper writes: (depending on the “regime”) this is clearly a revolutionary statement (or counter-revolutionary statement) shows to what extent the hydra of revolution (or counter-revolution) has raised its head in our country, etc. Then there are eloquent discussions about this “hydra” - and the more eloquently, those better; eloquence will divert attention from checking whether a statement is truly revolutionary or counter-revolutionary. When reading the statement itself, we usually do not delve into it with due attention; therefore, the “malicious nickname” passes “by itself”, without criticism, especially if it is given in “our newspaper”, which we trust. Sometimes these “malicious nicknames” frighten or, as people say, “scare” timid people. But sometimes a malicious nickname turns into a terrible weapon of demagoguery. It is known from history that at some point one has to shout to the crowd: “this is a provocateur”, “poisoner”, “revolutionary”, etc., and the fate of a person will be decided. Of course, sometimes the “scare” with malicious nicknames in stupid hands has a comical tint. So there was a time when some “public organizations”, which had enormous capital at their disposal, but very disliked government “audits,” “feared” that an audit of their activities was a “counter-revolutionary act.”

6. “Beautiful names” are no less successfully used in order, for example, to soften the impression of some fact, or “to pass off a crow as a hawk,” etc., etc. The words “crook” and “criminal” have very unpleasant connotations; but if you call the same person an “expropriator”, it sounds noble. Sometimes a name serves better than any fence. When a gang of criminals occupies a house and robs, they will not stand on ceremony with it. But once they throw out the “black flag” and call themselves “anarchists”, they get a completely different impression. Reluctance to sacrifice oneself for one's homeland when it is our duty is not a particularly respected quality; but it is worth calling the refusal to go into battle “war against war” or the like, and the most stupidly base, animal coward gets the appearance of a “fighter for an idea.” - This black magic of words is well known to the sophists. Where the remnant of shame, the voice of conscience, etc., etc., prevents you from committing a base act, a demagogue comes there, like a tempting devil, and throws in a “beautiful name” to cover up base motives. Most ardently grab at it as an excuse to free themselves from what they don’t want. - This is how the “inner sophist” tempts us within us; This is how a much more cunning, skillful and unscrupulous external sophist acts to help him.

7. Often the game with beautiful names and malicious nicknames becomes more complicated, turning into a “game of two synonyms.” It requires a pair of synonyms, usually differing most sharply from each other in a commendable and disapproving shade of thought, for example:

Generosity and extravagance, stinginess and miserliness, freedom and arbitrariness, firm power and despotism, etc. and so on. Let's take two such synonyms: “freedom of art” and “unbridled art.” The censor forbade the publication of X's pornographic work. X’s defender in the newspaper begins something like this: “Censorship again! Once again the pencil of the executioner of thought destroys the flowers of free art... The other day a book by the venerable X was banned, the contents of which were not liked by the chaste censor.”

"…Pornography! “It’s not for us, of course, to defend the unbridledness of art; it’s not for us to defend the right to the existence of such vileness as pornography.” Our reader knows this. It must be pursued, it must be punished, this poison of the spirit must be exterminated without pity. But you need to be able to distinguish pornography from light art, which elevates life to the pearl of creation! Otherwise we will come to the destruction of the Capitoline Venus or the divine bacchanalia of Rubens! We will get to the banning of “Ruslan and Lyudmila,” this prank of a young genius. But the censor’s hand does not know such differences and dares and encroaches on everything, even on the freedom of art.” Then there are sometimes “anecdotes from the life of the censor” and a “fiery, talented” defense of the freedom of art from the censors. How hot, how convincing in magazine template forms! - There is only one thing missing: evidence that the protected work is not pornography, but “light art.” - And this alone is the whole point. This trick can be called “playing with two synonyms.”

8. To the same kind of sophisms of an arbitrary name belongs one of the most common tricks of argument - an unsubstantiated assessment of the opponent’s arguments. Many, having heard the opponent’s argument, declare categorically: “nonsense!”, “nonsense!”, “sophism!”, “play on words,” “this is stupid!” etc., etc., etc. If they later prove the correctness of their assessment, then such harsh qualifications of the enemy’s arguments are at least unnecessary. Especially before any proof of their correctness. It must be said, however, that in the vast majority of cases such assessments are both unprovable and incorrect. But sometimes they don’t even try to justify them, but “let them go like this,” in the form of an argument, in the form of an objection. This is already the purest sophism of an arbitrary name: the name replaces the argument, but itself has not been proven. Even more, this is one of the crudest sophisms of this kind. Here is an example from Herzen.

Human life is a great social duty - said Louis Blanc. Should a person constantly sacrifice himself to society?

For what? - I asked suddenly.

What do you mean why? Have mercy: the whole goal, the whole purpose of a person is the welfare of society.

It will never be achieved if everyone sacrifices and no one enjoys.

This is a play on words.

“Barbaric confusion of concepts,” I said, laughing.

Or another example (from Turgenev).

When he (Stakhov) wanted to finally defeat the enemy, he said: these are all just phrases. I must admit that to many people this kind of objection seemed (and still seems) “irrefutable.

The day before, ch. III.

Arbitrary arguments also include or are associated with more subtle assessments of arguments intertwined with other sophisms in order to avoid the trouble of answering them. For example, “this argument is too crude and primitive and should not be taken into account.” Or “there is no point in dwelling on this naive argument,” etc. etc. We must remember that since we argue with someone, since we consider it possible to argue with him, then it is our duty to refute all these arguments, no matter how “rude” or naive they may seem.

This also includes such tricks of arbitrary argument as the one for which one English logician reproaches W. Hamilton. “The latter sometimes gets rid of the difficulty of refuting the opponent’s thoughts with such words: “in the final result of the analysis, this thought leads to a contradiction.” But he doesn't try to show that it actually leads to this. Thus, we get a “credit refutation,” which must be attributed either to errors or tricks.” (Monck. Ad Introduction to Logic. 1880). Or they get off with the remark: “We will not dwell on this argument, since its fallacy is obvious, but let’s move on to something more significant.” Or: “here we will not prove the truth (or falsity) of this thought. We will prove it in another book,” etc. This last one is also “before” To arranging on credit." The forms of such errors and tricks are countless.

9. Further, one of the most common types of arbitrary argument is incorrect references to authorities. Arguments “from authority” are very important and, in general, you often cannot do without them. But we must remember two conditions for their correct application: a) these arguments are correctly applied or in the absence of substantive arguments (which happens very often, because we cannot know everything, experience everything ourselves and personally verify everything); or to support arguments on the merits. In itself, the reference to authority in the vast majority of cases is only a more or less probable (and not reliable) argument; b) secondly, each authority is an authority only in the field of its specialty. If there are several such areas, so much the better for him, of course. But outside the scope of his specialty, he is an “ordinary mortal,” and reference to him in these cases is a mistake or sophistry. Here are two conditions under which a reference to authority can be correct. In other cases, such a reference is an error or sophistry (of a false or arbitrary argument).

But even if the specified conditions are met, a reference to authority has different degrees of probability, which must be taken into account each time separately. For example, in the field of a given person's specialty there are issues on which his truthful opinion can be considered reliable, and there are issues where it does not go beyond average degrees of probability. For example, let's take science. A. gives the argument: “the theory of the world ether has now been abandoned by many physicists.” In support, he refers to the words of Professor X, known for his precise mind and wide knowledge of the current state of physics. It is clear that such a person could not make a mistake in this matter. Just as we cannot do it in the question of whether we received a salary or not. The whole point will be whether A. correctly conveyed X’s words. On the contrary, if A. refers to X’s words as proof that such and such a controversial theory in physics is erroneous, then X’s opinion (if it is correctly conveyed) can only have the value of a greater or lesser probability, depending on many circumstances. X is an authority, but X is a man. Perhaps it is not the new theory that is wrong, but this authority’s assessment of it.

10. Abuse of references to authorities is often characteristic of carried away youth and those people who are not used to, do not like and do not know how to think independently. Those, for example, about whom you can repeat Gogol’s words: “He has a mind, but now after the publication of the magazine, and the book was late for publication - and there’s nothing in (85:) his head” (Theater Travel). Schopenhauer speaks sharply, but wittily, about such lovers of authority.

People who so hastily and so ardently grab onto authorities in order to resolve controversial issues by reference to them are, in essence, glad that they can use someone else’s reason and someone else’s insight, in the absence of their own. Their number is legion. For, as Seneca said: unus quisque mavult credere, quam judicare (Everyone prefers to believe rather than reason). Therefore, in their disputes, the usual weapon is authorities. They beat each other with them. Anyone who takes up an argument with them has done wrong if he wants to defend himself against them with substantive arguments and arguments. Plunged into the abyss of an inability to reason and think, they are enchanted against this weapon - a kind of Horny Sisfrieds. Therefore, they confront you with authority in the form of arguments and shout: “victory!”

Paregra und Paralipomena II, 266.

As a not uninteresting typical example of disputes of this kind, I will cite the story “Radda Bai” (Blavatsky).

“One stately Hindu, draped in a white and gold shawl, with gold rings on all his toes, a huge sign of Vishnu on his forehead and in a gold pince-nez, turned to me with a direct question: Having lived so long in America, my homeland, am I really Thomas Pena, do I believe in any deity?

“I confess, I believe, and I do not at all repent of such ignorant weakness,” came my answer.

And into the human soul? - he asked with a restrained grin?

Yes, both into the soul, and, surprisingly, even into the immortal spirit...

The young master, nervously playing with the rings on his feet, asked a new question, quite original this time.

So, in your opinion, Huxley is a charlatan and a fool?

In turn, I had to widen my eyes.

Why so? - I asked pince-nez.

Huxley - I said - as a naturalist, physiologist and scientist, I not only recognize, but also bow before his knowledge, respecting him as one of the greatest authorities of our time, that is, in everything related to purely physical sciences; but as a philosopher I have a very low opinion of him.”

“But it’s hard to go against logical conclusions based on fact. Have you read his article in the Forthightly Review about “human automaticity”?

- I think I read it... and remembered some of his amazing sophisms... But what about her?

- That's what. The professor in it indisputably proved that man is nothing more than a conscious and self-aware automaton, adding to this in his “Lay Sermons” that man is “the most cunning of nature’s watchmaking instruments,” but nothing more,” etc.

From the caves and wilds of Hindustan, St. Petersburg. 1912. 257-8.

These arguments: “so-and-so has undeniably proven”, “science has proven”, etc., are so often found in some disputes and so relatively rarely they are correct. Either it is a mistake of immature thinking illiterate in logic and science, or it is sophistry, i.e. false argument. Everyone probably knows how often it is used.

11. A trick of the opposite nature is a complete denial of authority.

In reality, there are relatively few issues that we can seriously, with full knowledge, and with all the necessary labor and effort, understand ourselves. These questions usually do not go beyond the limits of immediate everyday experience and interests and beyond the limits of our immediate specialty. For the rest, we inevitably rely on the experience and knowledge of the rest of humanity. You can't take a single step without them. But if so, then it is natural to rely on the experience and knowledge not of the first person who comes across the path, who may be completely unsuitable for this purpose, but on the information of the obviously best experts in the field to which the question relates, i.e. rely on authorities.

Sometimes this is the courage of a “free thinker” whose thought is “free” because it is not bound by the principles of reason, or the escapade of a young amateur of thought who is “original” with his negation, according to the precepts of the good old days. “Spirit of denial, spirit of doubt,” etc.

“I already told you, uncle, that we do not recognize authorities,” Arkady intervened.

“We act because of what we recognize as useful,” said Bazarov. At the present time, the most useful thing is denial - we deny.

That’s it...,” Bazarov repeated with inexpressible calm. P.P. stared at him. He didn’t expect this, and Arkady even blushed with pleasure.” (Turgenev. Fathers and Sons).

More often, however, what we encounter nowadays is not a complete denial of authorities, but another sophism: the denial of that authority that is correctly cited by the enemy to support his thoughts. For example, suppose I asserted that “a positive electron has not yet been isolated from an atom,” and I confirmed my statement by referring to the recent emphasis on this fact by the same well-known, generally recognized expert in physics and precise thinker, Prof. X. My opponent and I are laymen in these matters; I brought the authority quite correctly and to the point. But the enemy did not want to admit the argument I was proving, and he begins to sophist. “Excuse me, but prof. H. God, or what? Can't he be wrong? Just recently he was caught making such and such a mistake.” “Yes, Prof. X. is not God, he can make mistakes. It is possible that he was caught and rightly so. But the whole question is how be wrong? There are questions in which his mistake is as incredible as for you and me the mistake in the question: dissolved The State Duma or not". However, in such cases, to help the argument, as unproven, it is necessary to select other arguments. The enemy has achieved his goal.

Chapter 22. “Imaginary evidence”

Identity. “The argument is weaker than the thesis.” Converted proof. Circle in proof.

1. The sophisms of an arbitrary argument often include those imaginary evidence in which either a) in the form of an argument the same thesis is given to prove a thesis, only in different words - this will be a sophistry of identity (idem per idem); or b) the evidence seems to be “turned upside down.” A reliable or more probable thought is made a thesis, and a less probable thought is made an argument for proving this thesis, although it would be more correct to do just the opposite. This sophism can be called “reversed proof.” Finally, c) in the same dispute, in the same system of evidence, they first make thought A the thesis and try to prove it with the help of thought B; then, when it is necessary to prove thought B, they prove it with the help of thought A. A mutual guarantee is obtained: A is true because B is true; and B is true because A is true. Such sophism is called a “false circle” or “circle in evidence”, or “vicious circle”. Sometimes it happens in a hidden form. A can be proved with the help of B, but B cannot be proved except with the help of A.

The same names as sophistry also bear corresponding errors.

2. Identity occurs often, much more often than we notice. It has already been noted above how sometimes it is difficult to distinguish the same thought under different words. Especially if it is expressed in at least one of the cases in a confusing, difficult, foggy way. Sometimes the identity word has a rough form, for example, “believe me, one cannot help but be convinced: this is the truth.” (Gogol. Theatrical journey). Or another example, from student essays: “This cannot but be true, because it is the truth.” But often identity is hidden under very subtle forms. And it is not always possible to accurately determine whether we have two almost identical thoughts or one and the same one. For proof, however, both cases are usually equally unsuitable. When A. Pushkin complains about critics: “our critics usually say: it’s good because it’s beautiful; and this is bad because it’s bad. There’s no way to lure them out from here,” he accuses them of using identical words.

Or here’s another example of an identity: “the beginning of the universe without the Creator is unthinkable; because it is unthinkable for it to arise spontaneously, by itself.” Or - from (88:) a more abstract, philosophical area. Every property, quality, etc. is the quality and property of something, i.e. one cannot exist by itself. On this basis, many philosophers - and in the old days, all of them - accepted the existence, in addition to properties, of “carriers of properties” (so-called substances) separate from them.

And one famous philosopher (18th century) writes: “it is recognized... that extension, movement, in a word, all tangible qualities need a carrier, since they cannot exist on their own.” (Berkeley. Treatise, § 91). The argument and thesis I have emphasized are pure identity. It should be noted, by the way, that the more abstract the question, the greater the danger (all other things being equal) of falling into an identity.

3. With arbitrary arguments, it very often happens that the argument presented is even less acceptable for the person to whom it is intended, even more doubtful than the thesis itself. For example, the thesis: “There is no God,” and the argument: “God was invented by the oppressors in order to enslave the weak.” Or the thesis: “in this case deception is permissible,” and the argument: “there is no morality. These are all just conventions,” etc. The inverted proof connects this error with a curious feature of certain pairs of propositions.

There are pairs of judgments in which any judgment can serve as an argument for the other, if this other is put as a thesis, but also vice versa, the second can serve as an argument for the first. It all depends on which of them we recognize as more probable and acceptable. For example, such is the following pair of propositions: “it rained heavily recently” and “the streets are dirty now.” If we know that it has rained recently, we can conclude that the streets are dirty. If, on the contrary, we only know that the streets are dirty, then we can conclude that it has rained recently... So, from the same two thoughts, two proofs are possible. You can prove thought A from thought B; You can, as it were, turn this proof around, “reverse” it, and prove thought B from thought A. Depending on what we consider more likely - A. or B.

And when the error that we talked about above (“the argument is weaker than the thesis”) occurs in connection with such a pair of thoughts, then most often what can be called inverted evidence (hysteron proteron) results. Thought A is proven by thought B. But thought B is weaker than thought A, and it would be correct to prove just the opposite: to base thought B on thought A. For example, say, someone argues that a given action is our duty (argument); therefore, this is a good deed (thesis). But for us, his argument is weaker than the thesis. We are not at all sure that this action is our duty, but would rather agree that it is a good action. Therefore, it would be more correct from our point of view if the thesis took the place of the argument, and the argument took the place of the thesis. Those. we see in this case an error or sophistry of the inverted proof.

Since here everything depends on which of two logically related judgments we recognize as stronger, more likely than the other, and such assessments may be different for each of us, this type of error becomes very vague and subjective. For one, this proof is absolutely correct; for another it is inverted proof. For example, the following proof is given: God exists (argument); This means that there is a moral law (thesis). Many (p. 89:) consider it absolutely correct. But for a Kantian this proof will be an erroneous, inverted proof. For a Kantian, it is correct to do the opposite, to prove that since the moral law exists (argument), then God exists (thesis), etc. Thanks to this subjectivity of assessments, sophistry of this kind is often elusive.

4. The well-known error, the “false circle” in evidence, is most often based on the same connection between judgments. The only difference is usually that with it both evidence, the correct one and the reverse one, are given in the same dispute (or book, etc.), by the same person. It turns out that at first the arguer proved thought A with the help of thought B; and when it was necessary to prove B, he began to prove it with the help of A. The result was a vicious circle. For example, at first H. argued that “the river must have become (thesis), because there was severe frost at night” (argument), and then he begins to prove that “at night there must have been severe frost (thesis), because that the river has become” (argument). Most often, people who fall into a false circle are those who are personally equally confident in the truth of both the thesis and the argument. Therefore, when they have to prove thought A, they take as an argument thought B, connected with it by the above connection; but then, when it is necessary to prove thought B, they forget that they have already used the connection between these two thoughts once, and cite thought A as an argument. After all, for them they are equally reliable. For example, for a devout Mohammedan, two thoughts are equally undoubted: “everything that is written in the Koran, to the last line, is the truth” and “The Koran is inspired by God.” These thoughts stand in close logical interconnection. And so, when it is necessary to prove one of them, he does not hesitate to use another. If it is necessary to prove this too, then, forgetting about the proof that has just been used, he can easily use the reverse one. This happens especially often in long disputes, long articles, books, etc., where such oblivion is quite possible. This will create a false circle. “Everything in the Koran is true, because the Koran is inspired by God,” and “The Koran is inspired by God because everything in it is true, to the last line,” etc.

What one who has fallen into such an error does out of oblivion, the sophist does out of good will and consciously. Now he has proven to you that the will of God is perfect, because it is absolutely based on moral principles, which are perfect; If you ask him, a little later, why he considers moral principles “perfect” and whether there is something higher than moral principles? He can answer: moral principles are principles of God's will, which is perfect, or the like.

A false circle, like sophistry and error, occurs often, much more often than we notice it.

Chapter 23. Sophistry of inconsistency

False generalization. Sifting through the facts. Manipulation of facts. Substitution of concepts. "Woman's" or "ladies'" argument. Imposed consequence. Multiple questions.

1. Sophistry of inconsistency or incorrect reasoning, i.e. those in which the thesis “does not follow” from the arguments are also very common. In such cases, they sometimes say: “nothing follows from here (i.e., from the argument)”; or “your argument proves nothing,” etc. Unfortunately, it is inconvenient to analyze this kind of sophism in detail on the pages of this book. This requires some prior knowledge of logic. Here it is only possible to cite some of them, the most important and easily understandable to everyone.

First of all, we must mention “false generalization”. A person gives several examples that such and such persons or such objects possess a certain characteristic, etc., and without further reasoning concludes that all such persons and objects possess this characteristic. It’s like how Gogol’s hero saw that all the Orthodox Christians he met ate dumplings, and from this he concluded that all Orthodox Christians generally eat dumplings, and whoever does not eat them is not Orthodox. Or Thekla from “Marriage” noticed that all officials above the titular councilor drink, and took this as a kind of “law of nature”: “A. drinks; unquestioningly drinks. What can we do, he’s a titular councilor!” We reason this way very often, of course, in less naive forms. Everyone tends to paint the same color. For example, an Englishman is, well, a person with a strong will. We saw several bad people among the members of some party - well, that means “they are all like that.” If the heart is drawn to the party, then we tend to see “smart and honest people” in all its members.

2. This tendency is promoted by conscious or unconscious sifting of facts. Our memory also sifts through them, citing only those facts we observed that correspond to our mood or preconceived opinion. The newspapers are sifted almost mechanically. The newspaper prints only what it finds interesting, and it is only interested in facts of a certain kind. Therefore, they end up in print, but the opposite ones do not, even if there are incomparably more of them. This can result - and in practice it always turns out - a false, one-sided idea of the state of affairs and false generalizations: for “amendments” (91:) it is necessary at least read opposing newspapers, etc., etc. When such sifting of facts is done consciously, i.e. turns into a trick, it is called manipulation of facts.

Manipulation of facts and false generalizations are among the most common weapons of the sophist.

3. Then the sophism “substitution of concepts” is very common.

The fact is that in each proof or in different arguments, or in an argument and a thesis, some one and the same concept is always repeated at least twice. Without this there would be no logical connection. For example, the proof is given: “all people are mortal, saints are people, which means saints are mortal.” Here the same concept appears in both arguments: people. The first argument and the thesis have the same concept: mortals. In the second argument and thesis there is one and the same concept: saints. The entire logical connection in this proof is based on this identity of concepts. Try replacing the concept of “people” with another concept in one of your arguments, for example, “spirits,” or in the thesis, replace the concept of “saints” with another concept, for example, “bishops.” There will be no logical connection.

4. It is this identity of concepts found in different places in the proof that we must watch especially vigilantly. Otherwise, you will end up with an error - a substitution of a concept or, as is often said, a “substitution of a term” in the proof. It is very easy to fall into it, especially due to the imprecision of our ordinary speech. The same concept is often expressed in different words. Therefore, sometimes it is not easy to immediately understand whether one concept in front of us is accurate in different words, and not two different concepts. An even more treacherous feature of speech is that the same word often means several different concepts. We have already talked about this above. Here sometimes you yourself are not careful and in one place of the proof you use a word in one sense, and in another place you give a different meaning. Especially if the proof is long and the meaning of the word is not entirely clear. It is even easier to make such a mistake in a dispute when our opponent uses the word in one sense, and we use it in another. This happens very often. For example, if someone in a dispute mentions the words Ap. Paul: “Love is the sum of all perfections,” and another agrees with him, this does not mean that they think the same thing. In Russian, the word “love” has especially many meanings. You can love God and potatoes, a bride and an old robe, a neighbor and a “cold bath.” It seems that, for example, Don Juan and Alexei Tolstoy fall into such a mistake of “substitution of concepts.” It is worth comparing his words:

5. Of the other sophisms of inconsistency, it is necessary to mention here, first of all, a very common and often quite curious sophism, which can perhaps be called “woman’s” or, more politely, “ladies’ argument.” It is also popular among men, and how; but in women’s mouths, in general, for some reason it receives a special shine and relief.

The gist of it is this. On many issues, it is possible, conceivable, not one, not two, but several, many solutions, several assumptions, etc. Some of them are opposite to each other. By common sense and according to the requirements of logic, all of them must be taken into account. But the sophist does the opposite. Wanting, for example, to defend his opinion, he chooses the most extreme and most absurd opposite of other conceivable solutions to the issue and contrasts it with his opinion. At the same time, he invites us to make a choice: either recognize this absurdity, or accept his thought. The sharper the contrast between the absurdity and the opinion it defends, the better. All other possible solutions are deliberately kept silent.

Here is an example from life:

A. Why did you treat him so dryly? He, poor thing, felt very awkward with us.

B. How do you tell me to treat him? Place it in a corner instead of images and pray?

There are thousands of ways to treat people other than these two. But B. chose the most absurd imaginable absurd method for contrast. Or here is another example - from “serious” disputes. So “serious” that here a woman’s argument is mixed with a stick argument. Men argue:

A. In my opinion, the Provisional Government ( option- the current composition of the government) is completely unsuitable for governing the country.

IN. What does it mean, in your opinion, that Nikolai and Rasputin should be brought back again?

6. Another related sophism is no less common: imposed consequence. Most often he has external form the so-called reduction to absurdity.

It is known that one of the methods of refuting an incorrect thought is that we consider its consequences. If the consequences that necessarily follow from (93:) it are false or downright absurd, then the very thought from which they follow is also erroneous. The sophist, distorting this technique, often tries to impose an absurd consequence on the thought, which does not follow from it at all. Here is the simplest example (from a “everyday dispute”).

A. I think that the same reproach (about the heatedness of the argument) can be returned to you. I repeat the words of Jesus Christ: “to the doctor, heal yourself.”

B. Oh my God! He makes himself equal to Jesus Christ! etc. etc.

Or another case (also from a “everyday dispute”, from life).

B. Oh, how tired I am!

IN. But today you didn’t have to work much. X added the curtains. F went shopping.

B. A! So you call me a parasite! So, in your opinion, I am a parasite! etc. etc.

7. Finally, among other sophisms of reasoning, one can also mention here “multiple questions,” a very common sophism in antiquity, due to the special form of argument of that time. But it often occurs even now. Currently, it most often takes the form of misinformation. On any issue, only a conditional decision is possible: in some cases it is necessary to decide one way, in others another. The sophist demands that the opponent “simply” answer - “yes or no.” If the opponent wants to make the proper “distinction,” he is accused of “not wanting to answer directly and resorting to subterfuge.” Here is an example (again from life)

- “Is it fair or dishonest to defend another people (in a dispute) to the detriment of one’s own? Answer without pretense, directly: yes or no?

But wait! I can’t answer this question in two words, because...

A! You can't answer directly! When your back is against the wall, you always resort to tricks.

No! The question itself is of such a kind that it is impossible to answer it only “yes or no.” This is a complex question and it needs to be answered...

We have heard these loud phrases of yours, we know your tricks... I don’t need any intricacies... You answer me directly: honestly or dishonestly? etc.

Chapter 24. Measures against tricks

Preventative measures against sophistry and subterfuge. "Exposing" sophistry and tricks. "Conviction" in them. The question of the permissibility of “response sophisms.” Motives that justify them.

1. Whoever has studied the tricks of the sophists well and knows how to immediately recognize them will largely protect himself from them. How to answer each of them in one case or another depends on the tact, resourcefulness, etc., of the arguer. It is hardly possible to “prescribe a special medicine” against each of them and for all circumstances. Only one thing can be said: whoever takes in a dispute all those precautionary, “preventative”, so to speak, measures that we have indicated in this book, will largely protect himself from any attempts of a sophist. The most important of them are: a) argue only about what you know well. Remember, in a word, the admonition of Shchedrin’s ruff to the “idealist crucian carp”: “in order to conduct disputes and defend opinions, you must at least get acquainted with the circumstances of the case in advance”; b) do not argue unnecessarily with a swindler of words or with a “boorish” person in an argument, and if you need to argue, then be “on guard” all the time; c) learn to “embrace” the dispute, and not wander from argument to argument; d) maintain calm and complete self-control in every possible way in a dispute - a rule that is especially recommended; e) carefully and clearly clarify the thesis and all the main arguments - your own and your opponent's; f) reject all arguments that are not relevant to the case. If the debater knows well and is able to quickly recognize at least all the tricks that are indicated in this book, then the sophist can rarely hope for the success of his tricks.

Others consider it necessary to “expose” the tricks, and with them the sophist. To this we can say this: when it comes to sophistry, it is better never to resort to this means or in the rarest obvious cases. When it comes to other tricks - not sophistry - sometimes it’s the other way around: the best way is to “expose” the trick. But even here there are many such simple tricks (not sophistry), to which the best and only reasonable answer is not to fall for them.

2. “Convicting” sophistry - after all, in the vast majority of cases this comes down to the same “reading in hearts,” conscious or unconscious: here we are talking about a person’s intention, about a deliberate mistake. If you accuse someone of sophistry, you must prove the accusation, otherwise it will be a completely unacceptable, “unfounded accusation.” And to prove it, you need to: a) prove that there is an error in (95:) the proof and b) prove that it was made intentionally. The first is often easy to prove. But in most cases it is very difficult or impossible to prove with certainty the presence of an intention to “fraud in a dispute.” In this case, the dispute can take on an extremely difficult, unpleasant personal nature, and we will be left with an accusation that we have not proven.

We must also remember that very often such an accusation is not entirely reliable for ourselves; and often, even if it seems reliable to us, it may seem so erroneously. We are not immune from mistakes here. In all this, it is much better and more reasonable to limit ourselves to only pointing out the error in the enemy’s reasoning, without entering into a discussion of whether it was intentional or not. This is quite enough to destroy his proof. The rest, as they say, is “from the evil one.” Let us leave it to the sophists to accuse their interlocutors of sophistry - fortunately this is one of their favorite tricks. How can they not love her, because this accusation cannot often be refuted, just as it cannot, of course, be proven. But it can leave an impression on the listeners of the argument, etc., partly according to the principle: “slander, slander, something will stick.”

3. But such tricks as stick arguments, arguments to the “policeman”, disruption of the dispute, insinuation, etc., etc. must be exposed wherever they can be proven. Their essence is of such a nature that proving their existence is often not difficult. True, such revelations influence the enemy sophist relatively rarely: for the most part, the person who consciously resorts to them has a rather thick skin and you will not get through his “revelations”; he will continue his work. But there are people who use such tricks due to lack of consciousness, “they don’t know what they are doing.” Such people may be “ashamed” when they see with their own eyes a vivid image of the essence of their trick. Such revelations are useful for listeners and readers. Finally, generally speaking, remaining silent and enduring such methods without protest where they can be proven is even an anti-social act. This means encouraging them in the future. Protest in these cases is our duty, even if one cannot expect a tangible result from it. But, of course, where the presence of such tricks cannot be proven, one has to remain silent for the same reasons as with sophistry.

Psychological tricks - suggestion, distraction, techniques aimed at “pissing off” the enemy, etc. also usually do not require “exposure”. Proving their existence is often difficult and almost always out of place. This reduces the dispute to personalities, to the dirt. The best remedy against them - as far as we are concerned - do not give in to them; respond to “suggestion” with appropriate techniques on your part, etc. etc. etc.

4. The last piece of advice concerns an important question: is it permissible to respond to tricks in a dispute with appropriate tricks. You can answer it like this: - there are tricks that are unforgivable for an honest person under any circumstances. For example, such is the vile ploy to “upset” the enemy before a responsible, important dispute in order to weaken his strength; or “breaking up the dispute”, etc. etc. There are always permissible tricks, which we talked about at the beginning of this section - for example, delaying an objection, etc. The remaining tricks are an area where opinions differ. Some consider themselves not to have the right to let them in, although the enemy resorts to (96:) the most vile methods; others - mostly practitioners - think that in this case they are permissible. Such dubious tricks include sophistry. Some never stoop to sophistry, others consider sophistry to be sometimes permissible. This is already a matter of conscience.

In justification for those who respond to sophisms with sophisms and other tricks, we can say the following. Often there are only two possible ways to combat sophistry: a) show clearly that the proof is incorrect; “reveal the error” and b) respond with another sophism or trick that paralyzes the opponent’s sophistry. The first method, of course, is absolutely crystal honest. Unfortunately, in many cases it is either not applicable at all in practice, or it makes the argument extremely difficult and weakens the impression. If the argument is in front of an audience, and the sophist deftly uses his tricks, the chances in the fight often become too different. He, for example, uses such a false or arbitrary argument, it is very difficult or even impossible to expose the falsity or dubiousness of which to the given listeners. His argument is entirely based on the range of information and concepts available to these listeners or characteristic of them, and therefore is completely clear, understandable, simple for them and produces the complete illusion of irresistible truth. In order to show all the falsity of it, it is necessary to raise the listeners above their horizons, give them a supply of new information, instill in them new premises; it is necessary to show that the question is far from being as simple as it seems, and sometimes, on the contrary, it is very complex and confusing or does not even allow reliable solutions. All this is often completely unfeasible. Even if your sophistic opponent allows you to develop long arguments and justify premises without interference, then another listener will not listen to them: he will run away, fall asleep, or protest. He is inclined to attribute everything complex, confusing, and uncertain in reasoning to a flaw in your thinking. Straining his attention to follow your new or difficult for him reasoning is difficult for him. Meanwhile, “on the clear and simple” argument of his opponent, he “rests.” Well done! - speaks clearly, simply and gets to the essence. And he - how he went to spin! On the one hand, one cannot help but admit it, on the other hand one cannot help but admit it... It’s sickening to listen to.”

Here's an example to illustrate. They are arguing about “Constantinople and the Straits” - should they be demanded or not? The listeners are dark workers and peasants, for whom the whole world fits, as for Gogol’s hero, in the space “on this side and on this side of Dikanka.” The sophistic opponent says: “Think for yourself - you are adults. Why do we men need Constantinople? And some straits? Why will we shed our blood for them? Enough has been spilled. -Who wants Constantinople? Just look: whoever is a worker, whoever is a peasant, they all don’t want it. And the bourgeoisie, capitalists, and rich people are busy. This probably works to their advantage. Their first priority is to make money. So let them go and shed their blood. And ours had enough to drink. We won't give any more." - Try to expose the fallacy of these conclusions to an audience of workers and peasants. You will see how difficult it is when even the heads of many intellectuals cannot accommodate the objections that can be raised against this primitive argument.

That is why people, completely honest and correct, allow themselves, in extreme cases, to respond to the sophisms and tricks of the enemy with tricks and sophisms, when the dispute is about important issues public, state, etc. meanings. There is no need to be hypocritical: this method of fighting a dishonest enemy is often found in party tactics, in diplomacy, etc., etc., etc. The only difference is the extent to which it can be used. But, we repeat, this is a matter of everyone’s conscience.

In any case, Schopenhauer’s words on this issue cannot be accepted without limitation: “If we see,” he says, “that the enemy has used an imaginary or sophistic argument, then, of course, we can smash the latter, showing its falsity and deceptive appearance. But it is better to object to him with an equally imaginary and sophistical argument and defeat him in this way. After all, in such a dispute it is not about truth, but about victory.” (Eristische Dialektik. Kunstgr. 21). - It turns out that it is always better to respond to sophisms with sophisms. This is an obvious extreme. It is permissible to answer Schopenhauer’s words like this: “where possible, it is better not to get dirty in the mud.”

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF RUSSIA
Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution
higher professional education
"Chelyabinsk State University"
Faculty of Law
Department of Law and Economics of the Institute of Continuing Professional Education
Topic: Tricks in an argument.
Essay

Completed by a student

gr. 31YUS-103 Gomleshko K.V.

Checked by: Kosenko L.A.

Chelyabinsk
2011
Table of contents
Introduction 3
Tricks in an argument 5
Conclusion 20
Bibliography 21

Introduction

What is meant by the term "dispute"? The dictionary of modern Russian literary language defines the main meanings of the word “dispute”:
1. Verbal competition, a discussion of something between two or more persons, in which each party defends its opinion, its rightness.
2. Mutual claim to ownership, possession of something, resolved by the court.
3. Transfer. Duel, battle, single combat (mainly in poetic speech). Competition, rivalry.
Thus, what is common to all meanings of the word “dispute” is the presence of disagreements, lack of consensus, confrontation.
Usually, a dispute is understood as any clash of opinions, disagreement in points of view on any issue or subject, a struggle in which each side defends its rightness.
In Russian there are other words to denote this phenomenon: “discussion”, “dispute”, “controversy”, “debate”, “debate”. They are often used as synonyms for the word “dispute,” and in scientific research, in journalistic and artistic works, these words often serve as names for individual types of dispute.
For example, a discussion (Latin discussion - research, consideration, analysis) is a public dispute, the purpose of which is to clarify and compare different points of view, search, identify the true opinion, find the correct solution to a controversial issue. It is considered an effective way of persuasion.
On the other hand, polemic (Latin polemikos - “belligerent, hostile”) is not just a dispute, but a confrontation, a confrontation between sides, ideas, speeches. In other words, this is a public dispute with the goal of protecting, defending your point of view and refute the opinion of your opponent.
Consequently, controversy differs from discussion in its target orientation. It teaches you to support your thoughts with convincing and undeniable arguments, scientific arguments. Controversy is necessary when new views are developed, universal human values and human rights are defended.
There is a certain classification of disputes based on a number of main factors, which helps to distinguish one dispute from another.
In order to make a dispute correct and productive, as well as to effectively defend your point of view, you need to know the rules and laws of the dispute, be able to recognize and apply the techniques and tricks used in the dispute.

Tricks in an argument

In the process of argumentation and criticism, two types of errors can be made: intentional and unintentional. Deliberate errors are called sophisms, and persons who commit such errors are called sophists. The reasoning itself, which contains deliberate errors, is also called sophistry. The name sophistry comes from the Greek. ??????? - a cunning trick, an invention. A trick in a dispute is any technique with the help of which one usually wants to make the argument easier for oneself or to make the argument more difficult for the enemy. In Ancient Greece there were sophists who, for a fee, taught the art of winning an argument, no matter what the argument was about, the art of making a weak argument strong, and a strong one, if it was an opponent’s argument, weak. They taught to argue about what you don't understand. Such a teacher was, for example, the philosopher Protagoras. He is discussed in the famous sophism of Euathlus.
Euathlus learned from Protagoras the art of argument. According to the agreement between the teacher and the student, Evatl had to pay his tuition after the first lawsuit he won. A year has passed since graduation. Evatl did not participate in any trials during this year. Protagoras began to show impatience. He invited Evatlu to pay the tuition fee. Evatl refused. Then Protagoras said: “If you do not pay the fee, then I will go to court. If the court decides that you must pay, then you will pay for the tuition according to the court's decision. If the court decides “not to pay,” then you will win your first case and pay for training under the contract.” Since Euathlus had already mastered the art of argument, he objected to Protagoras: “You are wrong, teacher. If the court rules “not to pay”, then I will not pay according to the court decision. If he decides to “pay,” then I lose the process and will not pay under the contract.” Who is right? Sometimes they say that Protagoras is right and Euathlus is right. This answer to the question posed is reminiscent of the story of the village sage.
“An elderly peasant came to the sage and said: “I had an argument with my neighbor.”
The peasant outlined the essence of the dispute and asked: “Who is right?”
The sage replied: “You are right.”
After some time, the second of those arguing came to the sage. He also spoke about the dispute and asked: “Who is right?”
The sage replied: “You are right.”
"How so? – the wife asked the sage. “Is one right and the other right?”
“And you’re right, wife,” the sage answered her.”
Unintentional mistakes are made due to low culture of thinking, haste and some other reasons. They are called paralogisms (Greek: ???????????? - incorrect reasoning).
Compliance with special rules helps prevent errors in argumentation and criticism.
First rule: it is necessary to clearly formulate the thesis(in the form of a judgment, a system of judgments, a problem, a hypothesis, a concept, etc.). This rule expresses the main condition for the effectiveness of argumentation and criticism.
To implement the first rule of argumentation in relation to the thesis, you must:
first, explore the controversial idea and highlight points of agreement and disagreement;
secondly, agree on the points of argument of the parties.
Povarnin writes regarding the requirement to clearly formulate the thesis of the argument: “One should not think that it is enough to encounter a “controversial thought” in order to immediately make it, if desired, a “thesis of a dispute.” It always requires some preliminary research and processing before taking a thesis from it. Namely, it is necessary to find out exactly where we disagree with her; clarify “points of disagreement.” And further: “You need to acquire the skill quickly, sometimes “instantly,” to find and revise all the places from which disagreement with a given thought is possible. This skill is especially necessary in some specialties, for example in the legal practice of disputes.”
Second rule: the thesis must be formulated clearly and clearly. How to fulfill this requirement?
Firstly. It is necessary to find out whether all the descriptive (non-logical) terms contained in the thesis statement are completely understandable to everyone. If there are unclear or ambiguous words, they should be clarified, for example, by definition.
Secondly. It is necessary to identify the logical form of the thesis. If the thesis is a judgment in which something is affirmed or denied about objects, then you need to find out whether all objects are being discussed in the judgment or only some (about many, about the majority, and the minority, etc.) For example, the proponent states: “ people are angry." Some might argue that this is not the case. If the statement is qualified as follows: “Some people are evil,” then there is no need for argument. It is necessary to clarify in what sense the conjunctions “and”, “or”, “if., then” are used. etc. For example, the conjunction “or” can express both a loose and a strict disjunctive connection, “if., then.” - implicative or conditional connection, etc.
Third. Sometimes it is advisable to clarify the time in question in a judgment, for example, to clarify whether it is stated that a certain property always belongs to an object or it belongs to it sometimes; clarify the meaning of words such as “today”, “tomorrow”, “in so many hours”, etc. Sometimes it is stated that a certain event will happen in the near future, in the subsequent period. It is difficult to refute such statements because they are not clear. It is necessary to require the opponent to clarify such statements.
Fourthly. Sometimes it is necessary to find out whether a thesis is being asserted to be true or whether it is merely plausible. Preparatory work, which consists in developing a general field of argumentation, researching a controversial thought and highlighting and clearly formulating a thesis, allows you to save time at further stages of argumentation and increase its efficiency. Vague formulation of the thesis often underlies sophisms. Thus, in the sophism of Euathlus the expression “the first case won” is not defined. If, for example, we were talking about the first case won by Evatl, in which he acts as a defendant, then he would have to pay for training in the event that the court decides “not to pay.”
Sometimes a trick is used in a dispute "deliberately unclear formulation of the thesis" those. deliberately formulate the thesis vaguely. This trick was used in a polemic against Florida Senator K. Pepper, as a result of which he was defeated in the next election. His opponent said: “...the entire FBI and every member of Congress knows that Claude Pepper is a shameless extrovert. Moreover, there is reason to believe that he practices nepotism towards his sister-in-law; his sister was a Thespian in sinful New York. Finally, and this is hard to believe, it is well known that Pepper practiced celibacy before his marriage.” (Extrovert – talkative person, nepotism - patronage of relatives, Thespian - a fan of dramatic art, celibacy - celibacy.)
In the case when the enemy uses such a trick, you need to either clarify unknown expressions, or ask the one who put forward the thesis to do so.
There is also a trick associated with the first rule “excessive demand for clarification of the thesis.” It lies in the requirement to clarify even clear expressions. Someone, for example, says that he considers some expression to be true. He is asked the question: “What is truth?” If this person answers that truth is a statement that corresponds to reality, then he will be asked what he understands by reality, by correspondence, etc. What to do in this situation? You can remind your opponent and others present that a trick is being performed and tell you what it is called. You can suggest asking questions at the end of the speech. In such cases, some try not to notice the questions.
Another trick - “deliberate misunderstanding of the thesis.” It may involve changing the meaning of an expression in order to change the meaning of the thesis not in favor of the proponent. For example, instead of saying that a person has a headache, they say that he has something wrong with his head. Instead of “looks without turning his head,” they say “looks askance.”
It also happens that the author is unreasonably accused of being unclear. Trick "unfounded accusation of obscurity" is as follows. They pull out individual phrases from the text, the meaning of which is truly unclear outside the context. On this basis, the author is accused of a penchant for scholastic theorizing. If such an accusation is unfounded, it is necessary to show that the terms included in the phrases “snatched” from the text are defined in the text, and say that a trick was used that is unacceptable from a moral point of view.
Third rule: the thesis should not change in the process of argumentation and criticism without special reservations.
Violation of this rule is associated with an error called “substitution of the thesis.” It occurs when a certain statement is put forward as a thesis, and another, similar to the one put forward, is argued or criticized; in the end it is concluded that the original statement is justified or criticized.
A type of substitution of the thesis are errors:
(1) “replacement of a reasoned thesis with a stronger statement” (in relation to proof, this error is called “he who proves a lot, proves nothing”),”
(2) “replacing the criticized thesis with a weaker statement” (in relation to refutation it is called “he who refutes a lot, refutes nothing”). Type of error "substitution of thesis" There is also a mistake called the substitution of an argumentative or criticized thesis with references to a person’s personal qualities. This mistake is made in cases where, instead of justifying or criticizing a thesis, they characterize the person who put forward this thesis or the person referred to in the thesis. Thus, quite often, lawyers in court, instead of proving that the defendant is innocent, list his inherent positive qualities, for example, saying that he is a good worker, a good family man, etc. Sometimes in a dispute, instead of proving that a person is wrong, they say that he is still young, does not understand everything, or, on the contrary, he is at such an age (advanced) when they often make mistakes.
Another type of error "substitution of thesis"- “loss of thesis.” For example, one of the students speaks at a meeting and says: “We don’t study much in the evenings. In the dormitory we visit each other, distract each other from classes.” The speaker is told: “You’re still too young.” He loses his thesis and says that before entering the institute he worked at a factory, then served in the army. And then time ran out.
The following tricks are associated with the third rule.
"Weakening the thesis of an argument." The trick is this. The opponent makes a claim that is difficult or impossible to substantiate, and then replaces that claim with another, weaker claim that he can prove. You rashly try to refute this other statement, but, naturally, you fail to do this. Then the opponent provides a proof of the second statement and triumphs, pretending that he has proven the first statement. In this case, you need to be attentive and explain to those present what trick was used.
"Strengthening the criticized statement." This trick is used like this. You are putting forward a thesis. The opponent replaces your thesis with a stronger claim and shows that this second claim cannot be proven. Moreover, he can refute the second statement. As a result, the opponent pretends to refute your thesis. In order not to unintentionally replace the criticized statement (including with a stronger statement), during the discussion it is recommended to repeat statements before criticizing them. This is the ethical rule for conducting controversy.
"Logical sabotage." This trick consists of deliberately moving the conversation to another topic, one that is well known to the person arguing. A student at the Faculty of Journalism at Moscow University told the author of this book about how logical sabotage is used in exams. During the exam, she showed absolute ignorance of logic, although in her grade book she had excellent and good grades in other subjects. When asked by the examiner why she had not prepared for the logic exam, the student replied that she was not preparing for any exams. Her excellent knowledge of the work of Marina Tsvetaeva helps her get good grades. For example, on an exam in Russian literature she gets a question about A.S. Pushkin. The student talks for 3-5 minutes about the work of Pushkin, then compares the work of Marina Tsvetaeva with the work of Pushkin and amazes the teacher with her knowledge of the works and life path of Marina Tsvetaeva. The same technique is used in the Russian language exam. From adjectives the student moves on to metaphors, and then to metaphors in Tsvetaeva’s poetry. It was not possible to use this trick in the logic and English exams. From student folklore: “At a biology exam, a student is asked to talk about cats. The student knows only one question - about fleas. He answers: “A cat is an animal. Fleas live on cats.” Talks about fleas. The teacher suggests talking about dogs. The student answers: “A dog is an animal. Fleas live on dogs.” Talks about fleas. Then the teacher (very smart) asks to talk about fish. The student answers: “Fish are animals. Fleas do not live on fish.” Talking about fleas again."
RULES FOR ARGUMENTS:
First rule: arguments must be formulated explicitly and clearly. To comply with this rule you must:
1) list all the arguments; if in the process of argumentation some arguments are abandoned, arguments are changed, or new ones are brought forward, this must be specified;
2) clarify descriptive terms;
3) identify the logical content of the arguments; clarify quantifier words, logical connectives, modal terms;
4) clarify the evaluative characteristics of the arguments (whether they are true or plausible statements).
Second rule: arguments must be judgments, fully or partially justified. In relation to proof and refutation, this rule is formulated as follows: arguments must be fully justified (logically or factually). If the second rule is violated, an error occurs "an unfounded argument." In proofs and refutations, the corresponding fallacy is called an “unproven argument.” There are several varieties of the "unsubstantiated argument" fallacy. "False Argument" When making this mistake, an unsubstantiated statement is presented as an argument, which is also false. However, the arguer does not know about the falsity of the argument. An argument may be false due to self-contradiction. This is Socrates' statement: “I know that I know nothing.” Indeed, if Socrates does not know anything, then he does not know that he knows nothing. This mistake is also made when substantiating statements about facts, the final assessment of which can only be made in the future. For example, when justifying the correctness of the economic reforms being carried out, they use the following arguments: “In six months, the reforms will bring a significant effect,” “There will be no decline in the standard of living of the population,” etc.
"False Argument"- this (doubtful from the point of view of semantics) name was given by past logicians to the error that consisted in citing as arguments statements whose falsity is known to the arguer. Making such a mistake in most cases is a trick. Variants of the "false argument".
"A humorous false argument." Such a mistake is made in the following reasoning. "I have a father and a mother. My father and my mother also, of course, had father and mother. So, going out to the third generation, I find four ancestors Each of my two grandfathers and each of my two grandmothers also had a father and mother. Therefore, in the fourth generation I have eight ancestors. Going out to fifth, sixth, seventh, etc. generations ago, I find that the number of my ancestors is increasing, and, moreover, extremely strongly. Namely:
in the 2nd generation there are 2 ancestors;
in the 3rd generation there are 4 ancestors;
in the 4th generation there are 8 ancestors;
in the 20th generation there are 524,288 ancestors.
You see that 20 generations ago I already had a whole army of direct ancestors, numbering more than half a million. And with each subsequent generation, this number doubles. If we count, as is usually accepted, three generations per century, then at the beginning of our era, 19 centuries ago, a countless number of my ancestors should have lived on earth: it can be calculated that their number should contain 18 digits. The further into the depths of centuries, the more the number of my ancestors should increase. In the era of the first pharaohs, their numbers must have reached mind-boggling numbers. In the Stone Age, which preceded Egyptian history, my ancestors were probably already cramped on the globe.”
When calculating the number of ancestors, a false statement is made that the number of ancestors is growing in a specified manner.
"Tactical deceitful argument." This mistake is made during an argument with an opponent who seeks to refute all your arguments. Instead of an argument, they put forward a judgment that is a negation of the implied argument. The opponent proves the falsity of the proposition put forward. Then you state that you agree with this and offer an argument that you have not previously expressed. The enemy has no choice but to recognize it as true.
"Blatently false argument." When making this mistake, clearly false statements are given as arguments, assuming that the opponent will remain silent due to lack of courage or for some other reason. Sometimes this mistake is made when speaking on radio, television, or in print. For example, speaking on television, a government representative says that on the issue of setting prices we have two opinions, while those abroad have one, although he knows that abroad there are also two opinions.
"An Illegal Argument to Science." In disputes, scientific provisions are often referred to. However, sometimes, taking advantage of the fact that people respect scientific data, they refer to non-existent scientific data. They say: “Science has established such and such,” although this is not so. This technique is especially widely used in the so-called pseudo-scientific literature (about aliens, about life in other dimensions, etc.).
"A false argument as a premise of a question." An argument is not stated, but expressed through a question whose premise is false. Let’s say the debate described above is going on about the advisability of abolishing the death penalty as a criminal punishment. Proponents of abolition, instead of making the argument “If you are in favor of the death penalty, then you should be ready to immediately shoot the person sentenced to this measure of punishment,” which is false, ask: “Are you personally now ready to kill the person sentenced to death?” to the highest degree punishment?" In this case, it is necessary to indicate that the premise of the question is a false judgment, that the question is logically incorrect. At the same time, it is possible to propose, after completing the discussion of the problem associated with the abolition of the death penalty, to discuss the issue of ways to enforce the specified court sentence.
"A false argument not made at all." Argumentation is carried out in such a way that obviously false arguments are omitted, and the logically unprepared recipient of the argument deduces them himself. For example, justifying in print the need for a transition in our country from large agricultural farms to family farms, the economist writes that in the United States 80% of farms are family farms. At the same time, the economist is silent that they produce only 2% of agricultural products. The reader can conclude that family farms produce a lot of products. Sometimes, so that a false argument does not catch the eye, in the process of argumentation it is expressed as a missing premise of the enthymeme. Thus, in the argument “Philosophy is a class science, and logic, like mathematics, is not a class science. Consequently, logic is not a philosophical science,” the argument is missing: “All the properties of the whole are possessed by its parts.”
"Woman's argument" or, more noblely, the "ladies' argument." The mistake is to strengthen the opposing side's argument to such an extent that it turns out to be false.
The husband says to his wife:
- Why did you greet my friend poorly?
- What should I do, go to bed with him?
"Double-entry bookkeeping". The same argument is considered true in one case (if it is beneficial), and in another - false (if it is unprofitable).
"A false argument expressed by a descriptive name." The objects discussed in the argument are assigned properties not directly, but through descriptive names.
The Red-Browns held a rally on Manezhnaya Square.
In fact, there is an implicit statement here: “Those who held this rally are both communists and fascists.” Often arguments expressed in descriptive names are clearly false.
"Argument in conjunction." For example, when characterizing objects towards which the recipients of a dispute strive to develop a negative attitude, they simultaneously talk about things towards which a negative attitude has already been developed. The addressee unconsciously transfers negative properties to the first objects. For example, when talking about the leader of the party, they also characterize Hitler.
"Lawyer's Trick" The arguer considers his opponent’s mistake (false statement) as his argument. For example, a prosecutor incorrectly classifies an act (it should be classified under an article requiring a more severe punishment), but a lawyer agrees with him and passes it off as his own opinion.
"Pig argument." Your opponent made a mistake, perhaps he misspoke or made a typo, and then corrected himself. You continue to blame him for this mistake. Two types of the “unfounded” error are considered
etc.................

Tricks in an argument. Techniques for conducting a dispute

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Introduction

The significance of a dispute in a person’s life is quite great, since it is an important element of interpersonal communication and interaction between people, as well as an integral stage in the procedure for making any decisions that affect their interests.

In our world, in order to achieve success you need to be able to prove your ideas to people and defend them, for this you often have to enter into an argument, and the ability to argue is an art, and mastery of the art of argument is a big plus for every person.

1. Dispute. Types of dispute

A dispute is understood as any clash of opinions in which each party defends its rightness by constructing evidence. The dispute begins with the fact that the point of view expressed by one of its participants is, at a minimum, called into question.

In order to consciously conduct a correct, focused dispute, you need to be able to “embrace the dispute,” that is, all the time keep in mind the general picture of a given dispute, giving an account of what position it is in, what has been done, what is being done and why at a given moment.

There are the following types of dispute:

Discussion (from Latin discussio - research, discussion) is a public dispute, the purpose of which is to compare different points of view in order to correctly find a solution to a controversial issue. The discussion is led by an experienced facilitator.

A debate is a pre-prepared oral argument on a given topic (scientific, moral and ethical, socially important). During the dispute, they compare various points vision under the guidance of a competent facilitator.

Polemics (from the Greek polemikos - militant, hostile) is a heated dispute, a struggle between fundamentally opposing points of view. The goal is to defeat the enemy and defend your own position. A presenter is not required.

Debate is the name given to disputes that arise during the discussion of reports. It is important to note that each speaker may speak only once in a debate.

Disputes are classified by purpose, number of participants and form of conduct.

Based on the purpose, the following types of disputes are distinguished:

for the sake of argument: often there is an argument for the sake of argument. For such debaters, it makes no difference what to argue about or with whom to argue. It is important for them to show off their eloquence;

Based on the number of participants there are:

dispute-monologue: a person argues with himself, the so-called “internal dispute”;

dispute-dialogue;

dispute-polylogue.

2. Tricks in an argument

In the process of argumentation and criticism, two types of errors can be made: intentional and unintentional.

Unintentional mistakes are made due to low culture of thinking, haste and some other reasons. They are called paralogisms (Greek - incorrect reasoning).

The mistake of many questions - the opponent is asked several different questions under the guise of one and asked to answer “yes” or “no”. The way out of this situation is to give a detailed answer.

Answering a question with a question - not wanting to answer the question posed, the polemicist poses a counter question.

Answer on credit - experiencing difficulties in discussing a problem, debaters postpone the answer to “later”, citing its complexity.

Exit from a dispute occurs if one of the parties to the dispute realizes the weakness of his position.

Disruption of a dispute is done by constantly interrupting the opponent, demonstrating reluctance to listen to him.

The “argument to the policeman” is actively used in totalitarian societies. The thesis or argument is declared dangerous to society.

“Strike arguments” can be defined as a special form of intellectual violence. The disputant gives an argument that the opponent must accept for fear of something unpleasant or dangerous.

3. Permissible and impermissible tricks

The following can be considered permissible tricks in a dispute:

suspension of the dispute by one or both parties for valid reasons;

if the dispute escalates and the dispute reaches an unacceptable phase (violation), the dispute can be stopped by one (even the wrong) party to its benefit;

contacting an independent person or source with a request for clarification of inaccuracies.

The crudest tricks in a dispute are:

moving “aside” from the topic of the ongoing dispute with a transition to “personalities” - indications of: profession, nationality, position held, physical defects, psychological disorders;

shouting and obscene language, mutual insults, shouting and insults of third parties;

threats and hooligan behavior;

assault and fighting.

4. Measures against tricks

When one side notes to itself that the other is using subterfuge tactics in a dispute, the most adequate reaction will be the following:

1. Identify the very fact of using a specific trick.

2. Directly bring this up for discussion and agree on what rules the opponents in the dispute will adhere to in order to resolve it constructively.

1. You should abandon the initial negative attitude towards the controversial situation, and not consider it for yourself only as a source of troubles or threats.

2. Separate people from problems. Don't allow yourself to attack someone for using tactics that you consider illegal and inappropriate.

3. Focus on mutually beneficial options.

4. Use the tactic "I would like to better understand your position. Let me tell you where I have difficulty understanding your reasoning."

Conclusion

In conclusion, I think it is important to note that the goal of a dispute should be to find the truth or reach a compromise, but not to win. In cases where this condition is not met, it is better to interrupt the dispute.

A conversation can be considered successful if the result is:

1) the partners received new information for themselves and were able to better understand the opponent’s position;

2) were able to at least partially remove or reduce tension in relations, eliminate manifestations of mutual hostility, mistrust, resentment, irritation;

3) came to an understanding;

4) were able to resolve the controversial situation itself, eliminate the conflict, and reach agreement.

You need to remain calm in an argument. Sometimes this is difficult, especially when the opponent wants to win the argument at any cost. Mastering polemical skills is a difficult task. Solving it requires hard work, patience and perseverance, some effort on oneself, as well as great desire.

Bibliography

Similar documents

Tricks in an argument

Chapter 13. Permissive tricks

Chapter 14. The grossest impermissible tricks

Chapter 15. Complications and modifications of stick arguments

Chapter 16. Psychological tricks

Chapter 17. Psychological tricks (Continued)

Chapter 18. Sophistry: deviation from the task of the dispute

Chapter 19. Sophistry: deviations from the thesis

Chapter 20. False arguments

Chapter 21. Arbitrary arguments

Chapter 22. “Imaginary evidence”

Chapter 23. Sophistry of inconsistency

Chapter 24. Measures against tricks

Introduction

Tricks in an argument