In what year was the accident at the sshges. Nine years ago, a man-made disaster occurred at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

On August 17, 2009, due to the destruction of the fastening of the turbine cover of the hydroelectric unit, major accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. As a result of the tragedy, 75 people died, serious damage was caused to both the premises themselves and the equipment of the station. The work of the hydroelectric power station had to be temporarily stopped due to the threat ecological disaster in the region.

Catastrophe

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is one of the largest in the world and the largest hydroelectric power plant in Russia. She began her work in 1978.

On August 17, 2009, at 8:13 local time, an unexpected destruction of the second hydroelectric unit occurred, as a result of which huge masses of water began to flow uncontrollably through the shaft of the hydroelectric unit.

The engine room, the premises under it, as well as all the hydroelectric units of the station, without exception, were flooded very quickly. Moreover, due to flooding, short circuits occurred at the operating hydroelectric units, which put them out of action.

The entire station turned out to be de-energized, the power supply to the alarm system, automation devices, lighting was lost, and there was no operational communication. Since the gates of water intakes did not close due to the lack of electric power, water continued to flow in large quantities to idle turbines, which led to their destruction.

It was possible to manually close the gates of water intakes and open the gates of the spillway dam only by one in the afternoon. After that, all the water through the gates was supplied idly.

Investigation into the causes of the disaster

According to Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Shmatko, the accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was the largest and at the same time the most incomprehensible accident in the history of hydropower. Several departments were involved in the investigation of the disaster. Among other things, a parliamentary commission was created to investigate the disaster.

Due to the fact that initially the causes of the accident were not clear even to specialists, many hypotheses and assumptions arose around the event. Versions of water hammer, sabotage and terrorist attack were considered. However, no trace explosive could not be found.

Ultimately, Rostekhnadzor published an act on the website of the department, according to which the cause of the accident was the failure of the turbine cover, which, in turn, happened due to the destruction of the studs. This was attributed to the constant overloads experienced by the station equipment.

The capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is the largest in Russia. It is also the sixth in the world. The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is located in Khakassia, on the Yenisei River, not far from Sayanogorsk.

The composition of the station facilities

The main object of the station is the arch-gravity dam made of concrete, which has a height of 245 meters and a length of 1066 meters. The width of the dam at the base is 110 meters, and along the crest 25 meters. The dam can be divided into four parts. The left-bank and right-bank blind parts are 246 m and 298 m long, respectively, the spillway part is 190 m long, and the station part is 332 m.

The dam building of the hydroelectric power station is adjacent to the dam.

Tourism

The station itself and its engine room are interesting as tourist sites. The power plant also has its own museum. Since the object is secure, it can only be visited through regional tour operators.

The area where the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is located (map below) is a place that has become popular with tourists. Previously, there was even a special viewpoint from which you can best view the station. Now in this place, next to the dam, a memorial dedicated to the builders of the hydroelectric power station has been erected. On the banks of the Yenisei rises the five-domed peak Borus, which is considered a national shrine by the Khakass, as is the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. The map of Khakassia allows you to better know where these places are.

The observation deck on the left bank allows you to see a white rock two hundred meters high. It represents part of the Kibik-Kordon marble deposit, which occupies several kilometers of the Yenisei bank. One of the parts of the road leading from Sayanogorsk to Cheryomushki lies directly along the marble deposit. Severe geological conditions and rocky spurs prevented its laying, which made its laying one of the most expensive in the world.

Construction

The final decision to start construction of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was made in 1962. Construction began in 1968. In 1975, during the construction of the hydroelectric power station, the Yenisei riverbed was blocked, and already in 1978, with the launch of the first hydroelectric unit, the station gave the first current. From 1979 to 1985, another nine hydroelectric units were put into operation sequentially. In 1988, the construction of the station was basically completed. In 2005, work began on the construction of a coastal spillway, which should increase the reliability of the station. In 2011, the spillway was put into operation.

Exploitation

In 2006, serious miscalculations were discovered in the engine room and the station spillway. In 2007, a scheduled inspection revealed significant wear of booms, which were 20 years old. Not very successful, prone to increased cracking, was the design of the hydroelectric units with which the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was equipped. Photos published after the accident made it possible to judge the extent of their destruction.

A large program of modernization and technical re-equipment of the station was developed, the implementation of which began, but the accident at the power plant made its own adjustments to the plans of the builders.

Accident

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, the accident at which occurred on August 17, 2009, caused great damage.

In the morning in August 2009, an accident occurred at the hydroelectric power station. The destruction of the second hydraulic unit occurred, and the turbine room was flooded large quantity water. The 7th and 9th hydraulic units were badly damaged, the third, fourth and fifth hydraulic units were blocked by debris. This led to the destruction of the turbine hall from which the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was controlled. The accident resulted in the death of 75 people.

The tragedy was thoroughly investigated. The act of investigation was published in October 2009.

Recovery

New hydraulic units to replace the damaged ones were ordered from Power Machines. Already in 2010, units No. 6, No. 5, No. 4 and No. 3 were in operation, which made it possible to increase the power of the station to 2560 MW - 40% of the nominal one. At the same time, work was underway to dismantle unit No. 2 and build a coastal spillway, which ended in successful hydraulic tests. The station generated 10 billion kWh of electricity.

Thus, the first stage of reconstruction was completed, as a result of which four hydroelectric units of the station, which suffered the least, were put into operation.

In 2011, the second stage of reconstruction started. The construction of the second stage of the spillway was completed, and by the end of the year the entire spillway complex was put into operation.

In addition, a new hydraulic unit (No. 1) was put into operation.

Electricity generation in 2011 amounted to more than 18 billion kWh.
In 2012, three new hydroelectric units were launched: No. 7, No. 8, No. 9, after which the capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP amounted to 3840 MW.

In 2013, three new hydroelectric units were launched: No. 10, No. 6, No. 5, which made it possible to increase the station's capacity to 4,480 MW.

In 2013, the station produced more than 24 billion kWh.

In 2014, the third stage of the reconstruction of the station started. As part of its implementation in 2014, hydroelectric unit No. 4 gave current.

The Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP underwent a complete re-equipment with new hydraulic units from OJSC Power Machines, which have the best parameters and meet stringent safety and reliability requirements. The capacity of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP became equal to the nominal one - 6400 MW. The maximum efficiency of the new hydraulic turbines reached 96.6%, and the maximum service life of the machines was increased to 40 years. Now the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, whose photos immediately after the accident and today are strikingly different, is operating at full capacity.

abstract

Completed by a student
9th grade
Babich Ludmila.

2010

accident on Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP- industrialtechnological disaster, which took place on August 17, 2009 . As a result of the accident, 75 people died, and serious damage was caused to the equipment and premises of the station. Production station operation electricity suspended. The consequences of the accident affected environmental conditions of the water area adjacent to the hydroelectric power station , on the social and economic spheres of the region. As a result of the investigation, the direct cause of the accident was namedfatigue failure studs turbine cover fasteners hydraulic unit , which led to its failure and flooding station engine room.
This accident is the largest hydroelectric disaster in history. Russia and one of the most significant in the history of the worldhydropower. Nevertheless, the assessment of the consequences of the disaster in the expert and political community is ambiguous. Some specialists and organizations compare the Sayano-Shushenskaya catastrophe in terms of its significance and impact on the economic and sociological aspects of life in Russia withaccident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Other experts believe that these catastrophes are incomparable in scale.President of Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev believes that one should not overdramatize the situation and do "apocalyptic» comments. The accident caused a great public outcry, becoming one of the most discussed inin mass mediaevents of 2009.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP

General plan of the station
Main article:Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP
Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station Yenisei river is the largest hydroelectric power plant Russia and one of the largest hydroelectric power plants in the world. It is located on the borderKrasnoyarsk Territory and Khakassia . The construction of the hydroelectric power plant started in 1968 . The first hydroelectric unit was put into operation in 1978, the last - in 1985 . The power plant was put into permanent operation in 2000 . Technically, the HPP consists of concrete arch gravity damheight of 245 m and the dam building of the HPP, which houses 10radial-axialhydroelectric units with a capacity of 640 MW. The installed capacity of HPPs is 6400 MW, the average annual output is 24.5 billion kWh. Dam HPP forms a largeSayano-Shushenskoye reservoirseasonal regulation. Downstream of the Yenisei iscounterregulatory Mainskaya HPP , constituting a single production complex with the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP. The HPP facilities were designed by the institute " Lengidroproekt, hydraulic power equipmentdelivered by factories LMZ" and "Elektrosila "(now part of the concern" Power Machines "). Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP is owned by OAO RusHydro".

Catastrophe

At the time of the accident, the load on the station was 4100 MW, out of 10 hydroelectric units, 9 were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was under repair). At 8:13local time August 17, 2009 there was a sudden destruction of the hydraulic unit No. 2 with the flow of the hydraulic unit through the shaft under a large pressure significant volumes of water. The power plant personnel, who were in the engine room, heard a loud bang in the area of ​​hydroelectric unit No. 2 and saw the release of a powerful column of water. Streams of water quickly flooded the engine room and the rooms below it. All hydraulic units of the HPP were flooded, while on the working hydro generators there wereshort circuits(their flashes are clearly visible in the amateur video of the disaster), which disabled them. There was a complete load shedding of the hydroelectric power station, which led, among other things, to a de-energization of the station itself. On the central control panel of the station, a light and sound signaling , after which the remote control was de-energized - operational communication was lost, power supply lighting , automation and alarm devices. The automatic systems that stop the hydroelectric units worked only on the hydroelectric unit No. 5,guide apparatuswhich was automatically closed. The gates on the water intakes of other hydraulic units remained open, and the water water conduits continued to flow to the turbines, which led to the destruction of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9 (heavily damaged stators and crosses of generators ). Water flows and flying fragments of hydraulic units completely destroyed the walls and ceilings of the turbine hall in the area of ​​hydraulic aggregates No. 2, 3, 4. Hydroaggregates No. 3, 4 and 5 were littered with fragments of the turbine hall.Employees of the station, who had such an opportunity, promptly left the scene of the accident.
At the time of the accident, from the station management in their places were Chief Engineer HPP A. N. Mitrofanov, Acting Chief of Staff civil defense and emergency situations M. I. Chiglintsev, head of the equipment monitoring service A. V. Matvienko, head of the reliability and safety service N. V. Churichkov. After the accident, the chief engineer arrived at the central control point and gave the order to the station shift supervisor M. G. Nefyodov, who was there, to close the gates. Chiglintsev, Matvienko and Churichkov left the territory of the station after the accident.
Due to the loss of power supply, the gates could only be closed manually, for which the personnel had to enter a special room on the crest of the dam. At about 08:30, eight operational personnel reached the shutter room, after which they contacted the station shift supervisor by cell phone, who instructed the shutters to be lowered. Having broken the iron door, the station workers A. V. Kataytsev, E. V. Kondrattsev, I. M. Bagautdinov, P. A. Mayoroshin and N. N. Tretyakov manually reset the emergency repair gates within an hour water intakes by stopping the flow of water into the engine room. The closure of water conduits led to the need to open gatesspillway damto avoid flooding the reservoir. By 11:32 the food was organized gantry crane dam crest from movablediesel generator, at 11:50 the operation to lift the shutters began. By 13:07, all 11 gates of the spillway dam were open, and empty water flow began.

Rescue work

Search and rescue, repair and restoration work at the station began almost immediately after the accident by the station personnel and employees Siberian regional center Ministry of Emergency Situations . On the same day, the head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations flew to the accident area Sergei Shoigu , who led the work to eliminate the consequences of the accident, [the transfer of additional forces of the Ministry of Emergency Situations and employees of various divisions of JSC RusHydro began. Already on the day of the accident, diving work began to inspect the flooded premises of the station in order to search for survivors, as well as the bodies of the dead. On the first day after the accident, it was possible to save two people who were in "air bags" and gave signals for help - one 2 hours after the accident, the other 15 hours later. However, as early as August 18, the likelihood of finding other survivors was assessed as negligible. On August 20, pumping out of water from the premises of the engine room began; by this time, 17 bodies of the dead had been found, 58 people were listed as missing. As the internal premises of the station were freed from water, the number of found bodies of the dead grew rapidly, reaching 69 people by August 23, when work on pumping water entered the final stage. On August 23, the Ministry of Emergency Situations began to complete its work at the station, and work at the hydroelectric power station began to gradually move from the phase of a search and rescue operation to the phase of restoration of structures and equipment. On August 28, the regime was abolished in Khakassiaemergencyintroduced in connection with the accident. In total, up to 2,700 people were involved in search and rescue operations (of which about 2,000 people worked directly at the HPP) and more than 200 pieces of equipment. During the work, more than 5000 m? blockages, more than 277,000 m? water. To eliminate oil pollution water areas Yenisei was installed 9683 metersbooms and collected 324.2 tons oily emulsions.

Causes of the accident

The results of the investigation of the accident by the Rostechnadzor commission were published on the website of the department in the form of a document under official name“The act of technical investigation of the causes of the accident that occurred on August 17, 2009 in the branch of the Open Joint Stock Company RusHydro - Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP named after P. S. Neporozhny.” The act contains general information about the hydroelectric power plant, listing the events that preceded the accident, describes the course of the accident, lists the causes and events that influenced the development of the accident. The direct cause of the accident by this act was formulated as follows: Most of these causes are of a systemic multifactorial nature, including unacceptably low responsibility of the operating personnel, unacceptably low responsibility and professionalism of the plant management, as well as abuse of official position by the plant management.
The constant monitoring of the technical condition of the equipment by the operational and maintenance personnel was not properly organized (which should be provided for in the operating instructions for the hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, approved by the chief engineer of the SSHHPP dated May 18, 2009). The main cause of the accident was the failure to take measures to promptly shut down the second hydraulic unit and find out the causes of vibration. SShHPP with numerous human casualties was the result of a number of technical, organizational and regulatory reasons.

Prerequisites

Operating zones of hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP
Hydro unit No. 2 was launched November 5, 1979 , initially at reduced pressure and with temporary working wheel. November 7, 1986 the hydraulic unit was put into operation with a standard impeller. The standard service life of the hydroturbine was set by the manufacturer at 30 years. The design of hydraulic turbines RO230/833-B-677 is characterized by a number of disadvantages, one of which is the presence of an extensive zone of non-recommended operation; when the hydraulic unit is in this zone, the operation of the turbine is accompanied by strong hydraulic shocks in the flow path and significant noise. At the same time, the zone of non-recommended operation separates two zones in which the operation of the hydraulic unit is allowed; Thus, with a significant change in power, the hydraulic unit is forced to pass through the zone of non-recommended operation each time. In the act on the acceptance of the hydroelectric complex into operation, dated 2000 , the need to replace the impellers of hydraulic turbines was noted. According to the program of technical re-equipment and reconstruction of the station, the replacement of the impellers of the hydraulic units was planned from 2011; particularly in August 2009 a tender was announced for the supply of a new impeller for one of the HPP's hydroelectric units
Hydro unit No. 2 was undergoing the last overhaul in 2005 , its last medium repair was carried out between January 14 to March 16 2009. After the repair, the hydraulic unit was put into permanent operation; at the same time, increased vibration equipment, which nevertheless remained within the permissible values.During the operation of the hydraulic unit, its vibration state gradually worsened and at the end of June 2009 it passed the permissible level. The deterioration continued in the future; so, by 8:00 on August 17, 2009, the vibration amplitude of the turbine cover bearing was 600 micron at the maximum allowable 160 microns; at 8:13, just before the accident, it increased to 840 microns. In such a situation, the chief engineer of the station, in accordance with normative documents was obliged to stop the hydraulic unit in order to find out the reasons increased vibration, which was not done, which was one of the main reasons for the development of the accident. The continuous vibration monitoring system installed at hydroelectric unit No. 2 in 2009 was not put into operation and was not taken into account by the operating personnel and the plant management when making decisions. Effects

Social Consequences

At the time of the accident, there were 116 people in the turbine hall of the station, including one person on the roof of the hall, 52 people on the hall floor (327 m mark) and 63 people in the interior below the hall floor level (at elevations of 315 and 320 m). Of these, 15 people were employees of the station, the rest were employees of various contracting organizations that carried out repair work ( most of of them - employees of JSC Sayano-Shushensky Hydroenergoremont). In total, there were about 300 people on the territory of the station (including outside the zone affected by the accident). The accident killed 75 people, injured 13 people] . The body of the last deceased was found 23 September . Complete list of the deadwith an indication of the places where the bodies were found was published in the act of the technical investigation of the commission of Rostekhnadzor. A large number of The death toll is explained by the presence of most people in the internal premises of the station below the floor level of the turbine hall and the rapid flooding of these premises.
From the first day of the accident, estimates of the chances of survival of people who could be inside the water-flooded turbine hall were disappointing. In particular, board memberRusHydro company, the former general director of the HPP Alexander Toloshinov stated:
“The lack of official information about the accident and the state of the dam during the first hours, interruptions in communication, and, subsequently, distrust of the statements of local authorities based on experience, caused panic in the settlements lying downstream of the river - Cheryomushki, Sayanogorsk
etc.................

The accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP shocked the whole country. Its unexpectedness, scale and mystery attracted the attention of many people. Many versions have appeared, from completely fantastic to quite plausible, trying to explain what happened. On October 3, 2009, the Act of the Rostekhnadzor commission was published, on December 21, 2009 - the results of the investigation of the parliamentary commission. On March 23, 2011, the Investigative Committee completed its own investigation into the causes of the incident, indicting the management and technical staff of the station. It would seem that everything is clear - here are the technical reasons for what happened, here are the alleged culprits. However, everything is not so simple.

If you expect to see in this message some kind of “tearing off”, a story about the fact that the treacherous authorities hide the truth, about the fact that everything was stolen, etc. - forced to disappoint, this will not happen. There will be a serious analysis, saturated with a number of technical terms. Without this, alas, nothing. There will be many letters and few pictures. However, I will try to make the presentation as popular as possible.

For a long time I did not have any formed opinion about the causes of the accident. For all my longstanding interest in hydropower, I did not feel competent in a number of rather specific technical matters. At the end of 2009, I wrote an article on Wikipedia about the accident, where I neatly outlined the information from the Rostekhnadzor Act. There were some moments in the Act that alerted me back then, but I attributed them to my own incompetence. But in general, the reasons were clear, in the Act - www.sshges.rushydro.ru/file/main/sshges/p ress/news-materials/doc/Act6.pdf they are stated as follows:
“Due to the repeated occurrence of additional loads of a variable nature on the hydraulic unit associated with crossings through a non-recommended zone, fatigue damage was formed and developed on the attachment points of the hydraulic unit, including the turbine cover. The destruction of the studs caused by dynamic loads led to the failure of the turbine cover and the depressurization of the water supply path of the hydraulic unit ... there was a relative increase in the vibration of the GA-2 turbine bearing by about 4 times ... In this situation, in order to ensure safe operation, the chief engineer of the SSHHPP had to decide to stop the GA-2 and study of the causes of vibration”
Simply put, the hydraulic unit was destroyed by the vibrations that arose when it passed through an unrecommended zone. At the same time, the hydraulic unit signaled its abnormal state by increased vibration exceeding the permissible limits, to which the personnel did not pay attention.

However, I quickly noticed that this explanation does not quite suit the industry. This manifested itself in personal conversations, in some publicly uttered phrases. It was felt that the industry was comprehending what had happened, and sooner or later the results of this reflection would be presented. Which, in fact, happened a year and a half after the incident.
On February 2, 2011, on the Tayga.info resource at tayga.info/details/2011/02/02/~102283, a detailed article “On vibration at unit No. 2 of the SSHHPP before the accident was published. Discussion” by Alexander Klyukach, an engineer of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, one of the accused in the incident.
At the same time, in the February issue of the journal “Hydrotechnical construction” (this is the leading scientific and technical journal in the field of hydraulic engineering and hydropower), an article was published by A.P. Karpik, A.P. Epifanov (both doctors technical sciences) and Stefanenko N.I. (Ph.D., Head of Monitoring Service of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP) titled “On the Issue of the Causes of the Accident and Assessment of the State of the Arch-Gravity Dam of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP”.

Both of these works contain a scientifically designed, and therefore not quite understandable to a reader unfamiliar with the subject, harsh criticism of the conclusions of the Rostekhnadzor Act. Due to the specifics, they have largely gone unnoticed. But they made me think very seriously.
On May 19-20, 2011, the conference "Improving the efficiency of the HPP safety management system" was held. This event was conceived as an attempt by industry experts to understand the reasons for what happened at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, an attempt to draw conclusions so that this would not happen again. I will say right away - it seems to me that this result was achieved.
I had the opportunity to attend this conference. It brought together the elite of domestic hydropower and hydraulic engineering - prominent scientists, specialists from design organizations and factories, leading engineers of hydroelectric power stations - more than 150 people in total, about 50 reports. I sat in plenary sessions and tossed between five round tables held at the same time; fortunately for the most important reports I was able to get in. I listened to what these people say in reports, discussions and on the sidelines. And I realized one thing. They do not believe the Rostekhnadzor Act. Not everything, of course, but a number of its fundamental provisions.
Pieces of the puzzle in my head formed into a single picture.

Facts

So let's take a look at the facts. And they are:
1. The immediate technical cause of the accident was the fatigue failure of the studs securing the cover of the hydraulic unit No. 2 (HA No. 2). The fact of the presence of fatigue cracks was established by the study of studs at TsNIITMASH, whose specialist spoke at the conference. Some important details:
a. At the time of the accident average degree fatigue failure in studs was about 60-65%. The residual bearing capacity of the studs actually corresponded to the loads on the turbine, i.e. was exhausted. The accident could occur at any time during the perfectly normal operation of the turbine.
b. Fatigue failure developed gradually, over a long period of time, more than one year. This follows from the presence of rust in the cracks, as well as the presence of individual fracture zones. To all appearances, fatigue damage increased after the operations of tightening the nuts, which were carried out, in particular, during major overhauls (there were four of them).
All this puts an unambiguous end to all versions of the accident, implying as its root cause some powerful emergency effect on the hydraulic unit at the time of the accident - water hammer, terrorist attack, electrodynamic impact. There was simply no need for them.

2. After the accident, the studs of other hydraulic units of the station were examined for cracks. In particular, the studs of the hydraulic unit No. 1 were translucent with ultrasound by the same TsNIITMASH. According to his representative, they were fully confident that they would see approximately the same pattern of fatigue failure at hydroelectric unit No. 1. However, not a single crack was found in the studs of the hydraulic unit No. 1. As far as I know, studs and other hydraulic units have been investigated, with the same result.

This means the following. Transitions of the hydraulic unit through a non-recommended zone, called main reason development of fatigue failures in the Act of Rostekhnadzor, could not be the cause of the accident. Other hydroelectric units went through this zone no less, if not more, than hydroelectric unit No. 2; The Act itself states that in 2009 hydro unit No. 2 worked in this zone for a total of only 46 minutes, and hydro unit No. 4 - twice as much, 1 hour 38 minutes, but no fatigue damage was found in the hairpins of hydro unit No. 4. According to specialists of the country's leading institute in the field of hydraulic turbines - CKTI, vibrations in the non-recommended zone could not cause the destruction of the studs.

About the vibration of the hydraulic unit No. 2

Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the issue of the vibrational state of the hydraulic unit No. 2 before the accident, because the fact of its presence is primarily based on accusations against the plant personnel. The Act contains a graph of the vibration of the hydraulic unit, measured by the TP R NB sensor - radial vibrations of the turbine bearing, downstream. There he is:

It seems that everything is obvious - here it is, the growth of transcendental vibrations. However, if you think about it, the question arises - was it the only sensor on this turbine? The answer is contained in Klyukach's article - no, there were 10 of these sensors on the turbine. Only one sensor showed extreme vibration, while the others, installed next to it and taking measurements in the same direction, showed the norm. Moreover, this sensor showed extreme vibration even when the hydraulic unit was stopped, which makes its readings obviously unreliable. But it was these faulty and unreliable testimonies that formed the basis of the accusations of specific people.

The unreliability of the readings of the TP R NB sensor and the normal vibration state of the hydraulic unit No. 2 is also confirmed by other sources. This is stated by the former chief engineer and director of the station, now the chief technical inspector of JSC RusHydro, Valentin Stafievsky, in Lev Gordon's book “The Miracle of the Sayan”. The leading specialists of ORGRES, the leading organization dealing with the issue of vibration control of power equipment, spoke about the same in their report. There is also independent confirmation - a graph of dam vibrations (seismogram), recorded by an automatic seismic station installed on the dam.
Here is this seismogram, given in the above article in "Hydrotechnical Construction":

The seismic station is different high precision, it “catches” changes in the operating mode of hydraulic units - their start-ups, shutdowns, transitions through a non-recommended zone. The section between numbers 1 and 2, lasting 32.5 s, is the period of destruction of hydraulic unit No. 2, between 2 and 3, duration 74 - the impact of water flow on the turbine hall, after 3 - vibrations caused by uncontrolled acceleration of hydraulic units No. 7 and 9. Until the moment accidents, i.e. up to number 1, the vibration graph is even, due to the background vibrations of the dam from the hydraulic units operating in the normal mode. There are no transcendental vibrations, from which the “floor walks like a shaker”, no.

All of the above means that hydroelectric unit No. 2 before the accident did not have beyond-limit vibrations recorded by the control equipment, and, accordingly, the station personnel had no reason to stop it.

On the probable causes of the destruction of the studs

So, the conclusions of the Rostekhnadzor Act are doubtful. Why did the studs break? There are two versions of this. Each of them has its strengths and weak sides.
The first version, expressed in particular in the same article in "Hydrotechnical construction" - fatigue failures arose during the operation of GA No. 2 with a temporary impeller. It is known that GA No. 2 from 1979 to 1986, in the amount of about 20 thousand hours, worked at reduced pressure with a replaceable impeller. At the same time, there was a hydraulic imbalance of the impeller and significant vibrations that exceeded the permissible values. It is possible that during the overhaul the already weakened studs were “tightened”, which accelerated their further destruction - but it is already impossible to prove this.
The second version, which the CKTI specialists adhere to, is that the studs destroyed the high-frequency vibrations that occurred during the normal operation of the hydraulic unit in the recommended zone, which were not recorded by the available sensors, and were generally rather poorly studied.

I will not now analyze in detail the strengths and weaknesses of these versions, they are very highly specialized, and in order to confirm or refute them, additional research is required, which, as far as I know, is underway. But both of them deny the fault of the personnel and the station management working at the time of the accident.

Analogues

Very similar accidents, but with lesser consequences, occurred at hydroelectric power plants in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the USA. But the closest thing is the accident at the Nurek hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan.


Turbine room of the Nurek HPP. Photo from here - www.ljplus.ru/img4/p/i/pigger_2/t-ges09.j pg

On July 9, 1983, station personnel heard a blow and saw a stream of water escaping from the turbine shaft. The hydraulic unit was stopped, the pre-turbine gate was closed. The lower premises of the station were flooded with about a two-meter layer of water.
Upon examination, it turned out that 50 out of 72 pins were broken. The turbine had already begun to rise, but was stopped at the very beginning.
The cause of the accident was called fatigue failure of the studs due to insufficient tightening. Since that time, at the Tajik HPPs - Nurek and Baipazinskaya, ultrasonic testing of the studs has been mandatory twice a year. It was also held at the Zelenchukskaya hydroelectric power station, the backbone of which was made up of specialists who came from Tajikistan.
But alas, no conclusions were drawn from that accident, and there was no clear indication of the need for mandatory ultrasonic testing of studs at all large HPPs. Please note that this was not done in Soviet times, which are often cited as a standard right attitude to safety. In fact, the issue of control of the studs was given to the level of a particular HPP, somewhere they did it, but somewhere, bearing in mind the absence of instructions on the need for such control in the factory operating instructions for turbines, they did not. This situation is one of the typical signs systemic accidents.

In 1983, the Nurek hydroelectric power station swept through. In 2009 on Sayano-Shushenskaya - no. The accident developed faster, the duty shift of the engine room did not have time to stop the hydraulic unit and reset the shutter. The head of the shift died and will not tell anything.

Who is guilty?

Based on the above, I want to draw a conclusion that many will not like. I believe that the causes of the accident are not related to criminal negligence individual people. They are systemic in nature and have been taking shape for many years - at least since the commissioning of hydroelectric unit No. 2 in 1979. The mistakes of many people, each of which was not fatal in itself, formed at one point. Some of them have already died. Those who remain will feel responsible for this tragedy for the rest of their lives. It is foolish to look for and publicly punish “scapegoats” in this situation. Although it is politically expedient. The masses need specific people who can be declared responsible for everything. And it looks like they've already been found.

The hydropower industry has gradually recovered from the shock caused by the accident. Conclusions have been drawn, and they are based on an understanding of the systemic nature of the accident. That inspires a certain optimism.

The Sayano-Shushensky hydropower complex is located on the Yenisei River in the south-east of the Republic of Khakassia in the Sayan Canyon at the exit of the river in Minusinsk basin. The complex includes the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, as well as the counter-regulating Mainsky hydroelectric complex located downstream and a coastal spillway.

Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station named after P.S. Neporozhny (SSHGES) is a branch of the Russian energy holding RusHydro.

The HPP building houses 10 radial-axial hydraulic units with a capacity of 640 megawatts each.

Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP before the accident on August 17, 2009 was the most powerful source of peak load coverage in the Unified Energy System of Russia and Siberia. The main consumers of electricity from the SSHHPP were the Sayanogorsk aluminum plant, the Khakass aluminum plant, the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant, the Novokuznetsk aluminum plant, and the Kuznetsk ferroalloy plant.

On August 17, 2009 at 08.15 (04.15 Moscow time) due to the destruction of fasteners at the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, an accident occurred, the cover of the second hydraulic unit was torn off by a stream of water, into the turbine room. Repair shops were flooded, in which there were people. The accident killed 75 people.

At the time of the accident, nine hydroelectric units of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP were in operation (hydraulic unit No. 6 was in reserve). The total active power of the operating units was 4400 megawatts. The release of water from the crater of the turbine of the second hydraulic unit led to a partial collapse of building structures in the area from the first to the fifth hydroelectric units; the supporting columns of the building were damaged and in some places destroyed, as well as the equipment of the regulation and control systems of hydroelectric units; got mechanical damage varying degrees five phase power transformers; the building structures of the transformer site in the area of ​​the first and second blocks were damaged.

All ten units of the SSHHPP were damaged or completely destroyed, more than 40 tons of engine oil spilled into the waters of the Yenisei.

As a result of the accident, the production levels below the turbine hall were flooded. A short circuit in the generator control systems led to a complete shutdown of the hydroelectric power plant, including for its own needs.

The territory adjacent to the power plant was also under water. However, flooding settlements after all

The accident did not affect the state of the SSHHPP dam.

At 09.20 (05.20 Moscow time), the emergency repair gates of the hydraulic units were closed by the station personnel and contractors and the flow of water into the turbine hall was stopped.

In the premises of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP destroyed and flooded with water. In the machine room where the technological accident occurred, emergency recovery work was started. 115 people were involved, of which 98 people were the personnel of the Russian Emergencies Ministry for Khakassia (firefighters, rescuers, task forces) and 21 pieces of equipment.

An oil slick, formed as a result of transformer oil leakage, five kilometers downstream of the Yenisei.

At 11.40 (06.40 Moscow time) the gates of the spillway dam were opened and the balance of flow through the hydroelectric complex was restored. Prior to the opening of the gates of the spillway dam, the regulation of the sanitary release along the Yenisei River was carried out by the Mainskaya HPP.

Due to an accident at the SSHHPP in the energy system of Siberia. Power engineers were forced to work at a number of Kuzbass enterprises. In particular, temporary restrictions affected the largest metallurgical plants owned by Evraz Group - Novokuznetsk Iron and Steel Works (NKMK) and West Siberian Iron and Steel Works (ZapSib), a number of coal mines and cuts.

The shutdown of the Sayan and Khakas aluminum smelters was carried out, the load was reduced at the Krasnoyarsk aluminum smelter, the Kemerovo ferroalloy plant (load reduction by 150 megawatts),

At 21.10 Moscow time, during a conference call in the crisis center of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation, it was reported that there were 10 dead, 11 wounded, the fate of 72 people is being specified. Debris has been sorted out, and the power supply scheme is being restored.

Less than a day after the accident in two fish farms located downstream of the Yenisei from the hydroelectric power station in the village of Maina, due to the ingress of engine oil into the Yenisei from the destroyed hydraulic units. About 400 tons of commercial trout perished. In the Yenisei, the fish migrated away from the spot, so they did not die, but in trout farms they were in pontoons, they did not have the opportunity to leave.

During the liquidation of the consequences of the accident at the plant, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, in cooperation with the Ministry of Energy of Russia, involved up to 2.7 thousand people (including about 2 thousand people directly at the HPP), more than 200 pieces of equipment, including including 11 aircraft and 15 watercraft. More than 5,000 cubic meters of rubble were dismantled, more than 277,000 cubic meters water. 9683 meters of booms were installed, 324.2 tons of oil-containing emulsion were collected.

In order to coordinate the interaction of the organizations involved during the period of emergency rescue operations, in the future, for the prompt settlement of issues related to the restoration of the HPP, a operational headquarters Ministry of Energy of Russia headed by the Deputy Minister of Energy.

The project of restoration and complex reconstruction of SSHHPP. According to the plan approved by the Russian Ministry of Energy, the hydroelectric power plant should be fully restored in 2014.

In July 2013, the third hydroelectric unit of the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was stopped for reconstruction, which is one of the four units least affected in industrial accident 2009. By this time, the remaining nine units had already been reconstructed. The third hydraulic unit according to the plan

The material was prepared on the basis of information from RIA Novosti and open sources