Major General A.I. SOROKIN

In 1904, the armored cruisers Rurik, Rossiya, Gromoboy and Bogatyr, which were part of the Russian Pacific Fleet, were based in Vladivostok. According to the war plan, they were intended to divert part of the armored fleet the enemy and for operations on the Japan-Korea lines of communication against Japanese military transportation.

During the design and construction of the cruiser, they were designed for operations on ocean communications. In this regard, in order to increase the cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect deck artillery protection.

On the night of January 27, 1904, the commander of the cruiser detachment received an order from the viceroy to begin hostilities and inflict the most severe blow and harm on communications between Japan and Korea. The ships were in combat readiness and on the same day went to sea. During the five-day cruising they sank the Nakanoura-Maru steamer (1084 tons) and fired at one steamer. A violent storm forced the trip to be cancelled. The ships were covered with ice, and even the guns were covered with a thick crust of ice. After returning and a short stay at the base of the cruiser, they again went to sea to the Korean coast; but this campaign was also unsuccessful - except for small coasters, the cruisers did not meet anyone. The actions taken, although ineffective, nevertheless alarmed main bet Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory action against Vladivostok. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored and two light cruisers went to the Russian coast and randomly fired at Vladivostok.

Admiral Makarov, taking command Pacific Fleet, set the main task for the detachment of cruisers: to prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Genzan (Korea) and other points.

The cruisers were able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. The day before, on April 9, Admiral Kamimura went out for action against Vladivostok and on the same day called at the Korean port of Genzan for coal and water. The Russians didn't know about it. There was a thick fog on the sea; cruisers were moving slowly. On the morning of April 12, the detachment approached Fr. Khalezov. The destroyer sent to Genzan sank the steamer Goyo-Maru, which was on the roadstead, after which the destroyer returned to the cruisers; from about. Khalezov's detachment went north; in the afternoon they sank the coaster "sHaginura-Maru". Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22 hours 20 min. met the enemy military transport "Kinsyu-Maru" and sank it. Having learned from the prisoners that Kamimura's squadron was at sea, the Russian cruisers headed for Vladivostok.

On May 30, the cruisers were sent to the eastern passage of the Korea Strait. After noon on June 1, they passed about. Even a year and the next day they approached Fr. Tsushima, where the main lines of communication of the enemy passed and where the maneuverable base of Admiral Kamimura was located in Ozaki Bay. At about 8 o'clock in the morning, two transports appeared on the horizon: one of them, taking advantage of low visibility at sea, disappeared, the second, the Izuma-Maru, was sunk by the Thunderbolt. Soon two more large military steamers appeared from the east, sailing without guards. Transport "Hitachi-Maru", which was 1095 soldiers and officers of the reserve guards regiment, 120 crew members, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers, intended for shelling Port Arthur, was also sunk by the Thunderbolt. The second Sado-Maru transport had 1350 soldiers and officers on board. After warning shots from "Rurik" he stopped. The Russians offered the Japanese officers to transfer to the cruiser. The Japanese categorically refused. Panic began on the ship: the boats were clumsily lowered by the Japanese and turned over at the side, despite the complete absence of waves and wind. As time passed, Japanese cruisers might appear on the scene, and deliberately protracted turmoil continued on the Sado-Maru. The commander of the cruiser detachment ordered the transport to be sunk; two torpedoes fired at it hit the target, after which the cruisers, without waiting for the ship to sink, turned into the Sea of ​​Japan. Kamimura at that time was in the base, with four armored and five light cruisers and eight destroyers. Informed by radiotelegraph from the cruiser Tsushima, which was on patrol, of the appearance of Vladivostok cruisers, Kamimura went to sea, but all attempts to find the Russians were in vain. On the morning of June 3, he approached Fr. Even years. Russian cruisers at that time were 150 miles to the north-west, inspecting the detained English steamer Allanton, which was going with a smuggled cargo to Japan.

On June 6, the Russian cruisers, having successfully completed the campaign, returned to the Golden Horn Bay. Kamimura stopped searching and went back to his base.

In the second half of June, the cruisers repeated the raid, but less successfully; having met the Kamimura squadron in the Tsushima area, the Russians, without accepting the battle, withdrew. During the campaign, several small steamships and schooners were destroyed and a ship was brought to Vladivostok, captured on the way from Japan to Korea with timber for the Fuzan-Seoul-Chemulpo road under construction.

The raiding operations of the Vladivostok cruisers in the Sea of ​​Japan forced the enemy to send part of the transports with troops and cargoes to Korea and Manchuria from their eastern ports across the Yellow Sea. In this regard, on July 4, the commander of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment received an order from Alekseev to go to sea to operate on the communication routes of the eastern ports of Japan.

Having accepted coal and military supplies, “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik” on July 7 through the Sangar Strait entered the Pacific Ocean and turned south. On the morning of July 9, the cruisers met the large English steamer Arabia; on examination, it turned out that he was going to Yokohama with a contraband cargo; the ship was sent to Vladivostok. By midnight on July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay; in the morning the Japanese shores appeared. Here, the English steamship Knight Commander was met and subjected to inspection, sailing from Shanghai to Yokohama and Kobe with smuggled cargo. The ship was sunk because there was no coal on it in order to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners were destroyed, the German steamer "Tea", following with a smuggled cargo, and by the end of the day, the English steamer "Kalkhas" was captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. In the evening, the cruisers turned north, as there was only coal left for the return journey.

The commander of the cruiser detachment decided to return to his base again through the Sangar Strait, despite the fact that Kamimura could meet him at the entrance to the Sea of ​​Japan and further all the way to Vladivostok. But japanese admiral, apparently, decided that the Russians, bypassing Japan from the south, would try to connect with the Port Arthur squadron. He was waiting for them at Cape Shantung in the Yellow Sea.

The fact of the appearance of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, stirred up the whole world. Panic began in trading circles, the world exchange actively reacted to the cruisers' campaign, freight rates increased sharply, some large shipping companies stopped voyages to Japan, etc.

On July 29, in Vladivostok, a telegram was received from Admiral Alekseev (who did not yet know about the results of the naval battle on July 28) that the Port Arthur squadron had gone to sea and was fighting the enemy; the cruisers were to immediately enter the Korea Strait. The purpose of the detachment's campaign was to meet with Witgeft's squadron and assist him. The task for the cruisers was set out in the instructions, which stated that Witgeft's intentions were unknown, i.e. it is not clear whether it will go through the Tsushima Strait or around Japan, the exact time of its release to the sea is also unknown, so it is difficult to determine whether the meeting of the cruisers with the squadron will take place and when and where this may happen; if a rendezvous occurs, it will presumably be north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were forbidden to enter south of the Fuzan parallel. Further, the instructions stated that if the cruisers met with Kamimura, they were obliged to retreat to Vladivostok, dragging the Japanese along with them: the cruisers should not be distracted by any other tasks.

On the morning of July 30, “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik” went to sea. On the night of July 31, they marched in a 12-knot course in the wake column, during the day they deployed to the front with an interval of 30-50 cab., In order to cover as much space as possible with observation and not disperse from the Port Arthur squadron. The commander of the detachment, according to his calculations, expected to meet Vitgeft in the middle of the day on July 31, approximately abeam about. Even years. But his calculations were not justified. Having passed Evenlet and reached the Fuzan parallel in the early morning of August 1, the commander of the cruiser detachment, as he was ordered, decided to wait for Port Arthur ships in this area.

Cruiser 1st rank "Russia" (1897) From 1907 - armored cruiser

Beginning to light up. At 4 hours 50 min. the signalmen on the "Russia" suddenly saw in the darkness the silhouettes of four ships moving in parallel with the detachment. A few minutes later, the cruisers Izuma, Tokiwa, Azuma and Iwate were identified. The enemy was about 8 miles north, therefore, the Russians were cut off from Vladivostok and a battle could not be avoided. Both sides began to maneuver. The Japanese, having superiority in strength, 3 knots greater speed and Better conditions for firing, sought to impose a battle.

When the ships approached 60 cab., The Japanese about 5 hours. 20 minutes. opened fire. Topmast flags were hoisted on the Russian cruisers, and return fire was opened from the guns of the port side of the Rossiya and Gromoboy. After the very first volleys, strong explosions were heard on the Iwata and on the Azuma. The battle started well for the Russians. Later from Japanese messages it became known that a heavy projectile penetrated the Iwate battery, breaking three 152- and one 75-mm guns.

Soon the enemy shells covered the Russian ships, dead and wounded appeared. At the fourteenth minute of the battle, a strong fire began on the Rurik, the cruiser was out of order, but not for long, the fire was quickly extinguished. At about 6 o'clock, the light cruiser Napiva approached the Japanese. At this time, the Russian cruisers changed course and went to the northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, lay on a parallel course.

At 6 o'clock. 28 min. "Rurik", which was trailing, raised the signal: "The steering wheel does not work." For the Russians, this was a serious blow, since the Rurik was the strongest in the detachment in terms of the strength of the airborne volley. "Russia" and "Gromoboy" turned to the aid of the wrecked cruiser. For about two hours they fought to give Rurik the opportunity to repair the damage, but in vain.

Due to the fact that it was impossible to help the damaged ship, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment turned to Vladivostok, hoping that the Japanese would pursue him and leave Rurik alone, whose team, using this, would fix the damage . Kamimura really went after the Russian cruisers, but left the light cruisers Naniva and Takachilo in order to finish off the Rurik. "Russia" and "Gromoboy" went north; Kamimura pursued them, trying to pin them to the Korean shore.

The battle ended unexpectedly; at 10 o'clock the enemy's lead cruiser turned sharply and ceased fire, followed by the rest of the ships.

Kamimura refused to continue the pursuit due to casualties among the personnel, lack of shells and damage to the ships. The decision to end the battle was certainly influenced by the fact that, knowing about the battle in the Yellow Sea and having no information about its results, he had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or to engage in battle with the Russians who had broken through from Port Arthur ships.

At this time, "Rurik" continued to fight with the two Japanese cruisers "Takachiho" and "Naniva", but gradually its fire weakened, and in the end the ship fell silent: all its guns were knocked out, almost all commandors were killed or wounded. The cruiser commander captain 1st rank Trusov and senior officer captain 2nd rank Khlodovsky died of wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; almost half of the entire crew was out of action.

When the four cruisers of Kamimura, returning from the chase, approached the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, fearing the capture of the ship, decided to blow it up. This proved to be impossible; part of the flickford cords died during the battle, and the other part was in the steering compartment flooded with water. Then Ivanov ordered to open the kingstones.

In front of the eyes of the enemy, "Rurik" slowly sank and at half past eleven o'clock disappeared under water. Outdated and weakly armored, he fought for five hours. The behavior of his team was heroic.

Thus ended the battle in the Sea of ​​Japan on August 1. According to the Japanese, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. According to other sources, 40 people were killed and 37 wounded by one shell on the Iwata alone. Kamimura's flagship Izuma had up to 20 holes; the Azuma cruiser received 10 shells, the Tokiwa a few shells, and so on.

Assessing the actions of the Vladivostok cruisers; it must be said that they had a stronger opponent in the theater, but nevertheless inflicted it merchant fleet some losses and diverted part of the armored cruisers of the enemy fleet from the main theater from under Port Arthur. Cruisers, however, were not used for a long and permanent impact on the enemy's lines of communication, against the transport of troops, military materials and supplies. They were not prepared for this and acted without a clearly developed plan and without interaction with the Port Arthur squadron.

At the beginning of the XX century. military shipbuilding developed at a rapid pace. At this time, squadron battleships replaced the battery battleships. The most important innovation on ships of this type began equipping with tower artillery of the main caliber, although by inertia the artillery of medium and small caliber placed on board remained. It was believed that it would be effective in repelling destroyer attacks and for damaging the weakly armored parts of an enemy battleship. Artillery tower of the main caliber on the battleships of the times Russian- Japanese war was a complex technical structure. The device of such a tower is shown in Fig.1.

Fig.1. Arrangement of the artillery tower of the main caliber of the Russian battleship "Retvizan" during the Russo-Japanese War.

Twin 305 mm Gun Turret - a turret with two 305 mm guns; The 12 inch/ 40 caliber M1892 gun was effective out to approximately 10, 000 yards 1. Armored door - armored door; 2. Armored commander's cupola - armored cap of the tower commander; 3. Breech - gun breech; 4. Gun layer's cupola - gunner's armor cap; 5. Muzzle sight - front sight; 6. Pinion for cannons - pins; 7. Electrical controls for gun laying - electric drives for gun guidance systems; 8. Turret rotation gear - roller of the turret rotation system; 9. Handwheel for turret rotation - handwheel for manual rotation of the turret; 10. Battery charger - charger in the lower position; 11. Electrical controls for ammunition feed - electric drive of the ammunition supply system; 12. Armored barbettes - armored barbettes.

Main gun turret control

The turret commander received the calculated distance to the target from the artillery officer on the bridge through a system of electrical dials installed in the turret. If an artillery officer set his dial to 5,000 yards, then this data was instantly transmitted to the commanders of the towers, and their dials were also set to this distance. The bearing and azimuth of the main artillery battery was then set manually or with the help of electrical appliances. Powder charges and a projectile were lifted by an electric cart from the hold, placed on a special tray and then fed into the gun barrel. The procedure for loading the main caliber guns of Russian battleships took 30-60 seconds. slower than on Japanese ships. But taking into account the limited ammunition for the main caliber guns, this hardly had a strong effect during the long-term battle. Then the guns were fired using an electric switch on Japanese ships and using a cord on Russian ships.

Fig.2. The pride of the Japanese fleet, the battleship "Mikasa" in the English dry dock in 1902. Ordered in 1896, the battleship "Mikasa" of the "Majestic" class served as the flagship of Admiral Togo during the Russo-Japanese War.

Navies in the period 1888-1905 underwent re-equipment, since the first squadron battleships appeared, which later formed the class of battleships and replaced the ships of previous generations. New technical solutions in the field of naval artillery, armor protection, explosives, communications and battle management have made truly revolutionary changes.

Now both Japan and Russia based their naval power on ships of the line with twelve-inch main battery guns, mostly of British and French construction. Both sides were preparing their fleets for war, and in a period of rapid technical change, it was easy to make mistakes that would cost dearly on the battlefield. During the war for dominance at sea in 1904-1905. this was the first and last clash of roughly equal strength battleships before the advent of submarines and combat aircraft.

Rice. 3. Russian battleships Sisoy the Great (in the foreground) and Navarin (in the background), participants in the Battle of Tsushima, which decided the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.

When developing the concept of a battleship between 1873 and 1895. three main problems were solved, without which the concept could not be realized.

1. The design of tower artillery on rotary barbets was developed, while it was necessary to solve related issues in each specific case - what caliber guns should be placed in the towers, and what should be the amount of ammunition.

2. It was necessary to determine what should be the layout of artillery on board the battleship and the layout of the optimal placement of armor protection on the ship's hull.

3. It was necessary to resolve the issue of choosing the maximum speed of the armadillo and the range of autonomous navigation.

The first battleships had a limited amount of artillery and slow-loading main battery guns, which meant a low rate of fire. On early battleships, the turrets were too heavy, and the designers had to sink the turrets into the hull of the battleship to increase stability.

The invention of swivel barbettes reduced the weight of the turret and made it possible to place them higher without losing the seaworthiness and stability of the ship. At an early stage in the development of battleships, shells from smoothbore guns could not penetrate even single-layer armor.

But in 1863, in the UK, a variant of an armor-piercing projectile was developed, which received the designation "Palliser", penetrating armor up to 10 inches thick. Although the appearance in the 1870s. layered armor reduced the vulnerability of armadillos from enemy armor-piercing shells, which in turn led to the emergence of large-caliber artillery and greater firepower.

French scientists have developed a new explosive known as melinite and smokeless powder. Britain purchased patents for both inventions and improved them in 1889.

The only problem that the engineers of all naval powers tried to solve was to increase the rate of fire of the main caliber artillery. This was the state of the fleets, using in one way or another these achievements of engineering thought before the war of 1904-1905.

Rice. 4. Russian battleship of the French construction "Tsesarevich" on sea trials in Toulon in 1903. For its time, it was one of the most modern battleships with hull contours tapering upwards, a belt of armor plates, armored decks and auxiliary artillery in the form of towers with twin guns.

Battleship "Borodino" - characteristics

Displacement - 14181 tons
Total length - 121 m

Width - 23.2 m

Draft - 8.24-8.9 m

Power plant: 20 Belleville boilers, two 4-cylinder main double-acting triple expansion steam engines with a total capacity of 16,300 hp. With.

Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet

Detachment of cruisers on the roads in Vladivostok

common data

Number of members

Military conflicts

Vladivostok detachment of cruisers(Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet) created in the spring of 1903. maritime defense Vladivostok and disruption of enemy sea lanes in the Sea of ​​Japan. The detachment included the armored cruisers Rossiya, Gromoboy and Rurik, the armored cruiser Bogatyr and the auxiliary cruiser Lena. During the action, the detachment sank 10 transports and 12 schooners, captured 4 transports and 1 schooner. After disbanding Vladivostok detachment, cruisers, in March 1906, arrived in the Baltic and became part of the Baltic Fleet.

Story

The decision to create

The formation of a detachment of cruisers based in Vladivostok as an independent formation was envisaged as early as March 1901. The detachment, in addition to the cruisers "Russia", "Gromoboi" and "Rurik" in different time other cruisers were included ("Admiral Nakhimov", "Varyag", "Askold").

The decision in 1901-1903 to create a section of cruisers into an independent detachment was motivated by the following:

1. Armored cruisers are not battleships and are built specifically for cruising. The effect of their action on a wide theater should be much greater than in the squadron.
2. By diverting 6 Japanese armored cruisers, the detachment will weaken the preponderance of the main forces of the Japanese fleet over the Russian.
3. Raiding along the coast of the enemy, thereby disrupting the supply of enemy troops in the continental theater of operations.

This was at the same time the tasks that were assigned to the detachment.

The correctness of this allocation of the best cruisers in a separate detachment was confirmed by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War.

Formation

Squadron battleship"Tsesarevich"

The final composition of the Pacific squadron was announced at a meeting in Port Arthur on April 17, 1903. As a result of this meeting naval forces in the Far East were distributed as follows:

1. "Combat Squadron" based in Port Arthur (I and II divisions of battleships, detachments of distant and close reconnaissance (cruisers), 1st detachment destroyers) and a defensive unit.

2. A separate cruiser detachment and a defensive detachment based in Vladivostok.

In addition, groups of auxiliary vessels (transports) were formed based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.

A separate cruising detachment in Vladivostok was to include the armored cruisers Rossiya (the flag of the 1st junior flagship of the squadron), Gromoboi and Rurik, the armored cruiser Bogatyr and the steamships of the Volunteer Fleet Moscow and Kherson. In addition to the designated ships, the Vladivostok detachment included: gunboats "Koreets", "Manjur", "Beaver" and "Sivuch", mine transport "Aleut", military transports "Kamchadal" and "Yakut", destroyers No. 201, 202 and 209 , as well as six destroyers.

In July-August, 6 more numbered destroyers arrived in Vladivostok, transferred by the cruisers Boyarin and Rurik, however gunboats and the 20-nodal steamer "Moskva" never made it to Vladivostok. At the same time, "Kherson" (renamed "Lena"), due to defects in the boilers, could not develop a full 19.5 knot speed, which was reflected in a bad way on initial plans squad use.

Armored cruiser "Russia"

Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on May 20, 1895. Launched April 30, 1896. Entered service September 13, 1897. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East as part of the 1st Pacific Squadron. The flagship of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers.

Displacement 12580 tons. Armament - 4 - 203/45, 22 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47/43, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 5 NTA. Speed ​​- 19.74 knots, cruising range 7740 miles. Crew 28 officers and 811 sailors.

Armored cruiser "Gromoboy"

Laid down on July 14, 1897 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Launched April 26, 1889. Entered service in October 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War, he was part of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers.

Displacement 12455 tons. Dimensions: 146.6 / 144.2 / 140.6x20.9x7.9 m. Initial armament - 4 - 203/45, 16 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47 mm, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm dec., 4 PTA. Speed ​​20.1 knots; cruising range 8100 miles. Crew 28 officers and 846 sailors.

Armored cruiser "Rurik"

Unofficial construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down on May 19, 1890. Launched on October 22, 1892. Entered service October 16, 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East as part of the 1st Pacific Squadron. He was a member of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers.

Displacement 11930 tons. Dimensions: 132.6x20.4x8.3 m. Armament - 4 - 203/35, 16 - 152/35, 6 - 120/45, 6 - 47/43, 10 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des ., 6 NTA. Speed ​​18.84 knots; cruising range 7790 miles. Crew 27 officers and 692 sailors

Armored cruiser "Bogatyr"

Laid down in December 1898 in Stettin (Germany) on the ropes of the Vulkan company. Launched on January 17, 1901. During the Russo-Japanese War, he was a member of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers. On May 2, 1904, in the fog, he jumped onto the coastal rocks near Cape Bruce in the Amur Bay and, having received a hole in the hull, lay down on the ground. On June 18, 1904, she was refloated and docked for repairs, where she remained until the end of the war.

Displacement 6650 tons. Dimensions: 134.1x16.6x6.3 m. Armament 12 - 152/45, 12 - 75/50, 8 - 47 mm, 2 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm (desn), 2 PTA. Test speed up to 23.55 knots; cruising range 4900 miles. Crew 23 officers and 550 sailors.

During the design and construction, all these cruisers were designed for raider operations on enemy ocean communication routes. Because of this, in order to increase the cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect deck artillery protection.

Detachment names

The order to form the detachment was signed on June 7, 1903. In which he was given his first name: "A detachment of cruisers of the Pacific squadron."

After the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, the squadron commander was given the rights of a fleet commander. As a result, on February 25, 1904, the detachment was transformed into the "Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet".

On May 12, 1904, the structure of the fleet was changed and the detachment received a new name: "Separate detachment of cruisers of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet."

On December 20, 1904, after the death of the remnants of the squadron in Port Arthur, the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers was given a new name "Cruiser detachment in the Pacific Ocean."

fighting

First campaign (January 27 - February 1, 1904)

On the night of January 26-27, 1904, an order was received from the command, which read: "The detachment to begin hostilities and inflict the most sensitive blow and harm on Japan's communications with Korea." The ships were prepared in advance for hostilities and put to sea on the same day. But the campaign was not particularly successful, despite the absence of serious enemy forces. During the campaign, only one steamer IJN Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) was sunk and another was fired upon. The storm that broke out at sea forced them to return to their home port.

The second campaign (February 11 - 14, 1904)

The next exit to the sea took place on February 11, 1904. The area of ​​the second campaign was the coast from the border with Korea to the port of Genzan. But this campaign was even less productive - except for small coasters, the cruisers did not meet anyone.

Third campaign (February 24 - March 1, 1904)

Having put to sea on February 24, the detachment again headed to the coast of Korea, to ports to bays located in the Gulf of Korea and to the north of it, as well as to approaches to them from the coast of Japan, in particular, from the ports of Wakasa Bay.

Based on the results of a very superficial inspection of a number of bays on the coast of Korea, the detachment commander Reizenstein reported to the governor the following information: "Twice cruising gave the right to assume that the presence of our detachment here will not prevent the Japanese from conducting operations in the Sea of ​​Japan; they do not conduct them here. Troops in Genzan they do not transport, there is no trade and transportation of goods near the Korean coast; having passed along the entire coast of Korea, seeing all the bays clearly, not a single signal station was seen, which also confirms the absence of operations.

Bombardment of Vladivostok by Japanese cruisers (March 6, 1904)

But even such small successes of the detachment were enough to alarm the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against the detachment. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored and two armored cruisers March 6, 1904 entered the Ussuri Bay and fired at Vladivostok. A detachment of Vladivostok cruisers immediately after the start of the shelling of the city began to weigh anchors, but the exit from the bay was complicated by the ice situation and minefields. Upon entering the Ussuri Bay, the ships saw only the smoke of the Japanese squadron on the horizon, so they did not pursue it and returned to the roadstead. The shelling resulted in the death of one woman and the injury of five sailors.

Inaction (March 1 - April 9, 1904)

Among the first measures taken by S.O. Makarov to increase the combat capability and intensify the actions of the fleet, the order of February 24 was the appointment of Rear Admiral K.P. Jessen. And before Jessen was placed new task for the detachment: actively prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Korea.

But Jessen, for a number of reasons, could not proceed with the execution of orders:

1. Time was needed to master new units for him and to appropriate their combat training.
2. It was necessary to choose the direction in which the cruiser detachment should strike. This required reliable information about the intentions and actions of the Japanese fleet.

However, information about the enemy, which Russian command during this period, were very contradictory.

Fourth campaign (April 10 - 14, 1904)

But due to the ice situation, the detachment was able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. The detachment headed for the Korean coast to attack the port of Genzan. But Jessen did not know that on April 9, Admiral Kamimura sent his squadron to Vladivostok, after entering the same Genzan to replenish water and coal. Reports indicate that there was thick fog on the sea. On the morning of April 12, the detachment, entering Genzana Bay, sank the steamer IJN Goyo-Maru, which was in the roadstead, after which they sank the IJN Haginura-Maru coaster in the afternoon. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22:20, the IJN Kinsu-Maru transport appeared on the way of the Vladivostok detachment. He was also sunk. After that, the detachment commander, having numerous prisoners from sunken ships on board the cruisers, decided to return to Vladivostok.

The second approach of the Kamimura squadron to Vladivostok (April 16, 1904)

Admiral H. Kamimura

On April 15, 1904, the Japanese squadron approached Shkota Island, where it stayed for some time, making signals, then went south. On April 16, the destroyers IJN Sirakumo, IJN Asasivo, IJN Akatsuki and IJN Asagiri laid three mine banks at the entrance to Ussuri Bay. Russian cruisers did not leave the sea for fear of stumbling upon mines. Eight Russian destroyers were sent to monitor the Japanese ships. The trawling of Japanese mine cans was very poorly organized. Because of this, on July 4, in the Ussuri Bay, a mine was blown up and the destroyer No. 208 sank.

The accident of the cruiser "Bogatyr" (May 2, 1904)

On May 2, 1904, the Bogatyr cruiser hit the rocks near Cape Bruce in Slavyanka Bay. Soon the cruiser was removed from the stones and docked for repairs. But due to a poorly equipped port and a lack of materials for repairs, the cruiser stood in the dock until the end of the war.

Fifth campaign (May 30 - June 7, 1904)

The next time the cruisers went to sea and headed for the eastern passage of the Korea Strait only on May 30. On June 1, the detachment went to about. Tsushima, where the main communications routes of Japan were located and where Admiral Kamimura's base was located in Ozaki Bay. On the same day, the steamships IJN Idzuma-Maru and IJN Hitachi-Maru were sunk by the Thunderbolt. IJN Hitachi-Maru transported 1,095 officers and men Japanese army, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers, which were intended for shelling Port Arthur. Another IJN Sado-Maru transport (with 1350 soldiers and officers) was stopped by warning shots from the Rurik. The Japanese officers refused to surrender and the Russians had no choice but to sink the tarnsport, which was done. A detachment of cruisers went to the Sea of ​​​​Japan. Kamimura, who was at the base, received a report about the Russian detachment, went out to search for him, but to no avail.On June 3, Russian cruisers inspected the English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with a smuggled cargo to Japan.

On June 6, Russian cruisers returned from a successful raid to Vladivostok. Kamimura also returned to his base.

Sixth campaign (June 15 - 20, 1904)

On June 15, the detachment again went to Genzan. In order to achieve great success in the campaign, the auxiliary cruiser Lena and eight numbered destroyers joined the detachment. On June 17, the detachment entered Genzan and sank the schooner IJN Seiho-Maru and the coastal steamer IJN Koun-Maru, standing in the roadstead, losing one destroyer due to the accident. After that, "Lena" with the destroyers went to Vladivostok, and the cruisers to the Korea Strait. But having met Kamimura's squadron in the Tsushima region, the detachment did not accept the battle and retreated. On June 19, on the way to the native shores, the English steamer Cheltenham was detained and delivered to Vladivostok, which was transporting timber for the Fuzan-Seoul-Chemulpo railway under construction. On June 20, the detachment entered the port of Vladivostok.

Seventh campaign (July 4-19, 1904)

The active actions of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers under the command of Jessen forced the Japanese government to send the bulk of the transports with troops and military supplies to Korea and Manchuria through the Yellow Sea. Because of this, an order was received from Alekseev to go to the east coast of Japan for active operations on the routes of communication with America.

On July 7, 1904, a detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait and turned south. On July 9, the cruiser was inspected by the English steamer Arabiya; it turned out to be a contraband cargo; the ship was sent to Vladivostok. On July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here, with smuggled cargo, and sunk, due to the inability to reach Vladivostok, the English steamer Night Commander was inspected. On the same day, several schooners were sunk, the German steamer Tea, following with smuggling, and the English steamer Kalhas was also captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. After that, the cruisers headed back to Vladivostok. On July 19, the cruisers arrived in Vladivostok.

The actions of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, excited the whole world. The world exchange reacted very actively to the actions of our cruisers, the price of freight increased very strongly, but even high price failed to stop some companies from refusing to operate flights to the shores of Japan.

Eighth campaign (July 30 - August 4). Battle in the Korean Strait (August 1, 1904)

On July 29, a telegram arrived from Admiral Alekseev to Vladivostok (which did not yet know about the results of the tragic battle on July 28), which ordered the cruisers to immediately proceed to the Korea Strait. The purpose of this campaign for the detachment was to meet with Vitgeft's squadron and provide assistance to him. But the telegram did not indicate how the way will go detachment of Vitgeft, as well as the exact time of his release to the sea is unknown. Therefore, it was reported that the meeting was supposed to take place north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were forbidden to enter south of the Fuzan parallel. According to the instructions, when meeting with Kamimura, the cruisers should withdraw to Vladivostok, dragging the Japanese with them. On any other tasks of the cruiser, during the campaign, should not be distracted.

In the early morning of July 30, Rossiya, Gromoboy and Rurik left Vladivostok. On the morning of August 1, in the southern part of the Korea Strait, as was written in the order, a detachment of cruisers stopped to wait for Witgeft's squadron.

Cruiser IJN Iwate

When it began to get light, at 0450 hours, signalmen from the Rossiya saw four ships that were going in parallel with the detachment. The cruisers IJN Izumo, IJN Tokiwa, IJN Azuma and IJN Iwate were soon identified. The enemy ships cut off the detachment's retreat to Vladivostok. The fight was inevitable.

The battle began at 5:20. The Japanese cruisers were the first to open fire. Soon return volleys followed from the "Russia" and "Gromoboy". Immediately there were strong explosions at IJN Iwate and at IJN Azuma. The beginning of the battle was left to the Russian cruisers. As it became known later, hitting a heavy projectile in IJN Iwate broke three 152-mm and one 75-mm guns.

But soon the Japanese gunners took aim and hit the Russian ships, there were dead and wounded. Around the fourteenth minute of the battle, a fire started on the Rurik. The fire disabled the cruiser, but not for long. The fire was soon extinguished. 40 minutes after the start of the battle, the light cruiser IJN Naniwa approached the Japanese for help. Russian cruisers changed course and went to the northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, lay on a parallel course.

About an hour after the start of the battle, "Rurik" suffered the fate that experts predicted for him immediately upon entering the service, a Japanese projectile, hitting the unprotected tiller compartment, disabled the steering. And on the cruiser a signal was raised: "The rudder is not working." The cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboy" turned around to help the padded "Rurik". But they could not fix the damage on Rurik.

Seeing that there was no way to help the damaged cruiser, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment decided to break through to Vladivostok. Kamimura, with his detachment, pursued the Russian cruisers, but the light cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho remained behind to fight the immobilized Rurik.

The battle ended at about 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy ships ceased fire and went back on their course.

This decision was influenced by Kamimura the following factors: casualties among personnel; lack of shells and damage to ships. In addition, he did not know about the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea and had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or start a battle with the Russian squadron that had broken through from Port Arthur.

Cruiser "Rurik"

"Rurik" continued to fight the Japanese cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho, but soon all of its guns were hit, almost the entire command staff was killed or wounded. The cruiser commander captain 1st rank Trusov and senior officer captain 2nd rank Khlodovsky died of wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; almost half of the entire crew was out of action.

When the Kamimura cruiser returning from the chase began to approach the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command in order to prevent the capture of the ship, decided to flood it by opening the kingstones.

According to data from the Japanese cruisers, at half past ten, the Rurik cruiser completely disappeared under water. Outdated and weakly armored, it fought for five hours against superior enemy ships. The behavior of his team was heroic.

According to official Japanese figures, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. But according to other sources, only on IJN Iwate, 40 people were killed and 37 wounded by one shell. The IJN Izuma flagship had up to 20 holes; cruiser IJN Azuma received 10 shells, IJN Tokiwa several shells.

Last actions (August 1904 - November 1905)

The battle in the Korea Strait was actually the last active combat action of the detachment. Due to the weak capacity of the repair base of the port of Vladivostok, the repair of serious damage to the "Rossiya" and "Gromoboy" dragged on for a long time.

On October 13, 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy, immediately after repairs, ran into rocks when crossing into Posyet Bay and stood in the dock for repairs all winter.

In the spring of 1905, the detachment made a small raid on Hokkaido and sank the schooners IJN Yaya-Maru, IJN Senrio-Maru, IJN Koyo-Maru and IJN Hokuzey-Maru there.

In the summer of 1905, in view of real threat the spread of the war to the mainland of Russia (in July 1905, Sakhalin was captured by the Japanese) and the creation of a unified command for the defense of the region, headed by the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General G.N. Kazbek, a detachment of cruisers was subordinated to the head of the Separate detachment of ships assigned to protect the waters of the Ussuri Territory (led by the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve).

November 11, 1905, in accordance with the instructions of the General Naval Staff (October 11), a detachment of cruisers went to European part Russia. On March 30, 1906, upon arrival in Libau, the detachment headquarters ended the campaign, and the detachment itself was disbanded.

Conclusion

The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers did not fully justify the hopes that were placed on it in the Admiralty. But still, for the entire time of the raid, the detachment sank 3 Japanese transports, 5 Japanese steamers, 1 English steamer, 1 German steamer and 14 sailing schooners. In addition, 4 foreign steamships were captured (2 of which were later released) and 1 Japanese schooner.

But the experience of raiding enemy communications during the Russo-Japanese War was the basis of the German plan of action for their raiders (auxiliary cruisers) at the very beginning of the First World War.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the basis of any fleet was battleships - large ships with strong artillery and powerful armor protection. Let us recall three Russian ships of this class - participants in the Russo-Japanese and World War I.

Squadron battleship "Sevastopol"

The battleship Sevastopol was commissioned in 1900. The ship carried four 305 mm main battery guns. Eight 152 mm guns were located in pairs in four towers, and four more six-inch guns on the battery.

By the time the Russo-Japanese War began, Sevastopol, along with the Poltava and Petropavlovsk of the same type, was far from a new ship, but it was very problematic to destroy it in an artillery battle.

"Sevastopol" took part in the battle on January 27, 1904, supporting the actions ground forces at Port Arthur and naval battle in the Yellow Sea. Several times the battleship was damaged by Japanese mines, but, unlike the Petropavlovsk, it happily escaped death. In October 1904 Japanese troops began a methodical shooting of the ships of the 1st Pacific squadron in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. Only when most of the squadron died under fire from Japanese siege artillery, the commander of the battleship, captain 1st rank Essen, on his own initiative, managed to obtain permission to bring the battleship to the outer raid of the fortress in White Wolf Bay, where the crew began preparing an independent breakthrough of the blockade.

However, the lack of people in the team, the lack of part of the artillery transferred to the shore forced the breakthrough to be postponed. Meanwhile, the Japanese command, having discovered the Sevastopol in the outer roadstead, decided to destroy the Russian battleship with destroyer attacks. For several nights, the Sevastopol, which was under the protection of coastal batteries, the gunboat Groshiy and several destroyers, was subjected to numerous mine attacks.

Having fired up to 80 torpedoes at the Russian ship, the Japanese achieved one hit and two close explosions of torpedoes. On the "Sevastopol" a number of compartments were flooded and the battleship received a significant roll. True, this success cost the Japanese dearly. Destroyer No. 53 died on a Russian mine barrier with the entire crew, and destroyer No. 42, damaged by the fire of Sevastopol, was finished off by a torpedo from the destroyer Angry.

Another two dozen Japanese fighters and destroyers were damaged, and some, apparently, were no longer commissioned until the end of the war. The damage received by the Russian ship already ruled out the possibility of a breakthrough, and the Sevastopol crew switched to fighting Japanese batteries, which continued until the very last day of the defense of Port Arthur. In connection with the surrender of the fortress, the battleship was towed from the shore and flooded at a depth of more than 100 meters. Thus, the Sevastopol became the only Russian battleship sunk in Port Arthur, which was not raised by the Japanese and did not fall into the hands of the enemy.

Squadron battleship "Evstafiy"

The squadron battleship "Evstafiy" was a further development of the project of the battleship "Prince Potemkin Tauride". Unlike its prototype, the Evstafia has 152 mm. the guns at the extremities were replaced by 203 mm guns. However, the experience of the Russo-Japanese War made it necessary to reconsider the design of the ship. As a result, the already lengthy construction was delayed.

In 1907, all battleships of the Russian fleet were reclassified into battleships. With the advent of the Dreadnought battleship in England, all the battleships of the world of the “pre-dreadnought” type, including the Eustathius, instantly became obsolete. Despite this, both the Eustathius and the John Chrysostom of the same type represented an impressive force on the Black Sea, and the Ottoman Empire, as the main potential adversary, in principle, could not oppose anything serious to the Russian battleships.

To strengthen the Turkish fleet, the German command deployed the latest battle cruiser"Goeben" and light "Breislau", which Russia's allies in the Entente so obligingly let into the Black Sea.

The first collision with the "Goeben" occurred at Cape Sarych on November 5, 1914. The battle, in fact, came down to a duel between the flagship Eustathius and the German cruiser. The rest of the Russian ships, due to fog and errors in determining the distance, fired with large flights or did not open fire at all.

From the first volley, the commandors of "Evstafiya" managed to cover the "Goeben", which, according to various sources, received from three to fourteen direct hits in 14 minutes of the battle. As a result, the German cruiser withdrew from the battle and then underwent a two-week repair. The Eustathius was hit by five German shells that did not cause fatal damage.

The second clash between the Eustathius and the Goeben took place on April 27, 1915 near the Bosphorus, when german raider attempted piecemeal to destroy the core Black Sea Fleet. However, faced with three dreadnought battleships, the Germans did not tempt fate and hurried out of the battle after a short skirmish. The fate of "Evstafiy", which successfully operated in the First World War, turned out to be sad. In 1918, he fell into the hands of the German command, and then - former allies according to the Entente. Leaving Sevastopol, they blew up the Eustathius cars. The successful restoration of the battleship, which required skilled workers and a powerful industrial base, immediately after completion civil war proved impossible, and in 1922 the ship was cut into metal.

Battleship coastal defense"Admiral Ushakov"

Coastal defense battleships of the Admiral Ushakov type were built to protect the Baltic coast. Each of them carried four 254 mm guns (three Apraksin), four 120 mm guns and small-caliber artillery. Having a relatively small displacement (a little over 4,000 tons), the ships were distinguished by powerful weapons.

After the fall of Port Arthur, the formation of the 3rd Pacific squadron began, which, along with the Apraksin and Senyavin, included the Admiral Ushakov. The value of these ships consisted, first of all, in the well-trained crews, which, as part of the artillery training detachment, were engaged in the preparation of fleet commanders. However, before the ships were sent, the crews were replaced, and the battleships were sent to the Far East without replacing the main caliber guns, which subsequently played a fatal role in the fate of the Admiral Ushakov.

AT Tsushima battle“Admiral Ushakov was part of the 3rd combat detachment, closing the column of the main forces of the squadron. In the daytime battle on May 14, 1905, the ship was about 15 hours during a shootout with armored cruisers Admiral Kamimura received two large holes in the bow and fell behind the squadron. The speed of the battleship dropped to 10 knots.

At night, the Admiral Ushakov, walking without lighting, managed to avoid attacks by Japanese destroyers, but the next day was overtaken by the armored cruisers Yakumo and Iwate. At the offer of the Japanese to surrender, the Russian ship opened fire. Each of the Japanese cruisers carried four 203 mm and fourteen 152 mm guns, significantly outperforming the Russian battleship in speed. And if the first volleys of "Ushakov" covered the "Iwate", calling for Japanese cruiser fire, then in the future the Japanese ships kept out of reach of the armadillo's guns at a favorable battle distance for themselves. After a 40-minute battle, the Admiral Ushakov, when further resistance became pointless, was flooded by the crew. Among 94 dead officers and the sailors of "Ushakov" was the commander of the battleship Vladimir Nikolaevich Miklukha (brother of the famous explorer of Oceania N. N. Miklukho-Maklay). According to one version, he was mortally wounded by a shrapnel, and according to another, he himself refused to be rescued, pointing out to the Japanese a sailor drowning nearby.

Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. Probably in the history of Russia there is no more unfortunate defeat.
But it was precisely the defeat in this war that finally "hit the brains" of the Russian court and the command of the army and navy. In 10 years, Russia will get involved in a new bloody massacre - the First world war. And that will be the end of the empire.

The descent of the new ship took place in the presence of the august family. On the same day, another ship was launched into the water, which was to play huge role in the history of our country and in the life of Nicholas II - on May 11, 1900, the Aurora was launched - the last of the three Diana-class cruisers and the only domestic ship that has survived, albeit in a capitally rebuilt form, to this day.

the crew leaves the sunken battleship

it is possible that in the photo there is just a boat under the command of midshipman Vasilev S. N., who later broke through to the port of Chifu

flooded "Victory"

The ship was launched in 1900, scuttled in Port Arthur on the night of September 19-20, 1904. Later raised by the Japanese, restored and commissioned under the name "Suo" (according to other sources "Suvo"). Withdrawn from the combat core of the fleet in 1922. It is believed that in the same year it was dismantled for metal. According to other sources, it was used as a bloc until 1946.

Cruiser I rank "Aurora"

The fate of this ship is more than intricate - launched in 1900 - the Aurora is the only ship of those years that has survived to this day. At least - the only one in Russia. Until recently, he was listed as part of the combat core Baltic Fleet. The ship became famous for the fact that on October 25, 1917, it fired a blank volley towards the Winter Palace, which became the signal to storm it and the signal of the onset of an entire era in the history of Russia. Coincidence or irony of fate - the ship was launched into the water in the presence of the last Russian emperor and became last ship the imperial Russian fleet, which has survived to this day.

Cruiser 1st rank "Aurora" at the eternal parking lot on Petrovskaya embankment. St. Petersburg

1984, the ship is being repaired. It will take its place at the Petrovsky embankment only in 1987

Oranienbaum, 1944. "Aurora" after numerous bombings sat on the ground

in the Kronstadt dock, 1922

"Aurora" under repair at the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, 1917

"Aurora" during the First World War, the Baltic Sea

on the roads of Manila, 1905

"Aurora" on sea trials, 1903

Hull "Aurora" after launching, May 11, 1900

cruiser I rank "Diana"

built in 1896. Cruiser I rank "Diana" became the first in a series of three ships of the same type, named from Greek and Roman mythology - Diana (Roman goddess of vegetation), Aurora ( Greek goddess morning dawn), Pallas (Athena's foster sister, who was killed by Athena as a child. Although Athena herself could have been Pallas). In 1922, the ship was sold to Germany and in 1925 it was dismantled for metal. Then he was excluded from the lists of the RKKF.

on the Small Kronstadt roadstead

under fire from Japanese artillery, Port Arthur, 1904

"Diana" in Algiers, 1909-1910

at the dock

cruiser I rank "Pallada"

The second of three Diana-class cruisers. Built in 1899. December 8, 1904 sunk by shelling siege artillery. In 1905, she was raised by the Japanese, restored and included in the Japanese fleet. Since 1920 - converted into a mine layer. May 27, 1924 sunk during a demonstration bombardment in honor of the anniversary of the Battle of Tsushima.

cruiser "Pallada" under fire from Japanese artillery. On the starboard side - EBR "Victory".

sunken "Pallas" in the harbor of Port Arthur, 1904

the cruiser "Pallada" (in the background) and the steamer "Izhora"

Squadron battleship "Poltava"

Construction began in 1892, commissioned in 1900. EDB "Poltava" became the lead ship of a series of three slightly different battleships. One of the three was the Petropavlovsk EDB, which was blown up by a mine at the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War. Admiral S. O. Makarov perished along with the ship.
"Poltava" sank in Port Arthur in 1904 after shelling by Japanese siege artillery. Raised by the Japanese in 1905, restored and commissioned as the coastal defense battleship Tango. In 1915 it was redeemed by the Russian Admiralty and again enlisted in the Russian fleet under the name "Chesma". In March 1918, the ship was captured by the British and used as a floating prison. When departing from Arkhangelsk, the interventionists abandoned the ship (1920). In 1921 he was enrolled in the White Sea Flotlia, scrapped in 1924.

in the dock of Kronstadt, 1900

"Poltava" and "Sevastopol" at the outfitting wall

"Poltava" after commissioning

sunken "Poltava", Port Arthur, 1904

in a Japanese dock, 1905

Battleship "Tango", 1909-1910

already under the name "Chesma", Vladivostok, 1916

as part of the White Sea Flotilla, 1921

Squadron battleship "Emperor Nicholas I"

Entered service in 1891. In 1893 he made the crossing of the Atlantic and participated in the celebrations on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the discovery of America. From 1893 to 1898 - service in the Mediterranean. Under the command of P.P. Andreev, he participated in the Cretan peacekeeping operation. In 1898, under the command of S. O. Makarov, he moved to Vladivostok. In 1902 he returned to the Baltic. In 1904 - back to Far East. After the battle on May 15, 1905, it was surrendered to the Japanese by order of Admiral Nebogatov to the Japanese. In the Japanese Navy, he was put into combat service under the name "Iki". Sunk as a target in 19185 during firing practice.

launching, 1889

at the dock, 1895

after the battle of Tsushima

restoration work, already under the name "Iki"

Iki after commissioning

Armored cruiser I rank "Svetlana"

built in Le Havre. commissioned in 1898. Sunk during the Battle of Tsushima. In honor of the ship, the name "Svetlana" was given to a light cruiser laid down at the RBVZ in 1913. The second "Svetlana" after the revolution was renamed "Profintern", since 1925 - "Red Crimea". The ship was flooded in the 60s when testing missile weapons

on the raid with flags raised

on a hike

probably the picture was taken at the outfitting wall

Armored cruiser "Rossiya"

Launched in 1895, commissioned in 1897. Represents further development"Rurik". In August 1904, in the battle near the island of Ulsan, he was seriously damaged, returned to Vladivostok and during 1904-1905 was used as a floating fort in Novik Bay. In 1906 he came to Kronstadt, where he underwent a major overhaul from 1906 to 1909. In 1909 he was enrolled in the first detachment of the reserve, and since 1911 - in the detachment of cruisers of the Baltic Fleet, transferred to Helsingfors. In 1917 he moved to Kronshdatt ( ice hike). Since 1918 - on conservation. Decommissioned in 1922 and taken to Germany for scrapping. During towing in a severe storm, Develsey was thrown onto the bank, in December 1922 she was refloated and taken to Kiel for dismantling. The vicissitude of fate lies in the fact that during the tests in 1897, the cruiser left Kronstadt in a strong storm and was thrown aground near the island.

cruiser hull after launching

in the dock after the Kronstadt incident

in the dock during the overhaul of 1906-1909

cruiser on the move

after the battle at Ulsan island

cruiser in Helsingfors

Squadron battleship "Eagle"

Launched in 1902. Commissioned in 1904. In the Tsushima battle, he received 76 hits, but remained afloat. He joined the detachment of Admiral Nebogatov and was taken prisoner on May 10, 1905. He joined the Japanese fleet under the name "Iwami". Destroyed during firing in 1924.

launching

Kronstadt raid, 1904

on the roadstead of Revel before leaving for the Far East

loading coal on the high seas

after battle

"sieve" side

in the port of Maizuru

"Iwami" after entry into service