Readiness of teachers for inclusive education. Preparing teachers for inclusive education

The social ideal, in order to remain utopian, does not have to be realizable and real at all. The set of theoretical postulates from which the idea of ​​a social ideal is built is not limited only to historical facts, there is always a certain remainder that does not fit into a concrete historical context: “Neither the construction of absolutely harmonic “last” states, nor ideas about the transition to these supernatural forms of life.

Social philosophy must show the way to the highest perfection, but it can determine this way only by general and abstract features. But above all social philosophy should reject the idea of ​​the possible completion of human aspirations and the end of progress in the conditions of the existence of relative phenomena and earthly existence.

The social ideal is such not only because of its ideal content. Faith in a possible realization makes it an ideal. The paradox of utopian thinking is precisely that, as a utopia, it represents faith in the realization of the ideal on earth, and sees realism and vitality in the a priori inaccessibility of the ideal. From this point of view, the ideal should be both real and surreal, only such duality makes it concrete: “Let the whole of history in its external completeness be inaccessible to us, but .... humanity is able at any stage of its history through its knowledge to reach its self-consciousness. For the whole here is not the sum, not the external totality of all its parts: the whole as an ultra-modern essence of life is present ... in each of its parts in any segment of historical existence. If any sense of history is possible at all, then it should not consist in the fact that external historical epochs constitute a means to achieve an imaginary final goal lying in the future, but in the fact that “its concrete diversity in its entirety is expressed by a supratemporal unity. spiritual life of mankind"8*.

The emerging contradiction between the spiritual content of the ideal and its external form (method, terms of implementation, external prerequisites for implementation) expressed the contradiction between the ideal theoretical construction and the specific historical facts necessary for its implementation. However, at the level of utopian consciousness there was a substitution of conflicting categories. one.

On the contrary, the external form was understood as quite specific and individualized features of the realization of the ideal, which utopian thinking obviously seemed unattainable. In other words, belief in the realization of the ideal is recognized as a utopia, the assumption of its inaccessibility - as realistic thinking. The real prerequisite for the substitution was the introduction of the very concept of the social ideal into the structure of utopian thinking, which immanently denies the real nature of the existing order of things and constructs its own special world, a special utopian reality.

In the philosophy of law, the social ideal could not be described exclusively in the language of legal categories and concepts; it seemed insufficient to define it in terms of a relative and limited sphere of knowledge.

“From the point of view of the internal logic of ideas, faith in the speedy and final realization of the social ideal rested on an insufficient understanding of what a social, political and legal ideal is. And the same understanding underlay ... faith in the universal all-saving and all-healing social mission of law ... To determine the legal ideal, we need not ... final formulas, but a purely concrete description of the necessary experience that must be produced in order to law was built on the foundations of truth and justice. Didn't this mean a rejection of the general and abstract categories of the philosophy of law, a turn to "concrete experience", that relapse of dogmatic and formalized thinking, about which JI spoke. Petrazhitsky?

In the context of legal philosophy, Petrazhitsky considered the category of the social ideal mainly as a stimulus, an incentive for the collective psyche: the social ideal (according to Petrazhitsky, “universal love”) is both real and unreal. Just as history is both a way of empirical being and knowledge about it, so the social ideal is a set of empirical features and, at the same time, a spiritual symbol. In the philosophy of law, the social (legal) ideal is endowed with the same dual nature. N. Alekseev* argues: “Achieving a fair legal order is an endless task, or is its achievement really possible at certain stages of the historical process? I think that it is always possible and at the same time completely achievable for us - and this shows its true infinity. In this sense, the legal ideal is inaccessible to people in the same way as complete holiness. It is unrealizable in the objective world, it is beyond it. Mankind turned out to be included in two worlds of its existence at once: the ideal-spiritual and concrete-objective. “Legal reality in the perspective of such a dualism appears only as “unconsciously successful socio-psychological pressure in the direction of socially necessary behavior,”222 emphasizes Petrazhitsky. Earthly and intra-historical activity of people does not reach the highest goals, the ideal, the meaning of history; it cannot rise so high.

The philosophy of history faces higher tasks; it explores the origins of historical being and knowledge; considers these foundations in the unity of being and knowledge and in relation to the Absolute; reveals the meaning of the historical process. Raising the question of the meaning of history gives rise to the problem of historical Destiny. A person immersed in historical existence is at the same time a part of the macrocosm and personifies the microcosm, he is both a “fact” of history and a subject who knows it. Both aspects are refracted in the structures of legend, which implements the functions of a spiritual successive connection that passes through the human "I". The dynamic aspect of this connection, reflecting the individual, individual nature of events and facts, makes philosophical and historical comprehension possible. The uniqueness of phenomena, the unambiguity of choice just make up fate.

The real course of the development of the vast territories of the outskirts by the peasantry undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of stories about the extraordinary abundance of new lands and favorable social conditions on them.

The socio-utopian views of the peasants extended far beyond the borders of their community. They were expressed in the existence of various rumors about the promised lands; the formation of legends based on these rumors and the appearance of written texts; in the practice of resettlement in search of these lands and even in the creation peasant communities, whose life was an attempt to realize the peasant socio-utopian ideal. The existence of such communities, in turn, fed stories and legends about lands and villages with an ideal social order, exceptional natural wealth and economic prosperity.

The real course of the development of the vast territories of the outskirts by the peasantry undoubtedly contributed to the popularity of stories about the extraordinary abundance of new lands and favorable social conditions on them. Characteristic in this respect is what happened to modern ideas about the so-called Belovodie. At first it was considered legendary, and in the course of further research by historians, it turned into quite real peasant settlements of the 18th century in the valleys of the Bukhtarma, Uimon and other rivers in Altai, the history of which can be fully traced from written sources. But the existence of the real Belovodye did not exclude the independent later development of the legend according to the laws of the folklore genre. Stonemasons (as the local peasants called the fugitives who settled in the mountains, since Altai, like many other mountains, was popularly called “Stone”) of Bukhtarmy and Uimon is both a prototype of the folk legend about the promised land and an actual attempt to realize the peasant social utopian ideal.

For about half a century - from the 40s to the early 90s of the 18th century, in the most impregnable mountain valleys of the Altai, there were settlements of fugitives, who were ruled outside state power. In September 1791, Catherine II issued a decree, announced to the “masons” in July 1792, according to which they were accepted into Russian citizenship, having forgiven their “guilts”. For several decades, self-government operated in these communities, and peasant ideas about social justice were implemented. The population of the free communities of Bukhtarma and Uimon was formed from peasants (mostly splitters) and fugitive factory workers (also, as a rule, recent peasants). They were engaged in arable farming, crafts and secretly maintained relations, including economic ones, with the peasantry of the adjacent territories. S. I. Gulyaev, who collected information about Belovodye not only from “oral stories of some masons”, but also from documents from the archives of the Zmeinogorsk mining office and the Ust-Kamenogorsk commandant’s office, wrote about them: “Bound by the same participation, one way of life, alienated from society, the masons formed a kind of brotherhood, despite their different beliefs. They kept many good qualities of the Russian people: there were reliable comrades, they made mutual benefits to each other, especially they helped all the poor with supplies, seeds for sowing, agricultural tools, clothing and other things.

To solve fundamentally important issues, a gathering of all free villages was going to be held. The decisive word remained with the "old men". “Another year ago,” testified the artisan Fyodor Sizikov, who was interrogated by the authorities in 1790, after eight years of living among the “masons”, “the fugitive people living in those villages at the meeting intended to choose from themselves ... one person who would, quietly having somehow made his way to Barnaul, he appeared to the head of the factories for a request for their forgiveness for the crimes and that they should not be taken out of those places, putting them in the proper payment of taxes. But in the end, the old people said, although they would forgive us, they would take us to our former places and assign us to positions, and therefore remained as before.

Meetings of individual villages or groups of villages were convened as needed. So, in particular, the court was carried out. “If someone is convicted of crimes, then from several villages the residents summoned by the plaintiff will gather in the village to his house, and, having sorted it out in proportion to the crime, they will impose a punishment” (from the protocol of interrogation of F. Sizikov). most high measure punishment was forced expulsion from the community.

T. S. Mamsik, who studied the social life of the Bukhtarma villages in the 18th century according to the testimony of their inhabitants preserved in the archive, notes that “hiring among the“ masons ”was not of an entrepreneurial nature.” The new fugitives who arrived "into the stone" felt the support of the old-timers: they were accepted into someone's hut, where one of the recently arrived often lived "in comrades". The next summer, the stranger helped the owner of the house to sow bread and received seeds from him for self-sowing. On the fourth summer, the newly settled became an independent owner and, in turn, hired one of the new fugitives, supplying him with seeds, etc. There were “partnerships” in use - associations “on shares of two or more able-bodied people for agricultural or fishing activities. Sometimes the "comrades" jointly built a new hut. The community of "masons", which arose as a result of voluntary resettlements, included family-related communities, partnerships for running the economy or its individual branches, religious associations. The existence of this community was perceived by the peasantry itself as the realization of some social and religious and moral ideals. This was only a certain stage in the socio-economic development of the territorial community in the conditions of the development of the outskirts, in temporary isolation from the feudal state, but the peasantry absolutized it as ideal. Despite its small scale, this phenomenon left a noticeable mark in public consciousness peasants and in the subsequent period formed the basis for the movement of a number of groups of settlers in search of the legendary country "Belovodye" - a peasant utopia (Chistov, 1967, 239-277; Pokrovsky, 1974, 323-337; Mamsik, 1975; Mamsik, 1978, 85-115; Mamsik, 1982).

A clearly expressed tendency to realize the peasant socio-utopian ideal on the basis of Christian ideology in its Old Believer version can be traced in the history of the Vygoretsky (Vygoleksinsky) dormitory community, which arose at the end of the 17th century in the Olonets province. The Vyga organization, along with the usual monastic dispensation, adopted the traditions of the community of the state village and the "worldly" peasant monasteries. In the 18th century, their charters and conciliar resolutions on statutory issues were created - more than 60 documents in total. They attempt to combine democracy with the tasks of the division of labor in an economic-religious community.

In the personal property of the members of the hostel there was only a dress; as an exception, other things were left for some, but they were inherited by the community. The extensive economy of the Vygoretsky community and the sketes that gravitated towards it was based on the cooperative labor of its members. All economic and administrative management was elective. The most important matters were subject to conciliar discussion. Initially, the ideology of the Old Believer peasant community on Vyga was based on eschatological motives (that is, the expectation of the imminent end of the world), but in the future these motives weaken, there is a departure from asceticism in everyday life, from monastic forms of cohabitation. Vygoleksinsky world, being included by the state in the system of taxation, is gradually entering the usual track of socio-economic relations of the entire region.

A similar path, but with certain differences, is followed by the peasantry in the Old Believer sketes of two types: sketes-villages where families lived, and sketes on a communal charter with separate stays of men and women. The leaders and ideologists of the movement made the maximum demands on the ordinary Old Believer peasant (they are set out, in particular, in the “Announcement on the Deanery of the Desert”, 1737): a combination of hard agricultural labor with an ascetic lifestyle. The most enduring was that "part of the statutes, which did not infringe on the interests of the peasant family.

As a reaction to the secularization of the sketes, a new direction is born - a radical Philippian consent, reviving for some time the socio-utopian and religious ideals of the early Vyg. From the polemical messages exchanged between different sects of the Old Believers in the 18th century, it is clear that the principles of the community of estates and artel labor did not raise doubts on either side.

Attempts to proclaim and partially implement social ideals in the settlements of Old Believer peasants of various persuasions also took place in other regions of the country - in Yaroslavl, Pskov, Kostroma, Saratov and other provinces. Information about these phenomena was widely dispersed among the peasant non-Old Believers. Modern research confirms the idea famous historian XIX century A.P. Shchapova about the manifestation in the movement of schismatics of many features inherent in the traditional peasant consciousness and life in general. A certain popularity of the social-utopian ideal of the Old Believers, its sounding in peasant legends and programs of peasant movements, was based on this similarity.

At the initial stages of their existence, some communities of sectarians were also associated with the socio-ethical ideals of the peasantry: Dukhobors, Molokans, Khlysts. However, false mysticism, fanaticism, alienation from the church and the rest of the masses of Orthodox peasants, as a rule, nullified the positive aspects in their ideology. (Abramov, 366-378; Lyubomirov; Kuandykov - 1983; Kuandykov - 1984; Melnikov, 210, 240-241; Klibanov, 180, 199-201; 212; 262-284; Pokrovsky - 1973, 393-406; Ryndzyunsky; Koretsky ; Shchapov, 77, 119, 120).

An organic part of the socio-utopian ideas of the peasantry was the ideal of such a just monarch, who can bring the order on earth in line with divine truth. If in the social organization of their daily life, in the lower, so to speak, instances, the peasants clearly preferred democratic forms - this is evidenced, as we have seen, by the ubiquitous distribution of the community and the flexible diversity of its types, then in relation to the highest instance of governing the entire state, they remained monarchists. Just as the ideals of justice in the distribution of property and job duties found expression in the existence of certain peasant communities that tried to remain outside the states for a limited time, and the ideas of good kings also gave rise to imposture in real life.

This phenomenon was possible due to the widespread among the peasants of ideas related to the expectation of the arrival or return to power of the sovereign, unfairly, in their opinion, pushed aside in one way or another from the throne, possessing the ideal qualities of a ruler and intending to reckon with the interests of the people. The impostors, who appeared not only during the peasant wars, but also in private manifestations of social protest (in the 30-50s of the 18th century, for example, there were about a dozen of them), met the gullible attitude of part of the peasantry.

In the 30-50s of the 18th century, the names of Peter II and Ivan Antonovich served among the peasants as a kind of symbols of a good sovereign. They are replaced by the image of Peter III, who overshadowed his predecessors and found its highest expression in the peasant war of E. I. Pugachev. The peasantry could not know anything about the identity of the real Peter III, who ruled for only six months. At the same time, there was a certain awareness of the laws, combined with their own, peasant interpretation of them. The Manifesto of February 18, 1762 on the freedom of the nobility was interpreted as the first part of the legislative act, which was to be followed by the liberation of the peasants from the landowners. They also knew the decree on allowing the Old Believers who fled to Poland or other foreign lands to return to Russia and settle in the places allocated to them. At the same time, the authorities were instructed not to obstruct them "in the administration of the law according to their custom and old printed books." Finally, the destruction of the Secret Chancellery could not but find sympathy among the peasantry. All this, as well as the unclear circumstances of the death of Peter III, served as the basis for the formation of his positive image in the views of the peasants (Sivkov, 88-135; Chistov - 1967, 91-236; Kurmacheva, 114, 193; Peasantry of Siberia, 444-452) .

Pagination present e-book matches the original.

9) About the social ideal. one)

Man is aware of himself as free. The present and the future appear to him not as a series of causes and effects, the only possible one under given conditions, but as a series of different possibilities, and the realization of one or another possibility depends on his will, on his actions. Possibility choice and the denial of the need only possible course of events—this is the specific content of the idea of ​​freedom, which is revealed to everyone in his immediate consciousness. This does not mean, of course, that man has the freedom to perform, or, in other words, possesses omnipotence; it is subject to the iron law of objective causation and can act on it only as one of the causes, one of its elements. And this does not also mean that a person acts completely without reason, that is, apart from any motives - on the contrary, all his actions are necessarily motivated or causally conditioned. Nevertheless, a person is aware of himself free to incline to one or another motive, makes a choice between them.

The freedom of choice, directly experienced by each of us, we also recognize in relation to other people. Although we are sometimes able to foresee how this or that person will act under given circumstances, yet we are unable to get rid of the idea that he can act differently and that in doing so he has the same freedom of choice that we attribute to ourselves. This view is based on our

__________________________

1) Published in Questions of Philosophy and Psychology, 1903, III. (68).

Practical attitude towards other people, exhortations, requests, agitation, etc.

The feeling of freedom cannot be removed from our consciousness, whatever our metaphysical explanation of this fact may be. We can completely deny free will in the metaphysical sense and consider the feeling of freedom we experience as a kind of mental state accompanying volitional acts; we can, on the contrary, see in this feeling a manifestation of our true essence, a free self-determining spirit. This question is finally resolved only in connection with a general metaphysical worldview (and, above all, ontological teaching), but this or that solution of a metaphysical question has no significance for the existence of a sense of freedom, as direct fact of consciousness. In any case, this fact cannot be eliminated from consciousness, even if we deny free will in the metaphysical sense. One can assume, together with Spinoza, that a magnetic needle, if it had consciousness, would consider its movement to the north to be its free work, or, together with Kant, make a similar assumption regarding a rotating spit. But the illusory nature of this self-consciousness of the arrow and the spit can be a fact only of our, human, or even extraneous consciousness, but neither the arrow, nor the spit are able to simultaneously recognize themselves as both free and not free. In the same way, there are no grounds for not admitting that for some being alien to us our freedom is likened to the freedom of a magnetic needle and a spit, but we ourselves, while the field of our consciousness is occupied by a feeling of freedom, cannot at the same time recognize ourselves as not free, i.e. . not only theoretically allow, but also practically experience two mutually exclusive states. In practice, we recognize ourselves as free, and in view of the absolute indisputability of this epistemological fact, we can leave aside the metaphysical question of free will here.

Since freedom in our consciousness puts the limit of mechanical causality in everything that concerns our desires (as well as the desires of other people), it is obvious that these desires, according to the law of causality, turn out to be unknowable for us. Further, psychological causality or motivation is subject to an already accomplished act of will, an act, but not the desire itself, which precedes it and is accompanied by a sense of freedom. Therefore, no matter how much we postulate the universality of the law of causality and, in particular, the law

The numbering of social phenomena, of ourselves, we will involuntarily think of as free and put outside of this regularity, considering it as the outer limit of our freedom. We cannot think of ourselves under the exclusive domination of the category of necessity, and on this basis, social science, which would show us our future actions not as free, based on free choice, but as necessary and the only possible ones, leads to unbearable contradictions in our consciousness, because she is impossible. Of course, such knowledge of everything that exists is logically conceivable, in which all of it is presented as one connected act, united by the unity of a causal connection, but such knowledge is possible not for us, but for an absolute spirit that stands above us and outside of us with our limitations and with our consciousness. real or illusory free will. We must jump out of our own skin to know our own subjectively free actions like subjectively necessary. Therefore, social prediction, in which our future free actions are portrayed as necessary, includes an epistemological contradiction and is an ideal unattainable for man. We cannot consistently enforce the doctrine of determinism without ceasing to be ourselves. Happiness or misfortune in this for a person, but this is a fact, moreover, a fact connected not with this or that level of development of social science, but with the fundamental properties of your spirit, with the constant content of our consciousness. This fundamental impossibility of exceptional determinism was shown quite clearly by Stammler in his well-known study Wirtschaft und Recht nac h der Maierialistischen Geschichtsauf f assung", and this is his great merit to social science. Stammler clarified the contradiction of consistent determinism using the example of the so-called. scientific socialism, which, on the one hand, postulates the need for the advent of the socialist system of society, but at the same time appeals to the free will of man, inviting him to a certain course of action to achieve this result. As Stammler rightly remarks, it is impossible to found a party whose goal is to promote the onset of a lunar eclipse, which will come in its own time with natural necessity. One of two things: either the socialist order of the future society is necessary, as moon eclipse, then the appeal to the freedom of man is superfluous, or he cannot be thought of by us as

Necessary and is really only the goal of our free aspirations. There is not and cannot be a middle ground or compromise between freedom and necessity as states of consciousness, therefore every doctrine of consistent determinism, regardless of this or that particular content, is subject to these irreducible contradictions. In particular, the idea of ​​"scientific socialism", according to which the socialist system is simultaneously the necessary result of the causal dependence of the phenomenon and the ideal or obligation for free will, in other words, the idea of ​​causal obligation or free necessity is a kind of wooden iron or iron tree.

The freedom of the human will in the above sense is expressed, as has been said, in the faculty of choice. Choice, on the other hand, presupposes discrimination and comparative evaluation. Among the motives that appear to our consciousness, some we condemn, others we approve or justify. The ability to evaluate, the difference between good and evil, is to a greater or lesser extent characteristic of everyone, at least adults and healthy people. The possibility of such an assessment obviously implies the presence in our minds of some criterion or norm for this assessment. This norm may be clearly or vaguely recognized in each individual case or in each individual subject, but its very consciousness is an indisputable fact, and we state this fact in every judgment: this is good, this is bad. Since we are specifically interested here in the question of social relations or social behavior, we will focus our attention precisely on the question of social duty. Norms social behavior, present in the minds of everyone, presuppose a well-known social ideal, from the height of which social reality is assessed, and in accordance with such an assessment

1) In my old article on Stammler's book ("On the Regularity of Social Phenomena", see above), I objected to this fundamental proposition. Thinking the question over again, I finally came to the conclusion that my objections circumvented the question and did not really destroy Stammler's argument at all.

To avoid misunderstandings, I note that the exclusively epistemological formulation of the question of free will, in which we find it in Stammler, and also take it in the present presentation, being completely sufficient for the purposes of social science, of course, is by no means exhaustive and final. On the contrary, the main problem of free (or non-free) will in the metaphysical sense is not touched upon here, although the question of free will in the epistemological sense necessarily leads to this metaphysical problem.

The activity of people is also lying. What is the content of this ideal and how is it justified? Does its justification lead beyond the limits of political economy and experimental science in general, or, on the contrary, is it possible within these limits?

Let's take a look at the last opinion first. It is expressed most decisively in the teaching of scientific socialism, which in theory eliminates any independent meaning of obligation. There is not a single grain of ethics in Marxism, as Sombart once formulated this feature of his. In place of duty here is put the concept of natural necessity and class interest, as a natural reflection of objective economic phenomena. Is it possible, on such foundations, to construct a coherent system of social policy, such as Marxism, by and large, undoubtedly is, and does it remain true to its own theoretical principles in this construction?

As far as natural necessity in general is concerned, as the guiding principle of social policy, this principle does not give anything, because it gives too much. The whole future, from the point of view of consistent determinism, is equally necessary. Therefore, all the filth and abominations that still have to be committed in history are necessary, along with the exploits of love and truth. The idea of ​​natural necessity therefore does not provide any criterion for distinguishing the phenomena of reality, and yet the evaluation is necessarily based on distinction and choice. And, of course, the followers of Marx have always made and are making this choice, distinguishing between positive and negative phenomena, progressive and reactionary, and in the antagonistic system of capitalist society consciously taking the side of the workers, not the capitalists, although both classes are an equally necessary product of the social history of the new time. On the basis of what criterion, then, is such a distinction made, if any independent significance of the ideal and obligation is denied in advance?

However, a correction is introduced here in the form of the concept of class interest as a natural criterion of politics. But does this criterion turn out to be sufficient, does not an extra-estimated borrowing from the denied ethics take place?

If we accept the class or group interest as the norm of politics as a natural fact, then we will get as many such norms as there are individual class interests. From this point of view, which does not allow any evaluation of the various classes

Of all interests but their ethical value, the working class turns out to be just as right in its demands as are the classes of landowners and capitalists, for all these interests equally appear to be naturally necessary. Humanity, as it were, is divided into several castes or different breeds in accordance with the difference in class interests. However, all classes, hypocritically or sincerely, the seemingly natural fact of their class interest, strive in a certain way to justify it, to reduce it to the highest demands of justice or social obligation. On the other hand, there are also class defectors, traitors to their class, and some of them for some reason suddenly declare themselves to be representatives of the interests of the working class, to which, however, in fact they never belonged and do not belong. This is how the non-class intelligentsia defines itself. How, then, is it possible to explain this class reincarnation if we do not recognize the independent significance of the obligation in the name of which this reincarnation takes place?

But let's go further. Does the concept of class interest itself have such definite and indisputable features that would clearly delimit it? First of all, it is obvious that it is not the class that defines the class interest, but, on the contrary, its existence is determined depending on the existence of such a common interest. A class is a group of persons having the same economic interests. Therefore, the only sign of class and class politics remains the commonality of economic interests. In theory, it is usually assumed a priori that homogeneous social groups also have common economic interests, and this assumption is considered to correspond to concrete reality. However, if we begin to build the concept of class not from above, but from below, but posteriori, and we look in concrete reality for the actual unity of interests in order to determine class groupings on the basis of it, then the expected unity of interests of vast social groups that have much in common in their external position we won't find. Take, for example, the working class, which

__________________________

1) Sometimes this is motivated by the fact that the conditions of economic progress are connected with the interests of the working class. It is easy to see, however, that in such a case the norm of politics is no longer class interest, but economic progress; consequently, the original criterion is replaced by another.

generally distinguished by the greatest cohesion and is often accepted as having a homogeneous economic interest. In fact, within this class there are a wide variety of groupings. different interests, and it is quite possible that the worker, while belonging to one group with some of his interests, belongs to a completely opposite group in others. Between workers belonging to different national economies, conflicts are possible on the basis of competition in the world and even in the domestic market, both commodity and labor (a classic example of the latter is, for example, the current desire of American workers to limit the immigration of foreign labor, while than, as is known, this movement has already led to a number of laws that extremely restrict and impede the immigration of Europeans and actually prohibit the immigration of the Chinese). A strife of interests is also possible within the same country with respect to the workers of various industrial regions competing with each other. Even more often this is observed with regard to workers employed in different branches of production: for example, in Zap. Europe and especially in the American Union. States are now hostilely confronting the interests of industry and agriculture, and this, before to some extent, is expressed in a deaf or open antagonism of the corresponding categories of workers. Finally, workers employed in the same branch of production may, under certain conditions, have unequal or even opposite economic interests. We have a vivid example of such a temporary opposition of interests in cases of violation of the strike, the so-called. Strikebr e hell. Some workers start a strike in the name of their economic interest, others break it in the name of their economic interest. Who is right here, if we remain on the basis of the consistently carried out doctrine of economic class interest?

Consequently, if we turn to concrete reality to define the concept of class interest, we will be completely helpless in the face of the complexity and contradictory nature of individual interests and positions. Not only do we not find the stable definiteness of economic groupings, which is assumed in the teaching of Marxism as a matter of course, on the contrary, here we observe an endless variety and constant change. The consistent development of the doctrine of class interest, as a norm of social policy, necessarily leads to

The rejection of any norm, any general principles, leads to social atomism (Bentamism). the last concept to which this logical regressus leads will not even be an individual, for the same individual at different times and in different situations can have different and even opposite interests, but each individual act economic activity. The class interest turns out to be a shadow and slips out of our hands as soon as we make an attempt to catch it. And with it, the concept of class also slips away, since it is constituted by the sign of the unity of class interest.

The policy of class interest, consistent and consistent, obviously must be able to understand this sea of ​​concrete contradictions of economic interests and have a criterion for justifying some economic interests as correctly or ideally understood class interests and condemning others from the same point of view, for example, to sanction interests strikers and condemn the interests of the Strikebrechers. In this case, class interest turns out to be not a naturally necessary fact, but an ideal norm. In the name of an ideally understood class interest, you must do this and not otherwise; this is the real content of the idea of ​​class politics, which is revealed to us by an analysis of the concept of class. And if so, the doctrine of class politics has no right to oppose itself to social idealism or the doctrine of the independent role of the social ideal or obligation. It is only a separate case of this obligation, its particular formula, which is subject to discussion from the side of its special content, but it is not at all the fundamental negation of obligation in general. So, if we openly reveal the whole content of the idea of ​​class politics, which is secretly contained in this doctrine, then it will be completely like this: out of all existing social groupings fairness correspond to the economic aspirations or interests of the working class, but in a certain way understood why and the policy that meets the ideal of justice is a policy in the direction of the interests of this class. But even the real interests of this class can serve as the norm of politics only in so far as they correspond to the requirements of justice, or to the ideally understood class interest. One has only to turn to the popular literature of the Social-Democratic Party, to its newspapers, leaflets, appeals, etc., and we

different forms, but at every step we encounter a repetition of this very motive: in the name of class interest, understood as an ideal norm, as a demand for social justice, agitation is carried out, literary polemics are waged, the enemy is denounced, and a relentless struggle is preached. All Social-Democratic propaganda, one might say, is imbued with the very ethics from which Marxism does not want to introduce a grain of salt into its doctrine. Although this is inconsistent, it is quite natural and inevitable, because a person can refuse his ethical nature even if a doctrinaire scheme prompts him to do so. to Marxism in this case one can apply the words of Marx himself that a person is not really what he thinks of himself. Rejecting ethics in theory, in practice, social democracy is one of the most powerful ethical movements of modern times. public life.

But what in Marx's teaching is tolerable only against the will and, as it were, smuggling, for us constitutes the central problem: what determines social duty, what is the content of this social ideal that imparts the quality of justice or injustice to individual social aspirations and actions, what is its nature?

First of all, it is obvious that this obligation is not inextricably linked with any specific economic requirements, on the contrary, as a predicate, it can be combined with an economic content that is directly opposite and generally very different (for example, in England during the time of Ad. Smith, emancipatory ideals were associated with the requirements of economic individualism - Laiss e z faire, laissez passer, and now with diametrically opposed demands of socialism). Otherwise, this duty would not have the character of universality, general applicability, which is necessarily characteristic of it. And if the predicate of the proper belongs to a given economic demand, but by virtue of its special content, but only its relation to the social ideal, then this latter also cannot be a definite demand of an economic nature and, being higher and common to any economic content, can be rooted not in social economy, but only in morality. This raises the question of the nature of the mutual relations of morality and social policy.

In Marxism we saw an attempt to cut off morality from social

noah policy, sacrificing the first to the last. There are also opposite attempts - to destroy the independent field of social policy for the sake of the autocracy of morality. From this point of view, it is considered sufficient to have personally good, loving relations with everyone and everything; moral life is here limited to the area of ​​\u200b\u200bso-called personal morality. This is how the question of the relationship between morality and politics is resolved by two otherwise extremely distant doctrines, and both of them strive to give a correct interpretation of Christian teaching: the Byzantine-monastic worldview, on the one hand, and the teachings of L. N. Tolstoy - with another. Extremes meet. The first doctrine denies the independent field and significance of social and political reforms, at best it simply ignores it; to the idea social progress treats with distrust and suspicion, if not outright hostility, believing that real reform human relations can only be produced in the human heart. Therefore, only personal piety and morality are of paramount importance, perhaps also morals, but by no means institutions. (It is known that this Old Testament and fundamentally false view entered the political worldview of the old Slavophiles, who denied the importance of legal guarantees, even treated them with disdain, as a bad invention of the rotten West). L. N. Tolstoy's teaching on non-resistance to evil leads to the same final result; limiting itself only to the negative precepts of non-participation in evil, without the positive demand of fighting evil, this teaching naturally approaches the same socio-political nihilism as the Byzantine monastic doctrine. Both of these teachings must be countered with the moral axiom that morality, autonomous or religious, all the same, must give an answer and directions to all the demands of life and not turn away from any of them. We cannot build reality according to our own will, arbitrarily closing our eyes or declaring important aspects of it to be non-existent or unimportant. And in this reality, undoubtedly, there are such relations that go beyond the limits of personal relations of man to man and therefore remain outside the sphere of personal morality. This includes public life, the field of law and socio-economic relations. Everyone specific question this area has to be decided on the basis of not an immediate feeling, but an abstract

Cheni-rational principles. In principle, to exclude this area from the sphere of morality and its tasks means consciously giving it to the undivided domination of dark instincts and elemental forces. But besides that, living in a certain environment, we cannot even exercise non-intervention and abstinence, which are required by the doctrine in question. After all, it is not difficult to understand that non-participation is only a certain form of participation (as in political economy everyone admits that the policy of Laissez faire is still certain form politicians). While living under a well-known state organization and consciously excluding myself from political issues, I nevertheless passively support this organization (not to mention the direct financial support that I provide as a taxpayer). In the same way, we are all conscious or unconscious social politicians, not only Bismarck passing the workers' insurance law, but also the last worker to take part in a strike or reject it. Therefore, there can be no talk of fundamental non-participation in public life, because it is generally impossible. That is why, by the way, very often, especially among clerics, this speech is simply a mask for protective tendencies or a bad cover for social indifference.

Thus, politics or public morality becomes close to personal morality, representing its necessary development and continuation. Morality turns into politics. At the same time, politics, of course, cannot be something independent or alien to morality in relation to the basic and guiding principles, although the principles of morality are necessarily and refracted in social environment.

The highest standard of personal morality is the commandment of love for one's neighbor. Applied as a criterion of social policy, this beginning turns into a requirement justice, recognition for each of his rights. Justice is a form of love, as Vl. Solovyov (in "Justification of the Good"). In fact, love for one's neighbor simply as a person presupposes an equal attitude towards every human person, alien to any arbitrarily given preference to one over others, presupposes, in other words, justice as a self-evident and in this sense the natural norm of human relations: fair and unjust are concepts that we constantly use in our lives. The dispute about co-

Social ideals are nothing more than a dispute about justice and the correct understanding of its requirements, we will try to reveal the main content, which is the concept of justice as the norm of human relations.

Formula of justice - s uu m caique, to each his own. Each person is recognized as an inalienable suum, the sphere of his exclusive right and domination. On what does this recognition for each human personality of such a sphere rest? This question cannot be answered without resorting to the ridiculed and forever, as it seemed at one time, eliminated, but in fact indelible from human consciousness, the concept natural law.

Natural law is a legal and social obligation, these are ideal norms that do not exist in reality, but which should exist and, in the name of their objective obligation, deny the existing law and the existing social way of life. Criticism of law and social institutions there is an inalienable and ineradicable human need, without this social life would stop and freeze. And this criticism is, of course, not made empty-handed—such pointless criticism would be mere grumbling—but in the name of a certain ideal, an ideal duty. The existing, historically established and therefore inevitably imperfect way of life is opposed to the ideal, normal structure of human relations, and this idea of ​​ideal or natural law provides a criterion of good and evil for evaluating social and legal concrete reality. On the basis of such an assessment, one or another demand for reforms is developed, and these demands, of course, change in history, are subject to the law of historical development (this is the so-called das natürlich e Recht mit wechs el dem In h alt). But the legal ideal itself, the ideal norm of human relations, representing natural law in the proper sense, is absolute and, therefore, must also have an absolute sanction.

Natural law in this sense, as an ideal and absolute norm for evaluating positive law, is reduced to a few moral and legal axioms that are consciously or unconsciously implied in any legal judgment. The first of these axioms concerns equality of people. People are equal among themselves as moral persons: human dignity, the most holy of titles - a person, equalizes all

Between themselves. A person for a person should be of absolute value; the human personality is something impenetrable and self-sufficient, a microcosm.

This position is firmly rooted in the consciousness of modern civilized mankind; if we mentally try to remove it, all morality is destroyed, all values ​​\u200b\u200bare depreciated. (As is well known, this experiment was carried out by Nietzsche.) What is it based on, on what basis can this doctrine be affirmed, the inviolability of which is only confirmed by attempts to shake it?

First of all, it does not belong to the number of innate and therefore irremovable data of human consciousness. It does not resemble, for example, the forms of sensory perception - space and time, which we cannot eliminate from consciousness, even if we wanted to. On the contrary, the idea of ​​the absolute dignity of the human person and the equality of people as bearers of this dignity enters the consciousness of mankind gradually, is in this sense a product of historical development. Antiquity did not know this idea, the greatest thinkers of which - Plato and Aristotle - did not extend human dignity to slaves. Although the idea of ​​the equality of people was characteristic of the Stoics, it received worldwide significance only in the preaching of the Gospel.

The idea of ​​equality does not represent an unavoidable fact of consciousness, even in the sense that it does not at all correspond to our actual psychological experiences in this regard. We feel in too many ways that we are unequal to other people, above or below them, and in any case deeply different from them (on which the sense of individuality is based). If, finally, we turn to empirical reality, then here we will find that the indisputable fact of this reality is not the equality of people, but, on the contrary, their inequality. People are unequal in nature, unequal in age, in sex, in talent, in education, in appearance, in conditions of upbringing, in success in life, in character, etc., etc. could not, from experience we might rather get antique or Nietzschean ideas. The equality of people not only is not a fact, but cannot even become one, it is only norm human relations, an ideal that directly denies empirical reality. However, if the idea of ​​equality was recognized by mankind only in historical development, then perhaps it is simply a prejudice of our era,

her taste, whim? The ancient Greeks and the modern Europeans have different culinary tastes, fashions and costumes, different astronomical, physical and so on. scientific views; Perhaps these differences should be compared with the difference in attitudes towards the human person? But try in fact to equate this difference with all other features that distinguish us from the Hellenes, as we will immediately see all the huge and fundamental difference that exists here. I can dress in a frock coat and antique toga; I can have certain eating habits; I can, finally, have certain chemical, physiological, etc. views—all this in no way affects and does not characterize my moral personality, and these differences seem to it accidental and insignificant. On the contrary, in order to renounce the idea of ​​absolute human dignity, which is the same in me and in my neighbors, I must morally mouth, brutalize, harden, change your moral self. This idea turns out to be more stable and significant for the definition of a moral personality than the countless individual characteristics that in their totality form my empirical self, it constitutes, as it were, its integral part or core. My consciousness gives me a definite indication that this idea has not a subjective and therefore only an accidental meaning of whim or taste, which I can change daily, but an objective and essential one. It is true about me and my neighbors.

By affirming the equality of people, in spite of their empirical inequality, and the absolute dignity of the individual, in spite of its existing humiliated position, we deny empirical reality and behind the “crust of nature” we see the true, divine essence of the human soul. People not the point equal and people essence are equal, here are two contradictory provisions that we need to agree on. They can only be agreed upon by referring these contradictory predicates to different subjects. People are not equal in the natural order, like empirical beings, but equal in the ideal order, as intelligible entities, as spiritual substances. But at the same time, the ideal order provides a norm, natural law, for the natural order. Only in this way is it possible to think, without contradiction, equally indisputable truths for us about man both as a natural and as an ideal being. It follows from this that the doctrine of the equality of people and the absolute dignity of the human person, which is moral

The essential foundation of the newest democratic civilization necessarily implies a transcensus beyond the limits of experientially given reality, into a super-experimental area, accessible only to metaphysical thinking and religious faith, and this transcensus itself leads to dualism, to a bifurcation of reality, to the world of truly existing, ideal, and the empirical world, reproduces the age-old antithesis of Platonism. It is based on the religious doctrine of the nature of the human soul and its relation to the Divine, from which it receives its absolute dignity. We have already mentioned that the idea of ​​the absolute dignity of the human person and the equality of all before God, as “sons of God”, is preached by the Gospel and is inextricably linked in it with the doctrine of God and the world, with the basic provisions of Christian metaphysics. All democratic ideals of our time feed on this idea. But - in a strange way - not only the origin of this idea is forgotten and its real foundations are lost, but over time the ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity began to be considered something alien and even contrary to Christianity. There is no need here to analyze all the causes of this deplorable historical misunderstanding; but this misunderstanding leads to the fact that the mentioned ideals, torn off from their natural and, moreover, the only basis, turn out to be hanging in the air and open to all kinds of (Darwinian, Nietzschean, etc.) attacks, because they can have only one indisputable justification - religious - metaphysical. And if faith in man is preserved in the modern soul, then it is supported by the old habit of consciousness, which has outlived its foundations for a long time, unconscious religiosity. On the contrary, holding on to the soil of consistent positivism, judging a person by what empirical reality gives us, we have every reason to draw a conclusion about the inequality of people and, based on this actual inequality, to reject the preaching of equality as harmful and utopian. This was done by the fearless positivist Nietzsche, who deeply and rightly understood his anti-Christianity as a denial of the ideas of equality and democracy, both political and economic. (Therefore, one cannot help but be surprised at the blindness with which Nietzsche's preaching is now being attempted to fit the ideals of democracy and to adorn with bright feathers borrowed from Nietzsche the lifeless skeleton of the most ordinary positivism.) On this point, Nietzsche is more consistent than Comte and more consistent than Marx, for he reveals everything he can

give a philosophy of positivism without any borrowing from religion.

The idea of ​​equality must be led to the conclusion that no person has and cannot have a natural right to suppress the moral personality of another by violent means. The idea of ​​human equality necessarily includes the idea freedom as the norms of human relations or the ideal of social order. " Right is freedom, conditioned by equality. In this basic definition of law, the individualistic principle of freedom is inextricably linked with the social principle of equality, so that we can say that law is nothing but a synthesis of freedom and equality. The concepts of personality, freedom and equality constitute the essence of the so-called. natural law 1).

Here, some clarification is needed as to which real meaning may have the idea of ​​equality and freedom.

The idea of ​​the equality of people as moral persons does not and cannot destroy their empirical inequality and difference, not only secondary, created by social conditions, but also given as an initial fact. Differences in gender, age, intelligence, talent, and inclinations cannot be made non-existent. Mechanical equalization under one would be the greatest inequality, a gross violation of the principle of suum cuiqu e , yes, besides, it would be virtually unfeasible. The ideal of equality has meaning and significance, corresponds to the supreme idea of ​​justice only as a requirement for the possible equality of conditions for the development of the individual for the purpose of its free self-determination, moral autonomy. In other words, the whole practical content of the idea of ​​equality is reduced to the idea of ​​individual freedom and to the requirement of social conditions for its development, which are the most favorable for this freedom.

However, the demand for freedom does not negate any dependence of the individual on society. Such freedom is possible only on Robinson's Island; it must be sought in that prehistoric age when man wandered as a solitary savage. The life of people in society necessarily determines the interaction between them, which is a certain dependence of people on each other. This dependence takes the most diverse forms, in view of the existing empirical inequality of people.

_________________________

1) Vl. Solovyov. Law and morality. Sobr. op., vol. VII, p. 499.

It is easy to distinguish between internal or free dependence and external or forced dependence, the first we have in the relationship of the student to the teacher, the reader to the writer, the son to the father, etc. Such dependence not only does not violate the spiritual freedom of the individual, but, in fact, it represents a field for its manifestation, for the freedom of the individual is actually realized only in communication with other people. Dependence of the second type is created by the conditions of existence of a person as a physical being, connected with the outside world by an iron necessity to defend his physical existence. The consequence of this necessity is the emergence of a state and economic union, and a person becomes dependent on the forced organization of both. He cannot completely free himself from this dependence, remaining a slave to physical necessity. The ideal of individual freedom in this case comes down only to weakening or neutralizing this dependence as far as possible, turning it from external to internal, from compulsory to free.

Dependence on the state does not appear to us as political oppression, not as such, not because the state exists in general with its own demands, but only at those points where these demands contradict our moral sense and cannot be accepted and fulfilled freely, without coercion. It does not seem to us, for example, that it is a violation of freedom to prohibit stealing or killing; receiving full sanction from the moral consciousness, these demands of the state are fulfilled by us freely. On the contrary, those restrictions of a private and public law nature that are strongly condemned by our moral consciousness (as restrictions on the freedom of the individual, conscience, speech, etc.) are experienced as political oppression. The ideal of political freedom therefore does not consist in the destruction of the state (what is the theory of anarchism), but in its transformation in accordance with the requirements of moral consciousness.

Economic dependence takes place when the organization of production, the economic system, determines the external and forced subordination of one to another. This kind of dependence, based on the separation of labor from the instruments of production, is naturally experienced as economic oppression. Determined by a thousand individual circumstances in their details, the existence of such oppression allows one person to imperiously restrict the will of another, therefore, here in every

The case is a violation of the natural character of the freedom of the individual. However, the ideal of freedom here, too, can consist in the destruction of the economic union in general—such a senseless demand would be tantamount to an invitation to universal suicide—and, consequently, not in the severing of economic ties between people, which, as is well known, will not weaken, but strengthen and become more complex, but precisely in the neutralization of this dependence. It can only be neutralized by destroying the personal character of this dependence, for it is precisely this that offends the moral sense. This, so to speak, depersonalization and at the same time the destruction of economic dependence takes place with the growth of economic collectivism, along with which the place of a private entrepreneur or capitalist is increasingly replaced by society or the state, which is an abstract personality (more precisely, even impersonality). And every step forward that is taken towards the replacement or limitation of personal dictatorship, whether it be the factory law, or the municipal enterprise, or the cooperative, marks a gradual increase in the emancipation of the individual from personal economic oppression. However, from this point of view, certain forms of economic individualism are also equivalent to economic collectivism, namely, small-scale individual farming, an example of which we currently have in peasant farming, which is progressing in the West. If one can still argue against independent peasant farming for reasons of economic expediency and progress, then, from the point of view of the social ideal, this kind of individualism is quite equivalent to collectivism. That is why, by the way, considering purely economic arguments against peasant farming to be erroneous, I include in my economic program, along with collectivism in industry, peasant individualism in agriculture 1) (of course, replenished by the development of agricultural cooperatives), moreover, from the point of view of the general ideal freedom, such a seemingly contradictory combination turns out to be consistent and internally consistent.

Based on what has been said so far, it is clear that the moral foundation of socialism is provided by individualism, the ideal of individual freedom. Socialism and individualism are not only not the essence

__________________________

1) See my book: "Capitalism and Agriculture", 2 volumes, St. Petersburg, 1900.

Opposite beginnings, but mutually condition one another. Only their correct combination and balance ensures the possible completeness of the freedom of the individual and his rights. At the same time, for all the inseparability of both principles, their combination contains an irreconcilable antinomy: for the sake of freedom, the individual must submit to society, and this dependence of the individual on society increases as his freedom increases. On the other hand, assuming the task of protecting the freedom of the individual, public organization it can only be carried out by energetic maintenance of the legal order against encroachments on it by the arbitrariness of individuals. It is impossible even in theory to delimit exactly and indisputably where the rights of society and the state end and the area of ​​inviolable rights of the individual begins. In history, this frontier is constantly shifting first to one side and then the other, it is constantly searched anew along with the change historical conditions. Thanks to this irremovable antinomianism, there is always a dull struggle between the individual and society, and it can always flare up, turning into open defiance, on the one hand, or violent actions, on the other. Because of this antinomianism, even the most ideal social order can only have an unstable equilibrium.

Both members of this antinomy, taken in isolation and turned into "abstract principles", give rise to the ancient ideal, on the one hand, and the anarchist, on the other, these two poles of socio-philosophical thought. ancient world recognized only a society in front of which the individual is destroyed; the idea of ​​natural duties for the ancient consciousness seems to be much more indisputable than the idea of ​​natural rights. The ancient ideal of communism, just as precisely as the primitive or patriarchal communist system, can no longer serve as an ideal for us, because it lacks precisely that which, in our eyes, gives a moral value to communism, for which it serves only as a means - freedom personality. On the contrary, anarchism wants to know only the rights behind the individual, only "den Einzig e n u nd sein Eigenthum" by Max Stirner with his "lch habe meine Sach'auf Nicpts gestüllt" and his denial of obligations towards his own kind. (Nietzsche's ideal of the superman is also antisocial.)

This is the content of the social ideal: the commandment of love = social justice = recognition of equal and absolute dignity for every person = the requirement of the greatest fullness of rights

and individual freedom. The substantiation of this ideal is given by the religious and ethical doctrine of the nature of the human soul and the obligations of man to man that follow from this. The ideal of freedom, which constitutes the moral core of modern democracy (political and economic), is not revealed in political economy or the science of law: in empirical knowledge, a person seeks only means for the realization of an absolute ideal. At the same time, the political and social ideals that inspire today's humanity are undoubtedly Christian ideals, since they represent the development of the doctrine brought into the world by Christianity about the equality of people and the absolute value of the human person.

In order to understand the nature of the social ideal, it is essential not to forget that, being given a priori or externally for social policy, it cannot serve as a historical goal, one of those goals that can be achieved and left behind 1) .

Only concrete goals are achievable in historical development, while the ideal of justice is abstract and, by its very meaning, can be combined with various concrete contents. It is only a regulative idea, providing a framework for moral judgment and evaluation. Changing concrete conditions bring new data for the solution of this problem and for a new discovery of this world-historical sought. We cannot think without contradiction of the complete solution of this task in history (“heaven on earth”), because this would mean the end of all history, the immobility of death, or absolute perfection, which is unattainable under the conditions of empirical being. Let us not forget that the ideal of equality and freedom is the negation of these conditions, and for this reason alone cannot be fully embodied in them.

However, if the concept of history also implies the idea of ​​infinite development, this latter takes place in a certain direction, has an ideal goal; hence the very definite meaning and idea of ​​progress. The whole course of historical development appears to us as continuous (albeit zigzag) progress, the triumph of freedom and justice in the external forms of social life, the emancipation of the human personality,

_____________________________

1) Stammler, in whom the regulative nature of the social ideal is excellently clarified, quite rightly points out that such an ideal cannot be thought of as achieved, the movement towards it is endless, and therefore In this sense and the social question within the bounds of history is not definitively resolved.

Gradual gathering and external unification of historical humanity. One of the most important tasks lies in the emancipation of the individual and the socialization of mankind. world history. But here we are already on the threshold of the philosophy of history, which there is no need to cross in this exposition. We only note that the philosophical discussion social issue, the problem of social obligation, necessarily leads us to the philosophy of history, to the problem of social and historical being, which, in turn, is connected with all the main problems of philosophy. This connection exists equally for the metaphysical and positive thinkers, not only for Hegel, but also for Marx.

It should also be emphasized that the ideal of individual freedom differs significantly from the utilitarian or hedonistic criteria with which it is often replaced by positivists. A person should be free because it corresponds to his human dignity; external freedom is a means, more precisely, a negative condition of internal, moral freedom, which is the image of God in man. Kant expresses the idea that man, as a freely rational person, is the goal for which God created the world, that world necessity exists for the sake of human freedom. This idea should be strengthened and especially confirmed in relation to the history of mankind, for which the development of individual freedom is the supreme ideal. But while presenting this demand for freedom as an absolute religious and moral postulate, we do not connect it at all with the question of how exactly a free person wants to use this freedom of his, and also about whether he will be happy with it. A person can, as a moral personality, leading good and evil, decide both in one direction and in the other, and no one from people can predetermine this, nor decide for him. Only free human actions have a moral value, only in them does a person discover the true nature of his spiritual self, realizes a person in himself. It is also unlikely that anyone will dare to confidently say that, becoming more conscious and freer, a person generally becomes happier; in general, hedonistic progress is more than doubtful and remains, in any case, debatable. But even if it were proved absolutely indisputably that, in the hedonistic sense, civilization is accompanied by a positive regression, then even then humanity would have to be called forward to freedom and towards this regression,

and not back to sleepy contentment - freedom is such a priceless good that can redeem everything, and birthrights should not be sold for any lentil soup.

The question of the autonomy of the social ideal and the value of human freedom is posed with amazing force by the Grand Inquisitor (in the legend of Dostoevsky), who, as it were, is bargaining with Christ for human freedom. For the sake of the happiness of people, which consists in satiety, contentment and peace, the Inquisitor deprives them of what should be for a person above all earthly blessings - their moral freedom 1) .

Dostoevsky rightly sees here a denial of the main idea of ​​Christian morality and depicts the Inquisitor as a conscious enemy and adversary of Christ. The commandment of freedom, as history shows, is one of the ideas most difficult and reluctant to assimilate by mankind. That is why the Inquisitor has always collected and still collects many and many. Moral violence, violent virtue, such are the precepts not only of medieval, but also of the latest inquisitors, with the difference, however, that in accordance with the general softening of morals, fires have now been replaced by prohibitive and punitive laws.

Since the social ideal will only provide a scale for evaluating social phenomena, in itself it is not yet associated with any specific concrete content, the discovery of which is an independent task. And if the social ideal is presented to social science as given or given and, consequently, in in a certain sense super-scientific, then when finding its specific content, one can and should use the data of scientific experience to the fullest extent possible; a concrete ideal must be constructed scientifically, and this is the truth of the so-called. scientific socialism. Agreeing with the absolutely just demand of Marx, affinities for the realization of the ideal must not be invented out of the head, but found with the help of scientific analysis reality. Idealist politics should not be utopian, but realistic; idealism in politics can and must be practical. The logical possibility and even the necessity of combining idealism with sober realism is still insufficiently understood, thanks to the completely erroneous and arbitrary confusion of idealism with utopianism, when in fact there is nothing in common between the two. On the contrary, utopian psycho-

__________________________

1) Wed. "Ivan Karamazov as a Philosophical Type", pp. 99 et seq.

Logically, it is rather connected with positivism due to the fact that in the latter the absolute is sought in the relative, while in idealism the correct philosophical perspective is observed.

Socio-political realism, based on philosophical idealism and fundamentally opposed to unprincipled practicality and adaptation, does not at all consist in the fact that the ideal should be exchanged for trifles and dragged along the earth. The demands of a realistic politics guided by an absolute ideal can by no means be a preaching of small deeds and a denial of broad historical and social tasks. Of course, every practical activity consists of small deeds, i.e., of individual disparate actions, but these actions can and must be considered in organic connection with the great historical tasks that give life to them. These tasks are historical in the sense that they are not abstract postulates of morality, but quite concrete and feasible demands for the reorganization of reality in the direction of the ideal. It is precisely such tasks, and not abstract moral principles, that determine the programs of political parties and give definite content to the political and social struggle. These tasks can, of course, differ from each other in their breadth and require different times for their implementation; If sometimes a single parliamentary session is enough to put into practice a factory law, then the combined work of a number of generations is required for a radical social reform or political liberation of the country. It is quite possible, therefore, that such a task, without losing its historical character, in relation to individual life individual, plays the role of only a regulative idea that determines the direction of activity, but does not entirely fit into it. There is therefore a gradation between concrete historical tasks according to the degree of their breadth and difficulty; the deeper the spiritual needs of the individual, the wider the historical tasks with which he connects his activities. Broad horizons are necessary not only for the eye, but also for the spirit.

The ideal of justice is inherent in every person. There is no such person who would rebel against justice as such, who would consciously want to be unjust in his actions. The moral nature of people is the same and there is no reason to divide humanity in this respect into sheep and goats only on the basis of the fact of their belonging to

different socio-economic and political groups. And at the same time, it seems impossible to find two people who would agree on the understanding of the specific requirements of justice in all the smallest details, and all of humanity, as you know, is currently disintegrating into a number of parties or groups with different, even diametrically opposed, understanding of the requirements justice. How can this be explained?

A number of reasons can be pointed out, due to which the most diverse demands are made in the name of a single ideal of justice. First of all, one must take into account the entire complexity of social life and the resulting possibility of a completely sincere and conscientious disagreement when evaluating the same phenomena; Of course, this disagreement does not destroy the central meaning of the single ideal of justice, just as scientific disagreements do destroy the single truth as an ideal or norm. scientific knowledge. A vivid example of such a sincere and conscientious dissent is the socio-political views of Evg. Richter, the leader of the free thinkers on the one hand, and the Social Democrats on the other. The ideal of both Richter and Bebel is one and the same - the freedom of the individual; but one, in the name of this ideal, puts forward the demands of socialism, while the other, fearing the possibility of the despotic absorption of the individual by the state in a socialist society, puts forward the opposite program of Manchesterism. Fundamental disputes and fundamental struggles are generally waged on the basis of different understandings of the specific requirements of justice. The possibility of equally deep and sincere disagreements exists in the evaluation of individual measures, small and large deeds that make up social policy. Experience shows that on every question of a practical nature there are endless disagreements among social politicians, even with a complete commonality of guiding ideals: for example, it is enough to cite the differences on the peasant question, on the question of workers' unions, cooperatives, parliamentary activity, etc., existing in environment of the present German Social Democracy.

The third and, perhaps, the most important reason for differences in the understanding of justice is the fatal limitations of man, the narrowness of his spiritual outlook. The worldview of each person develops depending on the whole sum of individual conditions, which differ sharply for different social groups. Prejudices absorbed with mother's milk, education,

Ignorance of many aspects of life, involuntary and unconscious adaptation of the worldview to the conditions of life, a natural tribute to human weakness, all this will create a kind of mental warehouse of entire social groups, as they say, class psychology. To explain the peculiarities of class psychology, there is no need to reduce them to bare class interest, which has nothing in common with the ideas of justice; they are quite adequately explained on the basis of a general fact - the empirical limitations of man, thanks to which a different understanding of the requirements of justice becomes completely bona fide. A separate individual, to the extent of his spiritual strength and development, can weaken or break this empirical limitation of his worldview, psychologically declassify. However, one must not forget that such a declaration requires absolutely exceptional spiritual strength, sometimes heroism.

For all these reasons, if people were guided in their actions solely by the demands of justice, as everyone understands them, then even then there would inevitably be a struggle between them, due to the difference in this understanding and the natural desire of everyone to defend their truth, and on this basis civil strife would arise. and wars. But not only ideal motives, ideas about what is due and fair, but also selfish motives and personal interests have power over people. Extreme need or predatory instincts, weakness of the will or lust for power, hatred or slyness, envy or greed - in a word, the most diverse motives can cause actions performed either directly contrary to the requirements of justice, or even more often in addition to considerations about them; a habit is created in a whole series of actions to be guided by an egoistic instinct, not at all asking questions about justice, a kind of practical immorality is established with respect to entire aspects of life, of course, for everyone in their own way and in different sizes. The similarity of the economic situation and the identical direction of personal interests due to it creates class or group interests that play the role of levers in social life.

The individual life of every person is a psychological tangle of the most diverse motives, both ideal and vile, and there is no way to determine which of them plays a large role in a person's life. Therefore, by the way, the doctrine of the dominant role of class

self-interest, understood in the sense of a selfish instinct, is at least an unprovable assertion. However, if we are not able to unravel or calculate the motives of actions, then these very actions, accessible to direct observation, can be subjected to study and grouping. Important as knowledge of inner motives is for moral judgment, for the purposes of social policy, it is sufficient to know the usual course of action of individuals or social groups, whatever their motives, in order to be able to practically reckon with it. In the ranks of one and the same political party, no doubt, there will be people driven by the most diverse motives, with different convictions and mental moods; however, this difference is extinguished by a certain unity of action corresponding to the objective goals of the party, and this practical unity makes it possible to ignore all other differences, however great they may be. Such a view does not sin with moral indifference and is not a compromise, because the party and socio-political grouping does not take the whole person as a whole, but only a certain side of his activity, and demands certain actions from him, without looking into their innermost motives. Party discipline cannot and must not go beyond what is absolutely necessary for the purposes of party action, leaving in all other respects complete freedom of the individual. Unfortunately, a correct understanding of the boundaries of party discipline is poorly inculcated in practice.

Since there are various and even diametrically opposed aspirations in life, it is obvious that all of them cannot seem equally fair to us if we have a certain ideal, our own understanding of justice. Otherwise, we would have to turn the whole logic upside down and abolish the basic logical laws, above all the law of identity, contradiction and the excluded middle, and justify black and white at once. Or else we are left with criminal and flabby indifference, the fatherland of chaos and darkness, to use Kant's beautiful expression. Approaching life with certain requirements and finding in it a strife of interests and aspirations, which does not depend on my will and therefore must be accepted by me as a fact, I must necessarily take in it

_________________________

1) It goes without saying that a certain ethical minimum is also required here, but it consists mainly in demands of a negative, and not positive, character.

A clear and unambiguous position, joining any of the existing currents or taking your own direction. Consequently, any form of active participation in life fatally, against our will, draws us into fight for life is a struggle, and the truth in it not only unites, but also divides. Bright festive robes can only be preserved by those who leave life, and every vital person puts on a working apron or combat armor in order to work for his truth or fight for it.

Therefore, a concrete supra-class or universal policy is impossible, it is an empty place, in reality there is only class, party or group politics, a policy not of unity, but of division and struggle.

But do we not fall into a hopeless contradiction with ourselves? After all, at first we denied the independent foundations of class politics and established the universal ideal of social policy, and now we come to the conclusion that in reality only class politics is possible, and universal human politics is an empty ghost? The apparent contradiction, however, disappears if we pay attention to the real meaning of the two supposedly contradictory statements, of which the first concerns the ideal end, and the second the concrete means leading to its realization. It remains indisputable that the ideal of social policy, the criterion for evaluating certain specific phenomena and activities, is given by the idea of ​​the equivalence of the human personality and its natural rights, which follow from this. This absolute requirement of morality determines the direction in which community development. In relation to this absolute goal, all means of social policy, which are determined in detail by specific conditions, must be evaluated. From this point of view, class politics also has an ideal value, not because it is class politics, or because the interests of a given social group represent something sacred or preferable in themselves, but simply because in this case these requirements coincide with the requirements of social justice, and this connection is purely historical, and not logical, requirements social reforms emanating at the present time from the working class and in the main coinciding with its class interests, receive their ethical value not by virtue of this coincidence, but by virtue of the fact that these demands can be supported in the name of universal human interests, not alien to the capitalists,

The human dignity of which also does not correspond to the voluntary or involuntary position of the exploiters, in the name of the destruction of classes and class interests. Of course, the ideal interests of the human person in this case collide with the material interests of the given subject, placed in certain external conditions of life, and on this basis a struggle arises. But in this case, the struggle is the only way to the future, even if it is a distant world, to a world based not on cowardly reconciliation with untruth, but on the victorious triumph of truth.

Based on the above grounds, denying the socio-philosophical doctrine of Marxism and proceeding from completely different philosophical grounds, I still remain faithful to him in everything that concerns the basic issues of a specific social policy, deviating from him only in those points of the economic doctrine where the latter seems to me. erroneous due to arguments of a special economic nature (for example, in the agrarian question).

Theoretically, we distinguish between two ideals that give life to political economy: economic 1) and social. Of course, in concrete life there is no separation between economic and social phenomena, which is possible only in abstraction. In reality, economic demands also have social significance, and vice versa. Social liberation is also connected with economic liberation, freedom from social oppression is inseparable from freedom from poverty. However, although the requirements of social and economic policy may run in parallel and merge to the point of indistinguishability, it is theoretically possible to artificially separate and even oppose them. Each of the two ideals of political economy can be turned into an "abstract principle" and, developed one-sidedly, lead to socio-political absurdity. In this case, the question naturally arises, what is more important and what is easier to give up: freedom from poverty or from slavery, economic or social freedom? There is no way to give a satisfactory answer to this question, just as it is impossible to answer, for example, the question, which death penalty is preferable: by hanging or guillotining? To the question which is worse, here we have to answer: both perspectives are worse. Both economic and social freedom constitute an equally essential, albeit negative, condition for the development of the human personality. Right

_________________________

1) See the previous article "On the economic ideal".

It is more reasonable, therefore, to regard the two ideals of political economy as equivalent; in the complete absence of any reason whatsoever for giving preference to one or the other, the right policy must therefore be recognized as one that pays equal attention to the interests of both social and economic progress. These requirements, at least in principle, are satisfied by the social policy of Marxism, which consciously seeks to reconcile the interests of economic progress with the requirements of social justice. An example of a one-sided passion for economic progress is given by bourgeois English and non-English apologists, who looked at a person exclusively as an instrument for the production of wealth, and this one-sided aspect subordinated their socio-political demands. This was accompanied by the most outrageous indifference to the suffering of the working class, which bore on its shoulders the burden of accumulating wealth, an example of the opposite extreme - the recognition of the demands of social justice alone, without any attention to the requirements of economic progress, is the doctrine of simplification by L. N. Tolstoy. Outraged by modern disasters and all social injustices, Tolstoy offers a simple and immediate way to destroy them by simplifying and destroying the division of labor with all its consequences, in addition to the various and numerous objections that are easy to make against this teaching, one should not forget that the fulfillment of Tolstoy's preaching, having destroyed, perhaps, social slavery, humanity would probably be plunged into economic slavery, i.e., into hopeless poverty, which, given the current density of the population, could easily lead to starvation. This is exactly what the Germans characterize as splashing out of the bath along with the water and the baby. Thus, the requirements of economic and social policy must always be consistent with each other, and such an agreement in each individual case is a questio faeti, sometimes very difficult to resolve. But this question is already decided on the basis of the data supplied by empirical political economy, and goes beyond the limits of social philosophy.

So, the building of social policy is affirmed on two grounds - on the ideal of economic and social, and on the pediment of this building one word is inscribed, expressing the entire content of both of these ideals, and, consequently, all the tasks of social policy, and this magic word — freedom.

Page generated in 0.24 seconds!

Since psychological readiness is a condition for the effectiveness of the teacher's professional activity.

Psychological readiness of the teacher for inclusion

In the context of the development of inclusive education, the emergence of new requirements for professional abilities, the teacher's activity becomes much more complicated. Professional activity is connected with the peculiarities of the psychological readiness of the teacher for changes in education.

Since psychological readiness is a condition for the effectiveness of the teacher's professional activity. Psychological dissatisfaction with the teacher's activity becomes the uncertainty of the learning outcome. Then the teacher has a feeling of insecurity in his efforts. The question arises among teachers, what we will teach these students. And can we get sustainable results?

The teacher's thoughts are not focused on the individuality of the child, his capabilities and resources. Affects installation on the achievement of success in learning. Since the teacher does not know, there will be success in teaching children with disabilities. As a result of this, there is a reluctance of the teacher to work in an inclusive class, resistance to the very idea of ​​inclusion in education, disbelief in its result and possibility. To do this, specialists in special psychology in the field of correctional pedagogy, the methodological service of the school and its leaders should come to the rescue.

The implementation of an inclusive approach changes the individualization of education for children with special educational needs. The majority are students with disabilities. The preparedness of an inclusive school teacher is the ability to work with children with different learning opportunities. Determine the conditions and methods of working with specific children based on the results of the IPC.

The experience of teachers is connected with the understanding of their own lack of knowledge in the field of correctional pedagogy. With ignorance of the forms and methods of working with children, with developmental disabilities. Therefore, teachers undergo professional retraining. The introduction of the practice of helping joint teaching of general and special teachers will destroy the psychological obstacles of the teacher, build a new perception of the child with handicapped health. Pilot sites for the education of children with disabilities are also being formed.

Psychological readiness by a teacher is the emotional acceptance of children with various types of developmental disorders, motivational attitudes, attitudes towards the idea of ​​inclusion, and the personal determination of the teacher.

In this regard, the results of the study are of interest. Institute of Problems of Inclusive Education of MSUPE, which was attended by 640 teachers of secondary schools in Moscow working in inclusive practice. The study studied the following types of psychological readiness: motivational, emotional, determination to turn on, satisfaction with professional activities. The motivational readiness of teachers includes a set of motives that are adequate to the goals and objectives of professional activity. Based on the research data, 38% of teachers are focused primarily on the personal achievements of students, 26% - on their own satisfaction, that is, the inner motives of the teacher are put in the first place. At the same time, objective factors that show the success of the teacher, such as student performance and successful participation in subject Olympiads were noted only in 13% and 9% of teachers, respectively. That is, they are not the leading motives for teachers in assessing their own professional performance. The teacher's perception of his own effectiveness is less influenced by the attitude of external experts. The assessment by the school management was noted only by 3% of teachers, and the responses of parents by 11%.

The results obtained show that teachers are guided by internal motives, and it is they that are decisive in preparing teachers for inclusive education. Thus, it is required to work with the internal motivation of teachers, which includes, first of all, the analysis and reflection of their own experiences, needs associated with work. In the field of emotional acceptance of students, it was shown that teachers are more ready to accept children with motor disabilities than children with intellectual disabilities. Children with intellectual disabilities are the most problematic group. For these children, it is necessary to use an individual adaptive learning program. Satisfaction of these children is associated with their receipt of labor training specially organized according to special methods, social and cultural adaptation in society.

The teacher's professional confidence, emotional and motivational readiness to work in an inclusive environment depend on the help of specialists and the school administration, properly organized work to prepare the school for the implementation of the inclusive process. It is necessary to develop an individual adaptive program, a set of monitoring observations related to the dynamic assessment of the psychological parameters of the process of inclusion in educational institution and in the system as a whole.

The teacher of inclusive education sees, hears, perceives children with disabilities. Also finds a way out of any uncertain situation. Show interest in the subject area of ​​the field of knowledge in which he works. It is necessary for the teacher to use reflective and creative ways in the learning process, both to himself and to the teacher.

Bibliography:

1. Alyokhina S.V. Training teaching staff for an inclusive

education // Pedagogical journal. 2013. No. 1 (44). pp. 26–32.

2. Giddens E. Elusive world. How globalization is changing our lives.

M.: Ves Mir, 2004. C. 318.

4. Groznaya N. Development of inclusive education: international experience. 2004 // Access to the resource 12/29/2006.

3. Zaitsev D.V. Educational integration of children with disabilities.

4. Lubovsky V.I. Psychological and pedagogical problems of differentiated and integrated education / V.I. Lubovsky // Special Psychology. - 2008. S. 77-79

5. Sorokoumova S.N. Psychological features inclusive education. // Proceedings of the Samara Scientific Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 12. - No. 3. - 2010.

6. Triger R.D. Psychological features of the socialization of children with a delay mental development. - St. Petersburg: Peter, 2008.

7. Shcherbakova A.M., Shemanov A.Yu. Controversial issues of personality development of a child with intellectual disability // Psychological science and education. 2010. №2. – C. 63-8.